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Soviet Foreign Policy: Background and Prospects

Richard Pipes*

THE desire to seek explanation of a country's conduct in its history is a natural and justifiable one, since clearly every nation's outlook and behaviour are in some measure influenced by its past experience. But the procedure is always fraught with danger. It is all too easy to fashion an image of another people's national character, to assume that it is eternal and immutable, and from this assumption to draw completely false deductions. In reality, 'national character' is an elusive and transient thing. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example, the French were generally regarded as the most aggressive nation on the European continent, whereas the Germans were viewed as impractical dreamers, sovereigns of the 'realm of clouds', as Voltaire called them. Then, in the second half of the nineteenth century the roles were reversed, and the Germans, decending from their clouds, turned into a nation of Huns. The Japanese, who were once thought to have inherited from their samurai ancestors an unquenchable thirst for blood, have recently become a nation of frenetic businessmen, at the same time that the Jews, whose unfitness for warfare had been proverbial, created in Israel a military machine of unsurpassed efficiency. Such examples could be multiplied many times over.

As every historian knows, that which is loosely called 'national character' represents the spirit not of an entire nation, but only of that social group which at a given time happens to control the instruments of power and the organs of opinion, and manifests itself only as long as that group enjoys this control. The problem, therefore, is one of identifying the elite and ascertaining its particular experiences, interests, and expectations. Such knowledge is particularly useful in dealing with countries that have authoritative forms of government because there the ruling elite is relatively immune from public pressures.

In considering the elite which rules today's Russia and its possessions, four facts relevant to its conduct of foreign policy demand emphasis: its cultural background, the nature of its claim to authority, its class interests, and its colonial experience. Only when all four of these factors have been taken into account is it possible to understand something of that peculiar mixture of aggressiveness and caution which has distinguished Soviet foreign policy since 1917.

* This article is based on a statement made by the author to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee Hearing on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

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The Cultural Background of the Soviet Elite

The Soviet elite is not the same one that had ruled Russia in the imperial period, that is, from the accession of Peter the Great in 1689 to the Revolution. The imperial elite, composed largely of landed and service gentry, was thoroughly Westernized; it considered itself part of Europe and in its majority emulated European models. This class was overthrown in 1917, and replaced by a new elite formed of elements that had never been much exposed to Westernization: the lower bureaucracy, small tradesmen, provincial intelligentsia, clergy, skilled labour, and peasantry. The cultural roots of these groups lay not in the Westernized Russia of Peter and his successors, but in the pre-Petrine culture of Muscovy, and even beyond it, in Byzantium and the Turkic Steppe.

In imperial Russia, the ancestors of the Soviet elite had been kept out of the chambers of power. They always viewed the Western culture of the St Petersburg court and of its gentry with distaste and suspicion. Though not averse to borrowing Western technology, especially of a military nature, they rejected the spiritual foundations on which this technology rested. Their whole attitude towards the external world was decisively influenced by the teachings of the Orthodox Church which more than any other Christian establishment resisted innovation and persecuted heresy. The xenophobia which this Orthodox Church inculcated in its flock impressed itself very deeply on the mind of the Russian lower classes; and so did the belief that the Orthodox alone are pure and fit for salvation. This faith, in a secularized form, has remained very much part of the outlook of the Soviet elite; for although this elite professes militant atheism it has no other culture to fall back on than the xenophobic, anti-Western culture of old Moscow.

The practical consequences of this fact are considerable. The group ruling the Soviet Union is not predisposed by its cultural background to regard itself as part of a broader international community; nor does it tend to think in terms of a stable world order in which each nation enjoys a rightful place. Such an outlook is widespread in communities with a Protestant and a commercial culture, but it is rather rare elsewhere. The Soviet elite tends to think in terms of a perpetual conflict pitting right against wrong, from which only one side can emerge victorious. Needless to elaborate, communist ideology with its stress on class warfare culminating in a vast revolutionary cataclysm reinforces this inherited religiously-inspired outlook.

The Question of Legitimacy

The elite which rules Soviet Russia lacks a legitimate claim to authority and this fact has critical bearing on its conduct of both domestic and foreign policy. Lenin, Trotsky, and their associates seized power by force, overthrowing an ineffective but democratic government. The government they founded derives from a violent act perpetrated

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by a tiny minority. Furthermore, this power seizure was carried out under false pretences. The *coup d'état* of October 1917 was accomplished not on behalf of the Bolshevik party but on behalf of the Soviets—a fact which survives today mainly in the name 'Soviet Union'. The Soviets were representative bodies of soldiers, workers, and peasants which, for all their structural looseness and lack of regular procedure, did in a fashion express the will of the people. But although the Bolsheviks claimed to overthrow the Provisional Government in order to transfer power to these Soviets, in reality they used them from the beginning as a facade behind which to consolidate their own authority, and the transfer was never accomplished. And, finally, the Soviet government has never dared to seek a mandate from its population. The one and only post-1917 election in which the Bolsheviks ran in competition with other parties—the election for the Constituent Assembly held in the winter of 1917–18—gave them a quarter of the national vote, whereupon they ordered the assembly dissolved. No elections giving the voter a choice even from among communist candidates have been held since that single disagreeable experience.

Now it is sometimes said by friends of the Soviet Union abroad that one must not apply to its government standards of democracy derived from the West. And, indeed, it is perfectly possible to exercise authority without recourse to the Western idea of popular sovereignty or by twisting it out of all semblance as Hitler had done when he claimed that the will of 80 million Germans fused and became one with his own. But as a matter of record, the Soviet government makes no such claim on its own behalf: its constitution and legal system claim to rest on democratic principles indistinguishable from our own, and hence it cannot escape being judged by them. A government which came to power by force in the name of slogans which it did not and had no intention of honouring, and which has never dared to seek popular sanction, such a government cannot be said to be democratic no matter how broadly the term is defined. And herein lies its tragedy and insoluble inner contradiction. The yawning gap between constitutional promise and political reality stares in the eye of all but the most obtuse or cynical of Soviet citizens.

Legitimacy of some kind is essential to every political authority to justify the right of some men to order others about. The Soviet government is no exception. Unable to obtain a popular mandate, it seeks to obtain it in a variety of other ways, of which nationalism is the handiest. By appearing as the protector of Russian national interests from internal and external enemies, the regime can identify itself with the people. But to be able to do so, it must have enemies; and it conjures them up as the need arises. The atmosphere of a crisis is essential to the Soviet elite and can be counted on to remain an instrument of Soviet policy as long as the present elite remains in power. In the 1930s and 1940s it was often said that Soviet behaviour is motivated by fear. This is correct as far as it goes: only the fear is not

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of other peoples but of its own, and for that reason it is incapable of being allayed by concessions. Fear breeds insecurity which in turn expresses itself, in nations as in individuals, in aggressive behaviour.

(And it may be noted parenthetically that the one time the Soviet Union confronted a genuine menace rather than one of its own making, namely Nazi Germany, it reacted by appeasing; its most determined reactions have always been reserved for imaginary enemies.)

Class Interests of the Soviet Elite

All elites have vested interests, or they would not be elites. But as a rule, the disparity between the interests of the elite and of the rest of the citizenry is wider in poor countries than in rich ones, and the dread of losing status is proportionately more acute. And Russia is still a desperately poor country, with a standard of living below that of some countries in the pre-industrial stage of development. The bulk of the wealth created by Soviet industry since the inauguration of the first five-year plan in 1928 has gone into armaments and those branches of the economy of greatest direct benefit to the military. Agriculture has been ruined to pay for this most up-to-date military machine; and consumer industry has been forced to operate on a shoe-string. This situation has not significantly changed since the death of Stalin, periodic promises of a vast outpouring of consumer goods notwithstanding (for example, Khrushchev's confident boast that by 1970 the Soviet Union would exceed the United States in the production of meat and milk). The Soviet citizen today is poor not only in comparison with his counterpart in other European countries, but also in comparison with his own grandfather.* In terms of essentials—food, clothing, and housing—the Soviet population as a whole is worse off than it was before the Revolution and in the 1920s. If one considers such intangibles as access to information and the right to travel as elements of the standard of living—as they should be—then, the Soviet citizenry is positively destitute.

This cannot be said of the Soviet elite which enjoys a fairly decent standard of life. The closer a member of this group stands to the inner sancta of the bureaucratic-military-police establishment, the readier his access to the country's very limited store of goods and services, to the sources of objective information, to a passport authorizing travel abroad. No wonder therefore that the Soviet elite vigorously protects its privileged position and the political system which makes it possible; that it dreads democracy which would inevitably sweep away its status and force it to share the indescribably drab life of the

* A French scholar, Jovan Pavlevski, has recently published a detailed study of living standards in the Soviet Union. He concludes that 'The study of living standards of the Soviet population during the years 1917–1950 indicates clearly that the culminating point of material well-being before the October Revolution has never been regained'. 'Le Niveau de vie en Union Soviétique de la révolution d'Octobre à 1950', *Revue de l'Est* (Paris), Vol. I No. 2 (October 1970), pp. 47–96. The passage cited is on page 94.

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ordinary Soviet citizenry; that it supports the regime in its nationalism and crisis-mongering.

The Colonial Experience

The Moscow state, that is, the ancestor of the imperial and Soviet states, emerged on the fringe of Asia. In order to create a national state, its founders had not only to impose their authority on rival Russian principalities, but also to repel, subdue, and integrate the Turco-Mongol and Finnic populations with which they were surrounded. As a consequence, in Russia, the process of nation-building took place concurrently with that of empire-building, rather than before. The two processes, so distinct in the history of Western states, in the case of Russia cannot be readily separated either chronologically or geographically. In the second half of the sixteenth century Moscow already administered a sizeable colonial population of Tatars and Finns. To these were added in the seventeenth century the natives of Siberia and the Cossacks, in the eighteenth the nomads of Central Asia, the Crimean Tatars, the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Poles, Jews, and Baltic peoples, and in the nineteenth the Caucasians and Muslims of Turkestan.

As a result of these acquisitions, the Moscow government acquired early a great deal of expertise in handling foreigners; but this expertise it gained from administering subject peoples, western and oriental, not from dealing on equal terms with other sovereign states. The Office of Ambassadors in Moscow knew less, comparatively speaking, about foreigners than did the various administrative offices charged with responsibility for administering immense territories inhabited by peoples of different races and religions. In some measure this also held true of the imperial government and of the Soviet government; for techniques of administration tend to survive change of elites.

The implications are not far to seek. A country whose governing apparatus has learned how to deal with foreign peoples from what are essentially colonial practices is not predisposed to think in terms of a stable international community or of balance of power. Its natural instincts are to exert the maximum use of force, and to regard absorption as the only dependable way of settling relations with other states, especially those located along its own borders. There is little need here for theory, because the options are narrow, and concern tactics rather than objectives or strategy.

To anyone acquainted with the rich literature on the international relations of the Western powers it must come as a surprise to learn that there is no definitive or even comprehensive history of Russian foreign relations. The literature on the theory of Russian foreign policy is so meagre that it may be said not to exist. That Russians have felt no need to compile the record of their external relations or to investigate its principles is in itself a significant fact, illustrative of their general attitude towards the outside world.

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THESE four factors impel the elite which rules Soviet Russia to conduct a dynamic and inherently aggressive foreign policy, very different from that pursued by such predominantly commercial countries as the United States, whose principal aim is international stability. If the Soviet elite were not inhibited by other factors, which it is helpless to change, the Soviet Union very likely would conduct a policy of reckless external expansion such as Germany and Japan had pursued in the 1930s. But fortunately, such inhibiting factors do exist, and these must be taken into account to provide a rounded picture of Soviet foreign policy.

The most important of these is the spirit and mood of the ordinary people: not only the people of Great Russian stock but also those belonging to the numerous ethnic minorities inhabiting the Soviet Union.

The Russian people have no tradition of glorifying war, perhaps because they never had a feudal culture in the proper sense of the word. Its great medieval epic celebrates not the victory of Russian arms but their defeat. Neither in the folklore nor in the proverbs of Russia is there much trace of militarism. The common people have always viewed war as a desperate act to defend one's home; and Russian troops, so effective on their home soil, have never shown much skill on foreign campaigns. This general attitude deserves comment even in the case of a country which allows its citizenry no say in governmental affairs, because in the long run the quality of the human material has considerable bearing on a government's freedom of action.

Even more significant, however, is the fact that the people of the Soviet Union are utterly exhausted. The country had been mobilized in 1914 and except for brief respites has not been allowed since then to return to normal life. Having dropped out of the international war in 1917, Russia suffered for the next three years an even more devastating civil war followed by several years of epidemic and famine. It barely recovered from these disasters during the New Economic Policy era, when in 1928 it was reharnessed into state service to carry out the most ambitious programme of industrialization ever attempted by a nation. To make this programme economically feasible, a whole counter-revolution was inaugurated in the countryside, in the course of which the government confiscated, in the face of the peasantry's desperate resistance, its land, livestock and implements. This tragedy was not even over when the regime launched a political massacre of actual, potential, or imaginary opponents of nightmarish dimensions. And then came the second world war. The relative losses in human lives which the population of the Soviet Union has suffered between 1914–45 exceed those of any other people in modern times except European Jewry. They are estimated at two million casualties in the first world war, 14 million during the Civil War and the famine, 10 million during collectivization, 10 million during the purges and 20 million during the second world war, for a total of 56 million human lives lost.

After such exertions and bloodletting the inhabitants of the Soviet

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Union are simply incapable of being mobilized once again for any sustained national effort. Their fatigue is so profound that neither exhortations nor alarms can shake them from it. They require three things of which they have been deprived for the past half a century; peace, privacy, and prosperity, probably in that order. With a population in this state it is just not possible to launch ambitious drives of external expansion.

Consideration must also be given to the fact that approximately one-half of the population of the Soviet Union consists of peoples who are not of Russian nationality. This colonial population, brought under Russian sovereignty by imperial and Soviet conquest, not only shares the exhaustion of the Russians proper, but also experiences a sense of national frustration. Neither blandishments nor persecution have had much effect on the patriotic spirit among the ethnic minorities. They constitute a volatile and unreliable element.

Thus a kind of dilemma arises before the Soviet elite: one of the principal factors inducing it to maintain an aggressive posture, namely lack of confidence in its popular support and the need for crisis, also forces it to act cautiously. The Soviet government cannot risk a protracted war because such a war always makes the government dependent on its population. All the important concessions which the imperial government had made before the revolution were the consequence of long wars: the Crimean War, which induced it to free the serfs and institute local self-government; the Japanese War, which forced it to grant a constitution; and the first world war, which compelled it to abdicate. These historic lessons have not been lost on the Soviet government and in large measure account for the prudence which it has always shown in the face of firm resistance by other powers.

The same factor explains the haste with which the Soviet elite exploits any opportunity abroad where serious opposition seems unlikely. Guided more by the prospect of success than by any consideration of 'national interest', Russian expansion follows no discernible pattern. The whole concept of 'national interest', in the sense in which the term is used in the West, is altogether alien to the Russian mind. Most writings on the subject come from the pens of foreigners who seek to locate behind Russian foreign policy patterns of a kind they are familiar with in their own countries. In Russian literature, pre-revolutionary and Soviet, hardly anything is said on the matter. As for communist theory, it too provides no guidelines for the conduct of a rational foreign policy in so far as the whole assumption of communism is that the forces of 'progress' and of 'reaction' are split along class lines, not national ones.

By and large, Russian expansion tends to focus on targets of opportunity. Historians have long noted what may be called the 'pendulum' effect in nineteenth-century Russian expansion, meaning rapid shifts from one area to another in response to encountered resistance. Thus, frustrated by its defeat in the Crimean War from

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subjugating the Ottoman Empire, the imperial government promptly sent its forces into Central Asia which it conquered in a series of rapid expeditions. But as soon as the British, alarmed for the security of India, threatened to stop Russian advances in that region, St Petersburg shifted its attention to the Far East. Defeated in Korea and Manchuria by Japan, it returned to the Balkans.

Such pendular swings can also be detected in Soviet foreign policy: for instance, the shift in 1948 from expansion in Europe, where it was halted by determined US resistance, to East Asia. This evidence suggests that Russian expansion is motivated less by needs than by opportunities, less by what its elite wants than by what it can get. For this reason it is impossible to determine control of which areas would satisfy the Soviet government and induce it to assume a cooperative international stance. Russia has all the territory and all the resources it needs; its external security is assured by its military power and by vast buffer zones separating it from potential enemies. If it nevertheless keeps on expanding it is precisely because its expansion is in large measure determined by internal rather than external factors, above all, by the tragic relationship of the government to its people.

Developments which have occurred in military technology since the end of the second world war, and particularly the emergence of a strategy based on rocketry and nuclear weapons, have significantly affected the situation.

In some respects, the changes in warfare have had a positive effect on world peace. Scientific and technological warfare requires a large scientific and technical intelligentsia, whose outlook is bound to be very different from that of the traditional class of field or staff officers. That which has been learned of this intelligentsia through personal contacts during the past 15 years suggests that it differs indeed from the rest of the Soviet elite of which it is a member by virtue of its privileged status. Soviet scientists and technicians think of themselves not only as Russians but also as citizens of the world, for they are better aware than administrators of common human problems. They are more objective and less emotional. Their whole temper is more liberal than that of the rest of the Soviet elite. Their emergence is undoubtedly a healthy phenomenon, good for Russia and the rest of the world.

In other respects, the development of automated warfare has had a very deleterious effect on the prospects of peace. If it is true, as argued above, that the principal deterrent to a recklessly aggressive Soviet foreign policy is the unreliability of the Soviet population, then clearly any development which frees the regime from dependence on its population reduces the effectiveness of that deterrent. The more mechanized warfare becomes, the briefer and more devastating war tends to become, the less the Soviet elite needs to make allowance for the spirit of its population, the less it is afraid of war. The scientific-technical intelligentsia, of course, gains in status under these conditions; but its actual influence on government policy in Russia, as elsewhere,

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is questionable. It is a curious fact that those American scientists, who have been most frustrated in their attempt to influence their own government on issues such as ABM, are also the most sanguine about the power of their Soviet counterparts. But if they tried and failed to exert political power in a country where it is possible to appeal over the head of the administration to the mass of citizens, how can the Soviet scientific elite succeed in a country where no such opportunities exist?

On balance, the development of modern military technology will probably intensify the expansionist tendencies of the Soviet elite. It is likely to increase its self-confidence and encourage it to pursue targets of opportunity wherever they present themselves with greater boldness than before.

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Soviet Policy towards the Arab World 1955-71

Oded Eran
Jerome E. Singer

DURING the past 16 years Soviet policy-makers concerned with the Arab world have been required to make frequent tactical decisions regarding specific issues of state to state relations. Such tactical decisions were, however, invariably guided by an existing strategic conception of Soviet regional objectives. Presently available evidence suggests that Soviet policy in the area can be best conceptualized as having evolved during the period under study within the framework of four major decisions representing successive definitions by the Soviet leadership, in response to changing circumstances, of its strategic conception of policy goals. The progressive upgrading of Soviet objectives reflected in the dynamic of this strategic conception is the focus of our analysis.

Three decades of non-policy

It is a commonplace observation that the year 1955 witnessed a major change in the traditional Soviet policy towards the Arab world. The fact is that since the mid-twenties the Soviet Union had had no clearly defined policy towards the region.[1] Soviet expectations of what could be achieved in the Arab lands had been very low since local political realities, as seen from the Kremlin, excluded the Soviet Union from effective participation in the area's politics. Soviet policy-makers regarded the area as an impenetrable British and French imperial preserve with no potential for the development of political movements of a consistent anti-Western orientation. The former head of the Near Eastern Department of the Comintern during the thirties attests that his main problem was his inability to interest Stalin and other leaders in the domestic politics of the Arab world.[2]

N.B. This study was carried out under the auspices of the Middle East Study Group of the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute.

[1] The flirtations with Saudi Arabia and Yemen for limited tactical purposes in 1926 and 1928 hardly merit the description of a policy.

[2] Interview with Joseph Berger Barzilai, Tel Aviv, 10 January 1971. Mr Barzilai recalls also that at a Kremlin discussion attended by Molotov, in the late twenties, he was told sarcastically: 'There will be revolutionary developments in the Hawaiian Islands before anything will move in the Arab East.'

We know that at least on one occasion during the twenties Stalin rejected through lack of interest a request for arms by the leaders of a local revolt against the colonial power, in this case the French regime in Syria. (J. Berger Barzilai, loc. cit.) Mr Barzilai was the intermediary between Moscow and the Druz rebels. Stalin's innate distrust of Moslems, and in particular Arabs, was, according to Mr Barzilai,

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Despite Moscow's low evaluation of its prospects in the Arab East, the Soviet leaders were keenly aware of the strategic significance of the region. The presence of British military installations since the days of the Russian Civil War and the Intervention had kept Soviet leaders on constant alert with respect to a possible military incursion from this quarter. However, while this concern was an incessant theme of Soviet literature and propaganda until the second world war,[3] the Kremlin's appraisal of its opportunities among anti-Western nationalist elements remained pessimistic and its policy, accordingly, passive.

Moscow's assessment of the Arab situation paralleled its disenchantment with nationalist movements elsewhere in the colonial world. This disenchantment, under the impact of the communist disaster in China, had found doctrinal embodiment since 1928 in the theses adopted at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, theses which branded the national bourgeois forces in the colonial world as inherently reactionary and untrustworthy while exalting the local communist parties as the only reliable and consistent anti-Western elements in the national movements.[4] In the context of the contemporary Arab political arena, where communist parties, if they existed at all, were weak and totally without prospects, the Comintern theses were a prescription for passivity.

The second world war and the years that followed offered the Soviet leaders intermittent temptations to change their judgment. During two brief interludes, the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact and the immediate post-war period, Soviet prospects for territorial acquisitions seemed to brighten considerably.[5] When these hopes were not realized there began to appear sporadic indications that Moscow was reassessing the anti-Western potentialities of the local national forces. Soviet support

a relevant factor in this context. He believes that this antipathy of Stalin, together with the latter's regard for the Jews as the only element in the area capable of social progress, have perhaps been underestimated as factors influencing the Soviet decision in support of the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.

[3] As early as 1920 the Comintern organized the 'Baku Congress of the Toilers of the East' as a propaganda measure against the British presence on the southern border of the Soviet Union. Also noteworthy is the fact that in the programmes of the Arab communist parties the removal of foreign troops was accorded priority over any other national objective. See Madiar L. Mif, R. Orakhelashvili, M. Safarov, *Programnye Dokumenty Kommunisticheskikh Partii Vostoka* (Moskva: Partizdat, 1934), passim. The British base in Iraq seems to have particularly disturbed the Kremlin. See D. Yenukidze, 'Imperialisticheskiye Protivorechiya Na Blizhnem Vostoke', *Mirovoye Khozyaistvo i Mirovaya Politika*, No. 12 (1934), pp. 90–107 and the entry under Iraq in the *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (first ed., 1935), Vol. 29.

[4] Jane Degras, *The Communist International. Documents.* Vol. III (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 530–541.

[5] In discussions with Ribbentrop in 1940 concerning spheres of influence in the Middle East, Molotov proposed that the Soviet sphere should include the areas 'South of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf'. Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (eds.), *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941* (New York: Didier, 1948), pp. 217–59. Stalin at this time also demanded military bases on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, ibid. In post-war bargaining with its wartime allies the Soviet Union raised the demand for a trusteeship over Libya. The Soviet Union also advanced claims to Eritrea and the Dodecanese Islands, and presented claims upon Turkey and Persia as well.

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for the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, which assumed material form with substantial arms deliveries from Czechoslovakia, was evidence of such a reassessment; other signs indicated that a similar re-evaluation was in progress regarding certain Arab countries.[6]

However, these isolated indications hardly amounted to a sweeping revision of the pre-war line. By and large, the Soviet Union remained hostile towards Arab national leaders and aloof from inter-Arab politics until the mid-fifties. The same attitude characterized the Kremlin's posture towards national movements in other former colonies and was reflected in the bitter attacks of Soviet theorists and commentators on such prominent leaders as Ghandi, Nehru, U Nu, and Sukarno. Moscow as yet saw no meaningful difference in terms of its influence between an independent national bourgeois regime and the old imperialist domination. The prevailing 'two camp' concept of the international situation was incompatible with a positive evaluation of a neutralist posture.

1955: A programme of minimal objectives

By the mid-fifties it had become obvious that the traditional Soviet tenets with regard to the Arab countries and the Third World as a whole were not only obsolete, but also counter-productive and an obstacle to the advancement of Soviet purposes. *A priori* distrust of national bourgeois forces in the post-colonial countries alienated the Soviet government from potential allies, narrowed its range of options and inhibited exploitation of emerging opportunities.[7] Newly independent states in former colonial areas had begun to emerge collectively as a distinct and separate force in world politics. The anti-Western potential of the new nations did not escape the attention of the Soviet leaders, but no productive approach to them was feasible within the framework of the old dogmas.

It was in the Arab East where the disfunctional effect of the old line was most evident. This was true not only because local political factors took a favourable course, but also because developments there directly affected Soviet strategic interests. The anxiety with which the Soviet Union had always viewed the Western military presence on its southern border (which after the second world war was the only Soviet border contiguous to the territory of an ally of the West) became acute as a result of Western plans to organize the military alliance later known as the Baghdad Pact. This alliance, with its projected membership of Turkey, the Arab countries, Iran, and Pakistan threatened to become,

[6] Zhdanov's speech at the founding of the Comintern in 1947 contained passages, frequently overlooked in subsequent commentaries, singling out, among other countries, Egypt and Syria as states which 'sympathized with' the Soviet bloc. *For a Lasting Peace, For People's Democracy*, 10 November 1947. Also, Malenkov in his address to the the 19th Party Congress in 1952 listed Egypt as one of the countries exemplifying national resistance to imperialism. *Pravda*, 6 October 1952.

[7] The hesitant and faltering Soviet response to the Mossadeq episode in Iran 1953–54 demonstrated in part the disfunctional character of the old Stalinist dogma.

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upon its establishment, not only part of the Western defence system, forming a geographical link between NATO in Europe and SEATO in Asia, but also a political barrier immobilizing Soviet policy.

Fortunately for Moscow, however, increased danger from this quarter coincided with ripening opportunities. The emergence of the Nasser regime in Cairo as the chief anti-status quo force in the Arab world offered the Kremlin its first opening in the area. Nasser actively opposed the Baghdad Pact, had pressed for and achieved British agreement to withdraw from the Suez Canal zone, and was rapidly gaining stature as one of the prominent exponents of what had become known as positive neutralism. Having earlier regarded Nasser with the same distrust as it had other nationalist leaders,[8] Moscow now began to appreciate his potential usefulness. Indications are that the change in attitude towards the Nasser regime crystallized sometime late in 1954.[9]

It is clear from contemporaneous evidence that the reappraisal of Nasser's role was an integral part of a wholesale revision of the Soviet strategy in the Third World at large. The enthusiastic reaction in Moscow to the Bandung Conference, in April 1955, at which Communist China and North Vietnam played a major role, was but one indication of the new trend.[10] Subsequent statements made at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 legitimized the revision and the activation of Soviet policy in relation to the newly independent nations.[11] Khrushchev placed the Soviet imprimatur on the phenomenon of 'positive neutralism' by including governments of that orientation side by side with the Soviet bloc countries in what he described as a vast 'zone of peace'.[12]

Within the framework of this re-estimate of political realities the Soviet leaders were able for the first time to formulate a specific policy towards the Arab countries. This policy had initially a strictly limited objective which was negative and relatively minimal—the denial of the area to the West.

THE first indication on the official level of the new activism in Soviet policy came in the form of a 'Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' issued on 16 April 1955 entitled 'Security in the Near and

[8] Moscow initially assessed Nasser's coup as an American displacement of British influence in Cairo. TASS, 1 August 1952, quoted in *BBC Survey of World Broadcasts*, No. 335 pp. 3–4. This initially negative impression of Nasser was intensified by his persecution of the Egyptian communists.

[9] See 'Rashid Al Baravi: Sushchestnost Poslednego Perevorota v Egipte', *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 11, 1954.

[10] Other signs were (1) the *Pancha Shilla* agreement between China and India in the spring of 1954 setting forth the five principles of peaceful coexistence later incorporated into the resolutions adopted in Bandung, and (2) the trip by Bulganin and Khrushchev late in 1955 to India, Burma, and Afghanistan.

[11] Kuusinen, the former head of the Eastern Department of the Comintern, criticized Stalin's disfunctional approach to the national bourgeoisie and its negative effect upon Soviet strategy towards the East. Contending that the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world power after the second world war had widened the range of options open to the national bourgeois regimes, he argued that this fact increased the likelihood that those regimes would follow a genuinely independent course in international politics. *Pravda*, 20 February 1956.

[12] *Pravda*, 15 February 1956.

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Middle East'.[13] This statement noted that the region was 'in proximity to the southern borders of the USSR' and that therefore the USSR could not 'remain indifferent' to the formation of Western military alliances there. In the operative clause of the statement the Soviet government urged the governments of the area to avoid participation in such alliances and promised them assistance in the protection of their independence. Moscow committed itself to the objective of thwarting the consolidation of any regional military alliance under Western auspices. By offering military and economic assistance, it hoped to extend the range of options open to the Arab countries and thereby counteract the inducement to join hostile alliances. The primary goal was elimination of Western influence from the area; there is no evidence that the Kremlin considered as feasible at the time the direct extension of its own influence let alone the establishment of a Soviet physical presence.

The minimalist strategy for which Moscow opted appears to have been a product of a compromise between conflicting judgments. In the first place the view of the area as presenting an exploitable and fluid situation was not universally held in Moscow. As is clear from Soviet sources, Molotov, who shared Stalin's distrust of the national bourgeoisie, opposed the new course in the Middle East.[14] Doubtful of the inclination and ability of Nasser and other neutralist leaders to pursue a consistent anti-Western policy, he doubted the benefits to be derived from Soviet investment in these regimes. Moreover, Molotov seems to have believed that any Soviet attempt to exploit such opportunities as might exist would overstrain Soviet resources, particularly in view of the as yet unconsolidated Soviet position in Eastern Europe.

It seems likely that other arguments in opposition to the new direction were based on the obvious inconsistency between the global strategy of *détente* being pursued by the Soviet government at that time and a forward strategy in a region considered vital by the West. This inconsistency reflected two contradictory trends within the Soviet elite, one favouring acceptance of the global status quo and a long-term policy of *détente* and the other supporting a more dynamic policy involving some risk.[15]

In the case of the Middle East the Soviet leaders must have been aware, however, that the pursuit of more than minimal objectives entailed an unacceptably high degree of risk. This awareness conditioned Soviet behaviour in connexion with the implementation of the new line in the Arab world, as illustrated by the arms deal with Nasser.

It was natural that the Soviet Union should have chosen an arms

[13] *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, 17 April 1955.

[14] Molotov's opposition is convincingly documented in Uri Ra'anan, *The USSR Arms the Third World* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1969), pp. 102–130.

[15] These disagreements were in evidence in the debate over the nuclear war issue, in 1953–54, in which Khrushchev contended, against Malenkov's assertion that a nuclear war would mean the destruction of world civilization, that the Socialist camp would emerge victorious in such a war.

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deal as the means of facilitating its objective of eliminating Western influence from the region and that Egypt should have been the partner in this transaction. The three Western powers had sought through the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 to preserve their regional predominance through a system of arms rationing to the countries of the area. Egypt, on several occasions in the early fifties, had attempted to break this Western monopoly through arms purchases from the Soviet bloc.[16] The Soviet Union became a willing arms supplier, however, only upon the change of its traditional line towards the Arab countries and its recognition that the Nasser regime's opposition to the Baghdad Pact paralleled its own. By raising Nasser's prestige the Kremlin hoped to demonstrate to other Arab governments and peoples that there existed an alternative to that alliance and to undermine the Iraqi claim to leadership of the Arab world.

Determined to remain within the limits they had established for themselves, the Soviet leaders moved with extreme caution. In order to avoid precipitate Western reaction and overcommitment of their own political capital to the Nasser regime the Soviet leadership took pains to remove itself to a degree from the transaction. It was arranged that Czechoslovakia would be the actual source of supply and the arrangement, when publicly announced in September 1955, was described by Soviet spokesmen as an ordinary commercial exchange of Czech arms for Egyptian cotton. There is evidence that in providing arms Moscow was seeking chiefly to acquire political assets which it then hoped to trade in diplomatic bargaining for some diminution of Western presence.[17] That is to say priority was accorded at that point to the undermining of established Western positions in the region.

However much the Soviet Union might have intended the arms deal with Egypt as an anti-Western political move, the Egyptians for their part were bound to view the acquisition of armaments in a quantity hitherto unknown in the region principally in the context of their confrontation with Israel. The question therefore arises as to what effect the Soviet leadership expected the transaction to have on the Arab-Israel conflict. Soviet political and diplomatic support of the Arab side, for example in the UN, had been clear since the early fifties. Nonetheless, it seems that the Kremlin viewed this conflict at that stage as secondary to the antagonism between the Arab national movement and the West and had not yet come to appreciate its usefulness for Soviet purposes. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that the Soviet leaders

[16] In the second half of 1953 an Egyptian trade delegation was sent to various European countries including the Soviet Union to submit and discuss various Egyptian industrial projects. Under the heading agricultural machines the Egyptians included arms. David J. Dallin, *Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin* (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott Company, 1961), p. 389.

[17] Khrushchev and Bulganin, in their conversations with British Prime Minister Eden in April 1956, offered to support a general arms embargo to the Middle East to be supervised by the UN. Had it been accepted this proposal would have meant the disintegration of the Baghdad Pact. Dallin, op. cit., p. 403.

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regarded any intensification of Arab-Israel hostility as counterproductive, since, with naval and air access to the area firmly controlled by the West, open fighting might have revealed their inability to intervene effectively on the side of the Arabs and might also have distracted the Arabs from the path chartered for them by Soviet policy-makers. It was for this reason that, simultaneously with arms shipments to Egypt, Soviet diplomacy made attempts to smooth over Arab-Israel differences.[18] The moderate Soviet attitude was also part of a more general intention to reassure the West that the Kremlin's new policy had limited goals and did not pose a threat to its basic interests.[19]

THE principles guiding Soviet-Arab policy did not change in the course of the major regional crises in the period that followed the arms deal. The lessons of these crises were, however, too ambiguous to enable the Soviet leadership to draw clear-cut conclusions with regard to the planning of a future course. On the one hand Soviet gains from the Suez crisis in October 1956, and from the Iraqi-Lebanese-Jordanian crisis in July 1958, exceeded by far the expectations of Soviet policy-makers and gave rise to an extremely favourable assessment of Soviet chances in the area.

On the other hand, developments in Syria early in 1958 implied that perhaps an agonizing reappraisal of Moscow's policy in the Arab East might be in order.

There is no evidence that the Soviet Union instigated the Suez crisis either through advance commitments or otherwise. As was to be expected, the Soviet mass media produced abundant propaganda in support of the nationalization of the canal and in opposition to the British, French, and Israeli actions. However, on the official level, the Soviet government avoided committing itself to any concrete course of action at the height of the crisis. Only when it had become clear to the Kremlin that the United States was determined to force the retreat of its allies did the Soviet government come forth with explicit threats.[20] Notwithstanding its passive role the Soviet Union emerged from this crisis as a confirmed Middle East power. Credited by Arab public opinion as the outside power most instrumental in thwarting the attack

[18] See the statement of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs published in *Pravda*, 18 April 1956. The statement called for the strengthening of the statehood of the nations of the Middle East, among them Israel, and went so far as to call for a lasting peace settlement between the Arab states and Israel.

[19] See Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov's statement on his visit to Egypt in June 1956. Shepilov said on this occasion that the Soviet Union did not intend to encourage the hostility of the Arab peoples against any of the Western powers and would do everything possible to bring about international *détente* in this part of the world. *Le Monde*, 20 June 1956, as cited in Andre Fontaine, *History of the Cold War From the Korean War to the Present* (New York: Random House, Inc. Vintage Books, 1969), p. 171.

[20] See Walter Z. Laqueur, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 239.

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upon Egypt, the Soviet Union assumed the role of protector of the Arabs.[21]

Moscow's behaviour two years later at the time of the overthrow of the pro-Western regime in Baghdad and of the landing of American and British troops in Lebanon and Jordan respectively [22] was markedly similar to its conduct at the time of the Suez crisis. Despite the prospect of Western intervention against the newly established government in Baghdad, the Kremlin was not willing to go beyond verbal pronouncements for the sake of that regime. The concentration of troops on the southern border of the Soviet Union upon the landing of American troops in Lebanon was a conscious bluff on the part of Khrushchev.[23] Again, as had happened as a result of the Suez episode, the Soviet Union achieved significant gains by doing practically nothing. The new regime in Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and the Western position deteriorated further.

The quick and easy Soviet achievements resulting from these events tempted the Soviet leadership to enlarge its policy objectives in the region. It was in this hopeful spirit that the Kremlin decided upon the major investment of financing the construction of the Aswan Dam.

In Syria, however, Soviet policy suffered a major setback with disturbing implications. It had appeared in the summer of 1957 as if a pro-Soviet regime was emerging in Damascus with Syrian communists in key positions. This bright hope was suddenly extinguished in February 1958 with the formation of the union between Syria and Egypt, under Nasser's leadership, and the resumption of persecution of communists—a trend soon to become dominant in intra-Arab politics and temporarily arrest the development of more ambitious Soviet policy objectives in the area.

1959–61: Containment of Nasserism

In the late fifties, to the consternation of Moscow, the course of events in the Arab world ceased to be unambiguously favourable for Soviet interests. New developments appeared to confirm, at least partially, the misgivings which Molotov had expressed in 1955. As a result the basic premises of the post-1955 Soviet policy towards the Arab countries came under attack from many quarters.

At the root of Soviet troubles was Nasser's ambition to unite the

[21] It should be noted also that the Soviet Union might have achieved greater gains had its attention not been diverted at the time by the need to deal with the Hungarian uprising.

[22] This military action represented the first application of the Eisenhower Doctrine, enunciated by the United States early in 1958.

[23] Upon learning of events in Iraq, Nasser interrupted a visit to Yugoslavia and rushed to Moscow to enquire of Khrushchev what the latter was prepared to do to counter Western actions. Khrushchev indicated to Nasser that he was not prepared to go beyond the bluff of conspicuous troop manoeuvres on the southern border of the Soviet Union which he cautioned Nasser not to take too seriously. M. H. Heykal in *Al Ahram*, 22 January 1965, as cited in Nadav Safran, *From War to War* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 116–119.

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entire Arab world under his leadership and the resulting implications for Arab communists and Soviet influence. The formation of the United Arab Republic in February 1958 produced an unavoidable confrontation between Nasser and the powerful Syrian Communist Party. Nasser quickly destroyed the political base of the Syrian communists who only several months before had seemed on the verge of seizing power. The conflict between the Nasserists and the communists spread to Iraq several months later.

The Kassem regime, which had emerged in Baghdad shortly after the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy, refused to acknowledge Nasser's supremacy in the Arab world and adopted an independent line. In the absence of alternative sources of support, Kassem was forced into alliance with the Iraqi Communist Party which gained increasing prominence in the regime.[24] Angered by the communist role in Baghdad, Nasser launched a crusade, with obvious anti-Soviet tones, aimed at the elimination of communist influence in the Arab national movement.[25] The Soviet Union, which had accepted the earlier events in Syria with outward equanimity, reacted sharply this time to Nasser's offensive and the exchange escalated into bitter verbal warfare.[26] If the Kremlin believed that it had found compensation in the form of a ripening opportunity in Iraq, that hope was rudely shattered in July 1959, when Kassem, increasingly wary of his powerful allies, struck hard and successfully at communist positions.[27]

The persecution of communists was but one part of Soviet troubles in the Arab world in this period. Even more ominous were the signs that Nasser was unwilling to play the consistent anti-Western role which the Kremlin had assigned him. Not only did Egypt register public disagreement with the Soviet position in the Congo crisis of 1960 (by voting against a Soviet-sponsored resolution in the United Nations General Assembly) but Nasser was also reported to have been instrumental in blocking a resolution recommending the recognition of East Germany at the Belgrade Conference of non-aligned nations in 1961.[28]

[24] The Iraqi communists became particularly influential after they helped Kassem suppress the pro-Nasserist revolt in Mosul in March 1959, following which several members of the UAR Embassy were expelled from the country.

[25] Nasser's main anti-communist speeches were given in Port Said in December 1958 and in Damascus in March 1959.

[26] The Soviet position in this campaign was presented by Khrushchev himself on two occasions, at the 21st Congress of the CPSU (See *Pravda*, 28 January 1959) and at a Kremlin reception for an Iraqi delegation in March 1959 (See *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, 17 March 1959).

[27] Kassem's fear was aroused by the bloody attempt of the communists to gain control over the Kirkuk area in July 1959. After these events he systematically suppressed the communist front organizations in Iraq.

[28] See Charles D. Cremeans, *The Arabs and the World* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967), pp. 259, 263–64. Nasser was greatly influenced by Tito's strict concept of non-alliance. That Tito himself was again in disfavour in Moscow at this time as a result of his refusal to join the Warsaw Pact only heightened the concern felt by the Soviet leaders.

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Thus circumstances appeared to call into question the correctness of the evaluations on which the post-1955 Soviet policy towards the Arab countries had been based. Noting the unfavourable course of events, the Chinese leaders began in 1959 to urge the Soviet government to re-evaluate its attitude towards the nationalist regimes in the Arab world and in the Third World as a whole and to re-establish the 1928 Comintern theses as the foundation of Soviet policy in the East.[29] Indeed, the Soviet leadership could hardly escape a thorough reconsideration of the premises of its Arab policy.

Among the available options, the Kremlin might have opted for 'putschism'—the power-seeking strategy which it had prescribed for the communist parties until 1955 and which the Chinese leaders were advocating in the present circumstances. Such a strategy could have taken two forms: a 'dual policy' involving the preservation of working relations with Arab governments while seeking simultaneously to subvert them, or a total Soviet disengagement from the incumbent regimes coupled with exclusive concentration on communist activity. The Soviet leaders, as evidenced by their open disapproval of the Kirkuk uprising in Iraq in July 1959,[30] ruled out such a strategy in either form. It must have been obvious to Moscow that reversion to such a militant line would have brought about an erosion of its prior gains and have seriously harmed its prospects elsewhere in the Third World. Nonetheless, the continuing persecution of communists and the growing evidence of inconsistency in the orientation of the Nasser regime forced the Soviet leadership to adopt a more reserved attitude towards Nasserism in the Arab world.

The parallelism, which the Kremlin had assumed to exist in 1955, between its own interests and the interests of the Nasser regime was now brought into question. One major issue was whether the policy of suppressing the communist parties signalled a change, undesirable from a Soviet point of view, in Nasser's foreign policy. Although there appears to have been a vocal minority in the Soviet elite which saw a correlation between Nasser's domestic politics and his foreign policies, the majority did not share these apprehensions and was prepared to overlook the

[29] The Chinese leadership told Khrushchev upon his arrival in Pekin in 1959 that by supporting national bourgeois leaders who persecute communists he was repeating the Comintern error in China prior to 1927. The Chinese warned Khrushchev of the potentially catastrophic consequences of continuing such a course. D. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956–1961* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 277. It should be noted that in 1955 the Chinese approved of the new Soviet policy toward the Third World and were in fact its first practitioners as manifested in the *Pancha Shilla* accord with India.

[30] Moscow sternly censured the violent attempt of the Iraqi Communist Party to seize power in the Kirkuk area in July 1959 and forced the Iraqi Communists to engage in self-criticism. See 'Iz Materialov Plenuma Ts. K. Kommunisticheskoi Partii Iraka', *Kommunist*, No. 12 (August 1959). By contrast it appears that the Chinese were actively involved in the Kirkuk incident; immediately upon the suppression of the revolt the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires was declared *persona non grata* by the Iraqi government. See E. Be'eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1969), p. 187.

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persecution of communists as long as this persecution was not reflected in Cairo's foreign policy.[31]

Nonetheless, Moscow could not conceal its apprehensions that the expansion in the Arab world of Nasser's influence, even with its anti-Western connotations, jeopardized Soviet gains and prospects in the area. Moscow feared that unification of the Arab countries under Egyptian hegemony, and the resulting establishment of a stable status quo, was likely to render the area less amenable to Soviet influence and would severely limit Soviet opportunities in the future. Accordingly the Soviet leadership adopted a policy of containment towards Nasser, opposed his ambition to unite the Arab world and openly supported his chief rival Kassem.[32] A pattern was established whereby the extent of Soviet support of Nasser stood in inverse relationship to the degree of success which the latter's pan-Arab policies enjoyed.

Despite the unsettling implications of developments in the Arab countries in the years 1959–61, the Soviet leadership resolved to ride out its difficulties in that region and to regard them as a passing episode. The patient optimism which the Kremlin displayed was justified by events after 1961.

1963–66: Upgrading of objectives

With the break-up of the union between Egypt and Syria late in 1961, the danger, viewed from a Soviet perspective, of an Arab world united under Nasser's leadership receded. Shorn of the prospect of imminent success in achieving Arab unity, Nasserism was again in tune with Soviet interests in the area. Furthermore, the trend towards increased radicalization of domestic and foreign policies, which appeared in Third World countries generally,[33] clearly manifested itself in Nasser's domestic policies as well. In the years subsequent to 1961 the Egyptian government instituted broad-ranging schemes of nationalization coupled with constitutional reforms greatly concentrating the power of the state. In embarking on this path Egypt did not remain alone in the Arab world but was followed by Algeria in 1962 and, after short-lived interludes, by Syria and Iraq.

The rejection by a group of Arab regimes of Western models and standards in both political and economic spheres was seen in Moscow as creating a far more favourable environment for the extension of

[31] The relevant Soviet literature of this period evidences disagreement over the nature and extent of the relationship between the foreign policies and the domestic political orientation of a given regime. For an analysis of the argument between those supporting different assessments see O. Eran-Feinberg, *Soviet Thought on the Role of the Communist Party in the Third World, with Special Reference to the Arab Radical Regimes: A Study of Opinion Groups within the Soviet Elite.* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, May 1971.)

[32] See footnote 26.

[33] The countries outside the Arab world which were singled out by the Soviet press as exemplifying this trend were Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Indonesia, and Cuba. In later years other countries such as Burma and Tanzania were added to the list.

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Soviet influence. Moreover, the stepping up of Soviet involvement in the affairs of the Arab countries entailed fewer risks than in the mid-fifties since Western positions in the area had, by that time, been considerably weakened. The minimum objectives which the Soviet leaders had set for themselves in 1955, i.e. substantial diminution of Western regional influence, had in fact come about by the early sixties.

There were in addition two extra-regional factors which intensified Soviet interest in the area. One of these factors was the exposure of the Sino-Soviet rift which stimulated the competition in the Third World between the two communist giants. Secondly, the strategic inferiority of the Soviet Union, so clearly revealed during the Cuban missile confrontation, convinced the Soviet leadership of the necessity of the development of the means, primarily a strong Soviet navy, to project Soviet power into areas remote from Soviet territory. The increased significance in Soviet eyes of the Mediterranean with its links to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans was the natural consequence. The loss of the Soviet naval base in Albania, as a consequence of that country's defection from the Soviet bloc, made the problem of access to the Mediterranean all the more acute, enhancing the importance of those countries that could offer alternative naval facilities.[34] The Arab radical regimes, especially Syria, Egypt, and Algeria, were ideally situated for this purpose.

Beginning in 1962 Soviet authors commenced describing favourably radical trends in Egypt and Algeria. Some of the articles written in these years went so far as to suggest that Egypt, and later Algeria, were unalterably on the road towards emergence as full-fledged socialist states. The ruling elites of these regimes were with increasing frequency depicted as capable and fully qualified for the task of leading their societies towards the realization of socialist goals.[35] Inherent in such assertions was the assessment that circumstances were ripe for the scaling up of Soviet objectives in the Arab radical regimes which meant in turn that the inclusion of Egypt and Algeria in the Soviet orbit had acquired operative significance. While visiting Egypt in May 1964, Khrushchev himself referred to Egypt as a socialist state.[36]

Soviet commentators were, however, by no means unanimous in expressing such views. Some of them openly attacked the attempt to label Egypt socialist, arguing that the continued persecution of Egyptian communists was evidence that talk of including Egypt in the socialist

[34] A member of the Politburo of the Israel Communist Party claims that the loss of the Albanian base was a factor of prime importance in initially directing Soviet attention towards potential bases elsewhere in the Mediterranean, especially towards the Arab countries.

[35] See G. Mirsky, 'The U.A.R. Reforms', *New Times*, No. 4 (24 January 1962); R. Avakov and G. Mirsky, 'O Klassovoi Strukture v Slaborazvitykh Stranakh', *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya*, No. 4 (April 1962); and R. M. Avakov and G. I. Mirsky, 'Desyat Let Anti-Imperialisticheskoi Borby Egipetskogo Naroda, 1952–1962', *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4 (1962).

[36] See Khrushchev's speech before a special session of the Egyptian National Assembly on 5 May 1964. *Mizan*, Vol. 6, No. 5 (May 1964), p. 65.

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camp was premature.[37] This controversy was not resolved until Khrushchev was overthrown and was still raging at the time of his fall.[38]

Developments in the Arab world in the period immediately following Khrushchev's ouster contributed to the rapid resolution of the controversy in favour of those who had read the Arab situation as offering new promising opportunities. In 1965 Nasser finally terminated his endemic conflict with the communists, allowing them to join the Arab Socialist Union as individuals. An even more hopeful development from the Soviet standpoint was the seizure of power by the left-wing Ba'athists in Damascus, in February 1966. The new Syrian government reportedly included several communists for the first time in Syria's history.[39] These events produced a mood of jubilation in Moscow and finally convinced the Soviet leadership to drop the minimalist line in the Arab world and adopt a policy of maximal objectives.[40]

Kosygin's statement during his visit to Egypt in May 1966 reflected the new Soviet conception of its developing relationship with its allies in the Arab world—a bloc of 'progressive Arab regimes' closely associated with the 'Socialist Commonwealth'.[41] The objective was no longer the mere elimination of Western influence from neutralist governments but rather the welding together of a group of openly pro-Soviet regimes into a tight association with the Soviet bloc.

The obvious first step for the Soviet Union was to eliminate differences between its prospective allies, the Syrians and the Egyptians, who had not had diplomatic relations since the break-up of the UAR in 1961. Kosygin is reported to have urged Nasser to achieve agreement with the Syrians[42] and his urgings bore fruit with the conclusion of a military pact between the UAR and Syria on 4 November 1966.

The second requirement of the new Soviet approach was to devise a method to ensure the continuing attachment of these regimes to the Soviet bloc. Moscow felt particular urgency on this score in the wake of a succession of disasters for Soviet policy elsewhere in the Third World, i.e. the overthrow of Nkrumah in Ghana, Ben Bella in Algeria,

[37] See G. Kim, 'O Gosudarstve Natsionalnoi Demokratii', *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 10 (October 1962); N. G. Pospelova, 'Ekonomicheskiye, Klassovye i Politicheskiye Osnovy Gosudarstva Natsionalnoi Demokratii i Ego Funktsii', *Vestnik Leningradskogo Universiteta*, No. 23, Seriya Ekonomika, Filosofiya, Pravo, Vypusk 4; G. Kim, 'Natsionalnaya Nezavisimost i Sotsialnyi Progress', *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 10 (October 1964).

[38] See Uri Ra'anan, 'Moscow and the Third World', *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (January-February 1965), pp. 22–31. It has been argued that the opposition to Khrushchev's ideas came from the heads of the International Department in the Central Committee of the CPSU which is in charge of relations with foreign communist parties. See O. Eran-Feinberg, op. cit. for documentation of this thesis.

[39] *The Christian Science Monitor*, 16 November 1967.

[40] An Israeli communist leader quotes one of the Soviet leaders as saying: 'Now that we have two pillars, Syria and Egypt, we can start building on them.' The jubilant mood in Moscow is also attested by other Israeli communists who happened to be in the Soviet capital at that time on the occasion of the 23rd Party Congress.

[41] Kosygin's speech before the Egyptian National Assembly, 17 May 1966.

[42] AP and UPI dispatches from Cairo quoting Egyptian sources, *The Jerusalem Post*, 17 May 1966.

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and Keita in Mali, not to mention Sukarno in Indonesia. The Kremlin's inability to help its erstwhile Third World allies coupled with its failure to respond vigorously to the American bombing of North Vietnam had called into question the credibility of Soviet power. In the Arab world, the danger of a reversal of Soviet gains was especially acute at that time. Not only was Nasser mired in a costly and apparently unwinnable war in Yemen but his leadership of the Arab world was being seriously challenged by the emergence of the Western-oriented Islamic alliance, co-headed by King Faisal and the Shah of Iran. Nasser's decline carried with it the seeds of the disintegration of the Soviet position among its Arab clients. As its principal means for establishing its influence more firmly in Damascus and then for driving Syria and Egypt into lasting dependence on the Soviet Union, the Kremlin chose the deliberate exacerbation of the Arab-Israel conflict.

Though Soviet policy with respect to the Arab-Israel dispute had been clearly pro-Arab since the early fifties the Soviet Union had not particularly sought to aggravate Arab-Israel antagonisms until the mid-sixties. Inherent in the Soviet policy was the assumption that intensification of the dispute with Israel would distract Arab energies from the more important struggle on the anti-Western front.[43] A turning point in the Soviet approach to the conflict occurred when the new regime in Syria emerged as the most bellicose and extreme of all Arab governments on the question of Israel, both verbally and in the extent of its support and encouragement of Palestine Arab terrorists.[44] Moscow fully supported the militant Syrian government and moved decidedly closer to it on the Palestinian issue.[45]

The tactical utility of intensification of the dispute was clearly realized in Moscow and this realization has been an operative assumption of Soviet Arab policy since that time. The fabricated Soviet reports of the concentration of Israeli troops on the Syrian border in May 1967[46] was therefore one component of a carefully elaborated plan

[43] Interview with M. Sneh, a prominent Israeli communist, Jerusalem, 24 March 1971.

[44] Several months before the coup in Syria the older approach had been reaffirmed in connexion with the attempt of CPSU to mediate between the pro-Arab and Jewish factions of the Israel Communist Party, *Record of discussions between Israeli communists and CPSU leaders*, November 1965. Two Israeli communists of the Jewish faction attest that by the time of the 23rd Party Congress in 1966 they sensed for the first time that the Soviet attitude had changed.

[45] At the conclusion of a visit to the USSR by a Syrian delegation a joint communiqué on 25 April 1966 found Moscow going slightly, but significantly, further than they had in the past in expressing solidarity with the Arabs against Israel, adding to the customary formula of 'full support for the lawful rights of the Arabs of Palestine' the phrase 'in the just struggle against Zionism', *Pravda*, 26 April 1966.
This novel formulation clearly delighted the Syrians. Radio Damascus broadcast on 26 April 1966 that the Soviet stand on the Palestine issue had been 'defined in a new and clear way'.

[46] D. Chuvakhin, the Soviet Ambassador to Israel, was reportedly ordered by the Soviet security services to furnish the Politburo with reports concerning such alleged concentrations.

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to intensify Arab-Israel antagonism.[47] It is extremely doubtful however that the Soviet leaders wanted or expected that the situation would deteriorate into an armed conflict.[48]

The emerging conception of hegemony: 1967—

Israel's swift victory in the Six-Day War of June 1967 represented a severe blow to Soviet credibility in the Arab countries as well as in the Third World as a whole. It was demonstrated that despite Soviet political and diplomatic encouragement of Arab militancy, Moscow was not prepared to rescue its clients from military catastrophe if such action involved a possible confrontation with the United States. Thus the post-war situation confronted the Soviet leadership with a problem which it had not faced since the overthrow of Nuri A-Said and the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact in 1958, i.e. the protection and advancement of Soviet interests in the area entailed substantial risk of a collision with the West.

In the wake of the war, the Soviet leadership re-evaluated and redefined both its short- and long-range regional objectives taking the new circumstances into account. It seems clear from subsequent Soviet behaviour that the Kremlin defined its objective in the short run as the re-establishment of its credibility through the achievement of a political victory for the Arabs. It is equally clear that Moscow sought to exploit the new status quo to further its long-term aim of establishing Soviet predominance in this part of the world. Precisely how far these objectives could be promoted without running a major risk of armed conflict with the United States was unclear to the Soviet government.

Moscow's immediate and urgent priority was to prevent a drastic deterioration of its position in the Arab world: its failure to provide concrete assistance to the Arabs, in accordance with a commitment real or imagined, was a traumatic experience for the pro-Soviet elements in Arab politics and offered fertile ground for exploitation by anti-Soviet forces.[49] The Soviet government was fearful not only of the collapse of the friendly regimes in the defeated countries[50] but it also was

[47] According to a Tanyug dispatch of 29 March 1967 Gromyko, during his surprise visit to Cairo at the end of March 1967, was supposed to discuss the question of UNEF with President Nasser.

[48] The Soviet assumption appears clearly to have been that the US would restrain Israel from going to war. Not only did the Soviets appear to have explicitly assured their Eastern European allies of this (*New York Times*, 13 July 1967) but their own consternation and confusion at the outbreak of the war and the simultaneous absence from Moscow of all three members of the ruling triumvirate, Podgorny, Kosygin, Brezhnev, in the days preceding the war's outbreak, are strong circumstantial evidence of their misjudgment in this respect.

[49] The boldest outcry came from the Algerian leader Boumedienne who openly criticized the Soviet Union for its passivity. *Mizan*, Vol. 9 No. 4 (July–August 1967), p. 149.

[50] The contention that the war had been launched by imperialist forces for the purpose of destroying the Arab 'progressive' regimes, was repeatedly made by the Soviet leaders and mass media in the immediate post-war period. See, for example, G. Mirsky, 'Arabskie Narody Prodolzhayut Borbu', *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhduna-*

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apprehensive of the prospect of its own displacement by other powers, particularly the United States and China.[51] The Soviet leaders must have been aware of the fact that the collapse of their allies in the Arab countries as a result of Soviet irresolution would very probably have led to a gradual erosion of Soviet influence in the entire Third World, not to mention the obvious implications for Eastern Europe.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Moscow was in a great hurry to reverse the consequences of Israel's victory. It is clear, however, that the Soviet leadership, recognizing the limits to its ability to impose its solution on the area by force and the dangers which would be attendant upon such attempts, opted for political methods. The operative Soviet assumption since the war has been that it could successfully persuade the United States to compel Israel to withdraw to the pre-war armistice lines.[52] On the basis of this assumption the Soviet government devised its strategy aimed at the liquidation of Israel's gains.

The Soviet idea was to achieve, via the United Nations as well as big powers' deliberations, an international consensus against Israel's continuing presence in the territories which she had captured during the war. The Soviet government hoped that such a consensus would suffice to drive the United States to apply pressure on Israel. This course was pursued through such varied political means as a special session of the UN General Assembly, Security Council action, and contacts between representatives of the big powers such as the Glassboro meeting between Premier Kosygin and President Johnson or on a lower level between the UN ambassadors of the big powers. At the same time the Soviet Union made a tactical change in its position on the issue of Arab unity with the purpose of forming a united Arab front that would apply pressure on the Western powers, particularly the United States. The Kremlin did not intend to further the political control of Nasser over the Arab world but it did subscribe at this juncture to Egypt's leadership of a coordinated Arab effort.[53] In contrast to the pre-war period when the Soviet government had been exploiting internal Arab feuds to further its interests, any factor which now stimulated inter-Arab conflict was viewed by Moscow as disfunctional.

rodnye Otnosheniya, No. 3 (March 1968). While these assertions were undoubtedly motivated in great part by the desire to salvage Soviet prestige by claiming Soviet credit for having frustrated the achievement of a non-existent objective, they also reflected genuine concern.

[51] In the latter half of 1967 and continuing thereafter there is an upsurge of Soviet commentary warning the Arabs against the Chinese intentions as well as of rightist pro-imperialist tendencies in Arab politics.

[52] Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and the US Ambassador to the UN, Goldberg, reportedly reached agreement soon after the war on the basis of a total Israeli withdrawal in exchange for an Arab declaration of non-belligerence. Although this understanding collapsed in the face of a strenuous Arab objection the Soviet impression was confirmed that the US was uncomfortable with Israel's occupation of the territories that it had conquered. Arthur Lall, *The UN and the Middle East Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 212.

[53] G. Mirsky, 'Israel: Illusions and Miscalculations', *New Times*, No. 33 (2 October 1968).

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This explains the initially reserved Soviet attitude towards the Palestinian organizations as well as towards the militant Arab states such as Algeria and Syria which did not accept the Soviet tactics and called for an immediate 'fourth round'.[54]

Activity on the political front was only one dimension of Soviet behaviour immediately after the war. As a complement to this activity the Kremlin decided upon an immediate and substantial rearmament of both Egypt and Syria. This rearmament served the double function of stifling the initial barrage of anti-Soviet criticism in the Arab world and lending credibility to the coordinated Soviet-Arab diplomatic effort.[55] It is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union counselled its Arab allies to renew large-scale hostilities at this early stage.

It soon became clear to the Soviet government that the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* was no easy task and that the methods which it had selected for this purpose were not adequate. Soviet expectations that the United States would bring concrete pressure to bear upon Israel to withdraw proved overly sanguine. Moscow failed to take into account Washington's reluctance to repeat its post-Suez experience when American pressure on Israel had unwittingly produced a major Soviet political victory in the Arab world. Moreover, Moscow discovered to its consternation that uniting the Arabs behind its programme was an all but impossible task. The Khartoum conference in August 1967, which graphically revealed the rift between the proponents of an immediate resumption of the war and those who for the moment favoured political means,[56] was a severe disappointment for the Soviet leaders.[57] Another thorn in the side of Soviet policy at the time was the emergence of the Palestinian organizations whose strident militancy soon captured the Arab imagination and strengthened the forces of extremism in Arab politics.

Realizing that a shift had occurred in the political centre of gravity in the Arab world, the Soviet leadership tried to adjust its policy to the new equilibrium and to enhance its appeal to the militant elements. The change in the Soviet attitude toward the Palestinian organizations

[54] The Soviet press in this period contains frequent denunciations of 'extremists' in the Arab world. See G. Mirsky, op. cit., *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya*, No. 3 (March 1968) and G. Mirsky, 'Rebirth of the Arab World', *New Times*, No. 25 (26 June 1968). The Soviet assessment of the Arab predicament at this particular juncture appears clearly from the revealing remarks which President Podgorny is reported to have made to President Nasser on his visit to Cairo in June 1967. When the latter sought to compare Egypt's embattled situation with the condition of the partially occupied Soviet Union prior to the battle of Stalingrad and to draw inspiration from the Soviet experience for continued armed resistance, Podgorny indicated his belief that Soviet behaviour at Brest Litovsk in 1918 offered a more suitable model for Egyptian emulation. Safran, op. cit., p. 411.

[55] One indication of the importance which Moscow attaches to its role as an arms supplier is the reversal in the Soviet attitude toward a general arms embargo on the Middle East. See footnote 17.

[56] The Syrian delegation departed prior to the conclusion of the conference while Algeria's President Boumedienne refused to attend it.

[57] See P. Demchenko, 'Arabskii Vostok v Trudnyi Chas', *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 1 (1968).

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during 1968 was symptomatic; the Soviet press toned down its criticism of their activities and started referring to them positively as 'partisans'.[58] Still more significant and certainly more far-reaching and committing was the Soviet decision to support Nasser's unilateral abrogation of the cease fire and commencement of the 'war of attrition' against Israel. Obviously the Kremlin hoped also to bring additional pressure to bear on Israel and the United States and make them more responsive on the diplomatic front.

When the 'war of attrition' took a distinctly unfavourable course from the Egyptian point of view, with deep air penetrations by the Israelis, Moscow felt itself once again under immediate pressure to prevent an erosion of its credibility. With the memory of 1967 still fresh in the minds of the Arabs the Kremlin simply could not afford to stand idly by and not rescue its foundering client. The appearance of Soviet pilots flying combat missions over Egypt in the spring of 1970 and the later furnishing of a large Russian-manned defence system and Russian-piloted Mig 23s, were manifestations of the Soviet determination not to let Egypt suffer another military defeat. While recognizing that it was increasing the risk of a clash with the United States by its more active involvement, the Soviet government was tempted to do so by the indecisiveness and anxiety reflected in the American attitude toward the escalation of the conflict. On the other hand, more Soviet involvement implied more secure control by Moscow of the Egyptian war machine which counter-balanced the growing risk.

Despite its negative military consequences for the Egyptians, the 'war of attrition' bore fruit as far as the American position was concerned; the Rogers Plan, first enunciated in December 1969, provided for almost total Israeli withdrawal. Nevertheless it remains a continuing concern of the Soviet leadership that a settlement in which Israeli withdrawal will be delivered to the Arabs by the United States will eclipse the Soviet role in its achievement. The Soviet government seeks to prevent such a result by continually voicing support for maximal Arab demands, thereby outbidding the United States.

In view of the obvious benefits which the Arab-Israel conflict has brought the Soviet Union in the form of opportunities to establish its presence and extend its influence into the Arab world, one is justified in posing the question whether Moscow is really interested in the genuine termination of the conflict. To answer this question it is helpful to recognize the inverse relationship between the Soviet leadership's sense of its own political security in the region and the utility, from the Soviet point of view, of stimulating continued strife. The more securely established the Kremlin feels itself the more favourably it will regard measures designed to pacify the area, especially

[58] The terms 'partisans', 'Arab patriots', and 'Palestinian guerilla forces' have become the standard names for the Palestinian organizations since the spring of 1968.

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since the Kremlin has always viewed the maintenance of a state of high tension in the area as a means to an end and never as an end in itself.

While the restoration of its credibility was the major short-run preoccupation of the Soviet government after the Six-Day War, Moscow determined to make use of all opportunities offered by the circumstances of the Arab defeat to establish its hegemony over the area. Moscow has deemed essential the establishment of the permanent physical presence of its naval and air forces in the region; but it has also sought to ensure the continued existence of the local pro-Soviet regimes via penetration of the existing political systems. The Soviet Union's agreement to fully rearm Egypt after the war was conditional on Nasser's purging the Egyptian army of elements of 'doubtful reliability'.[59] An attempt to penetrate the powerful Egyptian security apparatus[60] and assiduous efforts to cultivate a pro-Soviet coterie within the Egyptian power elite consisting of Ali Sabry, Abu Nur and others, were also made. Moscow sought, too, to extend Soviet influence to all politically relevant sectors of the Arab body politic. The presence at the last congress of the Arab Socialist Union of Boris Ponomarev, the Communist official responsible for party foreign relations, indicated keen Soviet interest in the affairs of Egypt's mass party.[61] The attempts of the pro-Soviet Arab communist parties to establish their influence among the militant Palestinians[62] were yet another indication of Moscow's intent to widen its base of influence.

1971—A turning point?

To all outward appearances the Soviet effort to penetrate the Egyptian political system was progressing smoothly until May 1971, when, as a result of the power struggle in Cairo which followed Nasser's death, the entire pro-Soviet group was removed amid accusations that its members had conspired against President Sadat. In compensation for the failure of its efforts at covert penetration, Moscow sought to achieve a formal legitimation of its presence. This legitimation took the form of a 'Friendship and Collaboration Agreement' concluded between the two governments in the same month.

Whatever hopes the Kremlin may have entertained that this treaty would solidify its position in Egypt were soon shaken by subsequent developments in the Arab world. The pro-communist coup in the Sudan in July, its abortion through the coordinated effort of the Egyptian and Libyan governments and the subsequent decimation of the Sudanese Communist Party revived the long dormant antagonism between Arab nationalists and communists in a form which compelled Soviet spokesmen to take exception to the actions of Arab leaders.

[59] *Ma'ariv*, 7 February 1971. [60] Ibid.
[61] The Soviet press refers to Egyptian delegations to Moscow as 'Party-State' delegations, a description otherwise reserved for delegations from communist-ruled countries.
[62] See Fuad Nasser's speech in the 24th Congress of the CPSU in *Pravda*, 9 April 1971.

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As in the past, the re-emergence of this conflict led inevitably to sharp criticism of alleged Soviet interference in the internal affairs of the Arab countries involved. Such accusations were also voiced in Yemen after the failure of an attempted military coup in late August.

Presently available evidence does not permit a definite conclusion to be drawn regarding the extent of direct Soviet involvement in the attempts to seize power in Egypt, the Sudan or Yemen. There is every reason to believe, however, that the course chosen by Nasser's immediate successors aroused Soviet concern, particularly against the background of an energetic American attempt to undermine the Soviet position in the Arab world. The Soviet leadership must have judged that its open-ended commitment and continued high investment had so far yielded little in the way of commensurate political influence. Soviet impatience with this situation may well have been communicated informally, and even unwittingly, to ambitious local forces eager to interpret Soviet dissatisfaction with incumbent regimes as a signal to take direct action. Whatever the Soviet role in these events, the failure of pro-Soviet groups in their bids for power exacerbated Moscow's relations with its Arab clients.

Soviet policy has again, as in the years 1959–61, been forced to assume the character of a holding operation, though with a vastly larger investment to be protected than in the former period. Currently, Soviet efforts focus on limiting the embarrassment resulting from the trial of the Ali Sabry group in Cairo.

The growing disarray in the Arab world and the strengthening of such Arab conservatives as King Hussein of Jordan and King Hassan of Morocco further aggravate Soviet difficulties in the present context. Another source of concern for the Soviet leaders is the association of their two principal Arab clients, Egypt and Syria, in the new Federation of Arab Republics, with the anti-communist Colonel Kaddafi of Libya, whose wealth endows him with significant potential for political leverage.

In view of these mounting problems, it is not unlikely that some reappraisal of Soviet relations with the Arab countries is now under way in Moscow. The apparent Soviet attempt at limited rapprochement with Israel may represent not only a Soviet warning to wayward Arab clients of the availability of other Soviet options, but also a sign of decreased willingness on the part of Moscow to involve itself too directly in military operations in an area where its political influence has not increased to a degree commensurate with such involvement.

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Soviet Science and Foreign Policy

Tony Longrigg

COMBINATIONS of the concepts of science and foreign policy lend themselves to a variety of possible interpretations. One can speak of foreign science policy, scientific foreign policy, the policy of foreign science, or even the foreign science of politics. This is intended as a demonstration not of the flexibility of the English language, but of the complexities involved in any analysis of the interrelationships between science and foreign policy, complexities to which it would be difficult to do full justice in a large-scale book. This essay is concerned with Soviet international science policy—the relations of Soviet scientists and science policy-makers with their opposite numbers abroad, mainly in the Western capitalist countries, and particularly with the consequences of these relations for Soviet foreign policy in general, and the ways in which considerations of foreign policy influence the style and content of Soviet international science policies.

In any industrially and scientifically advanced country there must exist some form of policy-making machinery concerned with international relations in the field of science and technology. Though this machinery is usually highly fragmented, and the resultant policies pursued on an ad hoc basis, it is assumed that there is here a unified field of policy-making susceptible to coherent analysis, which can be designated *foreign research policy*. Its scope is defined as follows: 'All patterns of communication across national borders, at both governmental and non-governmental level, involving the deployment of scientific and technical resources, inside and outside national borders, in which these resources constitute the primary determinants of the policy-making process involved.'

In any country, the machinery which has evolved for foreign research policy will be a mixture of inherited tradition and political or economic circumstance. Thus in the USSR, the Academy of Sciences, ever since it was established under Peter the Great, has had responsibility for the international contacts of its members. Then, in 1961, the State Committee for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research was set up (its title being changed in October 1965 to the State Committee for Science and Technology), with the aim of introducing more rationality into the planning and co-ordination of research and development. Among its other responsibilities, the new Committee was entrusted with 'the co-ordination of the international contacts of ministries, departments and scientific research organizations in science and engineering', plus the supervision

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of 'information work'.[1] At the same time, it was specifically stated that the Academy retained responsibility for establishing contacts with research institutes in foreign countries. Thus, at the risk of over-simplifying, it appears that Soviet foreign research policy is jointly co-ordinated by these two bodies, each possessing a committee specifically entrusted with this responsibility. The State Committee has primary responsibility for intergovernmental scientific and technological agreements, the purchase of new technology, and the international contacts of the ministerial research sector; while the Academy, which lost many of its technologically oriented institutes in 1961 and again in 1963, remains primarily concerned with the fundamental and social sciences and within this sphere co-ordinates international contacts at the non-governmental level—exchange agreements with foreign academies, participation in international non-governmental organizations, international conferences, etc.

However, other committees and ministries retain responsibility for international contacts within their own sphere of interest. Thus scientific and technical relations between COMECON countries are either developed under bilateral agreements, or else come under the jurisdiction of the various COMECON permanent committees. Cultural agreements with Western countries, which include scientific exchange agreements, were the responsibility of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, until its demise at the end of 1968, and now apparently have become the concern of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bilateral agreements in the field of atomic energy involve the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, those between universities, the Ministry of Higher Education, and so on.

Since there is no single body in charge of Soviet foreign research policy, policy-makers can be seen as forming three main groups; (1) the Soviet scientific community and its institutional embodiment, the USSR Academy of Sciences; (2) science policy organizations at the national level, i.e. primarily the State Committee for Science and Technology, but also including other governmental bodies, ministries, etc.; (3) the organizations concerned with the formulation and execution of Soviet foreign policy.

These three groups can be considered as 'interest groups', in the sense that their priorities will differ regarding the goals of foreign research policy. Thus the scientists, we assume, will view foreign research policies primarily in terms of the advancement of their own field of research, or the body of scientific knowledge as a whole, and be interested in maintaining some form of independence in their relations with other national scientific communities, at least in so far as they consider outside interference will pervert the traditional patterns of scientific communication.

The second group will tend to see foreign research policies as a

[1] For the text of the reform see *Pravda*, 21 April 1961.

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useful adjunct to national R & D planning, and will assess these policies not in terms of their contribution to science as such, but within the context of the scientific, economic, and social progress of the USSR.

The organizations concerned with foreign policy will regard foreign research policy as an additional means towards the realization of both short- and long-term goals of Soviet foreign policy, and of course will have to take into account the consequences for the traditional patterns of Soviet foreign policy of the international aspirations of the first two groups.

These groups are not of course cut off from each other; just as there are many scientists involved in national science policy and foreign policy decision-making, so there are many science and foreign policy-makers who have the interests of science at heart, and vice versa. Nevertheless, at least in their public utterances, the three groups show a different outlook and a different scale of priorities which throw some light on the variety of motives underlying different aspects of Soviet foreign research policy. Even as regards the traditional non-governmental forms of international scientific relations—exchange of scientific journals and information of all types, visits by delegations or individuals to research or lecture, participation in international working groups and conferences, membership of international organizations, etc.—more is involved than simply the advancement of scientific knowledge. Scientists may claim that governments have a duty to protect the independence of the scientific community and its right, based on the international nature of the research process, to freedom of intercourse with foreign scientists. In the modern sovereign state, however, all forms of communication between the citizens of one state and those of another can take place only with the tacit or explicit consent of political authority. In the case of scientists, such consent may be given or withheld for reasons totally alien to the pursuit of science—to register diplomatic approval or disapproval of the other state, for reasons of national security (in a 'semi-closed' society such as the USSR) for fear of endangering the political loyalties of scientists taking part; or because these international contacts are considered to be beneficial to the economy. Within this basic political framework, however, it can be assumed that scientific criteria provide the main policy determinants for these forms of non-governmental scientific relations. In the case of so-called 'big science', however, in which vast sums of government money are involved, one may expect political criteria to play a much greater role. It is very difficult, for example, to view Soviet participation in Antarctic research purely in terms of the Soviet government's desire either to further scientific knowledge, or to promote the international contacts of its scientists. The Soviet presence in the Antarctic, which developed on a vast scale under the auspices of the International Geophysical Year, and has continued ever since, enabled the Soviet Government not only to have its share in any partition of

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the continent which might have taken place, but also to take a leading part in the negotiations leading up to the 1962 Antarctic Treaty.

In the case of space research, of course, political considerations are even more marked. A glance at President Kennedy's speech inaugurating the Apollo programme [2] illustrates the political motivation behind the technological feat, as do most of the official Soviet comments on their various space triumphs,[3] which emphasize not so much their contribution to scientific progress, as the evidence they provide of the superiority of the Soviet economic, social and scientific system—'socialism launched the sputnik', etc. Strictly speaking, of course, these national space programmes cannot be considered within the framework of foreign research policy, but the wide-ranging international implications of national science policies cannot be overlooked. National science programmes can also have considerable influence on the more traditional forms of international scientific relations. For example, it has been estimated that, largely as a result of Soviet space triumphs, one paper in five in the American periodical *Physical Review* cited the Soviet *Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics* in 1964, compared with one in a hundred in 1956.[4]

This approach to Soviet foreign research policy, then, in terms of three broadly defined policy-making groups, enables us to dispense with motivational definitions of the subject, e.g. 'foreign research policy is international communication in the pursuit of scientific progress'—and to view it as a composite area of international policy-making involving at any point political, economic, and scientific considerations to a greater or lesser degree, the only limiting factor being that outlined in the earlier definition, that scientific and technical considerations must constitute the primary determinants of the policy-making process. Thus, a rough inventory of areas considered within the scope of foreign research policy, in addition to the traditional areas of international scientific communication already outlined, would include governmental participation in international organizations concerned with scientific or technological affairs, for example UNESCO or the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA); official policy towards organizations of which the government is not a member, e.g. Euratom; bilateral governmental scientific or technological exchange agreements; the utilization of scientific authority and the presumed common interests and outlook of the international scientific community for at times essentially political purposes, as for example in the Pugwash conferences (named after the initial meeting-place in Nova Scotia, in which leading scientists of East and West meet to discuss political issues with high scientific or technological content, such as disarmament); problems of ensuring the political loyalty or reliability of scientists travelling abroad; and at a more general level, the impact of national scientific

[2] *United States Information Service Bulletin*, 26 May 1961.
[3] See for example Khrushchev's speech at the 21st CPSU Congress, 27 January 1959.
[4] *New Scientist*, 25 June 1964, p. 786.

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achievements on policy-makers and public opinion abroad and vice versa—the effects on national policy-makers of foreign scientific achievements.

THE earliest postwar statement by a Soviet scientist urging the importance of international scientific relations which I have been able to find came six weeks after the death of Stalin in a May Day speech by the then President of the Academy, A. N. Nesmeyanov,[5] in which he expressed the conviction that mutual and businesslike co-operation could develop between scientists of different countries, irrespective of their social systems and political or religious convictions, and stressed the willingness of the Academy to invite foreign scientists to the USSR, and send its representatives to congresses in capitalist countries.

A broader and more positive assertion of the value of scientific contacts with the West came in an article by Nesmeyanov in *Izvestia* on 31 December 1954. The development of any field of science, he wrote, is carried on most fruitfully in conditions of lively creative co-operation between scientists of different countries, uniting their efforts to solve problems for the benefit of all. Wide-ranging discussion between colleagues of complicated scientific problems helps to eliminate possible mistakes, to pinpoint the correct points of view, and the most effective approaches. This discussion should take place irrespective of the political beliefs, philosophical and religious outlook of the scientists involved.

The years between the death of Stalin and the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 saw several other statements by leading Soviet scientists on the same lines,[6] and scientists have continued since then to pay tribute to the importance of international scientific relations in books, articles, and speeches, one of the most recent examples being a speech by the current President of the Academy, M. Keldysh, at the July meeting of the Supreme Soviet in 1969.[7] 'History has shown that in no country can science develop in isolation from world science. . . . A whole series of important contemporary scientific problems can be solved only through the united efforts of scientists from many countries.'

There are various noteworthy features in all these statements. No mention is made of the innate superiority of socialist science, and relatively little stress is put on relations with 'fraternal' countries. There are, it is true, references to the development of what Nesmeyanov termed 'minus science'[8] in the West, where science is diverted from its true

[5] *Izvestia*, 29 April 1953.
[6] See for example *Pravda*, 26 January 1955, interview with D. Skobeltsyn. A. V. Topchiev, *Vestnik Akademii Nauk* (*V.A.N.*), No. 3, March 1955. A. N. Nesmeyanov, *Pravda*, 31 December 1955. *Izvestia*, 23 October 1954, interview with President of USSR Academy of Medical Sciences.
[7] *Pravda*, 12 July 1969.
[8] A. N. Nesmeyanov, *Pravda*, 31 December 1954.

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purposes by militarists and bourgeois monopolists, and also to the duty of scientists to fight for peace and disarmament and to be concerned over the development of revanchism in West Germany. But the main message is clear—political and ideological considerations should be no bar to the development of scientific relations. There is also no attempt made to put the argument for expanded scientific contacts in the form most palatable to the political authorities, i.e. the stress is not on the benefits that will accrue to Soviet scientific and economic progress through the use of foreign scientific achievements as a complement of their own efforts, but on the advantages for world science as a whole; the demand is not so much for more efficient scientific information services as for wide-ranging informal personal contacts.

There is also a notable lack of emphasis on the role of political authorities in extending international scientific contacts. The USSR Academy of Sciences, it is true, is to a considerable extent a political organization, but it is also the institutional embodiment of the Soviet scientific community, and as such has a long tradition of independence. Hence it is presumably no accident that virtually no mention is made in these statements, or in catalogues of the international activities of Soviet scientists, of the government's efforts in the field—joining UNESCO in 1954, beginning negotiations for setting up the International Atomic Energy Agency in the same year, the bilateral scientific and technical agreements that were concluded with various neutral countries in the mid 1950s, and the later scientific and technical agreements with Western countries. What this presumably signifies is not so much the scientists' disapproval of governmental initiatives, as their fear—common to many scientists in the West—that international scientific relations would become dominated by governmental and hence political considerations.

THE official Stalinist view was that bourgeois science could produce little of value, as it was an outgrowth of bourgeois society and was therefore inherently inferior to socialist science based on the precepts of Marxism-Leninism. There could therefore be little reason for official encouragement of contacts at any level between Soviet and Western science. After the death of Stalin, however, articles and policy statements began to appear criticizing Soviet scientists and research organizations for their arrogance (*zaznaistvo*) in ignoring Western science and technology.[9] Of course, Western science was utilized in the mercenary interests of bourgeois monopolists and imperialists, but it had nevertheless shown significant advances, which had to be critically assimilated by Soviet scientists in order that everything of value could be used to further Soviet economic and technological progress, and wasteful duplication of resources and parallelism be avoided. The importance attached to this new outlook can be grasped from the stress placed

[9] See for example two *Pravda* editorials, 20 January 1955, 8 July 1955.

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on it by Bulganin at the July 1955 Plenary Session of the Central Committee[10] and again at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. He emphasized the harm being done to the cause of technological progress by the many heads of ministries and departments and scientific workers who underestimated the achievements of foreign science and technology, and strongly criticized the way in which the task of learning and utilizing all that was useful in foreign science and technology had been neglected in recent years.

In these official statements there was no endorsement of the scientists' view of a united world of science and learning. International science was not so much a homogeneous entity as an enormous research laboratory to be put at the service of the Soviet economy, and this attitude has remained consistent up to the present. The farthest Soviet officials have gone towards endorsing the views of scientists is in the concept of a world 'treasure house' (*sokrovishchnitsa*) of science,[11] to which each nation contributes—and presumably also takes out what is useful. The way to utilize foreign science was not to expand informal personal contacts but to develop a highly efficient information service—through translations, abstracts, reference journals—and more recently by developing computerized information retrieval systems. To this end, the All Union Institute of Scientific Information (VINITI) was set up in 1952. Now under the joint authority of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for Science and Technology, the scale of its operations is enormous. In 1955 it examined 6,892 foreign periodicals[12]; in 1956 this had risen to 10,000 in 50 languages. It had agreements with 250 foreign publishers for the exchange of advance copies of scientific literature, exchanged works with 450 institutes, and had 12,000 foreign subscribers to its abstracts.[13] A more recent figure gives 17,000 journals regularly scanned, and 200,000 abstracts published yearly.[14]

One other field in which Soviet science policy has recently come to take account of foreign science is the purchase and sale of licences and patents. Thus in 1963 *Lisensintorg* was set up to sell Soviet licences abroad, and in 1965 the USSR joined the Paris Patents Convention,[15] by which nations agree to observe each other's patents. In 1966, at the 23rd CPSU Congress, Kosygin stressed the need for the USSR to take her proper place in the hitherto neglected world patents market, which could save Soviet R & D effort hundreds of millions of rubles.[16] In 1969 the permanent Soviet representative to COMECON wrote that 'no single country, not even a large one, is in a position to embrace by itself all the trends of scientific and technological progress

[10] See *Pravda*, 17 July 1955.
[11] See for example *Izvestia*, 11 January 1956.
[12] *Pravda*, 15 March 1955.
[13] D. Panov in *New Times*, August 1956.
[14] C. W. Clererdon in *Survey*, July 1964, p. 141.
[15] *Pravda*, 20 March 1965.
[16] *Pravda*, 6 April 1966.

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in such a way as to maintain material production branches permanently at the level of world achievements '.[17] He went on to say that COMECON countries were endeavouring to make still more efficient use of the achievements of foreign science and technology, via such methods as the purchase of patents and licences. In this connexion it is interesting to note that the recent series of bilateral technological agreements between the USSR, via the State Committee for Science and Technology, with leading Western governments—as in the case of the 1968 agreement with the UK—have included arrangements for the exchange on a commercial basis between industrial enterprises of 'know-how' and technology including licences.

FOREIGN policy from the superpower point of view can be regarded on two essentially different levels—as a world-wide battle for 'the minds of men', or, on a day to day level, as diplomatic thrust and counter-thrust. Science is playing an increasingly important role at both levels, and this is largely a result of post-war changes in the international power structure, and the relationship of science to other aspects of society.

The Manhattan Project, leading to the development of the atomic bomb, signified the end of the popular conception of science as a field apart from governmental concern. Science had played no part in the changes in the modes of production which had characterized the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The successive commercial and political pre-eminence of Spain, France, Holland, and Britain had borne no relationship to the strength of their scientific establishments. Germany, where towards the end of the nineteenth century the systematic application of theoretical science to technological innovation began, was the first country in which science played an important role in the rise to predominance. Subsequent years have seen the rapid expansion of all sectors of the R & D process in all industrialized countries; the decreasing 'lead-time' between theoretical discovery and industrial application; the increasing reliance of national defence capability on scientific and technological advances rather than human or industrial resources; and the emergence of science as a possible answer to many of the world's most pressing problems—food, over-population, etc. The modern industries and technologies most relevant to political, economic and military independence are mostly science based—electronics, aerospace, computers, atomic energy, etc. This, combined with the growth of the materialist outlook (the 'religion of the sputnik' etc.), has ensured the place of theoretical science as well as technology, as perhaps the most important indices of national power and prestige.

The role and significance of science in international politics has been further accentuated by post-war developments in the international power structure. Before 1939 both the USSR and the USA, the powers

[17] M. Lesechko, *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 10, March 1969.

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with the greatest potential ability to use science as an instrument of foreign policy, pursued essentially isolationist policies. In the post-war world the rise of Khrushchev in the USSR and the developing American policy of the containment of communism led to a worldwide confrontation between the ideologically opposed superpowers. It was not a confrontation that can be regarded in traditional balance of power terms. The onset of the missile age has meant that the foreign policy of the superpowers is not primarily aimed at adding to their military capability (in fact for the last 15 years they have been intermittently negotiating to reduce that capability). Power, as the capacity to influence others, has lost much of its association with the possession of 'hardware'. Diplomacy has become far more of a public relations exercise. This trend has been accentuated by the decolonization process, and the emergence of growing numbers of Afro-Asian neutral states, providing an impressionable audience for the superpower contest. Thus Soviet and American foreign policy-makers have had to broaden their areas of competence in order to display the advantages of their respective social and political systems, and to take account of the growing forms of mass international communication, which increasingly come to bear on national reputations.

These changes were reflected in the reorientation of Soviet foreign policy which took place in the mid 1950s, under the slogan of 'peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems'. This entailed the abandonment of the Zhdanov-Stalin two-camp thesis, and a new stress on Soviet friendship with the newly independent neutral Asian states—the 'zone of peace'—reflected in the emphasis placed by the Soviet press on the Bandung Conference of non-aligned states in April 1955 and the Bulganin-Khrushchev tour of Afghanistan, Burma and India later that year. Secondly, it involved a reassessment of relations with the West, signified by a stress on the value of negotiations as a means of settling disputes—the 'Geneva spirit', etc., and Khrushchev's assertion at the 20th Party Congress that countries with different social systems should do more than exist side by side, that the expansion of international contacts of all types would strengthen mutual trust and hence increase world security.

SOVIET theorists place great stress on the role of science and technology in their relations with capitalist states, and on interstate relations in general. First, the advances of military science and technology have provided the essential basis for a peaceful coexistence policy. In the words of Khrushchev[18]: 'The achievements of socialist production and Soviet science and technology have enabled us to effect a real revolution in military matters. The socialist system is now adequately defended against imperialist aggression, and we will not permit the imperialists to divert competition between the two systems from the path of peace.'

[18] See Report of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, 17 October 1961.

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Second, scientific and technological progress, via their contribution to the Soviet economy, have become an essenial element in this peaceful competition between the two systems. Since the mid 1950s all industrialized countries have been experiencing a 'research revolution', based in Soviet eyes on rapid advances in three main areas—automation and electronics, chemicalization, and atomic energy. Only under socialism can the benefits of this revolution be used for the good of society as a whole. Thus great stress is placed on the fact that the USSR was the first country to construct an atomic power station, and the first to construct a commercial atomic-powered vessel (the icebreaker *Lenin*). Commentaries on Soviet space research always stress the peaceful character of their exploration of the cosmos and compare this with American attempts to use the conquest of space for military, espionage, or more recently 'bourgeois monopolist' purposes (referring to the American 'Intelsat' Company). Under capitalism science and technology are the property of capitalists and imperialists, and thus the progress of the research revolution will only serve to deepen the inherent contradictions of capitalist society (a notable example of this being the West European fear of American domination in strategic science-based industries such as computers), and cause the correlation of forces in the world to move inexorably in favour of socialism. More recently, these arguments have often taken the shape of attacks on Western bourgeois theories of 'convergence', which are based on the mistaken assumption that science and technology can determine the system of social relations, whereas in fact the reverse is always the case.

Since science was officially declared to be a direct productive force and no longer part of the social superstructure in 1961, the theoretical significance of science and technology in international relations has increased accordingly. The same CPSU programme which made that declaration also stated that 'It is a matter of honour for Soviet scientists to consolidate the advanced position which Soviet science has won in major branches of knowledge, and to take a leading part in world science in all its basic directions.'[19] This was followed in 1966 by Kosygin's statement at the CPSU Congress that 'the course the economic competition between the two world systems will take depends in large measure on the level of scientific development, and the scale of application of research results with practice.'[20] One recent commentator declared that 'The scientific-technological revolution is becoming the central point at which the bitter ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism is being and will be carried on.'[21]

SOVIET accounts of scientific relations traditionally divide the field into three sectors—relations with 'fraternal' countries, with developing countries, and with capitalist countries. This is a very large

[19] Ibid., 18 October 1961.
[20] *Pravda*, 6 April 1966.
[21] Z. P. Ivanova in *Voprosy Istorii*, November 1969.

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topic, and only a summary of the chief trends of Soviet policy can be given here, concentrating mainly on relations with capitalist states before going on to examine in more detail Soviet non-governmental scientific relations.

Soviet scientific and technical relations with fraternal countries, especially within the CMEA, are, naturally, always held up as being the best developed and the most beneficial for all concerned. They represent what can be achieved by the principle of the international socialist division of labour, and are compared with the bourgeois monopolist character of the EEC and the continual struggle within that organization that this engenders. As for the diplomatic uses of scientific and technical relations, they clearly contribute to the unity of the socialist bloc and provide a powerful instrument for encouraging further integration within COMECON along the lines desired by Moscow, and opposed by some bloc members, notably Rumania. They also, of course, provide the USSR with a large additional source of scientific and technological expertise, though exchanges of scientific and technical documentation and technical delegations have been on the average 2 : 1 in favour of the East European states.[22]

Scientific and technical relations with developing countries form an important part of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. After the Bulganin-Khrushchev tour of Afghanistan, Burma, and India in 1955, Soviet relations with these countries were further cemented by a series of technological aid and exchange agreements, the most notable being for the construction of the mammoth Bhilai steel mills in India. Since then the USSR has concluded a series of scientific and technical agreements with Afro-Asian states, concentrating on those with an anti-Western outlook, and if possible, centred on some big prestige project like the Aswan Dam and stressing the relevance of the Soviet industrialization process (i.e. based on an initial concentration on heavy industry) for developing states. In international organizations such as UNESCO and the IAEA, Soviet policy whenever possible has been to side with the developing countries, encouraging their fears of the commercial and neo-colonial outlook of the West and their attempts to dominate these international organizations.

There are numerous references in Soviet writings to the ways in which cultural and scientific contacts between socialist and capitalist states contribute to increased mutual understanding and international security—along the lines of the thesis that wars begin in the minds of men. As a result of the global and ideological nature of the confrontation between the USSR and the West, increasing importance has become attached to those areas of social activity in which a common outlook and common problems exist—notably science and technology. Thus the bilateral governmental scientific or technological agreement has become an important weapon of Soviet diplomacy. Early examples

[22] M. Lesechko, op. cit.

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of this form of diplomacy occurred in 1955. In June of that year the Soviet Government sent a note to the West German Government proposing the normalization of relations between the two countries, which included a section on the need to promote scientific relations between the two countries and emphasized the past history of cooperation in this field. In August 1955, just after the return of Porkkala to Finland, the two countries signed an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation.

The period between 1958 and 1961 was marked by strenuous Soviet efforts in the field of cultural diplomacy, in which cultural and scientific exchange agreements were signed with a number of Western states including the USA, Britain, France, and West Germany. The actual scientific content of these and subsequent agreements has been relatively small—for example, the agreement concluded with the UK in February 1967 provided for the exchange of four highly qualified scientists (preferably Academicians) for up to three weeks; three leading scientists for between one and two months; and four research workers for periods up to 10 months, and similar numbers under the headings of 'technology' and 'agriculture and fisheries'. Nevertheless, they provide a useful diplomatic instrument for both sides. As they have to be renegotiated every two years, an improvement in political relations can be indicated by increasing the number or length of exchanges, and a deterioration in relations by cutting down on the exchanges, as was done by Moscow in 1968 in its agreement with Washington, as a protest against the escalation of the Vietnam war. In this latter capacity, they act as a kind of safety valve; the cutting down of such exchanges, along with cancellations of sporting or cultural contacts, perhaps gets more publicity for one's point of view than an exchange of notes between foreign offices, and also perhaps prevents or delays the development of serious diplomatic crises.

Another area of Soviet scientific diplomacy worthy of brief mention concerns the recent conclusion of a series of governmental scientific and technological agreements with West European countries. Aside from their obvious technological benefits, these must also be viewed as one aspect of the Soviet attempt to offset the disadvantages resulting from the increasing economic and political integration of West Europe. In this context the example of Soviet-French relations is particularly interesting. Franco-Soviet scientific and technical cooperation had been developing steadily since the 1956 visit of Mollet and Pineau to the USSR, and by the early 1960s was in advance of that between the USSR and any other West European country. De Gaulle's visit to the USSR in the summer of 1966, not unconnected, one suspects, with the French decision to leave NATO the same year, gave enormous impetus to this cooperation, which now represents a very important aspect of the Soviet attempt to encourage the independent and anti-American orientation of French policy within Western Europe. The various inter-governmental agreements now cover a variety of fields—space cooperation,

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including the planned launching of a French satellite by a Soviet rocket; the SECAM television agreement which includes the construction of a French pilot factory in the USSR; atomic energy, and the planned French contribution of a 'bubble chamber' to the Serpukhov accelerator; oceanography; medical research; agricultural technology; oil prospecting; desalinization.

There are a variety of other aspects of this form of Soviet scientific diplomacy, to which there is space to give only a brief mention—the current Soviet attempt to use proposals for European scientific and technical cooperation in such fields as nuclear and medical research, pipelines and waterways, as an incentive for Western powers to take part in a European security conference [23]; the series of Soviet and American proposals for joint research in space, desalinization, and the construction of a giant nuclear particle accelerator, which have been in part attempts on both sides to achieve propaganda successes, the use of such media as the Pugwash conferences or the International Atomic Energy Authority to achieve scientific support for a particular political viewpoint, and so on.

IT is very difficult to find ways of establishing either the extent of these relations or the motivational factors behind their development, as there is a notable lack of both suitable statistics and adequate conceptual tools. One possible area of investigation is an analysis of Soviet contributions to foreign scientific journals. Thus it has been calculated that in 1961 15 per cent of the articles in the American journal *Physical Abstracts* were originally written in Russian, compared with 68 per cent in English, 7 per cent in French, and 6 per cent in German. In 1964, the figures for *Chemical Abstracts* were: English 44 per cent, Russian 20 per cent, German 9 per cent, Japanese 8 per cent.[24] However, to build up a coherent picture based on this type of information, or in related fields such as reference counting, one would need considerably more data than are at present available; their compilation would be a monumental task.

A more fruitful area of investigation concerns the number of Soviet scientists travelling abroad, and the number of foreign scientists visiting the USSR. From figures scattered through various types of Soviet literature it has been possible to construct Tables A and B. The first thing to be said about these figures is that, like many Soviet statistics, it is not certain exactly what they represent, i.e. what percentage of the total number of Soviet scientists going abroad, or foreign scientists visiting the Soviet Union, as the phrases used to introduce the figures are not entirely consistent.

[23] See *Pravda*, 13 November 1969, and an interview with the Rumanian newspaper *Scientieia* by Academician Millionshchikov, reported in BBC *Summary of World Broadcasts*, pt. 2—East Europe no. 3285, 22 July 1970.

[24] Philip Abelson in *Science*, No. 149, 1965, p. 929.

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	Table A			*Table B*			
Year	Total abroad	To soc. ctries.	To cap. ctries.	Total No. scts. vstg. USSR	From soc. states	From cap. states	% from cap. states
54	175	-	-	175	-	-	-
55	481	-	-	361	-	-	-
56	877	-	-	823	-	-	-
57	1,529	-	-	907	-	-	-
58	2,011	(1,000)	(1,000)	2,833	1,596	1,237	44
59	1,701	870	(800)	1,564	1,144	420	27
60	2,408	1,053	1,355	3,700	-	-	-
61	1,674	700	800	(4,000)	-	-	-
62	1,501	710	792	1,428	900	528	37
63	2,064	975	1,089	1,841	1,370	471	20
64	2,287	1,107	1,180	3,200	1,888	1,312	41
65	2,911	1,533	1,409	4,326	2,539	1,787	41
66	3,459	1,648	(2,000)	9,305	3,662	5,643	61
67	4,522	-	-	3,590	-	-	-

Approximate figures in brackets

The question is whether to assume that the figures refer only to scientists within the Academy system, or whether the Academy has some kind of responsibility for the journeys of scientists under ministerial jurisdiction. A functional breakdown [25] of the activities pursued abroad by these scientists shows that they include not only scientists attending national or international conferences, but also those on lecture tours, exchange of experience (*obmena opytom*), expeditions at individual invitations or under agreements. The only other comparable figures I have found refer to Soviet specialists (*spetsialisti*) visiting 'fraternal' countries which give the numbers as 29,000 in the 'recent period' [26] (*istekshii period*), or over 5,000 between 1958 and 1961.[27] This latter figure is not signficantly greater than those given in Table A as visiting socialist countries (the total for 1958–61 adds up to 4,233); the difference is presumably explained by the wider connotation of *spetsialisti* as compared with *uchenye*. It would seem, therefore, that these figures do also refer to non-Academy scientists. This is indirectly confirmed by a glance at the *Vestnik Akademii Nauk*, the journal of the USSR Academy, which in the mid-1950s, for example, reports a very large number of attendances at technologically oriented international congresses.

If these assumptions are correct, the insignificant proportion of Soviet scientists going abroad becomes a striking feature of the table. In 1955, for example, the total number of *nauchnye rabotniki* in the USSR was 224,000; and in 1966 it was estimated that 15–20,000 American scientists attend 2,000 international meetings per annum.[28]

[25] In N. M. Sisakyan, *V.A.N.*, No. 3, March 1964.
[26] M. Lesechko, op. cit. [27] V. Novikov in *Izvestia*, 14 September 1962.
[28] George McGhee (US Ambassador in West Germany), reported in Glenn T. Seaborg 'What's ahead for International Science', *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, January 1967.

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However, given the uncertainty involved, further considerations of absolute size are less helpful than an examination of relative variations in the figures as they stand. This reveals a rapid growth in the mid-1950s both in the numbers of Soviet scientists travelling abroad, and foreigners visiting the USSR. Between 1954 and 1958 these figures increased twelvefold and sixteenfold respectively. This represents an increase of a different order from the total increase of *nauchnye rabotniki* in the USSR, which in the same period grew by less than 40 per cent.[29] These figures confirm the statements one occasionally meets concerning the ' emergence of Soviet scientists on to the international scene ' after the death of Stalin. It seems also that the increasingly confident statements made in this period by leading Soviet scientists examined earlier, in spite of the absence of any official pronouncements indicating a change of policy, at least gave rise to, or reflected, a tacit change of outlook on the part of the authorities towards informal international scientific contacts.

Another striking feature revealed by these figures is their erratic oscillation between 1958 and 1963, which again is reflected in both tables. Too much reliance should not be placed on Table B, as these figures will clearly depend on the number of international conferences held in the USSR in any one year (hence for example the abnormally high figure for 1966 was the result of the coincidence of several large conferences). However, it seems safe to assume that the number of conferences held outside the USSR does not vary greatly from year to year, and certainly does not suddenly decrease. As it is not yet certain what the figures in the tables represent, one possible explanation of these oscillations is an administrative change within the USSR, involving a decrease in Academy responsibility for scientists travelling abroad. The 1961 reforms by which the number of scientific establishments in the Academy system was reduced from 241 in 1960 to 167 in 1961,[30] might have influenced the figures. However, even if we assume that these figures refer only to Academy scientists, their actual number fell between 1960 and 1961, only from 23,771 to 19,068,[31] which does not seem sufficient to account for the drop of over 30 per cent in the Table A figures and the still lower figures for 1962. Another possibility is that the establishment of the State Committee in 1961, with responsibility for coordination of international scientific contacts, could have caused a sharp reduction in the number of scientists going abroad under Academy auspices. If this is so, there is no mention of any separate figures representing the Committee's responsibility. Nor do these administrative explanations account for the drop in 1959, after five years of rapid and sustained increase.

There is therefore the possibility that these figures are influenced by political considerations, by deteriorations in relations between the USSR and the West. A plausible hypothesis would be that the low figures in 1959 and 1961–62 represent the two Berlin crises of 1959 and

[29] *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo v 1958 godu.*
[30] R. Davies et al., *Science Policy in the USSR*, OECD, 1969, pp. 216–217.
[31] Ibid. pp. 216–217.

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1961 and the Cuban crisis of 1962, and that the steady subsequent increase reflects the stabilization of superpower relations after the Cuban crisis and the 1963 Test Ban Treaty. The drop in the figures at times of crisis might be the result of individual scientists' decisions or, more plausibly, official policy, either via instructions to the Academy or by cutting down on travel permits. An example of this in reverse would be the decision of NATO countries after the August 1961 Berlin crisis to restrict sharply the travel of East German citizens, including scientists, to NATO countries.[32] This, however, was in the nature of a diplomatic gesture of disapproval; no such effect would be achieved simply by the Soviet Government preventing its own citizens from travelling abroad. If we accept that political decisions are responsible for these oscillations, it must be assumed that they were the result of the highly security-conscious, almost xenophobic nature of Soviet politics.

There are, however, several drawbacks to this interpretation. In the first place, neither 1959 nor 1961 saw any marked increase in press attacks on the subversive activities of Western agents, either within the USSR, or against Soviet citizens abroad, nor was there any increase in the customary calls for vigilance in dealings with foreigners. Indeed, in October 1961, Zhukov, then head of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, gave an interview[33] in which he emphasized the importance of scientific and cultural contacts; though making the customary remarks on the uncooperative attitude of certain Western governments, he did not say that these contacts were being used for subversive purposes. Also, it must be remembered, 1959, especially, was the time when the USSR was negotiating many of its scientific and cultural agreements with the West.

Another difficulty arises from the need to explain why other similar East-West crises are not reflected in the figures, notably the year 1956, the time of the Polish and Hungarian uprisings and the Suez crisis. In the case of the Hungarian crisis, the question of timing arises. The vast majority of scientific exchanges and visits take place in summer; hence it could be argued that the Hungarian crisis which finally erupted in November 1956 was too late to affect the 1956 figures and was forgotten by the summer of 1957. However, the same argument could apply to the 1959 Berlin crisis, which developed in the final months of 1958 and had virtually evaporated by spring 1959.

A final possible explanation is that the figures reflect the general line of Soviet cultural policy, i.e. the official attitude to the liberal intelligentsia as a whole. Under Khrushchev, however, cultural policy was so erratic and pragmatic that it is difficult to isolate any general trends which might coincide with our figures. Certainly, it would be difficult to maintain that either 1959 or 1961 was a particularly repressive year. 1959, especially, was notable for Krushchev's attempted rapprochement

[32] Eugene B. Skolnikoff, *Science, Technology and American Foreign Policy*, 1969, p. 66.
[33] *Sovetskaya Kultura*, 14 October 1961.

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with the 'liberals' at the Third Writers' Congress after the difficulties of the Pasternak affair in 1958.

The main objection to all the above lines of reasoning is, as a glance at the tables will show, that figures for exchanges with socialist countries follow an almost identical pattern to those with non-socialist countries. The percentage visiting non-socialist countries is at its lowest—47 per cent—in 1959, and at its highest—57 per cent—in 1966. It should be noted, however, that 1959 and 1961 do have two of the lowest figures—47 per cent and 48 per cent respectively. (Though the 1961 figure is suspect as the two categories do not 'add up' for that year, the figure for socialist countries being 42 per cent of the total.) This does, perhaps, lend some credibility to the 'political' explanation, though, and here one must mention the possibility that the drop in the numbers visiting socialist states could have an alternative political explanation, i.e. the withdrawal of large numbers of scientists from China, which took place at this time. On the surface, this seems an obvious explanation, but it is still puzzling why the figures should follow the exact pattern they do—i.e. a drop in 1959, an increase in 1960 (the year the withdrawal was announced), and a sharp drop again in both 1961 and 1962. The matter is further complicated by a separate series of figures for the number of specialists sent to fraternal countries, which follow an identical pattern to those in Table A, i.e. 1958: 1,787; 1959: 1,272; 1960: 1,603; 1961: 1,338.[34] One is left with the problem, therefore, of where the 1,390 Soviet experts withdrawn from China in 1960 fit into this pattern.[35]

The only firm conclusion, it seems, is that the explanation of these variations must remain for the moment an open question.

Table C

Soviet Exchanges of Scientific Journals

	1956		1959		1962	
	Sent	Rcvd.	Sent	Rcvd.	Sent	Rcvd.
USA	9,425	8,818	16,735	12,163	33,074	30,937
UK	7,332	6,576	10,760	8,537	13,359	12,284
W. Germany	2,235	1,529	4,694	3,180	4,652	4,483
France	6,148	6,453	8,077	6,889	10,389	10,338
Italy	4,460	2,702	4,555	2,469	5,102	3,169

Table C represents the exchanges of the Leningrad Library of the Academy of Sciences with five leading capitalist countries, measured in terms of *izdatel'skie edinitsi* (publishing units), which include primarily monographs, journals, reprints, and photocopies. The most notable feature is the rapid increase in exchanges with the USA—over 300 per cent in publications both sent and received in the seven years covered

[34] *International Affairs* (Moscow), March 1963, p. 112.
[35] John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute 1963–7*, p. 139.

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by the table. This was considerably in excess of the increases with the other states (those with the UK and West Germany approximately doubling, with France slightly less, and Italy considerably so). The high figures achieved by the USA—two-and-a-half times greater than its nearest rival, the UK—would seem to suggest that it is primarily scientific considerations which determine the international flow of scientific publications to and from the USSR. The extremely low figure for West Germany, however, which—scientifically speaking—one would expect to be at least on a par with the UK, tends to create the opposite impression, and illustrates that there are considerable difficulties even at this level in establishing international scientific relations between states where great political antipathy exists. (Though the explanation could be simply that more Russian scientists read English than German, and more American than German scientists read Russian.)

One final remark concerning Table C: it is noticeable that in every case the USSR sent abroad more publications than it received, in spite of continued Soviet insistence on the principle of 'equivalence' or reciprocity in exchange agreements with Western scientific institutions, and indicates the great importance attached to this form of scientific exchange in the USSR, and the desire to expand it as rapidly as possible.

A further aspect of the subject is Soviet membership of international non-governmental organizations (INGOS). My information on this is drawn from the Yearbooks of International Organisations,[36] which provide bi-annual lists of the membership and various other characteristics of INGOS—including those classified as 'scientific' and 'technological'. Table D is an analysis of the percentage Soviet membership

Table D

Percentage Soviet Membership of Scientific and Technological INGOS

	Both sc. tech.	*Sc.*	*Technology*
1951–52	21	18	25
1955–56	32	35	26
1958–59	53	59	43
1960–61	56	63	49
1964–65	61	66	52
1968–69	55	69	38

of these scientific and technological INGOS for the period 1951–69 (though some years are missing due to the non-availability of certain Yearbooks). It reveals a similar trend to Tables A and B, though without the problematic oscillations. Some time between 1952 and 1956 Soviet membership began to rise rapidly and continued to do so until about 1959, when the growth rate begins to level off. The sudden drop in

[36] *Yearbook of International Organizations*, published by Brussels Union of International Organizations.

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'Technology' between 1965 and 1969 is largely explained by the rapid growth in the number of West European-based INGOS, which, presumably for political reasons, the USSR has declined to join. Compared with other major industrial and scientific powers, Soviet membership of INGOS is relatively low—even in 1969. For example the membership of France, Germany, the UK and the USA has remained at above 90 per cent, and by 1965 Japanese membership had reached 85 per cent.

These Yearbooks enable us to correlate Soviet membership of INGOS with other characteristics of the organizations. Table E represents an attempt to do this in terms of the function of the organizations. It can be seen from this table that two categories stand out as possessing substantially higher membership than the rest, those INGOS with

Table E

Soviet Membership of INGOS in terms of Organizational Function 1964–65

	Sc. & Tech.		*Sc.*		*Tech.*	
	A	B	A	B	A	B
T	61	115	66	113	52	121
a	51	112	52	118	50	108
b1	58	100	63	91	50	125
b2	76	103	92	103	62	103
c	53	101	56	76	50	301
d	78	120	91	127	57	115

Key

Columns: A=Soviet percentage membership
B=Growth rate: 1958=100

Rows T=Overall Soviet membership
a=INGOS which hold seminars, organize exchanges, or apparently just exist
b1=INGOS which initiate, finance or execute their *own* research on an international basis
b2=INGOS which do the above in *permanent* working and technical study groups
c=INGOS which provide services, e.g. libraries, documentation centres
d=INGOS concerned with standardization of nomenclature, etc.

permanent working and technical study groups, and those concerned with standardization. The high figure for the former category 'b2', combined with the relatively low figure for category 'a', would seem to suggest that there is a substantial Soviet commitment towards joint research activities with non-socialist states, at least at the non-governmental level. This could be taken as an example of the traditional

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Soviet dislike of informal international scientific relations, and a desire to direct the international activities of Soviet scientists towards those areas in which the field of research is clearly defined, and the results obtained can be assessed in terms of concrete benefits—as against the unique advantages scientists claim they derive from informal discussions and exchange of ideas. On the other hand, it could simply be that Soviet scientists, starting with a virtually blank sheet in the early 1950s, were first electing to join those INGOS which were most active and performing the most useful work. If this is so, it seems that, once it was decided at least tacitly to accept the increasing international activities of Soviet scientists, the authorities were not concerned to limit these activities to the most ineffectual areas, but were prepared to let their scientists become involved in joint research with their capitalist fellows, in a setting free of the usual political controls.

The relatively low membership figure for the INGOS providing library and documentation services is presumably a reflection of the adequate facilities available in the USSR. The high figure for the standardization group, which also possesses the highest growth rate between 1959 and 1965, reflects the growing Soviet interest in Western science and technology and the need to make the best use possible of Western achievements. A parallel factor is the increasing Soviet interest in the world patents and licence market, which was developing at the same time.

Another interesting result of this analysis of Soviet membership of INGOS came from an attempt to correlate Soviet membership with that of other selected international groupings of states. Aside from that of Soviet bloc countries, in which a clear correlation emerged, the three groupings used were: A—Afro-Asian developing countries (i.e. Afro-Asian countries minus Japan and South Africa); B—NATO members; C—members of the Western alliance system (i.e. Group B, plus members of CENTO, SEATO, OAS, and those with bilateral defence treaties with the USA—Japan, Spain, South Vietnam, Taiwan, and South Korea. The results are shown in Table F.

The method used with each group was to compare the percentage number of group memberships in the INGOS of which the USSR was

Table F

		Group A	*Group B*	*Group C*
1958–59	Sc.	N.S. Pos.	(S) Neg.	(S) Neg.
	Tech.	S. Pos.	S Neg.	S. Neg.
1964–65	Sc.	N.S. Pos.	(S) Neg.	N.S. Neg.
	Tech.	S* Pos.	S* Neg.	S* Neg.

Key N.S.=Not significant S =Significant
(S) =Significance doubtful S*=Highly Significant
Pos.=Positive correlation Neg.=Negative correlation

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a member, with those in which the USSR was not a member, and see if a significant difference emerged. In the case of Group A, it was thought that the USSR would tend to participate in the INGOS with a large Afro-Asian representation, on the grounds that, if membership was presumed to be in any way politically motivated, this group would provide both an opportunity to bring 'politico-scientific' influence to bear, and a sympathetic audience for illustrations of Soviet scientific and technological prowess. For similar reasons it was thought that the USSR would tend to avoid those INGOS which were in any way dominated by Western nations and their allies.

As Table F shows, there is in fact a wide difference between science and technology, a difference which became even more marked between 1959 and 1965. Part of the explanation for this, it is suggested, is administrative. Though it is not absolutely clear where responsibility lies for Soviet membership of INGOS, one presumes that as far as the 'scientific' are concerned, the Academy has primary responsibility, while the 'technological' will be the responsibility of ministries or State Committees, which, lacking the traditional independence of the Academy, would be more conscious of political factors in their international contacts.

A second explanation would be the difference in the nature of the knowledge and research process involved. Technological subjects would be more relevant to the needs and interests of the developing countries, and less amenable to mutual exchanges and experimentation with politically hostile nations. Thus, for example, where important exchanges of technical know-how do take place between the USSR and Western countries, they are usually carefully regulated by governmental agreement.

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Soviet Science Policy and the Scientific Establishment

Linda Lubrano Greenberg

IN his speech to the 24th Congress of the CPSU, Academician M. V. Keldysh [1] made no reference to the dissident elements of the scientific establishment. He focused, instead, on scientific achievements, technical problems, and prospects for greater effectiveness in scientific research. In a 'business-as-usual' tone, he spoke on behalf of more than 30,000 scientists employed by the USSR Academy of Sciences.[2]

While many of these scientists may not be sympathetic to dissident demands, they share certain working conditions within the Academy's elaborate network of laboratories, institutes, and departments. Over the last few years, changes in Soviet science policy have affected the relationships and research conditions of the Academy bureaucracy. In particular, the progressive imposition of political and administrative controls has eroded the relatively high degree of institutional autonomy that the Academy had developed by 1964.

These changes have threatened the rapport that existed between scientists and politicians during the Khrushchev period, when many scientists, particularly those in leadership positions, were quite outspoken on various issues that affected their research. They debated the formulation and administration of the government's science policy and suggested many of the reforms implemented between 1955 and 1963. At that time, the government accommodated the interests of this skilled group and gave the Academy considerable self-rule.

However, since 1965, the Party and government have significantly curtailed the relative autonomy of the scientific establishment. The Academy's activities have been integrated more closely with other institutions, such as industrial and educational establishments. The government has increased its supervision of academy work through the USSR Council of Ministers' State Committee on Science and Technology (*Gosudarstvennyi komitet po nauke i tekhnike*, GKNT), and the Party has done likewise through its primary Party organizations.

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[1] Mathematician, President of the USSR Academy of Sciences since 1961.

[2] 'Rech tovarishcha M. V. Keldysha' ('Speech of comrade M. V. Keldysh') *Pravda*, 2 April 1971, p. 5. The Academy employed 29,987 natural and social research scientists in all fields in 1967. (Helgard Wienert, 'The Organization and Planning of Research in the Academy System', in E. Zaleski, et al., *Science Policy in the USSR* (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1969), pp. 216–17.) However, the term 'scientific establishment' will be used here to refer only to the Academy's physicists, mathematicians, chemists, and biologists.

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ONE of the government's persistent goals in science, emphasized again at the 24th Party Congress, has been the rapid utilization of research results in production. In order to achieve this goal, it has been necessary to create effective channels of communication and co-ordination between the Academy and industry. Therefore, the government's policy has encouraged informal cooperation between academy scientists and industrial engineers and the establishment of formal coordinating institutions, such as the GKNT, science councils, and scientific-technical societies.

Informal liaison between academy and industrial personnel was not always successful. Academicians were expected to make periodic visits to industrial laboratories, but they often refused to do so. Engineers were supposed to bring new ideas into industry through their enrolment in graduate training programmes at the Academy. But, they complained that the incentive of an academic degree had a negative effect on industry, because it prompted some of their best technicians to join academy institutes, which offered better working conditions, higher salaries, and greater prestige.[3]

Differences in professional training presented another obstacle to effective communication between scientists and engineers. Many theoretical scientists did not understand production problems; engineers were often reluctant to accept the potential risks involved in the application of someone else's innovation. Although several examples of favourable personnel interaction were reported after 1966, a 1970 *Pravda* editorial still complained about the inadequate number of people trained in both the theoretical and practical aspects of science.[4]

The government seems to have been more successful in establishing formal administrative ties between the Academy and industry, but only since 1965. An earlier attempt in this direction was the creation of the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research Work (*Gosudarstvennyi komitet po koordinatsii nauchno-issledovatelskikh rabot*, GKKNIR) directly under the USSR Council of Ministers in 1961. It was expected, at first, that the new committee would coordinate all research and development and thereby ensure the prompt technological application of scientific discoveries. But GKKNIR lacked firm administrative authority, and its success depended heavily on a close working relationship with the Academy. The State Committee co-opted members of the Academy for advice and set procedural guidelines for the latter's draft plans, draft budgets, and international contacts.

The State Committee was soon unable to handle its workload, partly because the Academy refused to cooperate with it. GKKNIR shifted to a concentration on the administration of applied research and, in March 1963, it was placed under the Supreme Council of the National Economy. It was clear that the Academy, then one administrative level

[3] M. Dalin, 'Ne za stepen, a za delo' ('Not for a degree but for business'), *Izvestia*, 23 September 1964, p. 3.
[4] 'Nauka na zavode' ('Science at the plant'), *Pravda*, 6 June 1970, p. 1.

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above the State Committee, was not under the latter's control. As a result, the Academy's basic research was not coordinated effectively with industrial needs.

By 1965, the Party decided to strengthen the State Committee, particularly in its relationship with the Academy. At the September Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the Academy was instructed to collaborate with the government's committee in the formulation of annual proposals on the acceleration of technical progress.[5] GKKNIR was renamed the State Committee on Science and Technology in October 1965, and returned to the USSR Council of Ministers on a par with the Academy. The Party then expanded the jurisdiction of GKNT over all stages of the research and development process. For example, it was authorized to select the 'most promising' projects from academy and higher educational institutes and transfer them to design bureaux for further elaboration.[6] By 1968, plans for the entire complex of operations from the laboratory to production had to be confirmed by the GKNT, which then exercised general supervision over plan fulfilment.[7]

The State Committee's authority over academy affairs included the investigation of scientific institutes and the elimination of those that were 'second-rate'.[8] In defence, the Academy called attention to its institutes conducting joint research with industrial laboratories.[9] Apparently, the Academy also made structural changes in its departments in order to strengthen their ties with industry at the end of 1965,[10] and it resolved to give top priority to that research which contributed most to technological progress.[11]

Another way in which the government hoped to coordinate research with production was through the network of science councils (*nauchnye*

[5] 'Obsuzhdeniye dokladov po voprosam tsenoobrazovaniya' ('Discussion of the reports on the question of price formation'), *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* (hereafter referred to as *VAN*), No. 2 (1966), p. 91. Keldysh acknowledged that this was being done at the February 1966 General Meeting of the Academy. (M. V. Keldysh, 'Nekotorye itogi razvitiya nauki v minuvshem semiletii' ('Some results of the development of science in the last seven-year period') *VAN*, No. 3 (1966), p. 13.)

[6] 'Komitet po nauke i tekhnike: prava i obyazannosti' ('Committee on science and technology: rights and duties'), *Izvestia*, 9 October 1966, p. 3.

[7] TsK KPSS pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR (CPSU Central Committee of USSR Council of Ministers), 'O meropriyatiyakh po povysheniyu effektivnosti raboty nauchnykh organizatsii i uskoreniyu ispol'zovaniya v narodnom khozyaistve dostizhenii nauki i tekhniki' ('On measures to raise the efficiency of the work of scientific organizations and to accelerate the utilization of scientific and technical achievements in the national economy'), *Pravda*, 23 October 1968, pp. 1–2.

[8] 'Progress nauki—progress proizvodstva' ('Progress in science is progress in production'), *Pravda*, 30 November 1966, p. 1. This was done in conjunction with the USSR and republican academies of sciences, ministries, and agencies.

[9] For example, the Institute for Macro-molecular Compounds (ibid.) and the Institute of Physical Chemistry ('An Interview with N. Semenov', *Nedelya*, No. 19 (April 1967), pp. 11, 20–21, trans. JPRS (Joint Publications Research Service), US Department of Commerce, No. 41,490).

[10] 'Shirokii front nashei nauki' ('The broad front of our science'), *Pravda*, 11 August 1966, p. 1; N. M. Sisakyan, 'Vazhneishiye dostizheniya v oblasti estestvennykh i obshchestvennykh nauk v 1965 g.' ('The most important achievements in the area of the natural and social sciences in 1965), *VAN*, No. 3 (1966), p. 15.

[11] 'Obsuzhdeniye dokladov', p. 92.

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sovety).' While various forms of these councils had existed for many years, Peter Kapitsa (physicist, academician) proposed a new type of special 'complex' councils, in 1956, including scientists and engineers from several disciplines. Operating as *ad hoc* 'task forces' for the solution of specific, complex problems, he suggested that they temporarily use academy laboratories, design bureaux, and experimental facilities.[12] Such councils were established under the Academy Presidium in 1959 and under GKKNIR in 1961.

The councils held periodic conferences at which they discussed the procedures and substance of current research. The conferences assessed the priority of research problems and considered the distribution of the workload among various institutes. They served as information centres and made suggestions concerning the training of scientific personnel.[13] But the councils failed to close the gap between research and production, partly because the councils of the Academy were administratively separate from the councils of GKKNIR. The former were responsible for complex, inter-disciplinary problems in the natural and social sciences, whereas the latter dealt with complex, inter-industrial, and technical problems.[14]

In an effort to overcome this bureaucratic division, in 1965, the government placed all science councils under the supervision of the Learned Council (*Uchenyi sovet*) of the State Committee for Science and Technology. The Learned Council proceeded to reduce duplication and to improve coordination by merging some science councils and curtailing the activities of others.[15] It held regular meetings at which it surveyed the competence of the science councils, reviewed their activities, and made specific recommendations for research topics (most of which were accepted).[16] In this way, the Learned Council not only reduced the Academy's authority over its own councils, but also forced scientists on the councils to integrate their research with industrial needs.

The Learned Council included representatives of the scientific-technical societies, another set of institutions coordinating the Academy with industry. The societies had strengthened their relationship, in the late 1960s, not only with the Academy's science councils, but also with its institutes and departments. In order to further this trend, in 1968, V. G. Siluyanov (chairman, All-Union Council of Scientific and Technical

[12] P. L. Kapitsa, 'Nekotorye voprosy organizatsii nauchnoi raboty' ('Several questions on the organization of scientific work'), *Pravda*, 4 May 1957, p. 4.

[13] A. V. Topchiev, 'O sostoyanii i podgotovke nauchnykh kadrov v svete novykh zadach Akademii nauk SSSR' ('On the condition and preparation of scientific personnel in light of the new tasks of the USSR Academy of Sciences'), *VAN*, No. 12 (1961), pp. 35–48.

[14] 'Nauchnye sovety—novaya forma rukovodstva naukoi' ('Science councils are a new form of science administration'), *VAN*, No. 2 (1962), p. 4.

[15] The Learned Council's resolution was formally approved by the Academy and the State Committee. (V. D. Lyubimov, 'Iz opyta koordinatsii nauchnoi raboty v Sovetskom Soyuze' ('From the experience of coordinating scientific work in the Soviet Union'), *VAN*, No. 8 (1965), p. 46.)

[16] Ibid.

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Societies) called for more formal, permanent relationships between the Academy and the societies. M. V. Keldysh supported this idea by suggesting that the societies present thematic reports to sessions of the Academy's Presidium, and that they nominate candidates for the Academy's science councils. In addition, the Presidium instructed academy scientists to discuss their plans and scientific research with members of the societies, and it advised republican academies of sciences to do likewise.[17] Since the societies were in close contact with industrial enterprises, both directly and through their representatives on the scientific and technical divisions of government ministries, they not only facilitated communication between academy scientists and industrial workers, but also helped bring the Academy under closer government supervision.

The cumulative effect of the activities of the State Committee, its Learned Council, and the scientific-technical societies was to integrate the scientific establishment more closely with industry. This meant a decline in the Academy's relative autonomy from such institutions, and it threatened to reorient the Academy's research toward applied science. Such a shift in research emphasis could return academy scientists to the position from which they had extricated themselves between 1955 and 1964.

In the mid-1950s there had been more academicians in the Academy's Department of Technical Sciences than in all other departments combined. For three decades, the work of the Academy had been directed toward industrial goals.[18] After Stalin's death, several scientific leaders indicated that they had never been happy with the focus on applied research. The most outspoken on this issue, the president of the Academy, A. N. Nesmeyanov (organic chemist, academician) challenged the Central Committee's interpretation of the proper role of the Academy. He said that the Party misunderstood the 'fact' that the Academy's key function was the performance of basic research. For this reason, according to Nesmeyanov, the Academy could not, and should not, be expected to meet production requirements. He complained, moreover, that the excessive number of engineers in the Academy and the stress on applied research interfered with the Academy's ability to perform basic research effectively.[19]

Nesmeyanov's argument was picked up by N. N. Semenov (physical chemist, academician), in 1959, after it was supported by N. S. Khrushchev. A vigorous debate ensued in which academy engineers, led by the late I. P. Bardin (engineer, academician), took the view that

[17] 'Ob usilenii svyazei nauchno-tekhnicheskikh obshchestv s akademiei' ('Strengthening the contacts of scientific and technical societies with the Academy'), *VAN*, No. 1 (1968), pp. 17–20.

[18] The emphasis on applied science during this time was a drastic change from the Academy's major concentration on theoretical questions in the early 1920s and the pre-Soviet period.

[19] A. N. Nesmeyanov, 'Zaglyadyvaya v budushcheye nauki' ('Looking into the future of science'), *Pravda*, 31 December 1955, p. 2; 'Preniya po otchetnym dokladam' ('Discussion of the summary report'), *Pravda*, 19 February 1956, pp. 3–4.

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the Academy should continue in the role Stalin had set for it. By 1961, the issue was resolved in favour of the Semenov group. The Academy regained the right to concentrate mainly on basic research, and most of its technical institutes were transferred to industry. This 'de-Stalinization' of the Academy was carried further in 1963 when the government extended the Academy's authority over the coordination and supervision of basic research in the republican academies of sciences, higher educational establishments, and institutes attached to state committees.

The Academy's research orientation has been threatened since 1965, however, by the institutional trends discussed earlier. The government has given top priority to those theoretical problems that serve industrial needs. This has restricted the scientist's choice of basic research projects, and it could force the Academy to focus again on applied science.

WHILE the government was trying to bridge the gap between research and production, it was also pursuing another goal for science, namely an improvement in the training of scientific personnel. A consistent policy toward this end was the promotion of stronger ties between the Academy and higher educational establishments (*vuzy*)[20] in the areas of teaching and research.

Informal communication existed between academy and university scientists for many years. This was the result of a partial overlap of personnel and the inferior quality of university laboratories which forced many professors to use academy facilities for their own research and the training of their students. But these personal contacts were not enough to guarantee effective collaboration between the Academy and *vuzy*.

With the exception of Novosibirsk University, most higher educational establishments had received second-class treatment with regard to equipment and technical assistants. This led to an intense rivalry between the universities and the Academy. Professor M. Nuzhin (rector of Kazan University), for example, said that the government should have fortified and enlarged the network of universities, which had the potential to become major science centres. Instead, *vuzy* received less material and personnel support and less publication rights, while the Academy was able to coopt the best scientists.[21] Nuzhin's remarks were indicative of the resentment that made cooperation between the Academy and universities difficult.

The government tried to develop a more favourable relationship between academy institutes and *vuzy* through an overlap in their functional responsibilities. Prior to the Bolshevik revolution, the universities had performed both teaching and research. During Stalin's rapid industrialization, however, the academy institutes became centres for research, while the *vuzy* concentrated mainly on their pedagogical

[20] This paper refers only to the *vuzy* of the USSR and Republican Ministries of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education.

[21] M. Nuzhin, 'Universitety i nauka' ('Universities and science'), *Izvestia*, 24 March 1966, p. 4.

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functions. This trend was reversed by a 1956 government decree which initiated an expansion of research in higher educational establishments. The decree encouraged 'independent' research institutes at universities, and rectors were asked to limit the teaching load for some of their faculty so as to enable them to spend more time in research.[22]

Research in higher educational establishments included both basic and applied science. Even though *vuzy* concentrated on industrial research and development projects, their performance of some basic research provided a common ground for academy and educational personnel. The 'common ground' was extended considerably in 1963 when the Academy was made responsible for the supervision and coordination of all basic research in the *vuzy*.

At the same time that the *vuzy* were expanding their research activities, academy institutes were enlarging their training programmes, specifically the revised probationary system set up in 1963. This was another source of friction between the Academy and *vuzy*, because it meant that the Academy preferred to hire university graduates on a temporary basis (two years) during which time they received advanced training under close supervision. Academy scientists claimed that this practice was necessary because the *vuzy* concentrated too heavily on memorization and too little on independent, creative research. But the universities resented the assumption that their own programmes were inferior.

The Party and government took steps in September 1966 to improve the quality of research and teaching at universities and to bring the *vuzy* closer to academy institutes. Rectors were encouraged to expand their facilities with profits from *vuzy* contract work. Academy institutes (as well as industrial and agricultural institutes) had to accept teachers from *vuzy* in apprenticeship programmes for three months of advanced training and 're-tooling'. The Academy was instructed to cooperate with the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education and the USSR and Union-Republican Councils of Ministers to achieve greater integration with the *vuzy*, possibly through an extension of joint appointments. The territorial and regional Party committees, as well as the union-republican central committees, were charged with close supervision of these joint programmes.[23]

Party pressure seems to have contributed to improved cooperation between the Academy and universities since 1966. Academy scientists participated in the commissions that drafted new school programmes, which had been discussed widely at academy institutes and at joint

[22] F. I. Fed'kin, *Pravovye voprosy organizatsii nauchnoi raboty v SSSR* (*Legal questions on the organization of scientific work in the USSR*), trans. JPRS, No. 4660, pp. 130–131.

[23] TSK KPSS pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR (CPSU Central Committee of USSR Council of Ministers), 'O merakh po uluchsheniyu podgotovki spetsialistov i sovershenstvovaniyu rukovodstva vysshim i srednim spetsialnym obrazovaniem v strane' ('On measures for improving the training of specialists and perfecting the leadership in higher and secondary specialized education in the country'), *Pravda*, 9 September 1966, pp. 1–2.

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meetings with the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. The scientific establishment recommended revisions in the physics, chemistry, and biology programmes, including changes in topics, course sequences and textbooks, and increases in the amount of experimental work.[24] The Academy also sent plans and reports on its scientific research directly to the *vuzy*.[25] All this tended to draw *vuzy* closer to academy institutes.

Their working relationship had improved considerably by the end of 1968, when V. P. Elyutin (Minister of Higher Secondary and Specialized Education, USSR) went to the Academy Presidium and asked for the development of a truly effective, coordinated programme of joint research and experimental work on specific projects. He asked academicians and corresponding members of the Academy to give lectures and hold symposia at *vuzy* on a regular and more extensive basis and to provide additional text-books, educational aids, and laboratory time in academy institutes.[26]

Elyutin had a very responsive audience. Academy scientists recognized that the development of research in the *vuzy* was still handicapped seriously by inadequate allocations for space and modern equipment. The Presidium ordered scientists in the USSR and republican academies of sciences to respond favourably to each of Elyutin's requests. Department and institute directors were instructed to make provisions for *vuzy* proposals and research in the plans of the Academy and to help the *vuzy* with equipment, instruments, and scientific and technical documentation. The Presidium also asked members of the Academy and *vuzy* to follow through on the expansion of the probationary programmes and on the advanced training of *vuzy* teachers at academy institutes.[27]

At the same meeting, Keldysh complained about the excessive interference of the GKNT in academy affairs. He noted that there was no clear jurisdiction between the role of the Academy and that of the State Committee in supervising the *vuzy*.[28] In 1963, for example, the Academy had been clearly in charge of *vuzy* basic research. But by 1968, the GKNT had encroached upon the Academy's authority in this area as well. Therefore, while the Academy was assisting the universities in the training of scientific personnel, it was still under the surveillance of the State Committee.

PART of the success in bringing the scientific establishment closer to industry and education may be attributed to the extension of

[24] 'Obsuzhdeniye shkol'nykh programm' ('Discussion of school programmes'), *VAN*, No. 2 (1967), pp. 16–17.

[25] 'Nauchnaya rabota v vuzakh' ('Scientific work in the *vuzy*'), *VAN*, No. 1 (1968), p. 7.

[26] Ibid., pp. 3–8. Visiting lecture programmes authorized in 1962 had not been carried out effectively. (Helgard Wienert, 'The Organisation and Planning of Research in the Higher Educational Establishments', in E. Zaleski, *et al.*, *Science Policy*, p. 305).

[27] 'Nauchnaya rabota', pp. 8–16.

[28] Ibid., pp. 13–14.

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direct Party and government controls. The Party strengthened its position in the Academy in August 1966, when Ya. V. Peive (agrochemist, academician) became Chief Scientific Secretary. Compared to his three predecessors (Academicians N. M. Sisakian, biochemist, E. K. Fedorov, geophysicist, and A. V. Topchiev, organic chemist), Peive held substantially higher positions in the Party and government, and he had spent only half as much time in scientific research posts.

The new Chief Scientific Secretary had been a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee since 1961 and was promoted to full membership in 1966. He had been chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet for the preceding eight years. Peive did not become an academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences until 1966, although he had been a member of the Latvian Academy of Agricultural Sciences since 1946 and its president from 1951 to 1959. He served also as chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers and member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Latvia.[29]

Traditionally, the Chief Scientific Secretary played a major policy-making role in the Academy's Presidium. Prior to the election of Peive, developments within the Academy indicated that the power of the Presidium had declined vis-à-vis the Academy's departments. The gradual decentralization of authority within the Academy between 1955 and 1965 (climaxing in 1963) meant that academy institutes were no longer under central government control, through the Presidium, as they had been under Stalin.

The first attempt to transfer some of the Presidium's functions to the departments occurred in 1955, when the latter were given direct authority over academy institutes. But this was only partly successful, and from 1955 to 1958 scientists criticized vehemently the continued overextension of the Presidium's power.[30] When new statutes were passed in 1959, they limited the Presidium's jurisdiction and expanded departmental rights. Nevertheless, a survey of announced personnel changes in *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* between 1953 and 1970 showed that the Presidium continued to keep the upper hand on appointments, dismissals, and confirmations (especially for institute directors and editorial boards) until 1963, when its activities in this area declined rapidly.[31] In the same year, the Academy's internal structure was

[29] E. L. Crowley, A. I. Lebed, H. E. Schulz (eds.), *Prominent Personalities in the USSR* (New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1968), p. 482. Peive was no longer a member of the CPSU Central Committee at the 24th Party Congress.

[30] A. V. Topchiev, 'Osnovnye itogi nauchnoi deyatel'nosti Akademii nauk SSSR za 1954 god' ('Basic results of the scientific activities of the USSR Academy of Sciences for 1954'), *VAN*, No. 3 (1955), pp. 19–38; I. E. Tamm, in 'Obshcheye sobraniye Akademii SSSR' ('General meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences'), *VAN*, No. 1 (1956), p. 9; 'Na godichnom sobranii Akademii nauk SSSR' ('At the annual meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences'), *Izvestia*, 27 March 1958, p. 6.

[31] For example, in 1963 there was almost a 50 per cent drop from its average annual personnel changes since 1953, and there was almost a 75 per cent drop in 1964 from its earlier annual average. No figures were reported in 1965.

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reorganized, giving the departments a greater role in administrative decisions. By contrast, the tendency since 1966 appears to be a return to more Presidium supervision, particularly in the selection and placement of personnel.[32]

In addition to Party and government control through the Chief Scientific Secretary and the Presidium, the CPSU has tried to regulate the activities of the scientific establishment through primary Party organizations attached to academy institutes. The Party did not exercise much authority at this level from the late 1950s to 1966. Although the primary Party organizations included scientists with research positions at academy institutes, these scientists were usually more loyal to their institutes than to the Party. For example, there were many cases of collusion between primary Party organizations and research institutes, with the former refusing to report the inadequacies of the latter.[33] Furthermore, directors and deputy directors of institutes often brushed aside criticisms made by Party committees.

The situation was criticized at higher levels of the Party, but no action was taken to strengthen Party control over scientists. In fact the reverse occurred in August 1963, when Party organizations were told they could not use their 'right to control the administration' of academy institutes. Party influence was to be limited to a general review of plan fulfilment.[34] Discussions concerning the relationship between Party organizations and academy institutes revealed the Party's uncertainty and/or difficulty in maintaining a balance between its desire to regulate scientific activity and its recognition that scientists needed adequate breathing space for basic research.

Then, in 1966, there were signs of change. In a series of *Pravda* editorials, primary Party organizations were told to bring academy research institutes under their firm control. Party organizations were directed to improve the efficiency of research and to raise the scientists' responsibility for the prompt application of research results. In the autumn of 1966, a plenum of the Leningrad Oblast' Party Committee outlined measures that increased the power of primary Party organizations in academy institutes (as well as in design and technological institutes). The Party was to play a greater role in the granting of material and moral incentives and in the promotion and dismissal of scientific workers (partly through re-accreditation and stricter labour discipline). Party organizations were instructed to improve their own 'combat capability' (*boesposobnost'*) in order to be more effective in pressuring scientists to achieve a 'model order of business' in every

[32] The positions most affected were institute directors and editorial boards. The sharpest increase in appointments by the Presidium occurred in 1968, and they have since maintained the pre-1963 average.

[33] V. Zhilko and V. Girnik, 'Nauku—na peredovoi pozitsii' ('To science—at the leading position'), *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, 19 November 1963, p. 2.

[34] 'Partorganizatsiya nauchno-issledovatelskogo instituta' ('Party organization of the scientific research institute'), *Partiinaya zhizn'*, No. 16 (1963), p. 33.

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laboratory.[35] By 1970, it was reported that some Party committees and primary Party organizations had been successful in bringing the research of scientists closer to production, largely through administrative means.[36]

The Party used other tactics as well. In February 1967, a *Kommunist* editorial dwelled upon a theme that had not been given much attention since the early 1950s, namely the importance of *partiinost'* in science. Scientists were told to support the Party view in science.[37] Yet, almost two years later, *Kommunist* expressed a serious concern over the persistent lack of ideological commitment within the scientific establishment: 'Some young scientific workers imagine ideas such as democracy, personal freedom, and humanism as some kind of abstract, non-class categories.'[38] Instead of *partiinost'*, younger scientists had a 'snobbish' and indifferent attitude toward the Party, and they preferred to concentrate on their own research. This was reinforced by heads of research groups, departments, and laboratories who said, 'The scientist should deal with science only.'[39] Most of the blame fell upon the *oblast'*, city, and *raion* Party committees (and partly on the Komsomol) for not spending enough time at academy institutes, not providing proper leadership for the primary Party organizations, and not controlling the subject matter in the theoretical seminars.

In the summer of 1970, scientists at Novosibirsk were singled out for their 'naive' and 'weak' ideological views. Scientists were using the theoretical seminars to discuss current research and institute activities, rather than Marxism-Leninism. In an attempt to eliminate these apolitical attitudes, a Party group was established in the House of Scientists, and the Party increased surveillance over young people's clubs and cultural centres, organized a series of public lectures (called Science Days), took over the theoretical seminars, and conducted a methodological conference.[40] Although the Party considered this particular campaign successful, it was still not satisfied with the 'ideological loyalty' of academy institutes elsewhere.[41]

[35] G. Romanov, 'Nauchnym issledovaniyam—vysokuyu effektivnost', ('Give high efficiency to scientific research'), *Kommunist*, No. 4 (March 1967), p. 66. This 'model order' referred to the distribution of the work force within institutes and the use of scientists' working time. (Ibid., p. 62.)

[36] N. Rodionov, 'Partiinye komitety i sblizheniye nauki s proizvodstvom' ('The Party committees and the bringing together of science and production'), *Kommunist*, No. 9 (June 1970), pp. 14–25. Most frequently mentioned were mergers between scientific institutes and industrial enterprises.

[37] 'Trud i dolg sovetskogo uchenogo' ('The work and duty of the Soviet scientist'), *Kommunist*, No. 3 (February 1967), pp. 11–12.

[38] N. Sviridov, 'Partiinaya zabota o vospitanii nauchno-tekhnicheskoi intelligentsii' ('Party anxiety about the upbringing of the scientific-technical intelligentsia'), *Kommunist*, No. 18 (December 1968), p. 43.

[39] Ibid.

[40] R. Yanovsky, 'Ideinost' uchenogo' ('The moral fibre of scholars'), *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), 28 August 1970, p. 2.

[41] TsK KPSS (CPSU Central Committee), 'O rabote partiinogo komiteta fizicheskogo instituta imeni P. N. Lebedeva Akademii nauk SSSR' ('On the work of the Party committee of the Lebedev Institute of Physics, USSR Academy of Sciences'), *Partiinaya zhizn'*, No. 21 (1970), pp. 8–10.

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IDEOLOGICAL controls are, by their nature, more persuasive than the administrative controls discussed earlier. Enforced cooperation among scientists in academy and industrial institutes and universities has been directed toward a more rapid application of research and an improvement in the training of scientific personnel. Its effects, such as the relative decline in the Academy's institutional autonomy, are felt mainly within the scientists' occupational environment. By contrast, ideological controls are aimed at social integration and support for the political leadership. They are expected, therefore, to extend beyond the laboratory and into the scientists' daily living patterns.

Soviet leaders are making a delicate distinction between a scientist's work and his social behaviour.[42] The Party does not want to stifle research, *per se*, for it still values scientific contributions to Soviet technology, military power, and international prestige. Certainly, Soviet leaders have provided the scientific establishment with continued material support. And one could say that as long as a scientist has sufficient resources, he is free from political control during the actual research process, i.e., the conceptualization and testing of scientific ideas.

Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that now, when scientists have less institutional autonomy, they are experiencing greater demands on their professional roles. The integration of academy activities with industry, the universities, and the Party may contribute to the scientist's role-strain, or stress, while at the same time restricting his research choices. These can be significant factors in a scientist's support for dissident groups.

Meanwhile, the scientist continues to face social pressures as well. The intensification of the ideological campaign in academy institutes and the arrests of Zhores Medvedev (geneticist) and Revolt Pimenov (mathematician) make it clear that the Soviet leadership still opposes the transfer of communalism [43] and organized scepticism to political affairs. Such values inherent in the ethos of science must remain in the laboratory, where the scientist is expected to be creative. But when calls for scientific creativity are mixed with political regulations and ideological imperatives, then the system is asking scientists, in effect, to separate their work from their social behaviour. Certainly, Soviet scientists have coped with this dualism before, but many of them seem less willing to tolerate it now.

Administrative and political pressures can threaten a scientist's secur-

[42] For example, V. A. Medvedev (Leningrad Party Committee) is reported to have told Revolt Pimenov: 'You understand that we don't have to speak about your scientific work. Your scientific successes—they are all good. But there's something else. You're not living right.' Cited by Bernard Gwertzman, 'Soviet Scientist and Party Aide Clash on the Freedom of Ideas', *New York Times*, 8 October 1969, p. 2.

[43] By communalism, scientists generally mean the communication and sharing of information.

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ity and contribute to his sympathy for dissident groups.[44] It is quite possible, then, that the growth in public protests by Kapitsa, A.D. Sakharov (physicist, academician), V. N. Chalidze (physicist), and other scientists has resulted not only from general social issues, but also from the greater restrictions placed upon the USSR Academy of Sciences.

[44] Pimenov is reported to have replied to Medvedev by saying: 'For some time, we scientists have lost our sense of personal security. It has been roughly from the end of 1966. . . . The threat to personal security explains (our) study of politics.' (Gwertzman, 'Soviet Scientist', p. 2.)

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Lysenko Revisited

Ronald Hingley

EACH in its very different way, these two books[1] will materially advance the study of Lysenkoism and of its remarkable originator, Trofim Denisovich Lysenko. After capturing the support of Stalin, and then of Khrushchev, this fanatical charlatan was able to dominate many areas of the Soviet scientific and agricultural world in varying degree between 1929 and 1964—a reign of error which brought a succession of economic and personal disasters in its wake.

Lysenko cunningly bamboozled his political masters by dangling before them a succession of pseudo-scientific gimmicks, each offering the prospect of some sudden, dramatic upsurge in agricultural productivity, notoriously the weakest sector of the Soviet economy. Offering short-term gain with minimal outlay through the vernalization of wheat, the cropping of tundra-grown tomatoes, the planting of sugar beet in the torrid deserts of Central Asia, the mass afforestation of the steppes by the 'cluster' method, and through dozens of kindred recipes, Lysenko wasted many billions of rubles. He and his associates also hounded many a serious Soviet scientist—from the leading botanist-geneticist Vavilov downwards—to imprisonment and death, owing such success to the peculiar witch-hunting atmosphere of Stalinism. To attack Lysenko's individual nostrums, to impugn his eccentric methodology, was to be accused of sabotage, wrecking, kow-towing to the West, Weissmannism-Morganism, imperialism, Fascism, Mendelism, bourgeois deviationism, menshevizing idealism and scores of other heresies. Around the arch-quack orbited dozens of minor prophets, including V. R. Williams—advocate of the grasslands technique of cultivation as later denounced even by Khrushchev—down to the medico-scientific charlatan Lepeshinskaya, who promised to postpone old age indefinitely through bicarbonate of soda enemas. Who, in Stalinist Russia, would dare tell her what she could do with her bicarbonate of soda?

As such episodes remind one, Lysenko and his associates replaced scientific inquiry with something approaching alchemy. Over a large range of scientific activity—especially in the field of genetics—these weird medicine-men not only hampered scientists, destroying some of them physically, but sabotaged the very pursuit of scientific method based on controlled, repeatable and verifiable experiment.

Only during the four years 1948–52 was rampant Lysenkoism wholly triumphant, for it was during this period alone that its author enjoyed Stalin's virtually unqualified endorsement. However, even the limited support of the dictator was enough to enable the dreaded Trofim Denisovich to dominate the scene from 1935 onwards, and to intimidate his rivals from his pedestal as champion of the pseudo-science of 'agrobiology'; the word was, it seems, his own invention. Lysenko

[1] Zhores Z. Medvedev, *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko*, trans. I. Michael Lerner (Columbia University Press, New York and London) and David Joravsky, *The Lysenko Affair* (Harvard University Press).

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owed this vogue to Stalin's long-standing belief that there were, in effect, no strongholds—even, seemingly, the laws of cause and effect—which the Bolsheviks could not overthrow. Himself demonstrating during the great terror of 1937–38 that the apparently impossible could be achieved in terms of manipulating millions of individuals into a chain reaction of mutual slaughter, the Soviet dictator expected results equally original on the biological front.

Trofim Denisovich was ready for the challenge; he too could 'think big'. When he insisted on planting acorns in clusters of thirty rather than singly, leaving the saplings to fight it out among themselves, he was budgeting for an even higher rate of casualties than the General Secretary exacted within his Politburo and Central Committee. By the time when it became clear that the yield in cluster-planted oak-trees would be as negligible as the political benefits deriving from the murder of Eykhe, Postyshev, etc., Lysenko himself would be noisily promoting some entirely different sensational project.

OF the two studies of Lysenko reviewed here, that by the Soviet scientist Zhores Medvedev is the more lucid. Originally composed during the Khrushchev period in the hope of publication in the Soviet Union, the text was privately circulated in typescript, but brought the author into conflict with the Soviet authorities. At one point he was menaced with proceedings for criminal libel at the instigation of a surviving Lysenkoist scientific potentate. Then a microfilm of his typescript filtered out of the Soviet Union through unofficial channels, falling into the hands of Professor Lerner, who decided to translate and publish it for the excellent reasons which he outlines in his Foreword. Other publishers and translators of *samizdat* and kindred material would be well advised to copy Mr. Lerner in providing a brief and scholarly textological introduction such as is an absolute essential when issuing this kind of material.

Taking his story up to the late 1960s, Zhores Medvedev shows that the dethronement of Lysenko (which coincided with the Khrushchev ouster of late 1964) did not dislodge the Lysenkoists as a whole from their positions of power in the world of Soviet laboratories, universities, and institutes. Lysenkoism is dead, and Lysenko himself is no longer a power in the land, but doddering Lysenkoists still go marching on, it seems; and though genuine scientific inquiry is no longer hampered, as formerly, one seeks in vain for Soviet biological discoveries remotely comparable in significance to the cracking of the DNA genetic code in the West.

Zhores Medvedev's work is based on a familiar postulate which I cannot myself accept—that the horrors and absurdities of Stalinism represent a deviation from, rather than a development of, policies pioneered by Lenin. Medvedev also repeats, no more convincingly, the official dogma that Marxism-Leninism represents a brand of 'scientific' socialism. Such gobbledygook is, however, totally extraneous to the clear and closely reasoned argument contained in the text.

Ultimately Professor Joravsky's contribution is the more profound of the two. Its author is a formidably equipped scholar with a deep insight into the nature of Soviet society . . . yet does not appear to have studied the humble but extremely difficult craft of putting together a

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proper book. In a treatise of this kind, where two contrasting disciplines clash—the investigation of Soviet society on the one hand and geneticism-centred scientific study on the other—clarity and cogency are of the essence. Few potential readers—outside a tiny, professionally equipped minority of whom Professor Lerner is an example—will be sufficiently at home in both kinds of discipline to sail easily through the turgid viscosities of Mr. Joravsky's prose. But though the voyage is more arduous than it need have been, it is well worth undertaking, for the author's obscurities cloak many a penetrating comment, and he is everywhere worth pondering. It is most earnestly to be hoped that Professor Joravsky, who has much to offer in the investigation of Soviet society, should rethink drastically his approach to the gentle art of exposition, ridding his work of baroque excrescences and maintaining everywhere a more rigorously disciplined line of argument. His flaws are, regrettably, common to a large section of American scholarship within the Slavonic field; however, to say this is not, of course, to boast that non-American scholars are innocent of this or other equally regrettable habits.

I would also join issue with Professor Joravsky on one minor point—the passage in his preface where he deprecates those who derive satisfaction from Soviet tales of woe, and who may therefore take up his book in expectation of perverse pleasure. Personally I derive no pleasure whatever from contemplating the inability of the Soviet system to solve its economic, and especially its agricultural problems. Should such pleasure be experienced by others, however, must it necessarily be perverse . . . if, that is, militantly expansionist Soviet policies (as pursued with varying success under Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev) are taken into account? If my neighbour breaks his ankle I might indeed be perverse in experiencing pleasure; but what if he does so while trying to kick me in the shin or burgle my house?

There is a danger now, I think, that Western scholars may fall into the error of congratulating themselves excessively on their broad, tolerant understanding of Soviet absurdities in terms which could in the end become no less stereotyped than the old cold-war phraseology.

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The Nations of the USSR in 1970

Roman Szporluk

FEW people seemed to doubt 10 years ago, when they read the results of the 1959 Soviet census, that in 1970 the Soviet Union would be more of a Russian state, in the language and national identity of its citizens, than it was in 1959. In fact, the percentage of those Soviet citizens who declared themselves of Russian nationality (or who declared Russian as their native language) was lower in 1970. It even seemed to some observers that before 1980 (when a new census was due) the Russians might become a minority in the Soviet Union. It would be wise to abstain from making forecasts of this sort when one is presented with the failure of many earlier forecasts. A conclusion, however, that the relative decline of the Russian element is a sign that the nationality question, including the Russian question, will remain important in the life of the USSR throughout the 1970s does not seem to be far-fetched.

Shortly after the 1959 census the Central Statistical Office of the USSR worked out a population prognosis for 1970 and 1980. This prognosis constituted an important element in the preparation of the long-term plan for the 'construction of Communism' in the Soviet Union, adopted in 1961 at the 22nd Party Congress. According to this prognosis, the population of the USSR, which numbered about 209 million in 1959, would rise to 250 million in 1970 and to 280 million in 1980. It soon transpired that the statisticians had taken for granted something which demographers could have warned them against, had the former wished to listen. The birth-rates of the late 1950s–early 1960s, which the Statistical Office assumed would remain constant in subsequent years, began to decline rapidly. In 1968 the projection for 1980 was 'made more precise', i.e. it was lowered by eight million. V. Perevedentsev, one of the fiercest demographer-critics of the Statistical Office, wrote in 1967 that instead of the planned 250 million, the Soviet Union would have 244 million people, perhaps less, in 1970.[1] The next census confirmed his pessimism: in 1970 the Soviet population numbered 241,720,000 men and women, more than eight million under the projection (on which, let it be mentioned in passing, the economic plans for that year had presumably been based). The more recent and still 'more precise' prognosis for 1980, worked out by the Institute of Economics, USSR Academy of Sciences, considers two variants, 270

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[1] V. Perevedentsev, 'Spor o perepisi', *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 11 January 1967, p. 13. For earlier, optimistic views see e.g. S. Strumilin, *Nash mir cherez 20 let* (Moscow, 1964), or I. Yu. Pisarev, *Naseleniye i trud v SSSR* (Moscow, 1966).

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or 265 million, both lower than the recently corrected projection of the Statistical Office. A high official of the Statistical Office recently pointed out with ill-concealed satisfaction that while his office had cut down its estimate for 1980 by eight million (down to 272 million), the Institute of Economics associates, who had initially anticipated a population of 289·5 million in 1980, have made an even greater correction in their estimates.[2]

If some of the recent Soviet writers are right, even the revised projections for 1980 (whether 270 or 265 million) may prove to be too high. The present population of the Ukraine, the Baltic states, and of considerable parts of the Russian republic, according to the contributors to the collective work, *Voprosy demografii* (Moscow, 1970), is no longer capable of increasing on its own and these areas are facing the prospect of depopulation. The 'coefficient of reproduction' (net reproduction rate) in these areas is less than 1, which roughly means that without immigration the next generation, i.e. the population 30 years later, will be smaller in size than the current one. The 'co-efficient of reproduction' in the USSR as a whole still remains slightly above 1, which means that the present generation will be succeeded by one slightly more numerous, but this will be due only to the higher growth rates in Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaidjan. The coefficient of reproduction there equals 2, which means that the population of those areas will *double* in the course of 30 years (while in the European areas with the coefficient lower than 1, it will decrease absolutely).[3] A more recent Soviet source lists the RSFSR, along with the Ukraine and the Baltic states, among those parts of the Soviet Union where the coefficient is less than 1.[4]

In most countries it would be no cause for particular alarm if low population growth in some regions was sufficiently balanced by higher growth in others, thus securing the whole country's population gains (assuming such gains to be desired). However, under Soviet conditions the disparity between the European parts of the country and the Asian ones is not just a matter of geography. It has political significance because it means a weakening of the Slavic element (in which the Russians are the principal ethnic group) and a strengthening of the non-Slavic, chiefly Turkic, groups. If the Soviet scholars writing on this subject were truly 'internationalist', that is, if they were disposed equally well to all Soviet people (without regard to race or language), they would have applauded the Central Asians for their contributions at a time when the Europeans are failing to increase. But such is not

[2] '"Piat" milliardov otvetov', *Lit. Gaz.*, 21 January 1970, p. 3. (Interview with P. G. Podyachikh, the official in charge of the 1970 census.) The Institute of Economics was expecting a population of 270 or 265 million in 1980. (Ibid.)

[3] A. G. Volkov, L. Ye. Darsky, A. Ya. Kvasha (eds.), *Voprosy demografii (Issledovaniya, problemy, metody)* (Moscow, 1970), especially the papers by B. Smulevich and A. Kvasha. See also a review of this book by V. Perevedentsev, 'Problemy nauki o naselenii', *Druzhba narodov*, No. 1, 1971, pp. 278–280.

[4] V. Guseinov, V. Korchagin, 'Voprosy trudovykh resursov', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 2, 1971, pp. 45–51, esp. p. 50.

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the case: concern over the unfavourable demographic situation in Soviet Eastern Europe is sometimes accompanied by expressions of alarm over the seemingly *good* situation in Soviet Asia. Thus, a distinguished Soviet authority, D. I. Valentei, has proposed a policy of birth control for the Asian parts of the Soviet Union and a policy encouraging population growth in the European areas.[5] It is difficult to avoid the impression that the Soviet scholar regards the positive—from an impartial point of view—demographic situation in Asia as a threat rather than a blessing. It will not be surprising if the Uzbeks or Azerbaidzhanis conclude that the Moscow professor does not regard them as quite as valuable Soviet citizens as the natives of Vologda or Smolensk. Thus, besides the disappointment which over eight million Soviet citizens caused the Central Statistical Office by failing to be born before 1970, many of those citizens who *were* born were apparently born in the wrong places and to parents who spoke the wrong languages.

There was another demographic phenomenon in the 1960s which ran directly counter to plans made at the start of the decade. Millions of Soviet citizens had been expected to leave the highly populated areas of the country, such as the Ukraine, Moldavia and North Caucasus, and move to Siberia, the North, or to the Far Eastern provinces of the Soviet Union.[6] Just the reverse happened: more people moved west or south than east or north, and some of those doing the latter were returning after a short time. Even the natives of Siberia and the Urals were said to be following the returning Europeans or moving to already well-populated Central Asian republics. (According to Soviet sources, immigrants from the outside, including Russia's eastern regions, constituted a majority of population increase in the cities and towns of Kirghizia.[7])

The results of the 1970 census confirmed what some Soviet scholars had been pointing out earlier. The share of both the east of the Soviet Union (Siberia and the Far East) and of the west (the Urals and the European USSR) *declined* in the total of the Soviet population while the south-east (Central Asia, including Kazakhstan) gained. If one divides 'the West' into a northern and a southern part, it becomes clear that in the West it was chiefly the southern part that increased really rapidly:

[5] D. I. Valentei, *Teoriya i politika narodonaseleniya* (Moscow, 1967), pp. 163–165.

[6] For an estimate of the anticipated railway passenger traffic from the West to the East see O. A. Kibalchich, 'Opyt razrabotki gipotezy mezhraionnykh passazhirskikh potokov na perspektivu', *Voprosy geografii*, Vol. 57 (Moscow, 1962), pp. 180–193, esp. pp. 186–187.

[7] See *Regionalnye osobennosti ekonomicheskogo razvitiya raionov strany* (*Na primere Sibiri*) (Moscow, 1966), p. 165. According to this source immigration from the outside, especially immigration of the Russians, was one of the reasons why native rural populations were unable to move to the cities in their own republics. According to P. Litvyakov (ed.), *Demograficheskiye problemy zanyatosti* (Moscow, 1969), p. 184, among every 100 former *rural* residents who migrated to the cities of Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmeniya, and Kazakhstan, those coming from the other republics equalled, respectively, 49, 45, 50, 52, and 50. (There were, of course, also *urban* migrants from the other republics.)

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Transcaucasia, Southern Ukraine, Moldavia, and the North-Caucasus Region of the Russian Republic.[8]

All three of these negative phenomena—the less than planned-for total population growth, the uneven levels of population growth, and the unexpected direction of migrations—have a direct effect on the nationality question in the Soviet Union and the relations between the Russians and all the rest in particular. It is the Russians (and to some extent other Slavs) who had been expected to be, but were not, born; had *they* been born, the birth-rates in the European areas would not be said to have been low. Also, had these eight million people been added to the Soviet total, the direction of the migrations would have been at least partially different. This paper concentrates on one specific aspect of the demographic change between the censuses—the ethnic relations in the Soviet Union, more specifically the changes in the distribution of the Russians in separate areas of the Soviet Union and the changes in the numerical relationship in those areas between the Russians and the other major peoples of the USSR.

Before a more detailed region by region survey, general results on the growth of the largest (one million and above) Soviet nationalities, first of all the Russians, should be briefly summed up. (See Table 1.) In the 11 years between the censuses the population of the Soviet Union increased by 32,893,000, from 208,827,000 in 1959 to 241,720,000 in 1970, which equalled a 15·751 per cent growth. The Russians, however, increased by 13·058 per cent (from 114,114,000 to 129,015,000), and thus their share in the country's total population dropped from 54·645 to 53·374 per cent. Eleven among the 15 major Soviet nationalities which possess their own 'Union Republics' increased at a higher rate than the Russians; only the Ukrainians (increase of 9·395 per cent), Latvians (2·143 per cent), and Estonians (1·820 per cent) had a slower growth. The Russians ranked 17th among the 23 Soviet nationalities numbering more than a million people each (they include all 15 with Union Republic status). Besides the 11 nationalities with their own Union Republics, the Daghestanians (44·444 per cent), Bashkirs (25·379 per cent), Tatars (19·384 per cent), Chuvashes (15·238 per cent), and Germans (13·951 per cent) also increased faster than the Russians. Three among the larger Soviet nationalities decreased in absolute numbers, the Mordovians (loss of 2·017 per cent), Jews (loss of 5·159 per cent), and Poles (loss of 15·435 per cent), and thus ranked behind the Russians (as did the Ukrainians, Latvians and Estonians who increased more slowly than the Russians).

These figures will no doubt be closely analysed by the specialists on different peoples, as have been the results of the 1959 census and the

[8] For an analysis of the changes in the regional distribution of the Soviet population between 1959 and 1970 see S. A. Kovalyov, 'Noveishiye izmeneniya v razmeshchenii naseleniya SSSR (K momentu perepisi 1970 g.)', *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta*, Seriya geografiya, No. 6, 1970, pp. 42–48, and ibid., 'Izmeneniya v chislennosti i razmeshchenii naseleniya SSSR za period mezhdu perepisyami 1959 i 1970 gg.' *Geografiya v shkole*, No. 6, 1970, pp. 12–19.

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other nationality statistics published in the Soviet Union in the past.[9] Each of those studies should help to explain what appears to be the most important revelation of the census: that the major non-Russian nationalities, and the non-Russians as a whole, were increasing faster than the Russians in the Soviet Union and that in consequence the USSR in 1970 was less Russian than it had been in 1959. Although assimilation no doubt contributed to the net gain recorded by the Russians, Russian gains were too low to suspect widespread assimilation: most of the major nationalities seem to have been relatively immune to its pressures. Even the Belorussians, who are close linguistically to the Russians and are generally thought to lack an intense feeling of separateness, and the Germans, who lack a republic of their own, increased faster than the Russians. When they adopted Russian as their principal language (as many Belorussians and Germans, and also Ukrainians, did), they still did not declare themselves as Russians.

Another notable disclosure of the census was the picture of a highly uneven growth of the Russian population throughout the USSR.

The Russian ethnic group grew faster in the USSR at large than in the Russian Republic, and faster in the (at least nominally) non-Russian parts of the RSFSR than in 'ethnic Russia' or Russia proper. But most rapid of all was the growth of Russians in those parts of the USSR which are formally recognized as being non-Russian: the 14 Union Republics other than the RSFSR. While in the USSR the Russians gained slightly over 13 per cent and in the RSFSR as a whole slightly over 10 per cent, their increase in the USSR minus the RSFSR exceeded 30 per cent.

Russians in	*1959*	*1970*	Gain (per cent)
	(*thousands*)		
USSR	114,114	129,015	13·058
RSFSR	97,864	107,748	10·099
'ethnic Russia'	90,666	99,718	9·983
ASSRs	7,198	8,030	11·559
Non-Russian Union Republics	16,250	21,267	30·874

Source: *Izvestia*, 17 April 1971, and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 20 May 1971.

The population of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), i.e. the national republic of the Russians, increased by almost 11 per cent (10·671 per cent), well behind the all-Union rate. The ethnic Russians in it gained even less (10·099 per cent) and in consequence the Russians dropped from 83·3 to 82·5 per cent in the population total. This change was due to the faster growth of the other peoples of the RSFSR, and the emigration from Russia of ethnic Russians. If these

[9] For a comprehensive overview see Erich Goldhagen (ed.), *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union* (New York, Washington, London: Praeger, 1968).

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processes continue, the RSFSR may cease to have a majority of the Soviet Union's population and the Russians' share will decline further. Between the censuses, the RSFSR's share in the Soviet Union's population dropped from 56·283 per cent to 53·814 per cent, and stood at 130,079,000 in 1970 (1959: 117,534,000). Even now a majority of the youngest Soviet citizens no longer live in the RSFSR: among those less than 10 years of age in 1970 (of whom the Soviet Union had 44,986,000; a decline of 2·97 per cent from the 1959 total), only 21,286,000, i.e. 47·313 per cent, lived in the Russian Republic. In 1959, before those 45 million Soviet citizens were even born, the Soviet Union's children under 10 numbered 46,363,000, and the Russian Republic still held a majority of 55·579 per cent among them (25,768,000 in absolute figures). In this category of population the RSFSR has thus declined by over nine percentage points, compared with a two and a half percentage point loss in the total population.

Within the RSFSR itself, besides the regular predominantly Russian regions (*oblasti*), there exist 16 major subdivisions in the rank of 'autonomous republics'. Unlike the Union Republics which technically enjoy equal status with the Russian Republic, have a constitutional right to enter diplomatic relations with foreign countries, to establish their own armed forces, and even to secede from the Soviet Union, the autonomous republics do not even formally constitute 'sovereign states'. In practice, an autonomous republic of the RSFSR differs from a 'regular' Russian province in that a non-Russian language enjoys in it an official status (particularly in education, the press and broadcasting) along with Russian, which is the main language.

Some of the autonomous republics within the RSFSR, e.g. the Tatar ASSR, are larger in population than many Union Republics. They have been denied the latter status by a rather ingenious argument: since they are surrounded on all sides by the territory of the RSFSR, Stalin said in 1936, they would be unable in practice to make use of their right of secession. Therefore, rather than granting them rights, some of which they would be unable to exercise, they were simply denied this status and remained in the 'non-sovereign' category. Autonomous republics are the only territorial subdivisions of the RSFSR whose ethnic composition has so far been disclosed.

These autonomous republics do not form a geographic or ethnic unity, although some of them may be grouped together on the basis of geography or language and culture (North Caucasus, the Volga area, etc.). However, their ethnic identity and political and administrative status are distinct enough from the rest of Russia to allow some general observations about them. First, their combined population increased between the censuses from 15,903,000 to 18,592,000, or by 16·909 per cent, which is significantly higher than the increase of population for the RSFSR as a whole (10·671 per cent), and even exceeds the USSR's population increase (15·751 per cent). Secondly, the Russians in those areas of the Russian Republic increased faster than in the RSFSR as a

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whole. There were 7,198,000 Russians in the autonomous republics in 1959, and 8,030,000 in 1970, an increase of 11·559 per cent, while in the RSFSR as a whole there was a 10·099 per cent Russian increase. Nevertheless the Russian gains were surpassed by those of the non-Russians and as a result in 11 out of 15 autonomous republics there were relatively *fewer* Russians in 1970 than in 1959. In the combined population of the ASSRs the Russian ratio decreased from 45·262 to 43·177 per cent.

'Ethnic Russia'

The separation, somewhat arbitrary, of the ASSRs from the Russian Republic's totals makes it possible to take a look at the Russian Republic *without* its non-Russian autonomous sub-units. This 'purer' Russia had a population of 101,631,000 in 1959, which rose to 111,487,000 in 1970. This gain of 9·698 per cent was lower than the RSFSR average and much lower than that recorded by the combined ASSRs. The Russian population in this 'Russia proper' grew faster than the population at large, however, though still more slowly than the Russians outside Russia. The Russians in this smaller RSFSR gained 9,052,000 people (from 90,666,000 to 99,718,000) which virtually equals an increase of 10 per cent (9·983 per cent). Their share in population in 1959 was high (89·211 per cent) and increased slightly by 1970 (89·444 per cent).

Unlike the autonomous republics, only population totals are available for the provinces (or *oblasti*) of the RSFSR. Since these *oblasti* were overwhelmingly Russian in 1959, however, it may be correct to assume that changes in their population after the 1959 census closely reflected the changes in their Russian population. The figures published in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (20 May 1971) show that the growth of population in a majority of the 'purely Russian' regions of the European RSFSR stood far below the Republic's average. Thus, in the Central Economic Region, whose importance is conveyed by its name, population grew from 25,718,000 to 27,658,000, that is, by 7·52 per cent in an 11-year period. If one subtracts from these totals the figures for Moscow and Moscow *oblast* where growth was higher, we are left with 11 *oblasti* and a growth from 14,768,000 to 14,822,000, which equals 0·366 per cent. None of these *oblasti* grew by more than 8 per cent, most achieved less, while four (Kalinin, Kostroma, Ryazan and Smolensk) actually *lost* population. The population of Oryol *oblast* gained 0·215, and that of Yaroslavl' gained 0·286 per cent over 11 years. Three of the provinces in the North-Western Region, Vologda, Novgorod and Pskov, also lost population. (Leningrad, on the other hand, gained considerably.) The region of Volga-Vyatka grew by just above 1 per cent (this figure includes the higher growth in the Mari, Mordovian and Chuvash ASSRs), but the Kirov *oblast* in it went down considerably below its 1959 total. The Central Black Earth region, comprising five *oblasti* located to the south of the Central Region, gained less than 3 per cent, and two of its *oblasti*, Kursk and Tambov, recorded absolute decline. The economic

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regions of the Urals and West Siberia were under the RSFSR levels of growth and so were two of the *oblasti* of the Volga (*Povolzhskii*) Region. On the whole, however, the last-named region grew fast, especially its provinces of Volgograd and Astrakhan. The East Siberian Region had a growth above the RSFSR average (15·294 per cent) though not equal to the USSR average, and the Far Eastern increased even more (19·57 per cent). However, the Far Eastern Region's population was low in absolute terms (4,834,000 in 1959, 5,780,000 in 1970), and it decreased on the island of Sakhalin (loss of 34,000 from the 1959 figure of 649,000). It had been expected in the late 1950s that the two Siberian regions and the Far East would grow particularly rapidly in the next decades, while North Caucasus had been thought of as one of the sources of migrants to the east. Just the reverse happened in the 1960s: in the light of the Soviet 1970 census (and in accordance with the earlier admissions in the Soviet press) the Far East and the Urals were providing population to the Ukraine, North Caucasus and the Baltic states. Migration from European Russia, which, it had been anticipated, would be directed to the east, assumed unexpectedly large dimensions—and turned in unexpected directions, to the south and west. Scholars began to write about depopulation of central Russian provinces brought about by emigration and (since the migrants were mostly young) by a continuing decrease of the birth-rate.

In the Autonomous Republics of RSFSR

The 11·559 per cent increase figure of the Russians in their Republic's non-Russian subdivisions (and the decline in their percentage of combined population) hides considerable variations between autonomous republics. (See Table 2.) Thus, in five autonomous republics, Karelia, Komi, Udmurt, Chuvash, and Yakut ASSRs, the ratio of Russians in the total population *rose*. Karelia and Komi are located in the north-western and northern parts of the RSFSR respectively. The Russians now constitute 68·1 per cent in the population of Karelia (1959: 63·4 per cent) and 53·1 per cent in that of Komi ASSR (1959: 48·6 per cent). In the Far Eastern Yakutia the Russian population reached 47·3 per cent by 1970, an increase from 44·2 per cent in 1959. In the Ural-area Udmurt ASSR the Russians increased from 56·8 to 57·1 per cent, and in the Chuvash ASSR in the upper Volga from 24·0 to 24·5 per cent of the total population.

Except for the Udmurt Republic (where the Russians and the population at large increased at a slower rate than in the RSFSR as a whole), the increase of Russian population in these five autonomous republics was very considerable. Between 1959 and 1970 the Russians were up by 13·258 per cent in Chuvash ASSR, by 17·676 per cent in Karelia, 29·293 per cent in Komi, and 36·047 in Yakutia. It seems correct to think that this increase and the resultant strengthening of the Russians were achieved more by immigration than by natural increase.

There was a high Russian immigration rate also to some of the 11

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autonomous republics where their ratio in the population fell between 1959 and 1970. In some others the Russians were increasing very slowly, and in one autonomous republic, Daghestan ASSR in North Caucasus, their number actually went down from 214,000 to 210,000 (decrease of 1·869 per cent), and their percentage in the population fell from 20·1 to 14·7 of the total. In two republics, Mari ASSR and Mordovian ASSR, population increased relatively little but the Russian increase lagged behind that of the natives in these upper-Volga areas and though the Russians still constitute a dominant element there their percentage went down (in Mari from 47·8 to 46·9 per cent, in Mordovia from 59·1 to 58·9 per cent).

More interesting and more important seem to be the changes in the well-populated middle-Volga republics of Bashkiria and Tataria. In Bashkiria the Russians went down from 42·4 to 40·5 per cent while the Bashkirs rose from 22·1 to 23·4 per cent, and the Tatars (the second largest ethnic group in that republic) rose from 23·0 to 24·7 per cent. In the Tatar ASSR the Russians went down from 43·9 to 42·4 per cent of the total while the Tatars came close to regaining a majority (47·2 in 1959 to 49·1 per cent in 1970). There was no important Russian immigration to these areas and if there was any, it must have been counterbalanced by emigration. The Russian increase amounted to 9·104 per cent in Bashkiria and 6·150 per cent in Tataria.[10]

In the two Siberian republics, Buryat ASSR and Tuvinian ASSR (the latter once known to stamp collectors as the mysterious state of Tannu-Tuva), even as large an increase of the Russian population as 18·688 per cent in Buryat ASSR and 27·536 per cent in Tuva was not enough to prevent a relative decline (from 74·6 to 73·5 per cent in the former, and from 40·1 to 38·3 per cent in the latter). The 'natives' were obviously increasing even faster than the Russians.

Keeping up with the natives in the North Caucasus area of the RSFSR proved even more difficult for the Russians. In Kalmykian ASSR, whose population had been deported under Stalin and then rehabilitated, the Kalmyks increased from 35·1 to 41·1 per cent of the population (they numbered 110,000, an increase of 45,000 over 1959). The Russians, although they still outnumbered the Kalmyks by 13,000 in 1970, fell from 55·9 to 45·8 per cent in the Kalmyk Republic's population. Quite mysteriously, the Ukrainians more than *doubled* in Kalmykia between the two censuses (the increase was 106·25 per cent), from 1,600 to 3,300 souls, although their share in the population remains small (1·8 per cent).

An apparent Russian emigration from Daghestan (decline of 1·869

[10] Ethnic relations in the Tatar ASSR have been the subject of several recent Soviet studies. See e.g. Yu. V. Arutyunian, 'Konkretno-sotsiologicheskoye issledovaniye natsionalnykh otnoshenii', *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 12, 1969, pp. 129–139; O. I. Shkaratan, 'Etno-sotsialnaya struktura gorodskogo naseleniya Tatarskoi ASSR', *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, No. 3, 1970, pp. 3–16; and S. S. Savoskul, 'Sotsialno-etnicheskiye aspekty dukhovnoi kultury selskogo naseleniya Tatarskoi ASSR', *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, No. 1, 1971, pp. 3–13.

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per cent) caused their share in the population to fall from 20·1 to 14·7 per cent. Population as a whole rose far above the Soviet average in Daghestan, and it also rose in Kabardine-Balkaria, North Ossetia, and Chechen-Ingush ASSRs. In consequence, despite a 34·356 per cent increase, the Russians declined from 38·7 to 37·2 per cent in Kabardine-Balkaria's population. A slower (but still above the RSFSR average) Russian increase in North Ossetia (12·849 per cent) produced a Russian drop from 39·6 to 36·6 per cent in the total population, which as a whole rose twice as fast as the Russians in it. The low, less than the RSFSR average, gain of 5·46 per cent reduced the Russians from almost a half to just above a third in the population of Chechen-Ingush ASSR (from 49·0 to 34·5 per cent). That republic's population increased by a half between the censuses, when the Chechens and Ingushes, another collective victim of Soviet deportations, seem to have returned from their exile. The Chechens increased from 244,000 to 509,000 (from 34·3 per cent to 47·8 per cent) and the Ingushes from 48,000 to 114,000 (6·8 to 10·7 per cent).[11]

Beyond Russia

The Russian population was growing most rapidly of all in the non-Russian Union Republics, where it increased by over 30 per cent, more than twice the rate of the Russian gains in the USSR as a whole, and three times as fast as in the RSFSR. While in 1959 14·24 per cent of the Soviet Russians lived outside the RSFSR, 11 years later their ratio increased to 16·484 per cent. How were those Russians distributed 'in diaspora'?

It seems best to arrange the non-Russian Union Republics into three geographic groups or regions, especially since the pattern of Russian population increase varies significantly and there are also variations in the general population growth between the regions. The three regions are: Transcaucasia, Central Asia (including Kazakhstan which Soviet sources usually place in a separate category from Central Asia), and Soviet Eastern Europe.

Of the total of 5,017,000 Russians added to the population of the non-Russian Union Republics between 1959 and 1970, the share of Transcaucasia equalled a mere 8,000, that is, 0·159 per cent of the total gain of Russians outside the RSFSR. Soviet Eastern Europe received 2,714,000, more than half of the gain (54·096 per cent), and Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, received 2,295,000, i.e. 45·744 per cent. By 1970, Russian population in Central Asia reached 8,509,000 (1959: 6,214,000), in Transcaucasia 973,000 (1959: 965,000), and in Eastern Europe 11,785,000 (1959: 9,071,000). There was a slight percentage shift in the total distribution of the Russians over this period: Transcaucasia's share of the total number of Russians living outside the RSFSR dropped from

[11] See Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities* (London: Macmillan, 1970) and 'An Unreported Incident of National Unrest' (*Radio Liberty Dispatch*, 26 June 1969).

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5·938 to 4·575 per cent, Eastern Europe's declined from 55·821 to 55·414 per cent, and Central Asia's gained from 38·24 to 40·01 per cent.

Transcaucasia

In each of the three Transcaucasian republics the growth of titular nationalities was far higher than the growth of Russians and it also exceeded the growth of the population (in particular in Azerbaidzhan where the Azerbaidzhanis grew by over 50 per cent while the total population grew by less than 40 per cent). (See Table 3.) The Russians declined most significantly in Georgia, where their number in 1970 (397,000) was 11,000 less than in 1959 (408,000). This was a decline of 2·696 per cent and the Russians now constitute 8·5 per cent of Georgia's total population (1959: 10·1). In Azerbaidzhan the Russian population increased slightly (from 501,000 to 510,000, i.e. by 1·796 per cent) and the rapid growth of the principal nationality caused a serious drop in their share of the republic's population (1970: 10·0 per cent, 1959: 13·6).

In Armenia the Russians increased at a rate higher than their all-Union average (17·857 per cent) but since their number had been low (56,000, or 3·2 per cent in 1959) the net gain of 10,000 Russians in Armenia by 1970 merely meant that their relative drop in total population was smaller than it would have otherwise been. By 1970 the Russians constituted 2·7 per cent of Armenia's population—the lowest percentage in any of the 15 Soviet republics.

If one treats Transcaucasia as a single geographico-cultural area, which one is justified in doing despite the historic animosities between the Christian Georgians and Armenians and the Moslem Azerbaidzhanis, the relative decline of the Russian element there will become even more evident.

In 1959, the Russians in Transcaucasia constituted slightly over 10 per cent of the population (10·153), or 965,000 in a population of 9,505,000. Eleven years later their number rose 8,000 (to 973,000), a rise of less than 1 per cent (0·829), and their percentage in Transcaucasia's population dropped to 7·914. By contrast, both the Armenians (who constitute a sizeable minority in Georgia and Azerbaidzhan) and the Azerbaidzhanis (who likewise live in Armenia and Georgia besides their own country) gained significantly areawide. The Armenians in Transcaucasia as a whole increased by over 700,000 (from 2,437,000 to 3,146,000) or by 29·093 per cent, while the Azerbaidzhanis did even better. Their increase in Transcaucasia equalled 50·326 per cent, slightly under the increase in their own republic. In Transcaucasia there were 2,756,000 Azerbaidzhanis in 1959 and 4,143,000 in 1970. The figures for the Georgian population in Armenia and Azerbaidzhan were not included in the release of the Central Statistical Board of the USSR, presumably because of their small size. A vast majority (3,131,000 out of 3,245,000) of the Georgians live in Georgia, and the RSFSR has a majority of those not in Georgia (69,000 out of the total of 114,000 in 1970).

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There are reasons for thinking that the factors which have tended to keep the Russians out of Transcaucasia or at least to slow down their immigration will continue to operate in the foreseeable future. While the rural population in the USSR as a whole declined slightly (by about 3 per cent) over the 11-year period and constituted about 44 per cent of the Soviet population (105,745,000) in 1970, there was an absolute growth of rural population in all three Transcaucasian republics, from a small increase in Georgia (4·976 per cent) and somewhat higher growth in Armenia (14·756 per cent) to a quite substantial one in Azerbaidzhan (32·124 per cent). Since the rural population still constitutes a majority in Georgia and about a half in Azerbaidzhan (about 41 per cent in Armenia) there will no doubt be pressure for jobs in industry and towns. Since the natives of Transcaucasia are reluctant to go farming in Kazakhstan or Siberia, jobs will have to be found for them at home.

The task of providing work for the natives of Transcaucasia may not only require the creation of new jobs but may also mean a pressure on the 'outsiders', especially Russians and other Slavs, to leave. Since the Russian population in that area increased by less than 1 per cent over a period of 11 years, the Russians were either becoming Georgian, Armenian or Azerbaidzhani, or—which is more likely—were already leaving.[12]

Soviet Central Asia

The demographic situation in Central Asia shows that high increase in the number of local nationalities (including the rural population) is not necessarily accompanied by low growth of the Russian population. Four of the five principal nationalities of Central Asia (those with their own Union Republics) grew faster than any other of the major Soviet nations. The Tadzhiks in the USSR as a whole grew by 52·899 per cent, the Uzbeks by 52·868 per cent, the Turkmens by 52·196 per cent and the Kirghiz by 49·845 per cent. The Kazakhs grew by 46·3 per cent, a rate lower than that of the Azerbaidzhanis whose growth equalled 48·98 per cent. If one considers the growth rates of the principal 15 nations in their respective republics, all five Central Asian nations took the five top positions: they were among the six nations to increase by more than half in their own republics (the Azerbaidzhanis took the sixth position). Their rates of growth at home were faster than on the all-Union scale which means that in 1970 they were concentrated in their own republics more than in 1959 (see Table 4).

Also, all five Central Asian republics had a high proportion of rural population in 1959, and it continued to grow in the following 11 years. While in the European republics (except Moldavia) rural population was

[12] This writer knows no Soviet source confirming Russian emigration from Transcaucasia. However, V. Sh. Dzhaoshvili, 'Rozselennia ukraintsiv na terytorii Hruzynskoi RSR', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, No. 1, 1970, pp. 104–108, claims that since 1956 more people have been going from Georgia to the Ukraine than vice versa, and he thinks that the Ukrainians constitute a major segment of those migrants to the Ukraine.

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declining relatively and absolutely, and especially rapidly so in the RSFSR, including most of its Asian provinces, Central Asia recorded the highest growth rates for rural population as well. Uzbekistan (rural population up by 41·324 per cent), Turkmenia (37·622 per cent), Tadzhikistan (36·657 per cent) and Kirghizia (33·942 per cent) produce a striking contrast with the RSFSR (European and Asian parts combined), whose rural population, already relatively much smaller in 1959, *decreased* during the same period by over 12 per cent (12·19 per cent). Kazakhstan, too, had a high rate of growth of rural population (21·113 per cent) though again behind that of Azerbaidzhan (32·124 per cent). Kazakhstan was the only one of the five Central Asian republics to achieve a slight majority of urban population by 1970, Turkmenia had about 52 per cent rural population, and the other three had each more than 60 per cent rural population. Russia's rural population had in the meantime dropped to about 38 per cent of the republic's population.

Admittedly, the percentage growth of the urban population of Central Asia was even faster. Its effect, however, was very small: except for Kazakhstan where approximately twice as many people were added to the urban population as to the also growing rural population, the net effect of urbanization in the Central Asian republics was to shift the urban-rural ratio by just two or three percentage points.

Among the reasons why the growth of urban population did not bring any significant slowing down of the growth of the rural population, one of the most important seems to have been vast Russian immigration which, except in Kazakhstan, was directed primarily to cities and towns. As Soviet scholars have pointed out many times (and without any visible effect), the population leaving the villages of RSFSR has provided the major contingent of new urban residents for the cities of Central Asia. The construction of new industrial enterprises, roads, etc., in those republics means as a rule the bringing in from outside of personnel, not only at managerial level but also regular workers. When a textile factory is being built in an Uzbek or Turkmen city, for example, not only the equipment but also the workers are brought in from the central Russian regions of Moscow or Vladimir. The natives of Soviet Central Asia have apparently not yet reached the point of demanding that a share of jobs in construction projects be guaranteed to local residents (as well as provision for the training of skilled labour).

In Central Asia as a whole (see Table 5), the Russians increased by almost 37 per cent (36·933); in individual republics their growth varied from a 'low' of 19·011 per cent in Turkmenia to a high of 39·241 per cent in Kazakhstan. The rate of the Russian increase in Kazakhstan was almost equal to that of the total population (40·38 per cent) but still significantly below the growth of the Kazakhs themselves (52·281 per cent), who even managed to regain some of the lost ground. They are still a minority in their own country, but their percentage has gone up from 29·8 to 32·4, while the Russians dropped from 43·2 to 42·8 per cent. Whether the Kazakhs will go on improving their position or the Russians

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resume their upward trend of the pre-1959 years will depend on which process now at work will slow down first and more: Russian immigration or Kazakh birth-rates. In Uzbekistan, the Russian increase of more than a third (34·291 per cent) brought the number of Russians there up to almost one and a half million—but was not enough to improve or even maintain their relative standing in the country's population. The Russian share declined by one percentage point (down to 12·5 per cent) while the Uzbeks went up to 64·7, a gain of 4·6 percentage points. The Russians were also relatively worse off in the remaining republics, and the principal nations correspondingly improved their position. Although the data for ethnic composition of urban and rural population are not yet available, individual republics in some cases published a breakdown in ethnic terms of the population of the republic's capital city. Thus, according to *Pravda Vostoka* (28 April 1971), Tashkent, Uzbekistan's capital, whose population grew by almost a half between the censuses and reached 1,385,000 in 1970 (1959: 927,000), had 513,000 Uzbeks in 1970, an increase of 202,000 over the 1959 figure of 311,000. The Uzbeks are still only the second largest nationality in their capital (37·1 per cent; in 1959: 33·6 per cent), but the Russians have dropped from 44·1 to 40·8 per cent, and in absolute numbers are no longer so much above the Uzbeks: 565,000 in 1970, merely 54,000 Russians more than the Uzbeks. (There were 409,000 Russians in Tashkent in 1959.) It seems that what the German scholar K.-E. Wädekin foresaw seven years ago as the possible 'Returkicization' of Tashkent is in fact taking place. The high ratio of young people among the Uzbeks (relatively low among the Slavs), their high birth-rate, and the likelihood of an Uzbek immigration from the surrounding countryside were the factors which, Wädekin considered, favoured such an outcome. It could be countered, he noted however, by a strong Slavic immigration from other parts of the USSR and by cultural Russification in the city. (He thought that neither of these factors would be strong enough to prevent the 'Returkicization' from happening.[13])

What has been said here about Kazakhstan (which in its northern provinces does in fact have large Slavic rural populations to draw upon) and Uzbekistan applies also to Kirghizia, Turkmenia, and Tadzhikistan, where the Russian position has been considerably weaker from the start. Only large Russian immigration (or an immediate and significant decrease in the birth-rate of the non-Russians) can prevent further relative decline of Russian human potential in Central Asia. Can the Russians, with their responsibilities on the all-Union scale, biologically, economically, and politically afford to maintain these necessary levels of immigration? And, whether the Russians keep on coming in big numbers or not, will the native peoples of Central Asia, in whose opinion

[13] Karl-Eugen Wädekin, 'Nationalitätenpolitik und Lebenskraft der Völker in der Sowjet-union heute und morgen', *Osteuropa*, No. 11, 1964, pp. 837–850.

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there may possibly *already* be too many Russians (and Slavs in general) in Central Asia, continue to tolerate the present situation? [14]

The Baltic states

The Russian population growth in Central Asia, despite its large size, failed to change the ethnic balance of that region in favour of the Russians. All it achieved was to slow down the relative decline of the Slavic element there. What appeared at one time like a Russian offensive has proved to have been a defensive, holding-off action. In Eastern Europe the Russians have done much better.

In Latvia and Estonia, where the local population grew very slowly, Russian immigration was most successful in changing the Russian-native ratio in favour of the Russians. The number of Russians in Estonia between the censuses increased by 39·583 per cent and that of Estonians by 3·583 per cent, i.e. the Russian growth was about 11 times higher than the Estonian. In absolute numbers, there were 95,000 more Russians in Estonia in 1970 than in 1959 (total in 1970: 335,000), but only 32,000 more Estonians (total in 1970: 925,000).[15]

In Latvia the Latvians added another 44,000 to their number of 1,298,000 in 1959, that is they grew by 3·39 per cent, while dropping from 62 per cent in their republic's population to 56·8 per cent. (In Estonia the Estonians went down from 74·6 to 68·2 per cent.) The Russians, who increased in Latvia from 556,000 to 705,000, i.e. by 26·799 per cent, now constitute a sizeable minority of 29·8 per cent (1959: 26·6 per cent).

The third Baltic republic, Lithuania, is often mentioned together with Latvia and Estonia, but the population changes in it followed

[14] Several years ago a Polish reporter was told by an Uzbek in Tashkent: 'The cadres of our own intelligentsia are growing, including the professional (*specjalistyczna*) intelligentsia. . . . They are looking for a place for themselves.' A Russian official, on the other hand, complained that 'the Uzbeks, of course, support each other, whether it is justified or not. And secondly, they prefer to shift the more difficult work, and, first of all, the difficult and unpopular decisions, off to that deputy, to that *evropeyets* [i.e. a Russian]. . . .' Jerzy Lovell, 'Podróz na Wschód', *Życie Literackie* (Kraków), 19 December 1965, p. 7. The Arutyunian study (referred to in note 10) confirms the existence of relatively higher incidence of nationalist attitudes among the Tatar intelligentsia. Zev Katz, 'Sociology in the Soviet Union', *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XX, No. 3 (May–June 1971), p. 38, attributes 'revolutionary character' to Arutyunian's findings confirming the existence of both a traditional nationalism and a 'nationalism of a new type'.

[15] It may be worth while to note here that the percentage growth of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians (as of almost all other Soviet nationalities with their own Union Republics) was higher in their respective republics than in the USSR as a whole, which seems to confirm the assertion of those Soviet authors who argue that the non-Russians are generally disinclined to leave their own areas. For the Balts, see e.g. Yu. G. Saushkin, T. M. Kalashnikova, 'Gipoteza perspektivnogo razvitiya sistemy raionnykh territorialno-proizvodstvennykh kompleksov SSSR', *Voprosy geografii*, Vol. 57 (Moscow, 1962), pp. 121–146, esp. p. 128, and for the Ukrainians, see V. V. Pokshishevsky, 'Migratsii naseleniya v SSSR', *Priroda*, No. 9, 1969, pp. 67–75, esp. p. 72. V. I. Perevedentsev, 'O vliyanii etnicheskikh faktorov na territorialnoye pereraspredeleniye naseleniya', *Izvestia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Seriya geograficheskaya*, No. 4, 1965, pp. 31–39, considers ethnic distinctions to be a major factor influencing inter-republic migrations.

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another pattern. First of all, the Lithuanians themselves increased at a quite different pace: there were 2,507,000 Lithuanians in Lithuania in 1970, which was a gain of 16·55 per cent over the 1959 figure of 2,151,000. They even managed to *improve* their majority in the country's total population from 79·3 to 80·1 per cent. Secondly, the Russians also increased (16·017 per cent), but at a rate considerably lower than anywhere else in Soviet Eastern Europe and even slightly lower than that of Lithuanians themselves. There were 231,000 Russians in 1959, and 268,000 in 1970 in Lithuania. Their relative position improved only slightly: from 8·5 to 8·6 per cent of the total population.

When one discusses the Baltic-Russian relationship it is necessary to consider also the Belorussian and Ukrainian presence in and immigration to these areas. In view of the total lack of cultural or educational facilities for the Ukrainians and Belorussians outside the Ukraine and Belorussia respectively, and their linguistic closeness to the Russians, members of these nationalities outside their own republic function in practice as a Russifying element. The importance of this in the Baltic states should not be underestimated. The Ukranians increased in the Baltic area by more than two-thirds (from 63,000 in 1959 to 106,000 in 1970) and the Belorussians by more than a half (from 103,000 to 159,000). Since in Estonia the Estonians gained only 32,000 people, an increase of the Ukrainian population in that republic from 16,000 to 28,000, and of the Belorussian from 11,000 to 19,000, produced a weighty addition of 20,000 East Slavs to reinforce the Russian gain of 95,000. In Latvia the joint gain of Ukrainians and Belorussians was in fact higher than that of the Latvians. The Belorussians increased from 62,000 to 95,000 and the Ukrainians from 29,000 to 53,000; jointly they gained 57,000 in Latvia, 13,000 more than their host, the Latvian nation. Since there was also the gain of 149,000 Russians, these figures mean that in absolute numbers, for every new Latvian Latvia was simultaneously getting five new inhabitants who were Russian, Belorussian, or Ukrainian. How is one to interpret the fact that the growth of the Ukrainian population in Latvia exceeded 82 per cent, in Estonia reached 75 per cent, and came close to 40 per cent in Lithuania, when, as will be shown below, in the Ukraine itself the growth of the Ukrainian population was less than 10 per cent (while that of the Russians was nearly three times as large), and the Ukrainian share in the total population there declined considerably?

A review of the Baltic situation should not consist only of information on the weakening of the Baltic nations. One of them, the Lithuanian, has in fact won a major achievement in the period under consideration. Vilnius, the ancient capital of Lithuania, seems to have become more of a Lithuanian city than it has ever been during the past three or four hundred years. In consequence of a series of Polish-Lithuanian agreements which were finalized in the act of Polish-Lithuanian union at Lublin (1569), Vilnius and other cities of Lithuania became gradually Polonized, so that throughout the nineteenth and in the first half of the twentieth century Lithuanians in Vilnius numbered

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about 2 per cent of the population. After the second world war a majority of the Poles moved west to Poland but even as late as 1959 the Poles constituted a 20 per cent minority in the city. The places of those Poles who went west, and of the Yiddish-speaking Jews (in the past the second largest group in Vilnius) who perished under the Nazis, were taken by the Lithuanians moving in from the countryside and by the Russians coming in from the east. (The Russian element in Vilnius before the second world war was insignificant.) The following table shows the ethnic distribution of population of Vilnius in 1959 and 1970:

Vilnius in 1959 and 1970

	1959	1970
Total	231,100 (100 per cent)	372,100 (100 per cent)
Lithuanians	33·6 per cent	42·8 per cent
Russians	29·4	24·5
Poles	20·0	18·3
Belorussians	6·2	6·5
Jews	6·9	4·4
Others	3·9	3·5

Source: *Sovetskaya Litva*, 6 May 1971.

Although the Russians in Vilnius still remain in numbers far out of proportion to their share in Lithuania's population as a whole, and the Lithuanians far below theirs, the improved Lithuanian position in their capital is comparable to the Uzbeks' partial recovery of their own capital of Tashkent and promises to make local resistance to Russification more effective.[16]

Belorussia and Moldavia

Belorussia and Moldavia became part of the Russian Empire (1772–95 and 1812) later than Latvia and Estonia (1721) but for various historical, cultural and religious reasons their identity was never as distinct as that of the two Protestant nations in the Baltic area. Although the Russians form a relatively small minority in Belorussia (1959: 8·2 per cent, 1970: 10·4 per cent) and Moldavia (1959: 10·2 per cent, 1970: 11·6 per cent), these republics give the impression of being more Russified than either Latvia or Estonia. In fact the Russians are relatively much stronger in the latter. There are at least two reasons why Belorussia looks Russian or Russified. First, linguistically Belorussians

[16] For the role of capital cities in national development in the USSR see V. V. Pokshishevsky, 'Etnicheskiye protsessy v gorodakh SSSR i nekotorye problemy ikh izucheniya', *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, No. 5, 1969, pp. 3–15. Cf. the classic article by Mark Jefferson, 'The Law of Primate City', *Geographical Review*, Vol. 29 (1939), pp. 226–232.

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are very close to the Russians and their language was not used in schools, the periodical press, or book-publishing until after the Civil War. (The first modest use of Belorussian in print occurred after the 1905 revolution.) The period when the use of Belorussian was encouraged ended abruptly in the Stalinist purges of the early 1930s and thus lasted just about 10 years. The other reason why Russian prevails in Belorussia is that, until quite recently, the Belorussians remained primarily country people—the towns have traditionally been more Russian, Jewish, or Polish than Belorussian. More than in the case of other nationalities the city has appeared to a Belorussian immigrating from the village as a foreign, non-Belorussian, world—and at the same time one not sufficiently alien to provoke in him a nationalist reaction instead of the more common desire to adjust by assimilation.

Among the nationalities with their own Union Republics, the Belorussians have the largest proportion of those individuals who regard Russian, not their own nation's language, as their 'native' tongue. Almost one out of five Belorussians in the USSR is Russian linguistically, although many of those Russian-speaking Belorussians know Belorussian and declare it to be their *second* language. In Belorussia itself, the proportion of Russian-speaking Belorussians was lower than in the USSR as a whole. 719,000, or 9·863 per cent of the Belorussians in 1970, as compared with 442,000 or 6·767 per cent in 1959, declared Russian to be their first language. However, according to *Sovetskaya Belorussia* (19 May 1971), 321,000 of those 719,000 Belorussians declared that they also had a good command of Belorussian. (The question about second language was not asked in 1959.) According to the same source, 285,000 members of other nationalities also claimed a good knowledge of Belorussian, thus raising to 83·4 per cent the total number of Belorussia's inhabitants familiar with that language.

It is worth noting that high linguistic assimilation even among a people as close to the Russians as the Belorussians does not seem to lead to a change in national identity. The Belorussians continue to declare themselves as such (is Belorussianness becoming to some extent a territorial or political concept?) and their numerical increase in Belorussia has virtually kept pace with the increase of the republic's total population [17] (see Table 6). The Russian gain there was higher than in any East European republic, indeed, the highest recorded in any Union Republic (42·121 per cent), and their share in the population grew significantly. However, the Belorussians maintained their position virtually without change (a drop of one-tenth of one per cent, from 81·1 to 81·0 per cent), while the Poles lost heavily (a drop from 539,000 to 383,000), and it is possible that some Poles declared themselves as Belorussians in the 1970 census. (A majority of the Poles had declared Belorussian as their language in 1959.)

High mobility was another distinguishing feature of the Belorussians

[17] For the language problem in Belorussia see Nicholas P. Vakar, 'The Belorussian People Between Nationhood and Extinction', in Goldhagen, op. cit. pp. 218–228.

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and it was no doubt connected with the first, i.e. their high assimilation to the Russian language. Heavy Belorussian immigration to the Baltic states has already been noted, but the Belorussians were also moving to the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Kirghizia. Discounting the Georgians (who increased in the USSR by a fraction of a per cent faster than in Georgia), no other Union Republic nationality except the Belorussians was growing faster in the USSR than at home. While gaining 11·604 per cent in their republic, the Belorussians increased by 14·394 per cent in the USSR as a whole and by 27·589 per cent in the USSR excluding Belorussia. What is even more puzzling is the disparity between the increase of Belorussian-speaking Belorussians 'at home' and 'abroad': in the former they increased by 7·969 per cent (the assimilated ones by 62·67 per cent) while outside the borders of Belorussia the number of Belorussian speakers increased by 25·65 per cent and of the Russian-speaking Belorussians by 28·98 per cent. One can only speculate about the causes of this emigration of the natives from a republic which was attracting at the same time vast numbers of Russians and Ukrainians from the outside.

What has been said here about the traditionally agrarian character of Belorussia can be said with even greater force about Moldavia. In 1959 that republic had the dubious distinction of being the least urbanized of all 15 republics of the USSR. It retained this position 11 years later when the census showed that 68 per cent of Moldavia's population still lived in the villages (the figure for 1959 was 78 per cent). Moldavia's rural population *increased* by almost 9 per cent from 2,242,200 to 2,438,800, while in all other East European republics there was a decrease in the absolute number of rural residents. Compared with Moldavia even Belorussia was doing much better in this respect: rural population there fell by 8·578 per cent and constituted 57 per cent of the population in 1970.

In 1959, the Moldavians were a predominantly rural people (they constituted a minority of about one-third in their own capital) and they presumably remained so in 1970 despite impressive growth of urban population in the intervening years (from 642,300 to 1,130,000). The move of Moldavians to cities could not but have been obstructed by the vast Russian inflow to Moldavia. (The Moldavian press release on the 1970 census does not give an ethnic breakdown of the population of Kishinev, Moldavia's capital.) While the Moldavians increased (22·099 per cent) at a high pace, not much below that of the total population growth (23·709 per cent), the Russians increased nearly twice as fast (41·297 per cent). In addition, the Ukrainians seem to have found Moldavia preferable to virtually all parts of the Ukraine (20·427 per cent increase between 1959 and 1970). In the Ukraine itself, only Kiev City and the provinces of Kherson and the Crimea recorded a higher growth of the Ukrainian population than did the agrarian and already over-populated Moldavia. (In the near-by Odessa province in the Ukraine, on the other hand, the Russians increased twice as fast as the Ukrainians.)

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What was it that was making so many Russians and Ukrainians go to that small country located next to Rumania's borders, whose native population is linguistically close to if not identical with the Rumanians? (The Soviet official line regards Moldavian as a Romance language but one distinct from Rumanian; this view is not generally shared outside the borders of the Soviet Union, where the Moldavians are regarded as Rumanians.[18])

The relative weakness of Moldavian modern, urban culture, Moldavia's isolation from Rumania, and finally the demographic, political and cultural invasion from the East have all combined to give some effectiveness to Russifying pressures: between the censuses there was a downward shift among the Moldavian-speaking Moldavians (from 98·2 to 97·7 per cent); this shift was not as large as that noted in Belorussia (or in the Ukraine), but still a dangerous sign for the Moldavian identity.

The three regions of the Ukraine

The large size of the population of the Ukrainian Republic necessitates caution in making generalizations about Russian-Ukrainian relations there or in drawing comparisons with the other republics. The first fact one notices abut the census in the Ukraine is of course the extraordinary numerical power of the Russian element—over nine million in 1970—and its growth exceeding two million people since 1959. When one translates the absolute figures into percentages, and compares the latter with ethnic relationships in other Union Republics however, the apparent power of the Russians no longer appears to be so unusual or overwhelming. Taking only Eastern European republics for this comparison, one notes, first, that in 1970 there were relatively more Russians in Estonia or Latvia than in the Ukraine and, secondly, that the Russian increase between the censuses proceeded faster in Belorussia, Moldavia and Estonia than in the Ukraine. (In addition, the Russians increased faster in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia and Tadzhikistan.) Finally, the relative strength of the republic's principal nationality, the Ukrainians, was and remained higher than that of the principal nationalities in a majority of the Soviet republics (in East Europe the Ukrainians ranked above the Estonians, Latvians and Moldavians but were behind the Lithuanians and Belorussians).[19]

The preceding are precisely those generalizations and comparisons that, however correct they may be in themselves, do not probe much below the surface. A republic whose size is about equal to that of France (with a smaller population than France), the Ukraine is a composite of

[18] International political considerations cannot be discounted because the 'Bessarabian Question' may be coming up again. See Alexander Suga, 'Bessarabien—noch immer umstritten?', *Osteuropa*, No. 5, 1971, pp. 316–323.

[19] For an analysis of the population in the Ukraine between 1926 and 1959 see V. Kubijovyč (ed.), *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), Vol. I.

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regions with different historical experiences in modern times and with different population, especially ethnic, patterns. A division of the 47 million strong republic into three areas, corresponding to the so-called 'Large Economic Regions of the Gosplan', while still far from taking account of those dissimilarities, is therefore a minimum step for a better understanding of the Russo-Ukrainian relationship in the Ukraine and its evolution between 1959 and 1970 (Table 7).

East Ukraine

The Donetsk-Dnepr region comprises the main industrial centres of the Ukraine, including the coal-mining area of Donbas (Donetsk and Voroshilovgrad), the manufacturing and transportation centre of Kharkov, and the Dnepropetrovsk-Zaporozhye industrial region on the Dnepr River. Although it also includes the traditionally agrarian areas of Poltava, Sumy, and Kirovograd, the overwhelmingly urban character of the whole region is best represented by such cities as Kharkov, Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk. This is the region, especially its most industrialized and urbanized parts, that in modern times has been most Russianized. Even though the inclusion of the provinces of Poltava, Sumy and Kirovograd in the totals for the Donetsk-Dnepr region tends to lower the Russian strength where it matters most, the gains achieved by the Russians between the two censuses are impressive enough. Their share in the total population rose by 26·665 per cent (more than three percentage points) and in absolute figures their gain there exceeded one million people (1,177,000). This was about 58 per cent of the net Russian increase in the Ukrainian SSR. The number of Ukrainians added to the population of this region was lower (1,053,000), though in the Ukraine as a whole the Ukrainians gained over a million more people than the Russians. In relative terms, only one-third of the net Ukrainian growth (33·686 per cent) went to the Donetsk-Dnepr region, and the Ukrainians there grew by 8·387 per cent. Even more striking was the disparity between the Russian and Ukrainian population growth in the most urban sub-region of this most urban region of the Ukraine: in the Donbas, i.e. *oblasti* of Donetsk and Voroshilovgrad combined, the Russians increased by 584,000 (28·698 per cent of their net gain in the Ukraine) and the Ukrainians by 318,000 (10·173 per cent of the Ukrainian gain in the whole republic). The Ukrainians in the Donbas dropped from 56·366 to 53·683 per cent of the population while the Russians went up from 37·99 to 41·018 per cent. Since in 1959 this area also included the relatively greatest number of Ukrainians whose native language was Russian, one may assume that a majority of the population in the Donbas spoke Russian in 1970. (The appropriate figures for 1970 have not yet been published.)

Kiev and the West

The south-western region comprises 13 provinces (*oblasti*) of the Ukrainian SSR and has the largest population (20,689,000 in 1970). Its

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population was growing much more slowly than in the Donetsk-Dnepr or the southern region and its relative proportion fell between 1959 (when 44·446 per cent of the Ukraine's population lived there) and 1970 (43·901 per cent). The Donetsk-Dnepr region recorded a slight increase for the same period (from 42·432 to 42·56 per cent) while the south gained considerably (from 12·121 to 13·538 per cent). There are only two major cities in the region: the Ukraine's capital, Kiev, and the West Ukrainian city of Lvov, which was the capital of the Crownland of Galicia under the Habsburgs (1772–1918) and then a provincial centre in Poland (1918–39). Historically, this is the area of greatest Western influence in the Ukraine—major parts of this region never belonged to the Russian Empire and became Soviet only during or after the second world war (Galicia 1939; Bukovina or Chernovtsy *oblast* 1940; Transcarpathia 1945). Even those parts under Russia before 1914 were mostly relatively recent acquisitions, dating back to the second and third partitions of Poland (1793–95). Only in Kiev and its immediate vicinity and in Chernigov did the Russians appear as early as the second half of the seventeenth century.

Since much of the area was outside Russian control until about 30 years ago, and as a whole was densely populated and predominantly agrarian in character, there has been relatively little Russian immigration to it. The only exception in this regard was the Russian immigration wave to the 'new' Soviet provinces, where there had been no Russians previously, after the second world war. There the Russians partially replaced in the urban population the Poles and the Jews who were either killed or expelled during and after the war. In 1959, the south-western region's population was 87·823 per cent Ukrainian; by 1970 the Ukrainians dropped by a fraction of 1 per cent to 87·815. The increase in the Ukrainian population was slightly lower than the total population growth. The Russians grew by 22·862 per cent (below their average republic growth of 28·689 per cent) and their share in the region's population rose from 5·839 to 6·598 per cent. In absolute terms, however, the number of Russians involved was much lower than in the Donetsk-Dnepr region. Their net gain there equalled one-eighth of the total Russian gain in the Ukraine (254,000), less than their gain in the Donbas alone. In 1959, 15·668 per cent of the Ukraine's Russians lived in the south-western region; in 1970 the percentage fell to 14·957.

The growth of the Russian population in separate provinces of the South-West varied extensively. It was highest in the city of Kiev and in the provinces of Kiev, Ivano-Frankovsk and Cherkassy (ranging from 23·7 per cent in Ivano-Frankovsk to 46·5 per cent in Kiev City). In most cases it was higher than that of the Ukrainians and in only one did the actual number of Russians decline (Ternopol *oblast*, a drop from 27,000 to 26,000, or from 2·5 to 2·3 per cent of the *oblast's* population). The Ukrainians recorded their highest gain in the city of Kiev where in 1970 they constituted 64·8 per cent of the population. This was a considerable gain from the 60·2 per cent recorded in 1959, and seems to mean that

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Kiev has been a centre of particular attraction to Ukrainians (a growth from 668,000 to 1,057,000, or of 58·2 per cent).[20] In two *oblasti* of the Ukraine the absolute number of Ukrainians declined between the censuses and one of these was located in the south-western region. In Chernigov province the Ukrainians declined by 1·5 per cent and the Russians increased by 17·7 per cent. (The other *oblast* was Kirovograd in the Donetsk-Dnepr region where the Ukrainian decrease of 0·1 per cent was accompanied by a Russian gain of 12·6 per cent.)

Odessa and the Crimea

The southern region's population grew by over 25 per cent (25·714), an increase almost double the Ukraine's growth and almost three times faster than that of the south-western region. The region comprises four *oblasti*: the Crimea (the population of which increased by 1970 by more than half of the 1959 total), Kherson, Odessa and Nikolayev. This was one of the areas of greatest population growth for the Russians (a change of 38·57 per cent, far above the republic average of 28·698 per cent), who improved their position in three of the four *oblasti*: Odessa, Kherson and Nikolayev. The Russians were also growing very fast in the Crimea (change of 42·1 per cent), where already in 1959 they constituted a strong majority in the population (71·4 per cent). However, after 1959 the Ukrainian immigration to the Crimea seems to have been on an even bigger scale, as indicated by the increase of the Ukrainians there by something like 79·5 per cent (from 268,000 to 481,000) and their gain in the total population from 22·3 to 26·5 per cent (and the Russian decline to 67·3 per cent). The Ukrainian population gains in the other provinces were above the Ukrainian Republic average but still lower than the Russian ones and could not therefore prevent the relative decline of the Ukrainians in the region's population (from 56·985 to 54·984 per cent). The Ukrainians may even lose their slim majority in the region as a whole (the Russians have gone up from 30·857 to 34·012 per cent) unless the Russian immigration, which seems to be flowing mainly from the RSFSR, is slowed down by exhaustion or otherwise, and/or unless the Ukrainian immigration goes up. The south-western region remains the principal Ukrainian reservoir of human resources and much will depend on whether the people leaving villages and small towns of the South-West in search of better living conditions will go to the Ukrainian provinces on the Black Sea rather than to the Baltic states, Central Asia, or Siberia, as so many have been doing in the recent past.

The population growth in the South of the Ukraine appears to be part of the wider process of the southward migration in the USSR, which

[20] The drawing power of Kiev for migrants from all over the Ukraine was noted by V. I. Tovkun, 'Osoblyvosti mihratsii naselennia Ukrainskoi RSR u 1959–1963 rr.', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, No. 4, 1966, pp. 49–56, esp. pp. 55–56. Kiev's 'zone of gravitation' in railroad passenger traffic was compared with that of Kharkov (and found superior) by O. A. Kibalchich, 'Nekotorye osobennosti passazhirskikh svyazei krupnykh gorodov SSSR', *Voprosy geografii*, Vol. 66 (Moscow, 1965), pp. 141–152, esp. pp. 146–149.

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includes Moldavia, the North-Caucasus region of the RSFSR (Krasnodar and Rostov), and Central Asia. This is largely an unplanned development, contrary to the centrally designed and publicly announced directives, which call for an eastward migration.

The southern region, unlike the other two, seems to be still in the process of acquiring its ethnic shape: both Russians and Ukrainians there have been increasing fast, although at an uneven pace. From 1959 to 1970, the South's share in the Ukraine's population went up from 12·121 to 13·538 per cent. Although in 1959 only 22·084 per cent of the Ukraine's Russians and 8·993 per cent of the Ukraine's Ukrainians lived in the southern region, by 1970 these percentages rose to 23·778 and 9·942 respectively. In 1970, there were in the South 616,000 more Ukrainians (increase of 20·3 per cent) and 604,000 more Russians (increase of 38·57 per cent) than in 1959. In the Ukraine, the South accounted for 19·706 per cent of the increase in Ukrainians and for 29·68 per cent of the Russian gain.

This brief survey of the ethnic situation in the major regions of the Ukraine warrants some cautious conclusions. While the Russians gained throughout the Ukraine, they are particularly strong in the Donetsk-Dnepr region or, to be more precise, in the easternmost and most urbanized part of it, the Donbas. Their increase was fastest in the South and their relative position there improved, but the area was also the primary centre of attraction to Ukrainians (at least on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR), who were doing better in the Crimea than the Russians. Finally, Russian overall gains in the south-western region, relatively high though they were, were far too low to change the ethnic balance in any serious way. Despite their relatively high percentage gains in individual provinces of the South-West, the Russians remain in a minority of less than 10 per cent in all of them except the city of Kiev (which enjoys the status of an *oblast* in its own right), where they have been traditionally strong (in 1959 Russians constituted 23 per cent of Kiev's population and in 1970 22·9 per cent).

The overall numerical increase of Russians in the Ukraine was serious, and when one adds to this the considerable increase in the number of Ukrainians declaring Russian as their first language (Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in the Ukraine dropped from 93·5 to 91·4 per cent of all Ukrainians between the censuses), the Russian presence in the Ukraine will become even more conspicuous. The Russian gains in the Ukraine were distributed very unevenly, however, and in some areas there were counter-processes at work leading to an absolute or relative strengthening of the Ukrainian element. It does not seem that the Ukraine and the Ukrainians are about to disappear or dissolve into an all-Russian or Soviet nationality.

Conclusion

Dissolution or disappearance does not seem to be a prospect facing any of the nations of Soviet East Europe, not to mention those of

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Central Asia or Transcaucasia. Should the Russians ever win a majority in Latvia or Estonia (or in a number of Ukrainian provinces),[21] this will not by itself eliminate the non-Russians, although it will perhaps make them more dissatisfied with their fate in the USSR. After all, the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz have survived their transformation into minority nations in their own country, but may now be reversing the trend.

The policy of promoting and encouraging an 'inter-republic exchange of cadres', which was much extolled in Khrushchev's time, still remains in force and was quite recently reasserted in an authoritative *Pravda* article by E. Bagramov.[22] In practice it means that the Russians and the non-Russians, *provided they have become fully proficient in Russian,* should be employed anywhere in the USSR without the necessity of learning the local language. The natives, at the same time, are being refused employment in their own country because they do not know Russian well enough and they see the jobs being given to recent arrivals from Russia who have frequently been transferred to Uzbekistan or Tadzhikistan by the administration. These transfers involve not only highly skilled specialists but also truck-drivers, warehouse attendants, etc.[23] To remedy this situation (which is said to exist in other areas as well), Perevedentsev proposed an improvement of Russian teaching in village schools and possibly the reservation of some jobs for local residents.

There are other indications in Soviet scholarly and political journals that the intensification of Russian language instruction (in some republics it has now been extended to pre-school children) is seen by some at least as the way to maintain the privileged position of the Russian language which is being threatened by the numerical increase of Central Asians and the nations of the Caucasus. Without putting it in these words it is presumably hoped that an increased rate of assimilation to the Russian language will weaken resistance to Russification and nullify the effect of higher birth-rates among the non-Russians, thus removing the pressure for a change in linguistic policies. If assimilation proves effective, enough Russians will be found to make Riga, Vilnius and Kishinev more Russian than they are now; it will be possible to maintain and even improve the present Russian level in the population of Central Asia; and, finally, there will be sufficient cadres to repopulate Central Russian provinces and to go east, as far as the Chinese-Soviet border. Although

[21] The volume of migratory movements tending to weaken titular nationalities in their republics should not be underestimated. Immigrants accounted for 43·4 per cent of Latvia's population growth between 1950 and 1965, reaching 52·7 per cent in 1961–65 and 60·6 per cent in 1965 alone. (*Voprosy demografii*, p. 232.) Moldavia's and Belorussia's urban population increased among others through immigration from Russia and the Ukraine, the Ukraine's through immigration from the RSFSR, Kazakhstan, Belorussia, and Georgia (L. Denisova, T. Faddeeva, 'Nekotorye dannye o migratsii naseleniya v SSSR', *Vestnik statistiki*, No. 7, 1965, p. 20).

[22] E. Bagramov, 'Razvitiye i sblizheniye sotsialisticheskikh natsii', *Pravda*, 16 July 1971, pp. 3–4.

[23] V. Perevedentsev, 'Chto ishchet chelovek?', *Zhurnalist*, No. 4, 1968, pp. 72–75, and 'O vlianii etnicheskikh faktorov . . .', *Izvestia Akademii Nauk . . .*' No. 4, 1965, pp. 34–37.

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it is no longer held (as had been the case in the early years after 1959) that the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union are abandoning their languages in favour of Russian (the survival of other Soviet languages into a distant future is recognized now), assimilation to Russian is still being upheld as a 'progressive' phenomenon. One Soviet author, L. M. Drobizheva, has discovered, for example, that among the unspecified number of Belorussians and Ukrainians who read newspapers and books both in their own language and in Russian, respectively 99·3 and 90·9 per cent approve of the 'joint work of people of different nationalities'; among those who read only Belorussian or Ukrainian publications, the corresponding figures are 90·5 and 80·7 per cent. In face of such overwhelming evidence, the conclusion that the Moscow newspapers should be circulated even more widely was axiomatic; among other measures to promote internationalism, Miss Drobizheva recommended 'the extension of the network of clubs and libraries' in the rural localities of Central Asia.[24]

Linguistic assimilation is not the only means for 'the drawing of Soviet peoples together'. This aim is being pursued also through an 'interchange of cadres', which of course presupposes in the present set-up the adoption of the Russian language by non-Russian migrants. (In most cases, the non-Russians outside their own republics have no cultural or educational facilities in their own language.) Despite economic and social arguments against such practices, the policy of sending people to places where they would not normally go voluntarily is continued: in the spring of 1971 one could find in a Kiev youth newspaper an appeal addressed to young Ukrainians to go to work and study in a Central Asian republic noted for its rural overpopulation.[25] (Needless to say, other, more widespread measures, such as the assignment of graduates to work in other republics and the organized resettlement of peasants in Siberia and the Far East are also being followed.)

Contrary to their declarations, the Soviet leaders still seem to think that not being Russian linguistically makes a Soviet citizen less reliable and less valuable (or less 'progressive'). They still seem to be pursuing the long-range aim of making all Soviet citizens Russian in language and spirit. If they accepted the proposition that the Soviet Union should remain a multi-lingual and multi-cultural society, however, they would no longer have to think (as they seem to be doing now) that the interests of the Soviet state require constant intermixing of Soviet peoples and that a high percentage of Russians in an area's population is an index of its progress. For example, industrialization of Kirghizia or Uzbekistan giving work to the natives might prove econo-

[24] L. M. Drobizheva, 'O sblizhenii urovnei kulturnogo razvitiya soyuznykh respublik', *Istoriya SSSR*, No. 3, 1969, pp. 61–79, esp. pp. 77–79. See also M. N. Guboglo, 'Vzaimodeistviye yazykov i mezhnatsionalnye otnosheniya v sovetskom obshchestve', *Istoriya SSSR*, No. 6, 1969, pp. 22–41.

[25] See an advertisement in *Molod'Ukrainy* (Kiev), 20 April 1971, p. 4, offering scholarships and room and board to young men and women willing to learn a job at a textile plant in Leninabad, Tadzhikistan. Cf. note 23.

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mically and politically preferable to the present practice of sending Russians and Ukrainians there and telling the natives in the villages that they should brush up their Russian before they can ask for a job in town. Also, industrialization rather than birth control, as advocated by Professor Valentei, might be a sounder way to reduce the present excessively high birth-rates in Central Asia. Next, all Soviet citizens, whether in or out of their republic (and, indeed, those without a republic of their own), might be granted an opportunity to cultivate their traditions and language. If Yugoslavia can publish a special newspaper for its 30,000 Ukrainians, would it be too hard for the RSFSR to maintain one for its three million Ukrainians? (One could compile a long list of examples contrasting Soviet and East European practices in the treatment of minorities.)

The results of the 1970 census make the success of the assimilationist drive at best problematic in the long run. More immediately, this drive is likely to be met with increased resentment and possibly resistance, and it also entails economic and social drawbacks for the Soviet state. One of these is the demographic draining (and economic neglect) of Central Russia for the sake of maintaining the Russian presence on appropriate levels in Kzyl-Orda, Uzhgorod, and Tartu (among numerous other places). Another is related to the population problems of Siberia and the East. Various sources confirm that the Russians make the best immigrants to those areas; they adjust much better to climate, for example, and generally are more likely to stay there because they regard these areas as their own country.[26]

The time may come when both the non-Russian peoples of the USSR and the Russians conclude that the interests of communism in the Soviet Union do not require the ubiquitous Russian presence if it is going to act (and be perceived) as a political constraint on the non-Russian groups, and even an instrument for their eventual elimination, while impeding at the same time economic and social progress in the Russian areas, such as Siberia. A Siberian worker-correspondent of the Moscow *Literary Gazette*, N. Shchitov, suggested several years ago that in order to improve the economic management of the areas east of the Urals something like a 'ministry for Siberia' be set up in Novosibirsk.[27] This seems to be an excellent idea which can be improved on, though, by giving consideration to ethnic factors as well. Why not move the capital and whole government of the Russian republic from Moscow to the East, thus visibly separating the 'Soviet Union' from 'Russia', and making it clear that the former name is not a temporary pseudonym for the latter, and that all nations of the USSR are truly equal? The transfer of

[26] Dora Fischer, 'Arbeitskräfte-Fragen in der regionalen Wirtschaftsplanung der Sowjetunion', *Ost-Europa Wirtschaft*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1967), p. 71, concluded that the success of Soviet plans for the industrialization, settlement, and security of Siberia and the Far East would depend on the initiative of the *Russians* and their readiness to employ their own forces for that purpose.

[27] N. Shchitov, 'Otkrovenno o sokrovennom', *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 17 April 1968, p. 10.

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the Russian capital, not just setting up one agency, would make itself immediately felt in the East in many beneficial ways; for example, its new site would attract (and retain) immigrants from the West. Moscow would continue as the capital of the Soviet Union, of course, though perhaps after being separated with its immediate region from the RSFSR and constituted into a federal district, a common property of all Soviet nations.

TABLE 1

Largest Nationalities of the USSR
(in thousands)

	1959	%	1970	%	percentage change 1959 to 1970
USSR	208827	100	241720	100	15·715
Russians	114114	54·645	129015	53·374	13·058
Ukrainians	37253	17·839	40753	16·860	9·365
Uzbeks	6015	2·880	9195	3·804	52·868
Belorussians	7913	3·789	9052	3·745	14·394
Tatars	4968	2·379	5931	2·454	19·384
Kazakhs	3622	1·734	5299	2·192	46·300
Azerbaidzhanis	2940	1·408	4380	1·812	48·980
Armenians	2787	1·335	3559	1·472	27·700
Georgians	2696	1·291	3245	1·342	20·542
Moldavians	2214	1·060	2698	1·116	21·861
Lithuanians	2326	1·114	2665	1·102	14·574
Jews	2268	1·086	2151	0·890	−5·159
Tadzhiks	1397	0·669	2136	0·884	52·899
Germans	1620	0·776	1846	0·764	13·951
Chuvash	1470	0·704	1694	0·701	15·238
Turkmens	1002	0·480	1525	0·631	52·196
Kirghiz	969	0·464	1452	0·601	49·845
Latvians	1400	0·670	1430	0·592	2·143
Daghestanis	945	0·452	1365	0·565	44·444
Mordvins	1289	0·617	1263	0·522	−2·017
Bashkirs	989	0·474	1240	0·513	25·379
Poles	1380	0·661	1167	0·483	−15·435
Estonians	989	0·474	1007	0·417	1·820

Source: *Izvestia*, 17 April 1971. Percentages counted by the author.

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TABLE 2

Autonomous Republics of RSFSR

(*in thousands*)

Name of ASSR	Total population 1959	Total population 1970	Change from 1959 to 1970 (%)	Russians 1959	Russians %	Russians 1970	Russians %	Change from 1959 to 1970 (%)	Titular nation (nations) 1959	Titular nation (nations) % pop.	Titular nation (nations) 1970	Titular nation (nations) % pop.	Change from 1959 to 1970 %
Bashkir	3340	3818	14·311	1417	42·4	1546	40·5	9·104	738	22·1	892	23·4	20·867
Tatar	2850	3131	9·860	1252	43·9	1329	42·4	6·150	1345	47·2	1536	49·1	14·201
Daghestan	1063	1429	34·431	214	20·1	210	14·7	–1·869	736	69·3	1061	74·2	44·158
Udmurt	1338	1418	5·979	760	56·8	810	57·1	6·579	476	35·6	484	34·2	1·017
Chuvash	1098	1224	11·475	264	24·0	299	24·5	13·258	770	70·2	856	70·0	11·169
Chechen-Ingush	710	1065	50·000	348	49·0	367	34·5	5·460	244	34·3	509	47·8	108·607 (Chechens)
									48	6·8	114	10·7	137·500 (Ingushes)
Mordovian	1002	1029	2·695	592	59·1	607	58·9	2·534	358	35·7	365	35·4	1·955
Komi	815	965	18·405	396	48·6	512	53·1	29·293	245	30·1	276	28·6	12·653
Buryat	673	812	20·065	503	74·6	597	73·5	18·688	136	20·2	179	22·0	31·618
Karelian	651	713	9·524	413	63·4	486	68·1	17·676	85	13·1	84	11·8	–1·177
Mari	648	685	5·710	310	47·8	321	46·9	3·548	279	43·1	299	43·7	7·168
Yakut	487	664	36·345	215	44·2	314	47·3	36·047	226	46·4	286	43·0	26·549
Kabardine-Balkar	420	588	40·000	163	38·7	219	37·2	34·356	190	45·3	265	45·0	39·474 (Kabardines)
									34	8·1	51	8·7	50·000 (Balkars)
North-Ossetian	451	552	22·395	179	39·6	202	36·6	12·849	215	47·8	269	48·7	25·116
Kalmyk	185	268	44·865	103	55·9	123	45·8	19·417	65	35·1	110	41·1	69·231
Tuvinian	172	231	34·302	69	40·1	88	38·3	27·536	98	57·0	135	58·6	37·755

Source: *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 20 May 1971. Percentages of population growth counted by the author.

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TABLE 3

Ethnic Composition of the Transcaucasian Republics

	Total population in thousands 1959	1970	% change	Titular nationality (thousands and %) 1959	1970	% change	Russians (in thousands and %) 1959	1970	% change
Azerbaidzhan	3698	5117	38·372	2494 (67·5)	3777 (73·8)	51·443	501 (13·6)	510 (10·0)	1·796
Georgia	4044	4686	15·875	2601 (64·3)	3131 (66·8)	20·377	408 (10·1)	397 (8·5)	–2·696
Armenia	1763	2492	41·135	1552 (88·0)	2208 (88·6)	42·268	56 (3·2)	66 (2·7)	17·857

Source: *Izvestia*, 17 April 1971. Percentages of change counted by the author. Percentages in the parentheses calculated in the source.

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TABLE 4

Ethnic Composition of Soviet Central Asian Republics
(in thousands)

Republic	Population		%	Russians				%	Titular nation(s)				%
	1959	1970	change	1959	%	1970	%	change	1959	%	1970	%	change
Kazakhstan	9153	12849	40·380	3950	43·2	5500	42·8	39·241	2723	29·8	4161	32·4	52·281
Uzbekistan	8261	11960	44·777	1114	13·5	1496	12·5	34·291	5044	61·1	7734	64·7	53·331
Kirghizia	2066	2933	41·965	624	30·2	856	29·2	37·179	837	40·5	1285	43·8	53·524
Tadzhikistan	1981	2900	46·391	263	13·3	344	11·9	30·798	1051	53·1	1630	56·2	55·090
Turkmenia	1516	2159	42·241	263	17·3	313	14·5	19·011	924	60·9	1417	65·6	53·355
Areawide	22977	32801	42·756	6214	27·044	8509	25·941	36·933					

Source: *Izvestia*, 17 April 1971. Percentages of change counted by the author.

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TABLE 5

Major Nations in Soviet Central Asia
(*in thousands*)

Population	Central Asia incl. Kazakhstan		% change	%		Central Asia excl. Kazakhstan		% change	%	
	1959	1970		1959	1970	1959	1970		1959	1970
Total	22977	32801	42·756			13824	19452	44·433		
Uzbeks	5973	9120	52·269	25·996	27·040	5843	8912	52·524	42·267	45·815
Kazakhs	3233	4809	48·747	14·071	14·661	510	648	27·059	3·689	3·331
Kirghiz	956	1431	49·686	4·161	4·363	956	1431	49·686	6·915	7·357
Tadzhiks	1380	2109	52·826	6·006	6·430	1380	2109	52·826	9·983	10·842
Turkmen	979	1488	51·992	4·261	4·563	979	1488	51·992	7·082	7·650
Tatars	780	1038	33·077	3·395	3·164	591	754	27·580	4·275	3·876
Russians	6214	8509	36·933	27·044	25·941	2264	3009	32·906	16·377	15·081

Source: *Izvestia*, 17 April 1971. Percentages of change counted by the author.

TABLE 6

Ethnic Composition of Soviet Republics in Eastern Europe
(in thousands)

	Population		%	Russians				%	Titular nation				%
	1959	1970	change	1959	%	1970	%	change	1959	%	1970	%	change
Estonia	1197	1356	13·283	240	20·1	335	24·7	39·583	893	74·6	925	68·2	3·583
Latvia	2093	2364	12·948	556	26·6	705	29·8	26·799	1298	62·0	1342	56·8	3·390
Lithuania	2711	3128	15·382	231	8·5	268	8·6	16·017	2151	79·3	2507	80·1	16·550
Belorussia	8056	9002	11·743	660	8·2	938	10·4	42·121	6532	81·1	7290	81·0	11·604
Moldavia	2885	3569	23·709	293	10·2	414	11·6	41·297	1887	65·4	2304	64·6	22·099
Ukraine	41869	47126	12·556	7091	16·9	9126	19·4	28·698	32158	76·8	35284	74·9	9·721

Source: *Izvestia*, 17 April 1971. Percentages of population growth counted by the author, the others in the source.

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TABLE 7

Ethnic Composition of the Economic Regions of the Ukraine
(in thousands)

	Total population in		%	Ukrainians				%	Russians				%
	1959	1970	change	1959	%	1970	%	change	1959	%	1970	%	change
Ukraine	41869	47126	12·556	32158	76·8	35284	74·9	9·721	7091	16·9	9126	19·4	28·698
Donetsk-Dnepr Region	17766	20057	12·895	12555	70·669	13608	67·847	8·387	4414	24·845	5591	27·876	26·665
South-West Region	19028	20689	8·729	16711	87·823	18168	87·815	8·719	1111	5·839	1365	6·598	22·862
Southern Region	5075	6380	25·714	2892	56·985	3508	54·984	21·300	1566	30·857	2170	34·012	38·570

Source: *Radyanska Ukraina*, 25 April 1971. Percentages counted by the author.

Whither the Russian Theatre?

Ossia Trilling

'Do not judge a Revolution by its bureaucrats'

(Herberto Padilla)

THE return visit of the Moscow Art Theatre in 1970 to take part in the World Theatre Season at the Aldwych Theatre for the third time raises a number of questions about the present crisis in the Russian theatre. One may well ask why Peter Daubeny, the artistic director of the festival, preferred to have them come to London again, rather than a younger company. (He first presented them at Sadler's Wells Theatre in 1958, and again at the Aldwych in 1965.) He is known to have wanted to show British theatregoers one of the less well-known theatrical ensembles, like the seven-year-old Taganka Theatre of Yuri Liubimov, or the slightly older Contemporary Theatre of Oleg Yefremov. Why did these companies have to stand down in favour of their older rival? Is it as though the Royal Court Theatre, or Charles Marowitz and his Open Space Theatre, had been invited to, say, Belgrade, or Berlin, and had to make way for a return visit of the National Theatre. Britain's National Theatre can no more travel abroad without government approval or subsidy than can either of the smaller companies. And the same goes for the Moscow theatres. Since the final decision in the former case would lie with the British Council, it may be assumed that in the latter case it lies with the Soviet Ministry of Culture Theatre Department. Why, then, did the Ministry refuse to let Liubimov go? The answer to this question is bound up with what follows.

There has been a constantly shifting emphasis in the amount of freedom and independence enjoyed in the past 10 years or so in the theatres of Moscow and Leningrad. After the 'Thaw', directors had a wider choice of repertoire open to them. Greater efforts were made to engage in experiment and to discover a flexible definition for time-worn artistic dogmas by bringing them more into line with contemporary feeling.

Many of the recent gains have now had to be dropped. Official directives about repertoire and interpretation have borne down heavily on the theatre, as in the other arts. Maxim Gorki defined 'socialist realism' as 'the affirmation of life as an action, as a constructive endeavour, a fusion of artistic truth with the task of building a new world'. This lent itself to any number of interpretations. But recently it has boiled down to this, that any questioning of the assumption that life must be portrayed on the stage not as it is, or was, but as it should be, was unacceptable. Practically this has meant that no dramatist, or

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director, involved in a production from which certain spiritual and moral values were absent, as the Russian critic, Nikolai Abalkin, put it, would be likely to get a hearing, or, if he did, he would be sure to be silenced before very long.

Writing on the eve of the theatrical season which ended in the summer of 1970 and which was dedicated to the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Lenin, Abalkin called it 'a festive demonstration of the ideological and artistic maturity of progressive stage art and of its devotion to the people and to Lenin's revolutionary cause. The season', he wrote, 'would show that the Soviet theatre carries high the banner of truth, freedom, humanism, belief in life, in man and in his future'. After giving some examples of plays then in preparation, he concluded: 'When a playwright views the past, the present and the future as something integrally blended, this is a sign of his spiritual and moral soundness, and of his optimistic world outlook. This dialectic perception of life has always been a feature of Soviet stage art. Nearly all the new plays deal with serious moral problems, the moral code of the man in socialist society. The theatre invites people to its performances so as to think together about the main problems of life—how should a man live? When art opens up the prospects of life for a man, it becomes truly progressive art.' The present crisis in the Russian theatre can best be understood in the light of this kind of thinking.

THE endless tug-of-war between conservative and progressive elements in ministerial corridors and in the offices of theatrical managers and directors alike is reflected in the reputation enjoyed by the Moscow Art Theatre. For all its manifest artistic triumphs in the Western world and its undisputed status as Russia's most accomplished cultural ambassador, many of the younger generation in Russia are at a loss to understand the foreigners' adulation. At home it is viewed as either hidebound in tradition or as a living example of artistic arteriosclerosis. Even within its own walls there is a recognition that something is amiss. It has been freely admitted by no less an authority on the Stanislavsky system of psychological realism than the octogenarian principal director of the Moscow Art, Mikhail Kedrov, who is also one of the theatre's ruling triumvirate, that much of Stanislavsky's early teaching has been overtaken by the latest scientific research into human behaviour. All the same he claims that more account is being taken of recent developments in the field of psychology both in the company's teaching and in its rehearsal practice. Its greatest weakness, according to Kedrov, is the lack of experimentation, the absence of the kind of ancillary theatre-workshop that Stanislavsky used to encourage in his lifetime, the kind of off-shoot—like Yefremov's 15-year-old Contemporary Theatre—that came into being expressly to question orthodox practice and which might eventually, as so often happened, acquire an existence independent of the parent body and devoted to the elaboration of a new stylistic working method of its own, or at any rate of a variant of

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the standard method. The young director or actor, according to Kedrov, must be given his own head and urged to discover his own aesthetic truths, just as Vakhtangov and Zavadsky did 50 years ago, or Yefremov, a former teacher at the Moscow Art Theatre School, more recently. This would provide one answer to criticisms of the Moscow Art's artistic decline.

The grey realism, as it has been called, of so many plays is inextricably bound up with artistic dogma. A former manager of the Moscow Art and a noted theoretician of theatre art was Alexander Solodovnikov who made some effort in his day to clear the cobwebs off the stage of the Moscow Art, if only in the way of persuading the wizened members of the team to step down and let the younger ones have a shot at the plum roles. This problem is not, of course, peculiar either to the Moscow Art or the Russian theatre as a whole. But Solodovnikov has recently been writing again on aesthetic matters and what he has to say is hardly encouraging. His reference to the restoration of 'Leninist standards of social life, breaches of which had affected literature and art', sounds distressingly familiar. 'We have overcome tremendous difficulties', he writes, 'but we refuse to desert our basic aim, the building of a socialist society on principles of justice and beauty.' Western plays that reveal a spirit of hopelessness or scepticism are taboo, as are the plays of Soviet writers that fail to 'reflect our confidence in the future'. Plays in which the hero 'is not a person of intellect and action with lofty moral principles and a response to the problems of the day' will find it hard to find a producer. When Anatoli Efros, the young director and manager of the Komsomol Theatre, five years ago staged Chekhov's *Three Sisters* in a revolutionary way by stressing the futility of the ambiance and the absurdity of the characters, like Vershinin, who speak glowingly of the millennium to come, he was removed to a smaller, less well-known playhouse, the Malaya Bronnaya (which at the height of its pre-war fame was the home of the now defunct Jewish State Theatre). And when he revived the production there, with its pessimistic overtones that contrast so glaringly with the Moscow Art's very opposite interpretation of the same play, it was soon closed on orders from above.

However, by a strange paradox, the Moscow Art itself presently out-Efrosed Efros by staging *The Seagull,* one of two plays brought to London in 1970, in a manner quite unlike anything seen on its stage before, certainly not in the case of a Chekhov play. Its director, the 60-year-old actor, Boris Livanov (who is another of the theatre's three-man directorate), took unprecedented liberties with the text and worked out a dramaturgic scheme that has little in common with the straightforward, literal interpretations. The divisions into four acts have gone by the board. The text is split up into a succession of short scenes, divided from each other by cinematic fade-ins and fade-outs. In this way, the continuity is filmic rather than theatrical and the play acquires an attractive new rhythm. The production is backed up by a

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musical commentary from the works of Scriabin. This, of course, is nothing new in the Russian theatre, which loves musical backgrounds in dramatic performances. Okhlopkov's famous *Hamlet* at the Mayakovsky Theatre made notorious use of Chaikovsky's *Hamlet* music throughout. In *The Seagull* Treplyev pounds his off-stage piano for all he is worth—he is evidently a skilled pianist in this version—and this lends the evening a novel and dynamic force. The cuts have been made to slur over the inner contradictions in the characterization. The ensuing simplicity may offend the purists, but the gain in tempo is refreshing.

Then there are the transpositions and additions, some from other works of Chekhov, as when Shamrayev, the old bore, is given anecdotes borrowed from the short stories, as though he weren't bore enough without them. After Medvedenko marries Masha, his language undergoes a marked change. The high-falutin' Russian phrases and the intellectual pretensions of the first part disappear. And so on. The main textual changes are intended to underline the characters' personal foibles and their lack of heart. When Madame Arkadina tells the servants that the ruble she gave them as a tip is to be divided between all of them, Livanov invents a couple more than are provided for in the original stage directions, as though to make the meanness of the departing mistress of the house unmistakable.

There are several more changes of this type. Some work well enough, as, for example, when Masha, tippling with Trigorin, downs three vodkas one after the other and raises a laugh with the words 'women drink a great deal more in private than they'll admit'. The handling of the setting is particularly original. The design itself, in *fin-de-siècle* style, as a mirror of the decadence of the ambiance and its inmates, may not exactly please the eye. But it scores in the way in which it provides a changing background for the many short scenes. We first see the inner stage on which the play within the play is to be enacted in Act One from behind, that is, from the actors' point of view, for the first encounter between Nina and Treplyev. Then this appears to switch through 180 degrees, allowing the ensuing performance of the inner play to be viewed from over the shoulders of Arkadina and her guests. In Act Four, when Nina has to speak those difficult lines that have always sounded unconvincing—until now, the action moves to the inner stage of Act One. Nina remembers her first steps there as an amateur actress, when she recited the long speech written for her by Treplyev that his mother calls decadent nonsense but which anticipates the modern absurdist theatre by half a century. The words now come perfectly naturally from her. This innovation has the corresponding disadvantage that Treplyev has to blow his brains out in the garden, where his body has presently to be found by the doctor. Still, the final scene is very moving. The supper party are playing lotto, Masha has heard the shot, and she collapses into a fit of silent weeping.

The new version of *The Seagull* failed to satisfy all tastes when it

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opened in Moscow in 1969. One of its fiercest critics was Georgi Tovstonogov, manager and principal director of the Leningrad Gorki Theatre, which came to London five years ago with Dostoievsky's *The Idiot*. However, Tovstonogov's own version of *Three Sisters* in Leningrad also uses unconventional staging by reducing the set to a bare minimum. He has the actors perform on a revolve and so gives the audience an all-round view of them, as in reverse shots in the cinema. He has them propelled downstage on sliding platforms for the intimate scenes, in an equivalent of the film close-up. These technical and aesthetic changes work splendidly. But his dismissal of the rival theatre's staging as pretentious has a hollow ring in it. And so has his view that Oleg Strizhanov, the good-looking young stage and film star, whose resemblance to Innokenti Smoktunovsky (Tovstonogov's Prince Mishkin) is uncanny, postures unduly as Treplyev, or, again, that Svetlana Korkoshko, a Ukrainian newcomer to the company whose acting struck me as inspired, is guilty of provincial vulgarity, since this is precisely what Nina, in *The Seagull*, is intended to convey in the last act, at least. For all the heated arguments surrounding this production, it found its audience in Moscow, and even the old faithfuls who are seeing their favourite Chekhov in a new light are unable to deny it its huge success.

NO doubt Efros's demotion is to be explained not only because his interpretations fell out of line. He also staged a number of plays at the Komsomol that failed to conform to directives from above and this was taken to imply indirect criticism of the Party line on the function of the theatre in society. Criticism of the establishment, of social injustice, of anything that had gone wrong, was never entirely ruled out even in the most oppressive days. Censorship was avoided by the oblique use of allegory and parable, by knowing 'just how far one may go too far'. A perfect platform for this particular stratagem was and still is provided by the children's or young people's theatres, where Yefremov, Efros, and many like them, served their early apprenticeship as directors. Writing for these theatres and working in them offered an outlet for satire and social comment to the ingenious critic of human behaviour. Yevgeni Shvarts's theatrical comedies, ostensibly written for young spectators, are really political parables in dramatic dress.

Similarly, the satirical vein of Mayakovsky, which Valentin Pluchek was able to tap once more after the 'Thaw' at the Theatre of Satire, is still flowing there. And once Yefremov had thrown open his doors to critical writers who specialize in dealing with the problems of modern youth—like Viktor Rozov and Aleksander Volodin—it was not always possible to slam them shut again. His production of Shvarts's *The Naked Emperor*, banned when the late Nikolai Akimov first staged it at the Leningrad Comedy Theatre a quarter of a century ago, is still in the Contemporary's repertoire after nine years; ironically so, in view

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of its subject-matter, which is derived from Hans Andersen's fairy-tale of the innocent child who alone sees through the sycophantic façade of a society that wallows in spiritual enslavement. Efros has been less fortunate. Even though he changed the fortunes of the ailing Komsomol Theatre when he took it over by drawing enthusiastic crowds of young people to his productions of Bulgakov and Radzinsky and, in particular, of Arbuzov, he seems to have been too determined to go his own way for official tastes. Eduard Radzinsky's *104 Pages About Love,* which had a flighty air-hostess as heroine, incurred displeasure for its frank discussion of sexual relations, but it remained in the repertoire, for all that, after Efros's departure. Curiously, Tovstonogov also put this play on in his theatre (under a different title) where it attracted less opposition. Perhaps Leningrad is more liberal in matters of sex. A later play by Radzinsky, about a flighty film-director, called *Shooting a Film,* was even more sexually outspoken and drew even more fire from official quarters.

Alexei Arbuzov's *My Poor Marat,* which has swept through the theatres of the West as *The Promise,* also managed to survive inspired objections that it was a study of failure and not of success, and it, too, was staged, with no less public acclaim, by Tovstonogov in Leningrad. A later play by Arbuzov, *The Happy Days of an Unhappy Man,* that follows a similar pattern by using as protagonist a palpably anti-social character, has also attracted hostility and shares with *My Poor Marat* the distinction of having been presented simultaneously by Tovstonogov, in Leningrad and by Efros, at his new theatre, in Moscow. Here, too, Efros—as unrepentant as ever—recently tempted official scorn by putting on yet another outspokenly critical drama by Radzinsky, entitled *Seducer Kalabashkin,* about a modern Don Juan whose spiritual volatility accords ill with the standard conception of the new socialist man. Yefremov's production of Rozov's *School Reunion* has been under official attack, but still holds the boards, notwithstanding. It shows former schoolmates who meet in later life to bemoan life's missed opportunities. Arbuzov's *Fairy Tales of Old Arbat,* about a lone artist who finally succumbs to society's pressures, was put on by Efros with resounding success in 1969, but his earlier comedy, ironically entitled *Lucky Vassili,* because nothing goes right for his young hero, who is caught up in the Soviet rat-race and whose family is tragically split, has failed to find a producer. The pattern of official condemnation is mirrored in other fields. Rozov, together with Yevgeni Yevtushenko and Vassili Aksyonov, has been dropped from the editorial board of the youth magazine *Yunost*; however, Yevtushenko's epic poem, *The Bratsk Electric Power Station,* a stylized dramatic performance at the Malaya Bronnaya, staged even before Efros moved there, is still in the repertoire, and Aksyonov's *Everything in Stock* has so far not been ousted from the boards of the Contemporary Theatre, after its opening four years ago. This comedy satirizes present-day morals and turns the positive and negative heroes of the socialist realists inside out

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by choosing as hero an unmistakably anti-social type, with the suggestive name of Kistochkin. This lovable rogue leaves behind him a trail of wronged females and angry friends, a symbol of a demagogic order that takes over his philosophy of life. The comedy has a happy ending, however, which Aksyonov situates, by some wilful sense of social outrage, no doubt, in the distant future.

ALL these represent the hard core of the avant-garde that refuses to be dictated to. Its productions are visually more imaginative than most of what may be seen at the older, so-called 'academic' theatres, even when academism does not necessarily signify a discredited style. They lack the studiously pathetic acting convention practised at the Moscow Art or the much older Maly Theatre, though they often fail to muster the same degree of acting talent as makes the other two unrivalled in that field. For the most exciting and adventurous performances in Moscow, in the whole of Russia, for that matter, you have to go to the Taganka. This is because Liubimov's productions are entirely modern and non-conformist and appeal to the new contemporary spirit that takes nothing on trust and discards the ancient slogans and shibboleths.

It was founded by him out of an acting-class which he taught when an actor at the Vakhtangov Theatre. A pupil of Vakhtangov's successor, the late Reuben Simonov, Liubimov broke away to create the Theatre of Drama and Comedy, nicknamed the Taganka, after its location. His productions of Brecht, the younger poets like Yevtushenko and Voznesensky, and documentary dramas, are inventively unconventional. His manner of staging makes use of all the contributory arts, much as Meyerhold's was wont to do, but in a wholly modern way; his actors are trained as acrobats, dancers, mimes, and singers, and their director employs all the paraphernalia of modern technology to back them up.

Peter Brook once said jokingly that the best theatre in Moscow is Tovstonogov's Gorki Theatre in Leningrad. But Tovstonogov himself predicted five years ago that the Taganka would overtake him and become Moscow's most talked-of and popular playhouse. Tickets are hard to come by and a visit is a special occasion. The crowds mill inside and outside, and the stalls and circle bulge with eager, young spectators, in defiance of the fire regulations. The revolt against the obsolete, dreary naturalism of its rivals accounts for much of its popularity, too. But the independent-minded and flexible theatrical idiom of the repertoire and the technical means employed give it an irresistible appeal, except to the Party pundits who find it too critical or newfangled for comfort.

The subtitles of the plays give some indication of their unusual nature. *Pugachev*, by Sergei Esenin, is described as a 'dramatic poem'. Voznesensky's *Antiworlds* is called a 'dramatic production' and the lack of a plot is taken for granted by the audience. (When I asked its author once what his play was about, he dismissed my question with the reply: 'Does a play have to be about anything?') Valeri

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Osipov's *Only Telegrammes* is listed as a documentary production, a convention to which the Russian theatre is returning increasingly today. For example, Mikhail Shatrov's drama about the 1918 uprising of the Social-Revolutionaries, called *July the Sixth* (which the Moscow Art would have brought to London last year but for the illness of the leading actor playing Lenin), is, strictly speaking, a fictionalized documentary about Lenin's New Economic Policy which attempts to ask questions about his succession. The same author's *The Bolsheviks* is one of Yefremov's most brilliant pieces of stylized theatre-making at the Contemporary. At the Taganka, *The Fallen and the Living* is based on the poems of soldier-poets who fell in the war or who survived it and is described as a ' scenic composition '. Mayakovsky's *Listen!*, composed from the poet's best-known revolutionary writings, is another example of a ' poetic production '. Yet another was Voznesensky's *Guard your Faces!*, which closed on the day it opened in February 1970, presumably because it was found to be ideologically ambivalent, and his attack on American imperialism seems to have struck nearer home.

Liubimov's biggest hit, *Ten Days that Shook the World*, is based on John Reed's book of that name and describes the Bolsheviks' seizure of power in 1917. It is subtitled ' a Popular Entertainment, with Mime, Circus, Clowning and Shooting '. Liubimov's staging is at once beautiful and unbelievably simple—all this in the only unsubsidized theatre in the capital. Despite the encomiums written on the walls of Liubimov's office by his distinguished visitors, including the ones signed by Sir Laurence Olivier, Arthur Miller, and Fidel Castro, his path is by no means free of hindrance, and he is in constant political hot water. In 1969 he adapted Boris Mozhayev's colourful short story, *From the Life of Fyodor Kuzkin*, which Tvardovsky published in *Novy Mir* in 1966. The author's reputation as one of Russian's greatest prose writers is borne out by the appraisal he receives in the Soviet Encyclopedia of Literature. Tovstonogov has called him the equal of Solzhenitsyn in his descriptive power. *Kuzkin* adapts easily because it is written largely in dialogue form. It tells the story of the struggle against every kind of natural and man-made obstacle of its hero, a cunning old collective farmer, who refuses to have the wool pulled over his eyes. In the conflict between the individual and the machine, the man comes out victorious at the end, though only by the skin of his teeth. After the dress rehearsal the Party censors turned the production down and *Kuzkin* had to be indefinitely shelved, just as was Solzhenitsyn's *The Love-Girl and the Innocent* (as it is called in English translation) at Yefremov's theatre three years ago. Liubimov accused the censors of wishing to destroy yet another of Russia's great writers, but his appeal fell on deaf ears.

His productions of *Tartuffe* and Gorki's *Mother*, which followed, have become box-office hits though not without opposition from official quarters; *Mother* because the heroine was not adequately idealized as a revolutionary character, *Tartuffe* because it departed too radically from

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tradition. The objection to *Tartuffe* can be summed up in the words of a student of journalism at Moscow University who was given a chance to express her point of view in the pages of *Soviet Culture*. She put the question, why are young people always being given the classics in adaptation and never as written! In *Tartuffe*, Liubimov makes Molière's implied attack on Church and State explicit. Molière himself brings on his characters through the auditorium and pleads with puppets of the King of France and the Archbishop of Paris to lift the ban on the play. He meets with a refusal but nevertheless carries on the rehearsal in a most unconventional way that recalls Meyerhold's historic pre-war production of *The Government Inspector*, combining a form of theatrical alienation with modern *commedia dell' arte* techniques. Eventually he gets permission to do the play and the parallel between seventeenth-century and present-day censorship is inescapable. The same lady journalist accuses Liubimov of overdoing his criticism of the 'personality cult', for it is well known that he has been fighting against the recrudescence of Stalinism in all his work. Behind all this one may read the motives of the authorities who have prevented his company from accepting any of the countless invitations to perform abroad, even in the socialist countries. If Liubimov has been allowed to keep his theatre—and there have been persistent rumours that it is in danger of being closed—it is without a doubt because liberal counsels in ministerial corridors have prevailed until now.

Others have been less lucky. Yuri Rybakov, the editor of the monthly magazine *Theatre*, has been replaced; not for the first time in that publication's chequered career has an editor paid dearly for his desire to ventilate an ideological controversy with objectivity. Rybakov was accused of publishing too many articles favourable to Liubimov and his work. His successor, Viktor Lavrentyev, is a playwright with no great reputation either as a gifted writer or as someone likely to tolerate the other man's point of view. The theme of his drama *Honour thy Father*, at the Moscow Art, which loads all the dice against the young, supports this. His latest contribution to the Maly repertoire, *Man and the Globe*, is a semi-documentary. It has President Roosevelt and Harry L. Hopkins plotting to unleash the atom bomb on the world in order to ensure to the USA a military ascendancy over the USSR. The appointment of Sergei Mikhalkov as the new President of the Writers' Union is not as lugubrious a matter as has been thought. Despite his dictum that 'tolerance of the intolerable is harmful to the socialist cause', his many plays for young audiences hopefully suggest that he is more of a soft-liner than he appears to be on the surface.

The simultaneous revival of Gorki's 57-year-old drama, *The Old Man*, two years ago, at the Mossoviet and Maly theatres, suggests that reactionary policies are not gaining the upper hand everywhere. Unperformed in Russia since the Maly first staged it 52 years ago, and only published in a bowdlerized version, which has now been withdrawn, *The Old Man* depicts the Dostoyevskian figure of a Siberian deportee who

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returns from a labour-camp and seeks to revenge himself on society. He pleads his own suffering in justification and hounds an innocent man to his death. This tale of tsarist Russia paradoxically strikes a modern Russian audience as remarkably topical. (It won the veteran Maly Theatre actor Mikhail Tsaryov last year's award for the best acting performance.) It is understandable why a modern audience is not permitted to see a modern play about a Soviet labour-camp, though many people have read Solzhenitsyn either in official or in underground publications. Efros's project to stage a dramatisation of *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* was utopian even five years ago. One can hardly imagine the authorities allowing the public a glimpse of the inside of the dreaded camp, with its petty pilfering, racketeering, brutality, and favouritism, that seems inseparable from the system, which Solzhenitsyn creates on the stage in *The Love-Girl and the Innocent*.

THROUGHOUT the countries of Eastern Europe and especially in the Soviet Union the struggle between the theatre artist and the bureaucrat continues unabated. Often this means no more than the conflict of interest and prejudice that bedevils the relations between the professional and the amateur, between the qualified and the unqualified. The situation brings to mind Lenin's reply when asked his opinion of Mayakovsky's poetry. 'I dislike it intensely', he said, 'but who am I to judge?' If only there were more of Lenin's humility in matters of this sort in the ministerial corridors, it would give the Liubimovs of the theatre a better chance, as Uncle Vanya's brother-in-law, Professor Serebryakov, might have put it, to 'get on with the job'.

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Documents: Soviet Union
Soviet Mental Prisons: II

The use of mental hospitals as prisons for Soviet dissenters has recently received a good deal of publicity in the West. Information about and documentation of this inhuman practice, which Solzhenitsyn defined as ' spiritual murder ', is now very detailed and has been reaching the West in increasing volume through Samizdat. *The confinement of the young Soviet dissident, Vladimir Bukovsky, on March 29 1971 to the notorious Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry in Moscow (shortly after he made his appeal to Western psychiatrists for an investigation of relevant documents) has met with a sympathetic response.* The Times, *which published his original appeal (on March 12) printed (on September 16) a letter from a group of prominent British psychiatrists supporting his plea, which specifically requested that the world congress of the Psychiatric Association held this year in Mexico City should examine the problem. The mother of Bukovsky wrote a letter to Mme. Pompidou, asking her to intervene with Mr. Brezhnev who was to make his visit to France. Her appeal has been taken up by many French intellectuals and psychiatrists. A group of 47 Soviet citizens has sent a letter to the director of the Serbsky Institute asking him for the release of Bukovsky as being absolutely sane mentally. And finally the Soviet Human Rights Committee sent an appeal to the Mexico City congress of psychiatrists asking them to adopt three practical measures which might help in the struggle against the abuse of the profession in the Soviet Union: ' (1) The creation of permanent commissions of psychiatrists in various countries, which will study psychiatric practices and conduct a full-scale exchange of their results: (2) The systematic publication of materials: (3) The cooperation in these matters of both legal organizations and the United Nations, with a particular view to the working out of international norms regarding the civil rights of people ruled mentally ill.'*

The congress in Mexico which was held between November 28 and December 4 1971, has taken up these various appeals and discussed the matter.

We publish below some of the relevant documents which supplement our previous dossier on the subject, printed in Survey *No. 77.*

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Appeal to Western Psychiatrists

Vladimir Bukovsky

IN recent years in our country a number of court orders have been made involving the placing in psychiatric hospitals ('of special type' and otherwise) of people who in the opinion of their relatives and close friends are mentally healthy. These people are: Grigorenko, Rips, Gorbanevskaya, Novodvorskaya, Yakhimovich, Gershuni, Fainberg, Victor Kuznetsov, Iofe, V. Borisov, and others—people well known for their initiatives in defence of civil rights in the USSR.

This phenomenon arouses justified anxiety, especially in view of the widely publicized placing of the biologist Zhores Medvedev in a psychiatric hospital by extra-judicial means.

The diagnoses of the psychiatrists who have served as expert witnesses in court, and on whose diagnoses the court orders are based, provoke many doubts as regards their content. However, only specialists in psychiatry can express authoritative opinions about the degree of legitimacy of these diagnoses.

Taking advantage of the fact that I have managed to obtain exact copies of the diagnoses of the forensic-psychiatric teams which examined Grigorenko, Fainberg, Gorbanevskaya, Borisov, and Yakhimovich, and extracts from the diagnosis on V. Kuznetsov, I am sending you these documents, and also various letters and materials which reveal the characters of these people.

I will be very grateful to you if you can study this matter and express your opinion on it.

I realize that at a distance and without the essential clinical information it is very difficult to determine the mental condition of a person and either to diagnose an illness or assert the absence of any illness.

Therefore I ask you to express your opinion on only this point: do the above-mentioned diagnoses contain enough scientifically-based evidence not only to indicate the mental illnesses described in the diagnoses but also to indicate the necessity of isolating these people completely from society?

I will be very happy if you can interest your colleagues in this matter and if you consider it possible to place it on the agenda for discussion by the next International Congress of Psychiatrists.

For a healthy person there is no fate more terrible than indefinite internment in a psychiatric hospital.

I believe that you will not remain indifferent to this problem and will devote a portion of your time to it—just as physicists find time to

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combat the use of the achievements of their science in ways harmful to mankind.

Thanking you in advance,

28 January 1971 **V. Bukovsky**

The Resolution of Canadian Psychiatrists

Moved January 19, 1971:

The Board of Directors, Canadian Psychiatric Association, accepts the report of the Section of Psychiatry of British Columbia Medical Association of December 1970 regarding the alleged wrongful detention in mental hospitals in the USSR of seemingly healthy individuals whose views and attitudes are in conflict with those of the regime.

The Board of Directors recognizes that the information concerning instances of such practice included in the report is as 'hard' as can be expected short of first-hand investigation (which is most unlikely to be allowed).

The Board of Directors therefore accepts and endorses the resolutions of the Executive Committee of the Section of Psychiatry BCMA, December 21, 1970 (page 1, paragraphs A, B, C, D).

The Board of Directors urges the Canadian Medical Association to study the report, to support the resolutions and to press strongly through the following channels for further study and actions regarding such alleged practice in the USSR or in any other country or countries where similar practices are alleged to take place:

A. Medical Associations of other countries.
B. International psychiatric associations.
C. World Health Organization.
D. World Psychiatric Association.

Your Oath, Doctor

THE Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR decrees:

(1) The confirmation of the text of the physician's oath of the Soviet Union.
(2) The confirmation of the regulations for the procedure for taking the physician's oath of the Soviet Union.

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(3) That citizens of the USSR who, after 1 June 1971, have completed higher medical schools and medical faculties of universities in the USSR and have received the title of physician will take the physician's oath of the Soviet Union.

(Signed) Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR
N. Podgorny
Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR
M. Georgadze

Moscow, the Kremlin, 26 March 1971.

The Physician's Oath of the Soviet Union

HAVING attained the high calling of physician and entering medical practice I solemnly swear:

to devote all my knowledge and strength to the preservation and improvement of the health of man, to the curing and prevention of diseases, to work conscientiously wherever the interests of society demand;

to be ever ready to render medical aid, to be attentive and thoughtful of the patient, to maintain medical confidence;

constantly to perfect my medical knowledge and physician's skills, to further by my work the development of medical science and practice;

to turn, if the patient's interests demand it, for advice to my professional colleagues and that I myself will never refuse advice and help to them;

to preserve and further the noble traditions of our native medicine, that I will in all my actions be guided by the principles of communist morality, ever to bear in mind the high calling of the soviet physician, and of my responsibility to the people and the Soviet State.

I swear that I will be faithful to this oath throughout the rest of my life.

Meditsinskaya Gazeta, 20 April 1971

The '1961 Directives'

Directives on the Immediate Hospitalization of Persons Mentally Ill Who Are a Social Danger, Practice of Forensic Psychiatric Diagnosis,

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Research Handbook No. 6, under the editorship of G. V. Morozov, Ministry of Health of the USSR, Serbsky Central Research Institute of Forensic Psychiatry of the USSR, Moscow, 1962.

Confirmed by the deputy minister of health of the USSR, I. Kochergin, 10 October 1961. Number 04–14 32.

Affirmed for Procurator of the USSR, by Deputy General Procurator of the USSR, A. Mishutin, 10 October 1961.

Affirmed for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR, by the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR, P. Romashkov, 9 October 1961.

In a number of instances the necessity for prevention of dangerous actions of persons mentally ill requires their immediate hospitalization in psychiatric institutions. In accordance with this:

1. If there is a clear danger from a person mentally ill to those around him or to himself the health organs have the right (by way of immediate psychiatric assistance) to place him in a psychiatric hospital without the consent of the person who is ill or his relatives or guardians.

2. In the psychiatric institution within 24 hours the sick person hospitalized must be examined by a special committee composed of three doctor-psychiatrists, which considers the question of correctness of hospitalization and determines the necessity for further presence in the hospital.

The closest relatives are informed of the hospitalization of the sick person.

3. The basic indication for obligatory hospitalization is the social danger of the sick person as conditioned by the following particular features of his sick condition:

(a) Psychomotor excitation with a tendency towards aggressive actions;

(b) Deviant conduct accompanied by psychiatric disorder (hallucinations, deliriums, a syndrome of mental automatism, syndromes of disordered consciousness, and pathological impulsiveness), if it occurs in a condition of sharply expressed affective tension and a tendency to pass into action;

(c) Systematic delirious syndromes with a chronic deteriorating course, if they determine the socially dangerous conduct of the sick person;

(d) Hypochondriac delirious conditions causing incorrect, aggressive attitudes of the sick person towards particular persons, organisations and institutions.

The morbid conditions enumerated above, tending within themselves to undoubted social danger, may occur with externally correct conduct and dissimulation. In this connexion special care must be used when assessing the mental condition of such persons, so that

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the indications for immediate hospitalization are not stretched to fit the case, and, at the same time, the possibility of socially dangerous behaviour on the part of the mentally sick can be prevented by means of timely hospitalization.

The indications for immediate hospitalization enumerated above are not exhaustive, but are only a list of the more frequently occurring illnesses which present a social danger.

4. Simple, although acute, alcoholic intoxication is not an indication for immediate hospitalization in a mental institution, as is not also intoxication brought about by other narcotic compounds (except serious intoxicational psychosis and psychotic variations of abstential conditions), and affective reactions of persons who are not suffering from mental illness.

5. Doctor-psychiatrists effect the immediate hospitalization directly, but in districts where there are no psychiatric institutions doctors belonging to the general medical service do so, as the ill person must be immediately conveyed to the nearest psychiatric hospital.

6. When immediate hospitalization is indicated, the doctor committing the sick person to hospital is under obligation to give full details of the medical and social grounds for his decision, and in the conclusion of his report on the case, to mention his place of work, the post he occupies, his name, and the time when the decision on immediate hospitalization had been reached.

7. Local organs of the police in cases of necessity (if relatives or guardians of the ill person object or offer resistance) are obliged to offer assistance to medical workers in the hospitalization of persons mentally ill upon the request of the persons mentioned in paragraph 5 of the present Directives.

8. Sick persons hospitalized in psychiatric institutions are placed in the department appropriate to their mental condition for carrying out actual treatment, and are subject without exception (no less than once a month) to examination by a special commission composed of three doctor-psychiatrists for consideration of the question of further stay in the hospital. Upon improvement of the mental condition of the sick person, or such changes in the clinical picture of the illness as eliminate the social danger on the part of the sick person, the commission of doctors issues an opinion on the possible release of the sick person. Release of such an ill person is carried out by handing him over to relatives or guardians.

9. If a sick person who is due, according to medical indications, to be released from the hospital is in a condition where he may not be left on his own and does not have a permanent place of residence or persons able to take care of him, he may be released from the hospital only through transfer to patronage. In cases of necessity the hospital takes measures for the official registration of guardianship over the sick person.

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10. Upon release of the sick person the psychiatric hospital informs the relatives of the sick person and the psychoneurological clinician as to where such sick persons must attend for particular check-ups, if they are subject to regular prophylactic treatment..

Information about Zhores Medvedev for Friends

Roy Medvedev

Through this letter I am informing all his friends and my own friends that on the evening of 29 May [1970] my brother, Zhores Medvedev, was forcibly taken from his flat in Obninsk, Kaluga Region, to the Kaluga city mental hospital for 'an expert psychiatric examination' and for 'observation'.

Zhores has never suffered before from any psychological disturbances, and no one among his relatives, colleagues or acquaintances has ever had recourse to a psychiatrist on his behalf. The grounds for his compulsory hospitalization were—on the confession of Alexander Efimovich Livshits, chief medical officer of the Kaluga mental hospital—extracts from Zhores' writings which Livshits saw and which 'caused him to have doubts about Zhores' mental health'. (It was discovered later that he was referring to two works: 'The Cult of Personality and Biological Science' in the first version of 1962, and 'International Cooperation and National Frontiers', a pamphlet, first version 1968).

To carry out the forcible hospitalization a large group of policemen was provided, headed by a major. Formal directions were given by the above-mentioned Livshits and by the Obninsk city psychiatrist, Yury Yakovlevich Kiryushin. Zhores was not forewarned of the action which was being prepared. He refused to open the door to the doctors when they arrived and the police began to break it in. Zhores managed to telephone friends in Obninsk, and six colleagues from the Institute of Medical Radiology entered at the same time as the police and the doctors. When those present reproached the police for forcibly entering a private flat without a warrant, the major answered rudely 'This is a state-owned flat, and we can enter whenever we like.' No kind of document, no kind of doctors' statement showing the necessity for examination and hospitalization was presented to Zhores. The doctors just gave their names and demanded that Zhores go with them for examination at the Kaluga mental hospital. Zhores refused, saying that there were no grounds whatever for such an

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examination. He said that he would not resist, but at the same time he would not leave his house voluntarily. Zhores' colleagues who were present began to reproach the police for breaking the law, the defence of which should be their concern. 'We are an organ of coercion,' answered the major. 'You can complain to whom you like.' In front of his wife and children (teenagers of 13 and 17) and of his colleagues from the Institute they tied up Zhores' arms and led him from the house. In this way doctors from a mental institution themselves created a situation of shock for all those present in the flat, one of whom had something like a hysterical fit. Zhores himself was the calmest of all.

Zhores Medvedev is a well-known biologist. He is the author of two considerable monographs on the problems of biosynthesis and the genetic mechanisms of ageing in the [human] organism, published in the USSR in 1963 and 1969. These books were afterwards translated and published abroad. He is the author of more than 100 learned articles. His services to science in the sphere of genetics and gerontology have been recognized by biologists the world over.

Zhores Medvedev is also a well-known publicist. He is the author of a work which has become widely known in the USSR and abroad on the history of the biology debate in the USSR (originally entitled 'The Cult of Personality and Biological Science'). It is generally acknowledged that this work played an enormous role in exposing the arbitrariness and lawlessness practised for so long in biology by the Lysenko group and in mobilizing not only all honest biologists but all scientists against this arbitrariness. After the October plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1964 the situation in biological science in the USSR was on the way to becoming normal; however the followers of Lysenko were even then already trying in every way to discredit Zh. Medvedev's work and him personally; and were writing all kinds of denunciations and trying to have him silenced. These efforts were intensified in recent months, when a group of prominent Lysenko adherents appealed to the Central Committee and the Ministry of Agriculture 'in defence of the Michurin line'. At the same time many Lysenko followers started to spread rumours that Zhores Medvedev was 'an American spy', and that 'he was a mentally abnormal person'. This campaign of slander had already started in March–April 1970.

In 1969 Zhores Medvedev completed another pamphlet, 'International Cooperation and National Frontiers', in which is shown, on the basis of extensive factual material and from a deeply patriotic standpoint, the enormous harm which has been and is being done to Soviet science by the senseless and unnecessary barriers which to this day in our country block the path to exchange of scientific information and hinder cooperation between Soviet and foreign scientists.

In 1969, without the observance of legal formalities, Zhores Medvedev was dismissed by order of the Obninsk municipal com-

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mittee of the Communist Party from the Scientific Research Institute of Medical Radiology, on grounds provided by preposterous and absurd accusations. For nine months Zhores was not given the essential documents for finding other work, and so for more than a year he could work nowhere. Only after the Procuracy had intervened three times did Zhores receive in the spring of 1970 the necessary documents which he sent in for the competition for appointment to a post at the Moscow Institute of Medical Genetics. The competition was to take place at the beginning of June; and during the last week [of May] the certainty grew that the decision of the judges and of the Academic Council of the Institute would be positive.

That the forcible arrest of my brother was an act of provocation is evident from the fact that it was done on a Friday, on the eve of two days of a public holiday. My efforts, and the efforts of a number of prominent biologists and other scientists, to appeal to the departments of the special psychiatric service of the Ministry of Health of the USSR and the Russian SSR, to the Central Committee of the CP, and to the KGB were without result. Everywhere the same answer was given: 'Ring up on Monday.' Nevertheless a psychiatric commission from Moscow was appointed for Sunday. To my question, what should one do then if the law is broken on a public holiday, to whom should I in that case appeal?—the duty officer of a certain important institution answered rudely: 'Appeal to your wife.'

As far back as 1961, when he began his work on the history of the biology debate, my brother well understood the difficulty and even the danger of such work. He also understood that even now there was the possibility of occasional relapses into arbitrariness and lawlessness and that perhaps he would be one of the first victims. However this did not deter him, as it will not deter me nor other honest people in our country, in our search for truth and justice. I implore all my friends and my brother's friends to take all measures which they consider possible and suitable, in order to obtain the release of Zhores Medvedev from confinement and ensure the punishment of the guilty.

30 May 1970, morning **Roy Medvedev**

31 May, morning

Yesterday afternoon some old Bolsheviks—friends of our father—a friend of Zhores and I went together to the Kaluga mental hospital. We were unable to find Livshits, the chief medical officer of the hospital; but with Zhores' wife who had come from Obninsk we were allowed to see Zhores who was in a general ward with really sick people. I am certain that doctors have no right whatever to put a person in a general ward before a commission has made a diagnosis and come to a decision. The medical commission is fixed for Sunday afternoon. The doctors serving on it are coming from Moscow to

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Kaluga on a public holiday, although any day of the week could have been chosen. Zhores is calm; he thinks that this action has been undertaken on the initiative of the Obninsk or Kaluga authorities, although there are considerable doubts about that.

After the hospital visit I found out from telephone directory enquiries the private number and address of Livshits. We went to his flat. My friends stayed by the car, but I was invited by his wife to wait in the flat for his return. When he returned in half an hour and saw me, Livshits showed great uneasiness and was obviously nervous during our conversation. He gave me the impression of a man bewildered and even depressed by the task given him, but ready nevertheless to do what in no way was consonant with his calling as a doctor or with the elementary norms of his sense of duty as a physician. Before we went, I had asked for some enquiries to be made about what sort of a man Livshits was; and I was told that he was not altogether honest, but not hopeless either. Livshits tried to assure me that psychiatrists act only in the interests of their patients, that they protect them from harmful emotional shocks, that some people remain quite unaware of their own mental illness, nor do those around them notice the fact—but after treatment these people and their relatives come to thank the doctors, etc.

However, Livshits admitted that the very nature of the violence that had been allowed to take place on Friday could have serious repercussions on the mental state of Zhores and of those with him, especially on his children, one of whom (the elder son, 17 years old) was an extremely nervous youth who had been under this very Livshits for treatment for a short time. 'We discussed all that,' said Livshits, 'but we had no other means [of doing it] as we were sure that your brother would not come for an interview with psychiatrists at the polyclinic.'

Livshits admitted that to put a person before diagnosis into the same ward as really sick people could not have a salutary effect on his mental condition, and that it would have been better to keep Zhores in a single ward until his examination. 'But the hospital is full and at present we have no single wards.'

'But what grounds have you for considering that my brother is not mentally fit?'

'I have read extracts from his pamphlet on international co-operation between intellectuals, and also his essay "Biological Science and the Cult of Personality". I have been studying these works for a couple of months and I have doubts about them being written by a mentally healthy person.'

When I asked him which sentences or statements in the writings he had read gave rise to such doubts, Livshits did not answer.

'But these writings have been read by hundreds, if not thousands of people, including the most prominent Soviet scholars—biologists, doctors and writers. And they all consider these works of my brother

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to be in their own right remarkable productions which testify to the clear mind and strength of character of their author.'

'You all have your own views on these things; we psychiatrists have our own views and our own criteria.'

'But what right have you to judge works which are outside your speciality and to ignore the opinion of people much more competent in the problems Zhores deals with than you are?'

Livshits did not answer the question.

'Many people who have read the recently published novels of Shevtsov *In the Name of the Father and of the Son* and *Love and Hatred* think that the man who wrote them is not quite normal. It is obvious too from his topical satires published in the *Literary Gazette* and in the magazine *Youth*. But the novels of Shevtsov are published in hundreds of thousands of copies by our publishing firms and no one subjects him to a psychiatric examination, although the opinion about Shevtsov's abnormality is shared not only by many writers but also by doctors. And moreover when one reads Lysenko's works today, and learns about his activities, one begins to have doubts about his mental health too. Why does Lysenko still go to meetings of the Academy of Sciences and not to a check-up in a mental hospital?'

'You say just what your brother said to me at our first interview. I haven't read Shevtsov's novels nor his topical satires. Perhaps Lysenko is not normal either, but he does not live in the Kaluga region.'

'Why didn't you wait till Monday for taking action, instead of doing it all on a Friday evening? Why is the commission coming from Moscow on a Sunday? Why all this hurry?'

'We did not think about that. We chose the day quite by chance. As a matter of fact I have noticed that your brother has a split personality. He is a biologist, but for some reason he is concerned not only with biology, but with many things which have no relation at all to his immediate tasks. Besides, he is always dissatisfied with something, always struggling against something.'

'Then you must declare that Marx too was abnormal, he too was always struggling "against something". In no country is the situation such that a normal honest person can be content with everything and not struggle against some wrong [or other]. My brother was doing just that. And what you call "a split personality" can be found in nearly all scholars: a man can't live with only his own speciality. You should put all scholars into mental hospitals.'

Livshits said several times that the fact that Zhores had not been employed anywhere for a long time had had a bad effect on his mental condition. An employment should be found for him. This had been offered him, and he had refused it.

'But you know yourself that he was offered work only two weeks ago and then it was the post of a selection expert on a distant state farm in the Kaluga district. My brother is not a selection expert:

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that needs many years' training; and besides he cannot live separated from his family: his wife is a scientific worker in Obninsk. The offer of such a post was a mockery. When it comes to something serious —participation in the competition for an appointment at the Institute of Medical Genetics—you with your action have almost wrecked his chances: what Academic Council would choose a candidate confined to a mental hospital?'

Livshits assured me that he knew nothing of the forthcoming competition.

'What is your provisional diagnosis?'

'That is a medical secret.'

'But my brother and I are identical twins and we have precisely the same heredity. If my brother's mental condition is unsound without his being aware of it, then I must be in the same condition and you, as a doctor, are obliged to warn me about it.'

'I cannot tell you that.'

I told Livshits that by participating in such a shameful business he risked losing his reputation, that he was discrediting the authority of the whole of Soviet psychiatry and medicine. 'You are still a young man and a young doctor, and you should think of your future.' 'If you, as a member of the examining commission, decide to declare a healthy person mentally ill, in a few years' time no one will want to shake you by the hand.' 'Perhaps behind you there is someone unknown to me; he will remain unknown to everyone, and it is on you that the whole shame will fall.' 'I don't know who else will be on the commission, but I appeal to you and to your conscience.'

After this visit I went back to Moscow with my friends.

1 June, morning

Yesterday morning many prominent Soviet scholars and writers sent telegrams protesting against the forcible hospitalization of Z. Medvedev. The telegrams were sent to Livshits, chief medical officer and member of the examining commission. One of the academicians and one of the well-known writers came to Kaluga. They were received and spoke about Zhores, asking for their statements to be taken into account as the testimony of witnesses. After the psychiatric examination they were received by the chairman, Boris Vladimirovich Shostakovich, a psychiatrist from the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Medicine. G. P. Bondaryev and K. N. Levchenko, Kaluga city psychiatrists, also took part, as well as Livshits, the chief doctor of Kaluga mental hospital. There was no psychiatrist from the side of the examinee's, Medvedev's, relatives, as is laid down in the instructions. As Shostakovich said, Zhores had answered the questions put to him 'satisfactorily'. However, the commission did not decide on the immediate release of my brother. It took a decision on the following lines: 'The commission did not find any evident deviations from the mental norm in Z. Medvedev.' However, it found that 'Medvedev was showing a high degree

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of nervousness, and therefore was in need of further observation in hospital conditions.'

This is an absolutely absurd decision from the point of view both of medicine and common sense. If there are no evident deviations from the mental norm, why leave a person amongst mentally abnormal people? Can one really expect Olympian serenity from a man forcibly dragged away from his home, in the presence of his wife and children, and placed in the general ward of a mental hospital? It would seem that Shostakovich came to Kaluga with a ready-made diagnosis. However, learning of the protests beginning to come from prominent scholars, and of the presence in the hospital of one of the most eminent Soviet geneticists, a biologist with a world-wide reputation, the commission hesitated to announce the decision prepared beforehand. It did not, however, dare to free Zhores at once, and departed to Moscow for further instructions.

After the examination all Zhores' friends who had come to Kaluga were allowed to see him and found him completely calm and bearing up well.

Zhores' wife today sent a telegram of protest to Rudenko, the Procurator-General of the USSR. I sent a statement to the Central Committee of the CPSU and the following telegram to Rudenko:

> Moscow, Pushkinskaya 15a, USSR, Procurator-General, Rudenko:
>
> I protest emphatically against forcible placing 29 May in Kaluga mental hospital of my brother well-known scholar publicist Zhores Alexandrovich Medvedev who is absolutely healthy and never needed psychiatric or neurological help. This action transgresses relevant laws and instructions: yesterday psychiatric commission found no symptoms mental illness in my brother but left him in hospital general ward with genuinely sick patients. I demand immediate release of my brother investigation of lawlessness committed punishment of guilty.
>
> Roy Alexandrovich Medvedev
> Moscow, G-19, Post Box No. 45.

I sent a copy of this telegram to the Minister of Health, Petrovsky, and to the Kaluga Regional Department of Health.

(Address of the hospital: Kaluga, Mayakovsky Street, City Mental Hospital.)

2 June 1970

We now know some of the questions that Zhores was asked during the examination. At first there were elementary textbook questions such as: 'Is anyone victimizing you?' (to probe for persecution mania), 'How do you estimate yourself as a scholar?' (probing for megalomania), 'What are you, really—a biologist or a publicist?' (evidently, in order to uncover a split personality). According to the chairman of

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the commission, Medvedev answered these questions entirely satisfactorily. Then Zhores was asked questions about the publication in the USA of his pamphlet on the biology debate. Although these questions had no relation whatever to the mental health of my brother, he nevertheless gave an exhaustive reply to the question as to how his work on the biology debate—circulated in thousands, if not tens of thousands of copies in 1962—turned up abroad and was published in the USA. A few more questions were asked, after which the commission announced the decision recorded above.

Late in the evening I had a telephone conversation with the chief medical officer of the Kaluga hospital, Livshits. It went approximately as follows:

'I would like to know—what was the decision of the psychiatric commission?'

'I have already told your friends—yesterday.'

'Why must I receive information through my friends? I am the nearest relative, and I wish to hear the answer from an official person.'

'We found certain deviations in your brother, but decided to observe him a little longer.'

'You are a doctor, and should tell me the precise diagnosis of the illness. What do you mean by "deviations"? Everyone probably has some deviations. I am a teacher, and I too have noticed in you quite a few deviations, at least from the principles of Soviet morality. Tell me the diagnosis.'

'We have not made a precise diagnosis, and have decided on more observation.'

'That is not an answer. You have broken the law and the corresponding directives. If the commission did not discover on the third day any evidence of mental illness, he should be immediately released. I warn you that I shall bring legal action against you.'

Very many scholars, writers, and other intellectuals continue to send telegrams of protest against the forcible hospitalization of my brother. A large group of the most senior members of the Party today visited Nikolai Alexandrovich Demidov, head of the department of special medical aid in the Russian Ministry of Health. After listening to his visitors, Demidov said that he knew nothing of the hospitalization of Medvedev. He telephoned to Kaluga, and asked for an explanation from Livshits. The latter could not give a satisfactory explanation, and Demidov ordered Livshits to come to Moscow on 3 June.

3 June, evening

I learnt in the morning that at the USSR Ministry of Health a consultative meeting of psychiatrists was taking place in the office of the head of the department of special psychiatric aid, Zoë Nikolaevna Seryebryakova, probably to discuss the events that had taken place in Obninsk and Kaluga. I phoned Seryebryakova during the meeting and

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asked for permission to have charge of Zhores until a new commission was appointed, something which is allowed even with sick people. 'We do not practise that now', answered Seryebryakova.

Immediately after the consultative meeting Seryebryakova received a group of senior Bolsheviks, who expressed to her their protest against the forcible hospitalization of my brother. Seryebryakova acknowledged that the Kaluga doctors ought to have informed the relatives in the course of 24 hours of the grounds for the forcible hospitalization. However she did not show her visitors the corresponding directives, although she told them it was not secret. She said that a new, more authoritative medical commission of Moscow doctors had been appointed and that it would go to Kaluga on Friday. Seryebryakova agreed to include in the commission a psychiatrist representing Zhores' relatives. On the telephone Seryebryakova told me that the following psychiatrists were included in the commission: Morozov, Nadzharov, Lunts, and Portnov. 'Can I protest against [the inclusion of] any of the appointed doctors?' 'Yes, of course.'

Then I expressed emphatically the view that Lunts should be excluded. 'What are your motives for this?' 'He has a bad reputation among my friends.' Seryebryakova said Lunts would be excluded from the commission. As for the other doctors, I said that I did not know them and would communicate my opinion on Thursday when I was personally to visit the Ministry of Health at 3 p.m. according to an arrangement to which I had agreed.

In the evening some friends and a few experienced psychiatrists gathered at my flat and helped me to formulate a statement for the Ministry of Health of the USSR.

Academician A. D. Sakharov has told me by telephone that certain ill-intentioned persons are spreading rumours that Zhores Medvedev suffers from chronic alcoholism and was hospitalized because of an attack of delirium tremens. The person who tried to persuade Sakharov to accept this libel called himself Astafyev, a geneticist.

Statement*

Roy Alexandrovich Medvedev

4 June 1970

On Friday, 29 May 1970, my brother, the well-known scholar, biochemist, and publicist, Zhores Alexandrovich Medvedev was taken without his consent and with the application of force from his flat in Obninsk to the Kaluga mental hospital. The chief medical officer

* To: Comrade Zoë Nikolaevna Seryebryakova, USSR Ministry of Health. Copy to: Comrade Rudenko, USSR Procurator General.

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of the Kaluga hospital, Alexander Efimovich Livshits, and the Obninsk psychiatrist, Yury Yakovlevich Kiryushin, with a group of policemen actually broke open the door into Medvedev's flat, and without presenting any documents whatever authorizing compulsory hospitalization either to Medvedev himself or to his relatives tied him up in front of his wife and children and took him away to Kaluga. The chief medical officer of the Kaluga hospital, A. E. Livshits, has not, up to the present time, given Medvedev's relatives any grounds for the forcible hospitalization, although according to the directives relating to the forcible hospitalization of mentally sick people who are a social danger, which were confirmed in 1961 by the USSR Ministry of Health, and countersigned by the USSR Procuracy, MVD, and Soviet Supreme Court, this should have been done within 24 hours. The oral statement of Livshits, made in his private flat at the time of my visit, that he did not like Z. Medvedev's writings 'The Cult of Personality and Biological Science' (1962) and 'International Cooperation and National Frontiers' does not even deserve consideration in view of the absurdity of such an accusation.

I learnt that on Sunday 31 May a commission was appointed, and according to its decision, no evident signs of mental illness were discovered in my brother. In the meanwhile, my brother continues to be kept in the conditions of a mental hospital, and the Ministry of Health is about to appoint a new commission; but not for the examination of the infringement of the existing directives allowed by the Kaluga doctors, but for a second examination of my brother's mental health, although neither my brother's wife, Margarita Nikolayevna Medvedev, nor I insist on a second examination.

In the directions referred to above is included a precise enumeration of the [type of] persons requiring compulsory hospitalization. The scholarly and publicist activities of my brother cannot, even indirectly, correspond to any one of the categories on this list. In spite of this, the directives were in fact applied, and, evidently, in accordance with Paragraph 7 [6 (b)?] the police were called in to help the psychiatrists. In the directives on compulsory hospitalization the composition of the medical commission, which has to decide within three days the question of the presence or absence of mental illness, is precisely defined. However, in violation of these directions, persons unconnected with the Kaluga mental hospital were brought into the commission, one of whom, Boris Vladimirovich Shostakovich, is a psychiatrist of the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry in Moscow. The bringing in of a specialist in forensic psychiatry is in any case strange, as no court case whatever has been brought against my brother.

Nevertheless, as stated above, the Kaluga hospital commission found that symptoms of mental disturbance in my brother were absent, thus acknowledging the very fact that any of the conditions requiring compulsory hospitalization were absent also.

Therefore I consider:

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1. That the compulsory hospitalization of my brother in the Kaluga mental hospital is an illegal act, committed by the chief medical officer of that hospital, A. E. Livshits.

2. That the appointment of any new commission is superfluous, in so far as according to the directives relating to compulsory hospitalization, a second commission is not provided for. The Ministry of Health, however, has the right to appoint any commission for the investigation of the illegal actions of the Kaluga doctors.

3. I demand the immediate discharge of my brother, as a mentally fit person, from the mental hospital.

4. Both my brother and I reserve the right to claim the right to bring a civil court case against the Kaluga mental hospital because of moral and material damage done to him. (Z. Medvedev was, at the beginning of June, to take part in a competition for a post at the Moscow Institute of Medical Genetics.)

In case my demands, with which Z. A. Medvedev's wife is in complete agreement, are not met, and a second commission is nevertheless appointed, I ask you to take into account the following:

1. We are categorically opposed to the inclusion in the commission of D. R. Lunts and G. V. Morozov, whom the USSR Ministry of Health proposes to include. Both these professors are narrow specialists in forensic psychiatry. My brother has committed no punishable criminal offences and has not been charged by a court. I will not enlarge on the fact that among my relatives and friends Professors Lunts and Morozov have a bad reputation.

2. We are emphatically against the inclusion in the commission of A. A. Portnov, whose scientific views, according to the testimony of many psychiatrists in whom we have confidence, are extremely unreliable.

3. We agree to the canditures proposed by the USSR Ministry of Health of V. M. Morozov and R. N. Nadzharov.

4. We consider it would be appropriate to include in the commission the following professors of psychiatry: Yury Konstantinovich Tarasov (Moscow), Pyotr Fadeyevich Malkin (Kuibyshev), Joseph Adamovich Poleshuk (Kiev), Andrei Yulianovich Vyaskovsky (Odessa), Andrei Vladimirovich Snezhnevsky (Moscow). The following professors might also be included: Joseph Ilich Lukunsky and Mina Ignatovna Selinskaya (Moscow), Andrei Sergeyevich Listovich (Leningrad).

5. I consider it inappropriate that a new commission should be appointed for Friday, 5 June 1970. Such extreme haste prevents the inclusion of experienced psychiatrists from other towns. The [meeting of the] commission should be postponed till next week. Of course, in this case, Zhores Medvedev should be unconditionally released till the meeting of the commission, as a person whom the first commission declared to be mentally normal. We guarantee that Zhores Medvedev will not withdraw from attending the examination of the second commission.

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6. As a psychiatrist representing Zhores' relatives, we ask for the inclusion in the commission of the well-known psychiatrist Dmitry Yevgenyevich Melekhov, who has expressed his agreement.

5 June, early morning

Yesterday many discordant events took place. In the morning I typed the above statement, then took it to the USSR Procuracy, and at 3 o'clock went to an interview with the principal psychiatrist of the USSR Ministry of Health, Z. N. Seryebryakova. I was received by a young woman, probably of about 35. After reading my statement, she said 'The whole situation has already changed. We decided to send a commission—not on Friday, but today, Thursday. It has already left. Both Morozovs and Nadzharov were in it. Portnov could not go.' 'But why did you not inform me? We agreed to meet today and decide on the inclusion of a representative for the relatives. We were speaking about it at 5 o'clock [yesterday]. So you have deceived me?'

'No, everything was altered in the evening and we phoned the psychiatrists.'

'But why did you not phone me?'

'I did not know your number.'

'I protest against the participation in the commission of G. Morozov. He is a forensic psychiatrist. I consider that this commission has no right to take a decision.'

'Morozov has gone not as a forensic expert, but as a corresponding member of the Academy of Medical Sciences. The most distinguished psychiatrists have gone. The Ministry has every confidence in them; what grounds have you for not regarding them as competent?' And Seryebryakova continued to try to assure me that all would be well, that the commission would sort everything out. She acknowledged that Livshits had violated many points of the directives, and said he would be punished. 'We want to help you, Roy Alexandrovich, why do you behave so aggressively?'

'I have grave doubts about your help, considering your previous behaviour.' Seryebryakova tried to question me about Zhores, and about his friendship with the writer Solzhenitsyn. In the course of our conversation she dropped a sentence which explained a lot to me:

'We did not know he was such a distinguished scholar, and I had never read his works before.' And again 'Do you know why the Obninsk Party Committee is so set against your brother?'

I asked Seryebryakova for the telephone numbers of the members of the commission. 'I have them at home.' 'Well give me your home number.' 'Why worry, tomorrow you will know everything.'

'But I want to know everything tonight!'

I returned home and booked phone calls to Livshits and Obninsk.

At about 9 in the evening Zhores' wife phoned me. She said that the commission had already sat. She had seen Zhores afterwards. He was a little agitated as he had not expected the commission: he

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had been told it would be on Friday, and that a psychiatrist representing his relatives would be present.

The whole examination took about 20 minutes. The questions were asked with a telegraphic speed; the members of the commission did not even wait for the answers. Afterwards they consulted together for a long time and went to have supper with Livshits. The supper lasted for an hour and a half. Neither Zhores nor his wife were told what the commission had decided. Zhores' wife was very alarmed; she was afraid that Zhores might be moved somewhere or that something might be done to him in the night. She decided to spend the night near the hospital (leaving the children by themselves in Obninsk). I tried to calm her.

I rang Seryebryakova, but her husband answered that she was not at home, and would return late. I booked a call at the urgent rate to Livshits' flat (Kaluga 7–28–12) but I was told that no one answered the phone. I retained the booking. At 11 o'clock I had the idea of ringing the hospital. In a stern tone I asked for the chief medical officer.

'Today you had a Moscow commission including Doctors G. and V. Morozov and R. Nadzharov. What has this commission decided in relation to Zhores Medvedev in the third section?' The duty doctor answered: 'The commission decided he should be kept in hospital for treatment.' My heart fell, and I understood that the urgency with which the commission had been sent had nothing to do with a desire to help me.

Once again I phoned Seryebryakova. It was already about 12 o'clock, but I was told she was not at home. 'Please write down my phone number. The matter cannot be postponed. When she comes in ask her to phone me. But if she is at home and does not want to answer the phone, I warn you that I shall keep ringing all night.'

In a quarter of an hour Seryebryakova rang me. 'I have just come in. I was busy with other matters. What is worrying you, Roy Alexandrovich?'

I told her what I had learnt from the doctor on duty. 'Why are you so worried? I do not yet know the commission's decision; anyway it could not take a decision. It is a ministerial commission; tomorrow it will report everything to the Minister, and we will decide what to do with your brother. I myself will take part [in the discussion].' (Completely absurd that the Minister of Health, by profession a surgeon, should decide the question of the fate of my brother, confined to a mental hospital. The decision had to be immediate.)

I expressed my opinion to Seryebryakova about such procedures. 'Why did the commission not tell Zhores' wife of their decision? You are driving a woman to a mental breakdown. She has two children, but she spent the whole day in Kaluga and stayed the night there.'

'I don't know how to help you, but we have this procedure when

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a commission is appointed by a Minister.' I forgot to ask for the phone numbers of the commission members, but Seryebryakova would not have given me them in any case.

I again booked a call to Kaluga to Livshits, asking the operator to go on ringing until he answered. (Incidentally Livshit's home address is Kaluga, Pobyedy, 7, Flat 72.)

After a few minutes Livshits answered. 'You promised Zhores' wife to discharge him on Friday, isn't that so?' (Livshits had in fact spoken to Zhores' wife in the morning of 4 June and promised to discharge him on Friday.)

'Yes, we will discharge him tomorrow.'

'I will come for my brother tomorrow.'

'Why do you need to come from Moscow? Zhores' wife can take him herself. We usually deal with the wife in such cases.'

'She will be there too.'

'Only do not come in the morning. In the morning I will be very busy and cannot be in the hospital. Come after three in the afternoon.'

Of course, I no longer believed a word of what Livshits said; he had deceived everyone so often. I did not go to bed that night, having decided to write down the day's events. After reading once more the notorious directives about the immediate hospitalization of socially dangerous patients and not having found either the stamp 'secret' nor the stamp 'for judicial use', I decided to type out these directives, so that my friends and their relatives, if they found themselves in a similar situation, would be more prepared, and would know their rights as well as the duties of the doctors. The psychiatrist friend who gave me the directives for a few days also told me that as he understood it, and in practice, it was not a secret document; it was not only in the possession of psychiatrists but also at police stations and many other establishments, and one was permitted to show it to relatives to support the actions of psychiatric establishments and the police (however, neither the Kaluga doctors nor Seryebryakova showed these directives either to the relatives or the friends of Zhores in spite of persistent requests).

6 June 1970

Yesterday morning I went with a group of friends to Kaluga as a result of the conversation I had had with Livshits. Although I no longer believed a word he said I decided to be on the spot in case Zhores was, after all, discharged.

At 3 o'clock the chief medical officer was not at the hospital. 'He is at the office of the Regional Health Department,' I was told. Zhores' wife was already at the hospital. He was allowed to have a walk, and I succeeded in having 10 minutes' conversation with him. However, while we were talking a nurse came up and asked Zhores to go to 'his doctor', G. P. Bondarenko. Zhores refused, saying he had been given permission to have half an hour's walk. After a

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minute the same nurse came up and said that Zhores' wife was asking to see him urgently—for the discharge. He got up and went. However, his wife was at that time in the office and did not know we were having a talk; and there was no question of a discharge. It was simply that Bondarenko had decided to prevent our conversation and to lock up my brother once more in the hospital.

What I saw and learnt in the hospital is simply horrifying and does not fit into any framework—Zhores and his wife are kept in a constant state of tension. They have already been told three times of a discharge very soon—on Thursday, on Friday morning, at 3 o'clock on Friday—but it was all deception. The night of Thursday to Friday Zhores' wife spent in Kaluga, hoping for the discharge on Friday morning and at the same time afraid of what might happen (that he might be taken away to some place). Zhores can hardly sleep at all, as he refuses to take drugs from the doctors and those his wife brings are taken away. They are all the time trying to frighten him concerning me. 'Why does your brother phone Livshits at night? You had better warn him that your heredity is the same, you are identical twins. You are a geneticist and understand that you have the same heredity.' And then they ask him: 'Why do you forbid your brother to visit you in the ward?' (which is doubly locked). 'Are you afraid that they will take him too?' (an attempt to create persecution mania). I see that the psychiatrists in Kaluga know how to create disturbed conditions in the people who land up with them. I managed to tell Zhores that it seemed that he would not be discharged, that too many important people were involved in the affair, and that they would fight to have him kept in the hospital so as to justify their action. 'Prepare yourself for three or four weeks of struggle.' They are insisting all the time that Zhores should have his electro-encephalogram taken and examined, but he refuses his consent. The demands, however, continue. Evidently the graph of his electro-encephalogram influenced by insomnia and tension such as he is undergoing would be different from the normal, and that is important to the doctors as an 'objective indication'.

With my friends I went into the office of the deputy chief medical officer and asked him to call in Bondarenko, the doctor 'in charge' of my brother's case. She came immediately, and we talked for half an hour. A young pleasant-looking woman, she spoke in a quiet voice, but she let the cat out of the bag, and calmly said terrible and absurd things. There is no point in recording here the whole conversation. Here are parts of it. 'Don't think that we are not looking after your brother. I have a huge department and a great many patients, but 90 per cent of the time is now spent on your brother.' 'It would be better,' I answered, 'if you took care of the other, genuinely ill people: that's your duty, you are paid to do that. You have no right to neglect the other really sick patients and leave them without medical care. You have infringed one of the clauses of the directives, as you

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did not produce within 24 hours the medical and social reasons for his immediate hospitalization. We still don't know the reason for the violence that has been permitted.' 'We gave our reasons within 24 hours in [the record of] the history of his illness. We are not obliged to do it for his relatives.' 'But you will tell me now.' 'Yes, we acted on the basis of clause (c) of para. 3, that is, we found in your brother a socially dangerous delirious syndrome.' (In parenthesis—this is the vaguest clause of the directives, liable to any interpretation: one could enter anything under this heading.) 'But what gave you the grounds for such a conclusion? No doctor had examined my brother.' 'Yes, Liznenko, a psychiatrist, who was present when your brother was talking to Antonenko, the chairman of the Obninsk city council. He diagnosed his condition without examining him.' (Two weeks before Zhores had in fact been invited to an interview with Antonenko, who asked why Zhores was not employed anywhere. Zhores answered that he had not previously had the necessary documents and that just then he had entered an application [to be allowed] to compete for a post at the Institute of Medical Genetics. Antonenko suggested sending Zhores to a distant state farm as a selection specialist. Zhores refused, saying he was not a selection expert, and that he had a family in Obninsk, where his wife worked. At the interview was a person Zhores did not know, who said he was a representative of the Kaluga City Department of Education, and who asked Zhores two questions about his tenth [i.e. last] year of schooling. The whole conversation lasted about 20 minutes. And that was enough for Liznenko, returning to Kaluga, to establish that Zhores was mentally ill and the order was given for his forcible hospitalization. And yet, even in the directives referred to above, there is a recommendation for 'particular care'!)

Bondarenko even let out that the idea of Zhores' hospitalization was produced in the first place by the Obninsk city committee of the CPSU, and I also learnt that it had been agreed upon personally by the Minister of Health, Petrovsky, with the secretary of the Obninsk regional committee, Kondratyenko, who gave Zhores out to be an academic dismissed for unfitness from his post, and 'troubling the waters' of the town of Obninsk. In this manner, a 20-minute talk was considered sufficient to seize, with the help of the police, a scholar with a world reputation—and to put him away in a madhouse!

I told Bondarenko that this was utter lawlessness and an outrage on genuine psychiatry. 'Here am I talking to you agitatedly; and when you go back to the hospital you will write down your conclusion that I have displayed heightened aggressiveness. And if I were completely calm, you would report that I am suffering from depression and am indifferent to the fate of my brother, and consequently that I am an abnormal person. I warn you that you have a criminal responsibility for placing a healthy person in a mental hospital.' 'But you are accusing us,' answered Bondarenko, 'and yourself keep our chief medical officer in a state of constant tension, telephoning him at night

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at his home.' 'All that is not to be compared with your behaviour,' I replied, 'Besides, Livshits does not pick up the receiver in the evening, and his family say that he's not at home.'

At about 5 o'clock Livshits arrived at the hospital and announced to Zhores' wife that Zhores would not be discharged from the hospital for the time being, that a directive had come from the Ministry that Zhores was mentally ill, and that he must be kept in hospital for 'a few more days'. The precise diagnosis and decision of yesterday's examining commission was not communicated to us. I did not talk to Livshits, and we left.

It is clear to me that Zhores has purposely been placed in hospital from some political motives and that they are trying to induce morbid reactions in him. To do this is not only an arbitrary act, but a kind of subtle sadism, as a result of which my brother's health could be seriously impaired. Earlier I had asked my friends to appeal to the Minister, Petrovsky, but now I see that having sanctioned (by word of mouth) the hospitalization of Zhores, the Minister has now understood that his official standing is involved and that he could be punished; and he will do all in his power not only to justify the crime committed, but also to see to it that there is indeed a morbid change in my brother's mental condition. For this reason I ask my friends to send their protests against the arbitrary act which has been committed to the Central Committee of the CPSU and to the USSR Council of Ministers. The leaders of these establishments, as I understand, either know nothing of what has happened, or have only the most distorted idea from misleading documents sent by Petrovsky or Kondratyenkov. I have realized that the commission was sent not to release Zhores, but to correct the 'error' of the first commission, which took a contradictory and absurd decision; and in this way to save the prestige of the Minister of Health. Zhores must be saved, and there can be no delay; otherwise all gifted people who struggle against arbitrariness and deficiencies will be put away in mental hospitals.

4 June 1970, Moscow, Dybenko St. 14/1 Flat 15

The Trial of Olga Iofe

THE trial of Olya [intimate form of Olga] Iofe took place on 20 August in the Moscow City Court. O. Iofe was charged under article 70 of the Russian Criminal Code with taking an active part in the preparation of 245 leaflets of anti-Soviet content, and with the possession and circulation of documents of anti-Soviet content which had been confiscated from her during a search.

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The members of the court were:

Judge—Bogdanov;
Procurator—Vankovich;
Counsel for the Defence—Yu. Pozdeyev.

A preliminary psychiatric examination, carried out in the Serbsky Central Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Psychiatry by Professor Morozov, doctor of medical sciences D. R. Lunts, and the doctors Felinskaya and Martynenko, had judged O. Iofe to be of unsound mind, diagnosing creeping schizophrenia of a straightforward type.

Defence counsel Yu. B. Pozdeyev submitted two petitions: (1) that the parents of O. Iofe, N. Ya. Shatunovskaya and Yu. M. Iofe, should be recognized as the accused's legal representatives; (2) that the accused should be brought to the trial. The procurator objected to the second petition on the grounds that it was painful for a sick person to be present at his own trial. The court rejected this petition.

The judge announced that three witnesses had been summoned in connexion with the case: I. M. Kaplun, V. I. Bakhmin, and V. M. Tishinin.

The witness V. Bakhmin testified that he had been acquainted with O. Iofe for about a year and a half, and that on 7 and 8 November 1969 he had been in I. M. Kaplun's flat together with Kaplun, Iofe, Khromova and Dibtseva. O. Iofe had dictated the text of a leaflet, while he and Kaplun typed it. These leaflets had been given to V. Tishinin to keep.

Bakhmin further declared that the leaflets had been typed with no particular aim, since it had not yet been decided by what method to circulate them or whether to circulate them at all. The leaflets had been typed on 7 and 8 November because these were the only days when they did not have to attend classes. The leaflets had been prepared in readiness for 21 December [the 90th anniversary of Stalin's birth]. Later, on 30 November, a few hours before their arrest, it had been decided to destroy all the leaflets.

Bakhmin had been shown a document on which the compilation of the leaflet was based, and he testified that the text of the document was written in O. Iofe's hand, while the corrections were in his hand. He had not been acquainted with the other documents shown to him.

The testimony of I. M. Kaplun, who had been friendly with O. Iofe since 1956, coincided exactly with that of Bakhmin.

I. M. Kaplun stated that the activities of herself and her friends were in no way directed at undermining the Soviet political system, but, on the contrary, at strengthening it, and that they were acting in accordance with the Leninist principle that the people must be told the truth.

On the subject of O. Iofe's leaflet all the witnesses testified that Olga was a tenacious and consistent person of strong will, and a logical thinker, that she always finished what she had started, that

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she was good-natured towards others and that she had a sense of humour. Besides this, at the request of defence counsel Pozdeyev, character references from her places of work and study were read out, describing her in glowing terms.

The third witness, V. M. Tishinin, was not present in court, and not a word was said about his testimony. (It is known that Tishinin is at liberty and that shortly before the arrest of Iofe, Kaplun and Bakhmin he wrote a letter of denunciation to the KGB, which was the cause of their arrest.)

At the request of defence counsel the parents of O. Iofe were questioned. N. Ya. Shatunovskaya said of her daughter that Olga had developed normally, and neither in her childhood nor in her youth had any deviations from the norm been in evidence. She was an affectionate, serene, restrained and sociable girl.

Martynenko, the chairman of the diagnosis commission, read out the established diagnosis. Defence counsel Pozdeyev put to her a number of questions.

Question: Exactly what physiological tests were carried out to establish that she was suffering from an illness?

Answer: Such physiological tests are carried out on everybody without exception. The absence of symptoms of an illness cannot prove the absence of the illness itself.

Question: On the basis of exactly what remarks did the commission establish that her thought processes were functioning on different levels? Describe even one of the tests administered to Olga, by means of which major disturbances of her thought processes were established, or give even one remark by her which suggested such disturbances.

Answer: I am unable to give a concrete answer, and if the court requires one it will be necessary to send to the Serbsky Institute for the history of the illness. However, her reaction to being taken to the Serbsky Institute may serve as an example of her behaviour. She knew where she had been taken and realized what this meant, but she showed no sign of emotion, the tone of her voice didn't even change.

(V. Novodvorskaya [see *Chronicles* 11 and 13] showed signs of emotion—too many. The result of the examination was the same!)

Question: Do you not ascribe Olga's behaviour to her self-control, strength of will and serenity, of which the witnesses have spoken?

Answer: It's impossible to control oneself to that extent.

Question: How do you explain the fact that the presence of an illness which, according to the diagnosis, has been developing in O. Iofe since she was 14, did not prevent her from successfully graduating from the mathematical school and entering the university? (The apparent implication of the diagnosis is that the illness began in 1966, when O. Iofe and her friends circulated leaflets at school—see *Chronicle* No. 11.)

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Answer: The presence of this form of schizophrenia does not presuppose changes in the personality noticeable to others.

Defence counsel Pozdeyev then read out from a monograph by Morozov and others the symptoms of the illness from which, according to the diagnosis, Olga was suffering (a hostile attitude to others, isolation from the world, thoughts skipping from one subject to another, apathy—to such an extent that the patient never gets out of bed) and asked the expert to say exactly which of these symptoms, if only one of them, had been observed in O. Iofe. At the same time he said that the presence of the symptoms enumerated had been completely refuted by the character references from her places of work and study and by the testimony of the witnesses.

Answer: All these symptoms cannot be considered in isolation, but only in their entirety.

Defence counsel stated that he was not satisfied with the answers of the representative of the commission, inasmuch as not a single concrete answer had been given.

Defence counsel's request for a further examination by a different commission was rejected on the grounds that the commission at the Serbsky Institute had been warned of its responsibility under article 187 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (responsibility for refusal to give conclusions or for giving deliberately false conclusions), and, in any case, the commission had been sufficiently authoritative.

In his speech the procurator said: 'We are today considering an extremely unusual case; its unusualness lies in the fact that the defendant in the case we are considering is not present, since she is suffering from a serious mental illness, which has been diagnosed by an authoritative commission at the Serbsky Institute. Iofe's guilt is completely proved. Yes, she committed a serious crime specified in article 70 of the Russian Criminal Code. It is clear to me from the testimony of her parents that they took no supervisory measures to prevent the perpetration of serious crimes. Although, of course, this person is ill and is not responsible for her actions. The prosecution asks that Iofe should be sent for compulsory treatment to a hospital of special type.'

Defence counsel Pozdeyev then said that as long ago as 2 December 1969, on the day after her arrest, O. Iofe had stated that she did not consider her activity to be anti-Soviet and that it had by no means been aimed at undermining the Soviet system. On the basis of the witnesses' testimony it could be regarded as proved that the three documents had not been circulated at all, and had merely been the expression of thoughts of the moment; Kaplun had admitted that one document had been written by her and only rewritten in Iofe's hand after a discussion. Each witness had testified that it was decided to destroy the leaflets on 30 November.

Thus there was no case to answer under article 70 of the Russian Criminal Code.

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Defence counsel asked that article 70 should be replaced by article 190–1 of the Code.

Defence counsel further stated that he had got the impression from his conversation with O. Iofe that she took in reasoned arguments easily, that it was easy to establish contact with her and that she was inclined to listen to somebody else's opinion and think it over. Defence counsel referred to the youth of the accused (20) and to a certain tendency, peculiar to that age, to make categorical judgments. He said that when one was young it was sometimes hard to sort out a flood of information and to reach a correct conclusion. Failure to do so, however, was not a crime. Considering the age of the accused and the fact that she was suffering from a straightforward form of schizophrenia (according to the diagnosis), which was easier than others to treat, defence counsel regarded it as pointless to send O. Iofe to a psychiatric hospital of a special type, which presupposed protracted treatment and cases of serious illness, and he asked that she be sent to a hospital of normal type.

The sentence of the court contained no changes from the original indictment, nor any supplementary grounds for its decision. This was to send O. Iofe for treatment in a psychiatric hospital of special type and to hold her in custody until she was taken to the hospital.

Chronicle of Current Events, No. 15.

Report No. 59/S

An in-patient forensic psychiatric diagnosis of P. G. Grigorenko

ON 19 November 1969 in the Serbsky Central Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Psychiatry an examination was made of P. G. Grigorenko, born 1907, accused under Article 190–1 of the Russian Criminal Code. He entered the Institute in compliance with a decision of the investigator of the Uzbek Procuracy concerned with particularly important cases made on 13 October 1969 in connexion with a doubt as the psychological health of the patient.

From the words of the patient, from the medical records and the documents in the case it is known that the patient lost his mother in early childhood, grew up in difficult material circumstances and started heavy physical work early. He was a weak, sickly child who began school at eight. In character he was lively and sociable; had an enquiring mind, was easily carried away, stubborn, always defended his own point of view and defended the weak. He was a good pupil. After four years of school he worked as a metal worker's apprentice. From this time onwards he took an active part in community life. He joined

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the Komsomol. He studied in the Workers' Faculty of the Kharkov Technical Institute. In 1931 he was mobilized into the army and sent to the Military Engineering Academy. During his training at the Academy and in the following years he remained active and purposeful, was interested in all the events that took place in the country, and as he himself oberves, was energetic, 'brought order' and enjoyed prestige among his comrades; but at the same time he did not like contradiction, was easily irritated, and in argument could say rude sharp things to someone's face. In 1934 he finished his course at the Academy and although he could have remained a post-graduate there, he managed to get directed to a building project.

He then graduated from the General Staff Academy and was stationed in Khabarovsk till 1943. In his own words he worked with enthusiasm, trying to reach the heart of any matter and always tried to understand what, to his way of thinking, had significance for the solution of this or that question.

In the early years of the war he was reprimanded within the Party for critical comments on the state of the armed forces of the USSR.

From 1943 he took part in the Patriotic War. In 1944 he received a wound (in the leg) and was concussed, with a brief loss of consciousness. He was not hospitalized.

After the war he worked in the Frunze Military Academy as senior lecturer; in 1949 he defended his master's thesis. According to him, the defence was postponed because in discussion he expressed critical views on several points. In 1959 Grigorenko was appointed head of the Department of Military Administration.

At this time he made no complaints about the state of his health, was active, conducted scientific work, published articles, followed social and political events in the country, thought a great deal about what took place at the 20th Party Congress, and came to the conclusion that all the consequences of the 'personality cult' had not been liquidated, that there remained in the Party 'Bonapartist methods of work'.

In 1961 he made a speech at a district Party conference which contained 'critical remarks', after which he was dismissed from his post. He took this very hard, was convinced of his rightness and struggled for a restoration of his rights. At this time he had headaches, noises in the head and pains in the heart. He became more hasty-tempered and irritable, and could not bear contradiction. In 1962 Grigorenko was appointed chief to the operations section of the army of the [Pacific] Maritime Province.

As is evident from report No. 25/S of the forensic psychiatric diagnosis of 1964, in which there are data relating to his period of service in the Maritime Province, Grigorenko, along with his energy and an exceptional industriousness, suffered from 'extreme conceit' and over-estimated his own knowledge and capabilities; was hasty-tempered, lacking in restraint and did not have authority. He observes

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that he was insulted by his transfer from Moscow, and considered that he had been 'sent away' on purpose. Then he came to the conclusion that the government was 'becoming rotten' and had departed from Leninist norms and principles, and that it was essential to conduct explanatory work among the people, aimed at 'breaking down' the existing order. He studied Marx and Lenin and pondered over the mistakes of the political leadership, tried to map out the right course. He was engrossed in these thoughts, and considered this 'a matter for his conscience and his honour'.

In 1964 when on leave in Moscow he distributed leaflets with contents of this kind. He was called to face a criminal charge under Article 70 Part 1 of the Russian Criminal Code. He underwent in-patient forensic psychiatric diagnosis in the Serbsky Scientific Research Institute from 12 March to 18 April 1964.

His psychological condition was characterized by the presence of reformist ideas, in particular for the reorganization of the state apparatus; and this was linked with the ideas of over-estimation of his own personality that reached messianic proportions. He felt his experiences with affective intensity and was unshakeably convinced of the rightness of his actions. At the same time elements of a pathological interpretation of his surroundings were observed, together with morbid suspicion and sharply expressed affective excitability.

Conclusion of the diagnosis of 17 April 1964: 'Grigorenko is suffering from a psychological illness in the form of a paranoid confusion development of the personality, combined with the first signs of cerebral arterio-sclerosis. Non-accountable. Requires compulsory treatment in a special psychiatric hospital.'

Until April 1965 Grigorenko underwent compulsory treatment in the special psychiatric hospital in Leningrad. In the hospital he at first behaved with self-assurance, was obstinate and insistent in his demands, easily became irritated and then remained in a cross and angry state. A tendency was observed to 'get stuck' on experiences [for him] affectively coloured, to interpret facts broadly and to over-estimate his own possibilities; he did not show a critical attitude to his own condition and the situation that had developed. Subsequently he became calmer, and his behaviour more adjusted.

As is pointed out in the hospital report on his discharge from compulsory treatment, there had appeared a critical attitude towards what he had done, towards the situation that had developed, and to his own condition. In the hospital it was established that there were variations of arterial blood pressure between 120/70 and 150/90 mm. of mercury.

On 16 March 1965 the commission came to the conclusion that P. G. Grigorenko had been suffering from a psychological illness in the form of paranoid development of the personality with a background of early cerebral arterio-sclerosis. At that time he was no longer in the sick condition indicated earlier and was in a state of good

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compensation, not requiring in-patient treatment, and showing only signs of sclerosis of the brain.

On discharge from the hospital the patient learnt, as he says, that he had been deprived of his rank and his pension. According to him, he took this very hard, considering that he had been treated unfairly, 'not humanly'. He wrote letters and applications, but without result. He found himself in a difficult position materially, as he could not find work, being in the second category of disablement. In the health centre he managed to be transferred to the third category. On the out-patient card V-755012 of the Lenin District psychiatric health centre there is an entry stating that after his discharge from the special psychiatric hospital Grigorenko visited the health centre for re-examination. At the interview his behaviour was outwardly well-adjusted but at the same time he expressed dissatisfaction with the pension of 20 rubles [per month—about £9] which had been allocated to him, considering that he should be restored to the post which he occupied till he was charged. There were no active psychiatric symptoms; however a certain stickiness and concern with detail was noticed in his thinking, and an insufficiently critical attitude to the situation which had developed.

In 1965 Grigorenko, an invalid of the third category, was visited several times by a nurse from the health centre, in whose notes it is recorded that he did not complain of his health and that he was sociable and welcoming.

On the out-patient card of the health centre there is the answer to an enquiry from the Uzbek KGB about Grigorenko's health, in connexion with his interrogation as a witness. In the answer it is pointed out that for a decision on the question about the possibility of Grigorenko giving testimony as a witness it was essential for him to have a forensic psychiatric examination. For eight months, as the patient relates, he worked as a loader in a shop; he quickly tired, and had difficulty in managing the physical work of loading, but considered he was suffering for his ideas and so was patient.

In 1965 after a whole series of letters and applications to various departments he was allocated a pension of 120 rubles [£50]. However, considering this decision incorrect, he continued to write letters and applications requesting that the decision be re-examined; but he received no answer. As a result of this there grew in him, as he expresses it, irritability and an offended, angry feeling.

All his efforts to find work in his own line ended in failure: everywhere he turned, when certain facts of his life became known, he was refused work. He found himself, in his words, 'in isolation', he 'had been knocked out of his way of life', and then he decided 'to fight against the injustice and lawlessness' which in his opinion exists in the state. In about 1967 he once again started to be involved in questions of 'general politics' and all his energy, he says, he devoted to the struggle for truth. He soon became acquainted with people

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whose views he found acceptable, readily consorted with them, and worked on articles in which he set forth his ideas on various events taking place in the country. At the same time he wrote letters to government leaders in which he 'openly' criticized their actions and expressed his point of view. He was enthusiastic about his work, considering it useful and necessary, and saw in it an 'outlet' for the inactivity which in his opinion the KGB was trying to thrust upon him. In character he remained alert and lively but he became even more hot-tempered, irritable, and emotional. At the same time he considered it necessary to react to any events which he considered unjust, although they had no relation to him. It is precisely by his endeavour to do this that he explains his activity at the time of the trials of certain people charged under Articles 70 and 190–1 of the Russian Criminal Code and the active help he gave to Crimean Tatars trying to return to the Crimea.

The patient's wife and son, with whom a doctor of the Serbsky Institute spoke, stated that Grigorenko had never made any complaints about his health, and alleged that there had never been any strangeness in his behaviour. At the same time they remarked that he was active and purposeful, always uncompromising towards injustice, and that he had friends who, they said, valued and respected him. In addition his wife denied the information which she had communicated to the Serbsky Institute in 1964, when she had pointed out a worsening in his condition beginning in 1961.

On 18 August 1969 Grigorenko underwent an out-patient psychiatric examination in Tashkent under the chairmanship of Professor F. F. Detengof. The commission did not observe any psychopathological disorders, and came to the conclusion that Grigorenko did not reveal any symptoms of mental illness at that time, just as he had not in the period in which he committed the incriminating offences (1965–69). He was sane.

Among the documents of the criminal case are the testimonies of witnesses, including his relatives, in which Grigorenko is described as a man of honour and integrity, well-balanced and friendly; and no eccentricity in his behaviour had been observed. At the same time in other witnesses' testimonies it is pointed out that Grigorenko had 'dictatorial ways', that he talked a great deal and with heat when he was proving his point of view, thrusting it on his interlocutor. Witnesses who saw Grigorenko near the court building on 9–11 October 1968 at the time of the trial of persons charged under Articles 190–1 of the Russian Criminal Code observe that he 'stood out' by his behaviour, that he was active, gave loud voice to his opinions, was abusive, insulted the *druzhinniki* [voluntary police], calling them fascists and Black-Hundreders, that he drew a crowd round him, to which he spoke about himself, shouting that he would fight for democracy and truth. In the period of investigation, as is evident from the documents in the case, when exercising and in his cell, Grigorenko

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would shout in answer to rebukes, insulted the prison staff, was irritable during interrogation, and for a time went on hunger-strike.

During investigation at the Institute the following was observed:

Physical condition . . .

Neurological condition:

Right pupil larger than left; naso-labial skin creases symmetrical. The tongue when protruded deflects very slightly to the left. Lumbar lordosis flattened, flexibility of the spine in the neck, and lumbar regions slightly limited. Right knee jerk less marked than the left. Faintly positive Marinescu symptom on each side. All forms of sensation preserved. Steady in the Romberg position. Wasserman reaction in the blood—negative.

An examination optic fundi showed traces of a partial disturbance of the circulation in the upper branch of the central retinal vein in the right eye.

From the electro-encephalographic investigation: evidence of disturbances in bioelectrical activity of a diffuse nature and of a persistent asymmetrical amplitude through the presence of synchronic alpha-waves and pathological forms of activity, more pronounced on the left, and a lowering of conductivity of the brain structures. Accent of changes in the left cerebral hemisphere.

On the psychological side:

When he entered the Institute and during the first days there, the patient protested at having to undergo the forensic psychiatric examination; was agitated, spoke in a raised voice, declared that sending him to the Institute for diagnosis was an 'arbitrary act', all the more so as the previous out-patient commission had declared him to be mentally fit. Subsequently the patient became calmer, and made contact with the doctor willingly. During an interview he behaves with a sense of his own dignity, willingly gives information about himself, getting stuck on affectively coloured experiences and beginning to talk in a louder tone, his face gradually reddening, his hands beginning to tremble; and he gets into a state of affective excitement.

He relates that in 1964, when he was sent for forensic psychiatric diagnosis, it was unexpected for him and so in the Institute he was in 'a state of shock', was 'wrought up', suspected all the doctors of not having an objective relationship to him, and was sure that the question of his condition had already been decided in accordance with a 'directive from above'. At that time the patient thought that even those around him were, in his words, 'spies'. Now he alleges he can suppose that he was then perhaps in a somewhat unusual state which quickly passed, and when undergoing compulsory treatment he was, he says, already completely fit.

At the same time he affirms that all that he wrote during that period was perfectly correct: he does not, even now, renounce the views which he expressed then. After discharge from the hospital and

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subsequently he also felt quite well, and if it had not been for the unpleasant situation which developed for him, he would, in his opinion, have obtained a post suiting his qualifications and written scientific works. However, the things that happened to him 'pushed' him, in his words, along the path of struggle against injustice and lawlessness. From that time on, all his energy and activity were 'devoted' to the fight for 'truth' and the creation of conditions which would exclude injustice in the life of the community.

He considers his struggle absolutely legitimate, and the path he has entered on to be the only correct one. When attempts are made to dissuade him he becomes angry and ill-tempered and declares to the doctor that the whole of life consists of struggle, that he had foreseen the possibility of arrest, but that that never stopped him, as he could not renounce his ideas. At the present time he considers himself to be mentally fit.

He formally declares in conversation with the doctor that he does not rank himself among outstanding people and alleges that he does not consider his activity to have historical significance; he says that he acted at the behest of conscience and he hopes that his struggle will not be without effect.

But in his letters, which are among the documents of the case, one finds a clear over-estimation of his own activity and of the significance of his personality and reformist ideas, of the rightness of which he is unshakeably convinced.

In addition he distinctly reveals a tendency to write much and at length, and in his writings it can be observed that side by side with disturbances of the critical faculty he has preserved his former knowledge and ability to present, formally, a consistent account of facts. In his wing of the Institute the patient tries to behave calmly, is polite, sociable, with those around him, and reads literary works.

Conclusions

Grigorenko is suffering from a mental illness in the form of a pathological paranoid development of the personality, with the presence of reformist ideas that have appeared in his personality, and with psychopathic features of the character and the first signs of cerebral arterio-sclerosis.

Confirmation of this can be seen in the psychotic condition present in 1964 which arose during an unfavourable situation and which expressed itself in ideas, with strongly affective colouring, of reformism, and of persecution. Subsequently, as is evident from the documents of the criminal case and the data of the present clinical examination, the paranoid condition was not completely overcome. Reformist ideas have taken on an obstinate character and determine the conduct of the patient; in addition the intensity of these ideas is increased in connexion with various external circumstances which have no direct relation to him, and is accompanied by an uncritical attitude to his

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own utterances and acts. The above-mentioned condition of mental illness excludes the possibility of his being responsible for his actions and controlling them; consequently the patient must be considered of unsound mind.

The commission cannot agree with the out-patient forensic psychiatric diagnosis formulated in Tashkent in consequence of the presence in Grigorenko of pathological changes in his psyche recorded in the present report which could not be revealed in the conditions of an out-patient examination because of his outwardly well-adjusted behaviour, his formally coherent utterances, and his retention of his past knowledge and manners—all of which is characteristic of a pathological development of the personality. Because of his mental condition Grigorenko requires compulsory treatment in a special psychiatric hospital, as the paranoid reformist ideas described above are of obstinate character and determine the conduct of the patient.

Corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences G. V. Morozov, Professor V. M. Morozov.

Professor D. R. Lunts;
Senior Scientific worker Z. G. Turova;
Lecturer and Junior Scientific worker M. M. Maltseva.

Report No. 40

The out-patient forensic psychiatric diagnosis of P. G. Grigorenko, 18 August 1969, on the premises of the KGB, in the presence of [police] investigator Beryozovsky

ON 17 April 1964 Grigorenko underwent in-patient forensic psychiatric examination in connexion with the charge against him of offences indictable under Article 70 Part 1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Republic. The commission of the Central Serbsky Scientific Research Institute for Forensic Psychiatry came to the conclusion that he was non-accountable, in that he suffered from a mental illness in the form of a paranoid (confusional [*bredovoi*]) development of the personality combined with the first signs of arterio-sclerosis of the brain. It was ascertained that he had reformist ideas, in particular for the reorganization of the state apparatus, linked with an over-estimation of his own personality, messianic ideas, and elements of paranoid interpretation of particular neutral facts. The patient was unshakeable in his ideas, set them forth with affective intensity and reacted in an uncritical manner to the objections of those conversing with him.

In accordance with decision 004/64 of the Military Collegium of

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the Supreme Court of the USSR and in conformity with Article 2 of the Russian Criminal Code Grigorenko was released from criminal responsibility in relation to Part 1 of Article 70 of the Russian Criminal Code and on the basis of Article 58 of the Criminal Code was sent for compulsory treatment to a psychiatric hospital of special type, which he entered on 14 August 1964.

On 16 March 1965 Grigorenko was examined by an in-patient forensic psychiatric commission of experts at the special psychiatric hospital of the Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order [now renamed Ministry of Internal Affairs] in Leningrad. The commission confirmed the conclusion of the commission of experts of the Serbsky Institute, but pointed out also that at the time of the examination on 16 March 1965 Grigorenko was no longer in a sick condition—'he is in a condition of good compensation, not requiring in-patient treatment, and shows only symptoms of sclerosis of the brain.' The commission therefore considered that a further period in a special psychiatric hospital was unnecessary, and that it was possible to discharge him to be under the observation of his local psycho-neurological health centre.

By decision No. 004/64 of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR compulsory treatment in the psychiatric hospital of special type was terminated as from 17 April 1965. However, in the period 1965–69, while living in Moscow, Grigorenko continued to be systematically engaged in the preparation, duplication, and circulation of documents containing fabrications slandering the Soviet political and social system, in connexion with which he was again called to answer a criminal charge.

From his medical record, the documents of the case, and the testimony of the patient, the following has been established:

He was born into a peasant family, and from his early years took part in various kinds of work in the fields. At school he showed an enquiring mind, was an energetic and apt pupil. When he finished village school he worked as apprentice to a metal worker, took an active part in community life, entered the Komsomol, was enterprising and exacting towards himself, tried to widen his outlook, read political literature, and tried to increase his general knowledge. On finishing workers' high school he studied at the Kharkov Technological Institute. In 1931 he was mobilized into the army and sent to the Military Engineering Academy, from which he graduated in 1934. He was always active, took part in various discussions, fought against 'slackness', and for clarification of certain theoretical questions he applied directly to the Central Committee. He graduated from the Academy of the General Staff. In 1939 he received a slight contusion at the battle of Khalkhin-Gol. During the Great Patriotic War he was at the front. In 1944 he was wounded in the region of the heel and was in hospital. When he returned to the front he was contused, lost consciousness for a short time, but did not remain in hospital. During the war he showed himself to be alert, efficient and capable. In the early years

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of the war he was given a Party reprimand for sharp criticisms about the state of our armed forces.

After the end of the war he worked in the Frunze Military Academy as a senior lecturer. In 1949 he defended his thesis for a master's degree, but his defence was held up because of his criticism of some long-established principles. In 1951 he had shingles, paresis of the facial nerve, and sharp fluctuations in blood pressure were observed. From 1959 he was head of the Department on the Administration of Armed Forces, and prepared his doctor's thesis.

The 20th Congress [1956] caused him to ponder a great deal on the significance of Stalin as a personality and he came to the conclusion that it was not Stalin who was guilty of everything—but the system which produced him. In 1961 he spoke at a Party conference expressing criticisms and his own views. After this speech he was deprived of his mandate and dismissed from his post as head of department. He considered such measures incorrect. He complained to various Party and state institutions. After an examination of his case by a Party commission he decided that the government had departed from 'Leninist principles'. In 1962 he was given the post of head of the operations section of the Army in the [Pacific] Maritime Province. He was not pleased with this appointment, considering it to be unfair. He decided to struggle against the existing order, 'to conduct an explanation of Leninist tenets among the people, and spread Leninist principles'. He began to prepare leaflets and to duplicate them on a typewriter. The leaflets issued from a self-styled 'Union of struggle for the revival of Leninism'. He involved his sons and nephew in the preparation of the leaflets. At this time there appeared headaches, aches in the region of the heart, a suspected myocardial attack, and minor attacks were diagnosed four times. But he remained active, energetic and persistent. In service testimonials among the documents, and in statements by his colleagues, Grigorenko is described positively, as energetic, disciplined, industrious, hard-working; and negatively as hasty-tempered, lacking in restraint, too self-confident, inclined to over-estimate his own knowledge and capabilities. Grigorenko describes himself as a very industrious and disciplined person, he had 'always gone at the behest of the Party to work where it was needed, although sometimes it was very difficult'. In practice, his physical health had always been good. In childhood he had typhus and malaria several times. As an adult he has been to the doctor for simple ailments such as boils, gastritis, radiculitis, and neurasthenic reactions.

In 1961 he was in a sanatorium for 'mild athero-sclerosis of the aorta and coronary vessels and atherosclerotic myocardial sclerosis'.

No significant changes in character or in his physical condition were noticed by either Grigorenko or those around him.

During the investigation and the time he spent in the Serbsky Institute in 1964–65 he protested actively against being sent for diagnosis, showed a tendency to affective reaction, announced a hunger-strike,

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and considered that a 'special regimen' was established in the Institute —artificial conditions to induce 'psychological reactions', and that people affecting his psyche were 'placed near him' on purpose. Subsequently he became calmer, read a great deal, saw his mission to lie in the struggle for the revival of Leninist ideas, for the creation of 'a generation of new revolutionaries'. He considered his work, for the present, to have borne no fruit, but that it was not useless: the struggle was just, and the path he had chosen the only correct one. He was intending to use his trial as a platform for a speech. He was verbose, with difficulty turned his attention to new subjects of discussion; revealed symptoms of weak-heartedness, was inclined to tears, and did not interpret his situation sufficiently critically. In the special hospital his bearing was calm, he was polite and reserved. However, when giving explanations about his case he would begin to get agitated, would argue, become excited, raise his voice, and would become irritable, even angry. When the subject of conversation was changed he easily controlled himself and calmed down. There were no deceptions in the expression of his feelings. His thinking was of an ordinary tempo, without structural disorders, but somewhat inert, with a tendency to become stuck on the same facts and disturbing experiences. He revealed obstinacy, was persistent. In conversation he tried to gain the initiative, to press his point of view on his interlocutor. A tendency to widen the interpretation of facts and a certain incompetence in generalizing from them were noted. He did not acknowledge that he was mentally ill. He continued to think too highly of his own capabilities and possibilities, behaved with self-assurance, was demanding and captious with the staff. Criticism of his own illegal acts was insufficient. He agreed that he had 'behaved foolishly', and 'had caused trouble for his family', but in essence he remained convinced that the political and economic course followed was incorrect. No failures of memory or intellect were observed. Warm relations with his family were maintained. Gradually he learnt to live with the idea that a return to his former post was impossible, as was discharge from the hospital without a reappraisal of his sanity; there appeared a correct critical attitude to his illegal actions, and 'the sacrificial and messianic element disappeared'. He agreed on the possibility of isolated shortcomings [in the Soviet system], on the necessity for patient and preserving work to overcome them. The denial to him of an army pension he considered illegal, but maintained that he would be able to earn some income until the question of his pension was decided. His plans for the future were realistic. After his discharge he refused the [private's] pension [offered him] and worked as a loader till 1967. He strove to prove in practice that 'a communist can behave as well as the deacon in Kuprin's tale *Anathema*', and that he, like the deacon, 'preferred to shift stones rather than forgo his ideals and his human dignity'. Numerous witnesses—Grigorenko's fellow-thinkers—describe him as active, a man of principle, and an educated, highly cultured person. In 1965 Grigo-

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renko began to write letters to the highest Party and Soviet departments, in which he expressed in sharp form his disagreement with the existing order and the direction of policy. He considered there was a departure from Leninist principles.

At the present time the following was established on examination:

On the physical side: he is of tall stature, and sufficiently nourished. Heart-tones muffled; arterial blood pressure—180/90. . . .

Nervous system: pupils uniform, their reaction to light and accommodation lively. Convergence adequate. Face and teeth-ridge symmetrical. Tongue follows central line, soft palate mobile and symmetrical when speaking. No abnormality of movement. Tendon reflexes in upper extremities lively, equal. No Achilles tendon reflex whatever on the right (wound). No pathological reflexes, no disorders of sensation or coordination.

Psychological condition: consciousness clear, correctly orientated. In conversation is perfectly well-adjusted, natural. It is easy to make contact with him. His speech is coherent, purposeful, somewhat pompous. He communicates detailed and consistent information about himself, and in doing so reveals sufficient concentration and memory, a wide and many-sided knowledge of political and social questions, and of questions both of general educational and specialist interest. He declares that all his conscious life he has been interested in the social and political sciences, 'had always been an active political leader and propagandist, had struggled against laxity and lawlessness'. Despite the fact that in the course of his duty he was concerned with technical military disciplines, he considers himself to be better informed on questions relating to the social and political sciences. He describes himself as persevering and active in the attainment of an aim and when 'he comes to some conclusion or other, will not then give it up'.

At the time of the examination he is sufficiently responsive and emotionally alive. To a question about his illegal activities he has an affective reaction, is irritated, becomes red in the face, and in a raised voice tries to prove the rightness of his judgments. Evaluates critically his criminal activity before 1964, when he produced and distributed leaflets and other documents amongst the population. Considers this method of struggle to be incorrect. In the activities relating to the present charge against him he does not see anything illegal, as he conducted them openly, spoke only for himself, and did not undertake any organizational measures. He shows no confusion, no perceptual delusions. He is painfully and sufficiently aware of the situation which has developed for him. He considers himself a mentally fit person, pointing out that he was upset by the fact of the appointment of a forensic psychiatric commission, as what he fears above all is to be declared mentally ill, to be sent to a psychiatric hospital and to have to live among mental patients. Speaking of this, he showed a very lively emotional reaction, started to weep, but was at once embarrassed,

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lowered his head, tried to hide his tears, and asked the members of the commission to excuse his 'weakness'.

During the whole of the conversation he retained his courtesy and correctness of behaviour.

On the basis of data gathered from a study of the documents of the criminal case, from the medical documents attached to it, from observation of Grigorenko in the investigation prison (all documents of his personal case), and also from data obtained by our objective investigation of him, we come to the conclusion:

Grigorenko at the present time shows no symptoms of mental illness, just as he did not show any in the period of the offences incriminating him (from the second half of 1965 to April 1969), when he understood [the nature of] his activities and was capable of directing them.

In what he did he was of sound mind.

(1) Grigorenko's activity had a purposeful character, it concerned concrete events and facts, arose from his personal convictions and in many cases from the same convictions as his fellow-thinkers, and it did not contain sick or hysterical symptoms. All his life Grigorenko has developed correctly from the neuro-psychological point of view, although he has always shown certain original traits of character, such as perseverance in the attainment of a goal, a certain tendency to overestimate his capabilities, and a desire to affirm his own opinion.

At the same time he has revealed good intellectual capabilities, has through steady effort achieved good general development and stature in the sphere of his work and of socio-community life. He had good relationships in collectives, was a leader and an educator. No appreciable break or change in the development of his personality has been observed.

It is not excluded that in 1964 under the influence of the psychologically unfavourable situation, and having certain peculiarities of character, Grigorenko suffered a reactive illness assessed in the Serbsky Institute as 'paranoid development'. Subsequently, as is evident from the conclusion of the forensic psychiatric commission of experts at the Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order psychiatric hospital in Leningrad, Grigorenko was no longer in a sick condition. Subsequent observation of him in the psycho-neurological health centre in Moscow revealed no symptoms of psychological illness in him.

(2) Grigorenko does not require in-patient investigation, as his personal characteristics and psychological condition are amply described in the documents of the case, in data acquired through observation of him in the investigation prison, and also in the data acquired through examination of him as an out-patient.

No doubts concerning Grigorenko's mental health have arisen in the course of the out-patient investigation. In-patient investigation at this time would not increase our understanding of his case, but, on the contrary, taking into consideration his age, his sharply negative attitude

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to residence in psychiatric hospitals, and his heightened sensitivity, it would complicate a diagnosis.

Detengof (Professor), Kagan (chief psychiatrist of the Turkestan Military District), Slavgorodskaya, Smirnova.

Petition[1] of S. B. Kallistratova, Barrister, to the Tashkent City Court in defence of P. G. Grigorenko

PROCEEDING from the deep conviction that Grigorenko is not suffering from a psychological illness and that he is of sound mind, the defence considers it essential that the court should conduct a thorough investigation of this question, and essential that for this purpose the production of additional medical documents should be inisited upon and another (third) examination made.

This petition is based primarily on the fact that in this case there are two diametrically opposed conclusions of the forensic psychiatric teams concerning the psychological condition of Grigorenko.

The first is the conclusion of the out-patient examination conducted under the chairmanship of Professor F. F. Detengof, doctor of medical sciences, Honoured Scientist of the Uzbek SSR, on 18 August 1969, when it was declared that Grigorenko 'shows no symptoms of mental illness at the present time, just as he did not show any in the period of the offences incriminating him (from the second half of 1965 to April 1969) when he understood [the nature of] his activities and was capable of directing them. In what he did he was *of sound mind*.'

The second is the conclusion, on 19 November 1969, of the in-patient forensic psychiatric examination conducted in the Serbsky Institute, when it was declared that 'Grigorenko is suffering from a mental illness in the form of a pathological paranoid development of the personality with the presence of reformist ideas that have appeared in his personality with psychopathic features of the character and the first signs of arterio-sclerosis of the vessels of the brain.' In this conclusion Grigorenko was declared to be of unsound mind and in need of compulsory treatment in a mental hospital of special type.

Such a divergence in conclusions between highly qualified psychiatric

N.B.—These footnotes have been added by the translator.

[1] Request for additional medical documents and for a new forensic psychiatric examination to be held in court at the court sitting on 3 February 1970.

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experts, rarely found in judicial practice, makes it imperative that the most exhaustive medical documentation should be included in the files of this case.

According to Articles 50, 52, and 65 of the Uzbek Criminal Code, the conclusions of both diagnoses are evidence subject to the appraisal of the court, and neither can take precedence over the other. But an appraisal, by persons without specialist knowledge, of two such diametrically opposed conclusions on a purely specialist matter, without the appointment of a third expert opinion, is essentially impossible.

From the documents in the case it is clear that by decisions of the Special Medical Expert Commission of the Lenin District of Moscow Grigorenko was in June 1965 transferred from the second to the third group of disablement (vol. XIX, sheet 18 of the case materials), and then, on 29 December 1965, was altogether removed from the category of disablement (vol. XIX, sheets 20 and 23).[2]

As long ago as 6 August 1969, Grigorenko submitted a petition (vol. XIX, sheet 165) for the documents of the Special Medical Commission of the Lenin District to be obtained and included in his file.[3] A petition was also presented by the defence at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. However, these petitions were not granted, on the grounds that the history of Grigorenko's illness from the neuropsychiatric health centre was included in the documents of the case. But the Special Medical Commission and the health centre are two independent organizations, and their documents are not interchangeable. In the presence of such basic divergences in the conclusions of expert psychiatrists the inclusion in the file of the documents of such an authoritative organization as the Special Medical Commission, and their appraisal, are absolutely essential.

The diagnosis of the first [Tashkent] commission was refuted by the in-patient [Serbsky] commission on the grounds that the facts could only be discovered through in-patient clinical observation. However, the precise nature of these 'facts' is not indicated in the report of the in-patient commission. In view of this, the defence considers it absolutely essential to obtain and add to the file the *authentic history of Grigorenko's illness* during the whole of his stay in the Serbsky Institute, from October to November 1969.

Besides this, during his interview with the defence, Grigorenko maintained that when he was in the Serbsky Institute he wrote a statement, addressed to Professor Lunts, about his attitude to his activities before his arrest and about his plans for the future. This statement is of course highly significant for determining the question of Grigorenko's mental condition and must also be included in the documents of the case.

[2] According to the written statement of Zinaida M. Grigorenko of 23 January 1968 Grigorenko 'was discharged from hospital as an invalid of the second group' on 29 April 1965, and 'in December 1965 by a decision of the Special Medical Expert Commission of No. 1 Health Centre of the Lenin District her husband was declared mentally fit and taken off the register'.

[3] See his prison diary, *Possev*, No. 4 (1970).

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In consequence of the above, the defence must make the following requests:

(a) that all the 1965 documents concerning Grigorenko be obtained from the Special Medical Commission of the Lenin District of Moscow and included in the file of his case;
(b) that the whole authentic [history of] Grigorenko's illness for October–November 1969 be obtained from the Serbsky Institute and included in the file of his case; and
(c) that the letter written by Grigorenko to Professor D. R. Lunts during his period of in-patient examination be obtained and included in the file of his case.

The diagnostic report of the in-patient commission of 19 November 1969 suffers from defects which give grounds for considering the view of nonaccountability to be unfounded:

1. *There is no precise diagnosis of mental illness.*

In the international classification of mental diseases, recognized by the USSR, there is No. 297: 'paranoia'. However, the in-patient commission did not make this diagnosis of Grigorenko, but spoke only of a paranoid development of the personality with psychopathic features of the character, i.e. of one of the forms of psychopathy.

Psychopathy, according to a whole series of authors, amongst them the most eminent of Soviet psychiatrists, Gannushkin, is not one of the mental diseases.

In V. M. Banshchikov[4] and T. A. Nevzorova's book *Psychiatry* (published by *Medicine*, Moscow, 1969), it is stated 'Psychopathy should be looked upon as a pathological variant of the formation of the personality, and not as a mental illness. Hence it follows that psychopaths are not ill, but psychopathic features of the character are formed during the life process' (p. 286).

In the textbook *Forensic Psychiatry*, written by a group at the Serbsky Institute, under the editorship of Professors G. V. Morozov[5] and Ya. M. Kalashnikov (published by 'Judicial Literature', Moscow, 1967) it is stated: 'Psychopathy should be distinguished not only from mental illnesses, but from the individual variants of character that are usually met' (p. 348). And further: 'The forensic psychiatric appraisal of types of psychopathy is determined, as is well known, by the fact that psychopathy is not the result of a progressive illness which changes the personality. Psychopaths are not devoid of the capacity to appraise

[4] Vassili Mikhailovich Banshchikov, doctor of medical sciences, Director of the Russian Ministry of Health Psychiatric Research Institute, Professor of Psychiatry at the First (Sechenov) Medical Institute, Moscow. See *The Medical Worker*, 15 January 1960, p. 6. The book *Psychiatry* is unobtainable.

[5] G. V. Morozov, the Director of the Serbsky Institute. In 1968, in Milan, he took part in the work of the first International Congress on higher neural functions: see 'In the Praesidium of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences', *USSR AMS Messenger*, No. 5 (1970).

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correctly the real conditions surrounding them and to direct their own actions, as they do not have those changes in the psyche which mentally sick people have' (p. 362).

And so contemporary psychiatry does not consider psychopathy to be a mental illness, nor psychopaths to be mentally ill. Only in isolated cases, when there are deep psychopathic changes in the personality, can psychopathy be equated with mental illness. In this connexion it is stated in the work *Psychiatry* cited above: 'Psychopaths, as they are not mentally ill, are, in the majority of cases, declared of sound mind. Sometimes the psychopathic changes in the personality are so deep that they exclude the possibility of a person understanding his actions and directing them. In such cases the patients are declared of unsound mind' (p. 292).

In the textbook *Forensic Psychiatry* quoted above, it is written: '. . . Psychopaths are, in most cases, declared of sound mind and are subject to the usual forms of punishment. There are exceptions. In certain cases the changes in the character of the psychopathic personality are so deep that in fact the condition of psychopathy can be equated with a condition of mental illness and the psychopath can be considered of unsound mind' (p. 363).

In the report of the in-patient commission there is no information about precisely what changes in the personality give grounds for equating the condition of Grigorenko with mental illness. There is no information, either, concerning the period to which the experts attribute the aggravation [of his condition] which gives them grounds for concluding that the confinement of Grigorenko to a special psychiatric hospital is necessary, nor concerning the way this aggravation manifests itself.

2. *The statement of the forensic psychiatric diagnosis of 19 November contains a number of inaccuracies, distortions, and arbitrary assessments.*

(a) In the anamnestic section of the Serbsky Institute statement it is stated that the examinee grew up as 'a weak, sickly child', that 'in character he was . . . stubborn', that during his period of study in institutions of higher education 'he did not like contradiction, was easily irritated', that while serving in the [Pacific] Maritime Military District 'he suffered from extreme conceit and enjoyed no authority.' Such information is absent from the diagnostic report of the out-patient psychiatric commission, and absent from the other documents in the case, although both expert forensic psychiatric commissions certainly had at their disposal the same documents.

(b) In the anamnestic section, the description of the condition of the examinee (when he was under the observation of the health centre of the Lenin District of Moscow), based on the out-patient case-notes, states: 'There were no active psychopathological symptoms; however a certain stickiness and concern with detail was noticed in his thinking,

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and an insufficiently critical attitude to the situation which had developed.'

Such a manner of describing an examinee's condition is inadmissible, for 'stickiness' and so on are not psychotic phenomena, and therefore the use of these terms, with the help of the expression 'however' after the absence of psychotic symptoms has been mentioned, is not legitimate.

Besides this, the notes on the out-patient card are themselves inaccurately quoted: in the note for 27 October 1965 on the health centre card it is stated: 'He has a critical attitude to his former activities.' Thus, in contradiction to the statement in the [Serbsky] diagnostic report, the retention of the examinee's critical faculty is unambiguously emphasized.

On the out-patient card (note of 29 April 1965) there is a mention of 'stickiness' and 'concern with detail'. However, at the same time the words 'a little' are added, bearing witness to the fact that the health centre doctors did not find these symptoms pronounced.

In the anamnestic part of the statement of 19 November 1969 this mitigating expression is omitted.

(c) In the account of the same period, 1965–69, it is stated in the report of 19 November 1969 that, according to what the examinee said, he put up with physical deprivations, considering that he was 'suffering for his ideas' and that after his requests had been refused there grew in him 'irritability and an offended, angry feeling'. Neither in the documents of the case, nor in the data of the medical documents is there any information of this kind.

(d) In setting forth information taken from the words of the examinee's wife, the report of 19 November 1969 prefaces her statement that she had not noticed any strangeness in her husband's behaviour with the word 'alleged', which speaks only of the subjective doubts of the examining psychiatrists—although it is not indicated on what they were based. The inclusion of such expressions of judgment in the purely reportive part of the diagnostic statement of the forensic psychiatric commission is absolutely inadmissible.

(e) In setting forth other material relating to the case the commission's report of 19 November 1969 concludes categorically: 'he had dictatorial ways', 'he talked a great deal and with heat, proving his point of view and thrusting it upon his interlocutor'.

When quoting the testimony of the witnesses, it was omitted that the reference to 'dictatorial ways' applied not to his behaviour in everyday life, but only to his manner of conducting an argument.

(f) Referring to the testimony of unnamed witnesses who saw the examinee once outside a Moscow court,[6] the commission quotes: 'He stood out by his behaviour, was active, . . . drew a crowd around him . . . shouting that he would fight for democracy and truth.'

Evidently the witnesses meant are Nikolayev and Zhelokhovsky[7]

[6] i.e. 9 October 1968, on the first day of the trial of Pavel Litvinov and others.
[7] No information is available on these persons.

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(vol. XVIII, sheets 129 and 218) who testified to the active behaviour of Grigorenko.

However, their testimony bears witness to the singleness of purpose in Grigorenko's activity. The witness Nikolayev testified frankly: 'In my view Grigorenko is a healthy person. I did not notice any psychological deviations in him. He quoted accurately and fluently from Lenin for every fact' (vol. XVIII, sheet 129).

(g) In the in-patient report it is stated, without any commentary, that when exercising and in his cell during the period of investigation Grigorenko shouted, insulted the prison staff, was irritable during interrogation, and for a certain period refused food.

These references contain unjustified generalizations. In the documents of the case only two instances of Grigorenko's infringing the regulations in the investigation cell are noted. From the explanations of Grigorenko (vol. XVIII, sheet 77) it is evident that his behaviour in these instances was of a purposeful character and was an adequate reaction to the situation which had developed.

On the 'irritability' of Grigorenko during interrogation there is no information whatever in the case-papers. From the statement of Grigorenko in vol. XVIII, on sheets 64, 74, 79, and 87, it is evident that his 'refusal to take food', which occurred in June 1969, was not a sign of psychological illness, but a conscious, motivated act of will which is called 'declaration of hunger-strike'.[8]

(h) In the diagnostic report of 19 November 1969, in the passage describing the mental condition of the examinee, the account of Grigorenko's behaviour and utterances in the Institute is interrupted on page 7 of the report by an analysis of his condition and the use of the terms 'disturbances of the critical faculty' and 'reformist ideas', the content of which are not revealed, and of which no concrete, specific examples are given. Reference to letters among the documents in the case cannot be considered convincing, as the sheets are not mentioned, and it is not clear which letters are alluded to.

In this way the rules for writing forensic psychiatric diagnostic reports are broken, as inferences should follow the description of a mental condition and not be interspersed in it, and should certainly not anticipate it.

In this connexion, in the manual *Forensic Psychiatry*, edited by G. V. Morozov (Moscow, 1966[9]) it is stated: 'One should consider unconvincing any psychiatric diagnostic report in which the utterances and behaviour of the examinee are not given in the concrete form of clinical observation, but in terms of psychiatric assessment' (p. 23). Also: 'The examining psychiatrists, when stating the presence of such

[8] i.e. from 13 to 27 June 1969.

[9] The manual in its 1966 edition is unobtainable; in the 1967 edition, edited by G. V. Morozov and Ya. M. Kalashnik, the same idea is expressed as follows: 'The report of a psychiatric examination, in which the utterances and behaviour of the examinee are given in terms of psychiatric value judgments . . . does not carry conviction.'

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and such psychopathological deviations, must indicate in what way they are concretely expressed' (ibid.).

(i) In the same part of the report (the description of the mental condition of the examinee) it is said that he 'tries to behave calmly', although no examples are given showing that the calm behaviour of the examinee was intentional, or that he had at the same time other aims as well. Thus an impermissible psychological interpretation of the clinical picture has been given—for this unsubstantiated assertion of the examining psychiatrists is simply a logical outcome, without regard to facts, of the opinion already expressed by them (in violation of existing rules) that the examinee is mentally ill.

At the same time Professor Lunts in his monograph *The Problem of Accountability in the Theory and Practice of Forensic Psychiatry* (Moscow, 1966[10]) points out: 'Arbitrary psychological constructions during the analysis of pathological disorders can lead, in certain cases, to the under-estimation of the seriousness of unhealthy changes, and, in others, to an excessive over-estimation of them' (p. 137).

The above exposition shows irrefutably that in the report of the forensic psychiatric in-patient examination at the Serbsky Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Psychiatry there has been arbitrary treatment by the examining psychiatrists of the data in the medical documentation and of the [other] documents in the case; and that the rules for drawing up a report of an examination have been violated.

All this to a significant extent deprives the statement of the objective character required for legal proof.

3. *The diagnostic conclusion of the in-patient psychiatric commission is clinically unsubstantiated*

(a) The presence in the examinee of a paranoid development of the personality is not proved. According to the findings of contemporary psychiatry, a paranoid condition is expressed by paranoid (confusional) ideas.

'The paranoid syndrome is expressed entirely in confusional ideas of a nervous kind' (O. V. Kerbikov,[11] M. V. Korkina, R. A. Nadzharov, A. V. Snezhnevsky—*Psychiatry*, Moscow, 1969, p. 96[12]).

[10] Published by the publishers of *Medicine*, 236 pages long. The book is unobtainable.

[11] Oleg Vassilyevich Kerbikov—from 1960 corresponding member of USSR Academy of Medical Sciences [AMS] ('The Medical Worker', 2 February 1960, p. 1); from 1962 member of the USSR AMS and member of the Presidium of the AMS (ibid. 9 February 1962, p. 1); from 1963 chief academic secretary, AMS ('Medical Gazette', 12 February 1963, p. 2). In 1957 deputy to the Moscow City Council ('Vechernyaya Moskva', 5 March 1957, p. 2), scientific worker of the Serbsky Institute. Died 1966 or 1967: *Forensic Psychiatry*, edited by G. V. Morozov and Ya. M. Kalashnik (Moscow, 1967), p. 2.

M. V. Korkina: it has not been possible to check this name.

R. A. Nadzharov: author of the article 'Schizophrenia', *Korsakov Journal of Neuropathology and Psychiatry*, vol. 67, No. 11 (1967), pp. 1722–8.

Andrei Vladimirovich Snezhnevsky, born 1904, professor, from 1949 doctor of

[12] For footnote, see p. 157.

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Consequently, the psychiatric experts ought, first and foremost, to have shown the presence in the examinee of confusional ideas. However, in the report of 19 November 1969 this question is avoided completely.

There is mention of 'reformist ideas', but it is not explained precisely what ideas are meant: ordinary ones, i.e. those that are the result of the thinking processes of a normal psyche, ones of exaggerated self-importance, or confusional ones.

Ordinary ideas are not of course a symptom of mental illness; where ideas of exaggerated self-importance are present, persons charged with criminal offences are usually declared accountable. The following is characteristic of confusional ideas: (1) unshakeable conviction; the strength of irrefutable truth, in spite of contradiction with reality—with the impossibility of correction; (2) 'mistaken basis' (*Psychiatry*, O. V. Kerbikov and others, p. 45).

In the description of his psychological condition when the examining psychiatrists recount the examinee's statements, they do not evaluate them, do not establish their correspondence or lack of correspondence with reality, nor their bases; they limit themselves to saying that they did not succeed in persuading the examinee of the incorrectness of his judgments. At the same time, in contrast to the report of the in-patient examination, the members of the out-patient forensic psychiatric commission of 18 August declare frankly that Grigorenko's utterances are not of a sick confusional kind, but express convictions belonging not only to him, but to a number of people.

Professor A. V. Snezhnevsky writes in the collective manual of guidance on psychiatry (*Psychiatry*, cited above—by O. V. Kerbikov and others) on page 46: 'Convictions not corresponding to reality, together with an absolute belief in their trustworthiness, are also met in healthy people. Mistakes in cognition are a daily occurrence, and are often defended with unshakeable obstinacy and substantiated with extraordinary conviction; and nevertheless, they cannot be called confusional. To establish confusion it is essential not only to ascertain the presence of judgments not corresponding to reality, but also the presence of the pathological basis giving rise to them and making for "the insight of madness" and "the naiveté of genius".' [He continues:] 'The confusional judgments of the mentally ill always relate to themselves and are developed from ideas which also relate to themselves. In this way they differ from the mistakes of the healthy, which are concerned with various objective circumstances.'

In the report of 19 November 1969 the examining psychiatrists have

medical sciences, from 1962 member of the USSR AMS and Director of the Institute of Psychiatry of USSR AMS; from 1966 academic secretary of the department of clinical medicine of the AMS; in 1968 elected member of the British Royal Medico-Psychological Association (see 'In the Presidium of the USSR AMS', *USSR AMS Messenger*, No. 5 (1970)). For his biography see *Portraits of Prominent USSR Personalities* (1968), p. 591.

[12] i.e. the book mentioned earlier edited by Banshchikov and Nevzorova; see note 4.

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completely omitted to make the analysis which is of decisive importance: whether it is possible to call Grigorenko's judgments confusional; and their conclusion on this matter is arrived at without any proof whatsoever. The grounds given for the correctness of the conclusions reached by the in-patient psychiatric commission in its report of 19 November 1969 are also unconvincing.

As a first argument a thesis is put forward about 'the psychotic condition suffered in 1964 expressing itself in ideas of reformism, of persecution, and of relationship, all with strongly affective colouring'.

At the same time in the report of the out-patient forensic psychiatric examination of 18 August 1969, the supposition is expressed that—in the light of the anamnestic data, documentarily confirmed by the card recording the out-patient observation of the Lenin district neuropsychiatric health centre—in 1964 Grigorenko suffered a reactive illness, that is, a passing disorder in mental activity. In the report of the in-patient examination these suppositions are completely ignored and are not even given consideration.

As a second argument of the in-patient commission the unqualified assumption is made that 'the psychotic condition was subsequently not overcome', it 'periodically became aggravated'. However, in the data contained in the medical documentation, if examined objectively, there are no indications whatever of this; and the [other] documents in the case only testify to Grigorenko's having retained convictions, the sick character of which is not proved by the examining psychiatrists.

And, finally, one finds very strange the sentence in the report about the 'aggravation' of the examinee's condition being brought about by 'various external circumstances which have no direct relation to him': for the task of a forensic psychiatric commission is only to establish symptoms of illness of one sort or another in a given person, and to estimate how pronounced they are; it is in no way to put limits to the legitimate range of personal interests of an examinee.

All of the above proves that the report of the forensic psychiatric examination of 19 November 1969 does not substantiate the presence in the examinee of a paranoid (confusional) development of the personality.

In connexion with such a situation it is stated in the manual of forensic psychiatry already quoted (editor G. V. Morozov): 'Deductions in a report must follow from the data of the psychiatric investigation and the analysis of the documents in the criminal case, they must agree with other evidence in the case, and must be categorical (affirmative or negative). Contradictory, unclear and simply incorrect formulations of a conclusion, which do not arise from the documents of the case and the data produced by the investigation of the examinee, complicate the work of justice and can be a source of judicial error' (p. 24).[13]

[13] In the 1967 edition of Morozov and Kalashnik the same idea is expressed thus: 'Deductions must follow from the data of the investigation and the analysis of the documents of the criminal case and agree with other evidence in the case. . . .' '. . . Contradictory, confused, ambiguous and incorrect formulations of a

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(b) The presence of the psychopathic features of the character in the examinee is not proved. From Grigorenko's anamnesis, recorded in the report of the in-patient diagnosis, it is evident that from childhood and throughout his life, including service for 30 years in posts of command in the Soviet Army, Grigorenko grew up, developed, studied and worked normally, and revealed no kind of deviation or peculiarity of character testifying to the development of psychopathic features of the character.

Grigorenko has always been well adapted to his environment and has always reacted adequately to a situation. In the opinion of dozens of witnesses, including his relatives, who have known Grigorenko at all periods in his life, he has never shown any oddities of character, let alone signs of mental illness.

Thus we see that the diagnosis of the in-patient forensic psychiatric commission finds no confirmation—either in the report of 19 November 1969, or in the documents of the case.

In other words—the *medical criterion of non-accountability* (the presence of mental illness) *in the examinee has not been established by the commission.*

Therefore the psychological (legal) criterion of non-accountability also (which ' excludes the possibility of [the examinee] being responsible for his actions and controlling them '), as presented in the report of 19 November 1969, is likewise devoid of any meaning; for ' both criteria —the medical and the legal—must exist as an indissoluble entity.' (D. R. Lunts, in the work quoted above, p. 63).

All this taken together gives absolute grounds for affirming that the conclusion of the in-patient examining commission on the *non-accountability* of the examinee is *mistaken.*

Everything set out above gives the defence grounds for urgently requesting that a third forensic psychiatric commission be appointed in this case, to decide the question of the mental health and accountability of P. G. Grigorenko.

Taking into consideration the fact that Grigorenko has already, while in custody, been for a long time under the observation of psychiatrists, and that in the documents of the case there is enough data from the investigation of Grigorenko; and taking into consideration also the opinion of the out-patient commission that Grigorenko does not require in-patient investigation, as his personal characteristics and psychological condition are amply described in the documents of the case, in data acquired through observation of him in the investigation prison, and

conclusion, which do not arise from the documents of the case and the data produced by investigation of the examinee, do not help the cause of justice but complicate its work and can be a source of judicial error.'

' On the question of whether the conclusion of the expert should be categorical (affirmative or negative), or whether it may also be conjectural, there are different points of view.'

' The majority of lawyers and experts consider that the conclusion of the experts should be only categorical—affirmative or negative ' (pp. 47–48).

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also in the data acquired through investigation of him as an out-patient ('in-patient investigation at this time would not increase our understanding of the case, but, on the contrary, taking into consideration his age, his sharply negative attitude to residence in psychiatric hospitals and his heightened sensitivity—it would complicate a diagnosis' (vol. XX, sheet 174)).

On the basis of the above I request the court to appoint a third qualified commission to give an out-patient examination.

In accordance with Article 144 of the Uzbek Criminal Code I request that the following experts be included in the commission:

1. Professor N. N. Timofeyev,[14] doctor of medical sciences, Major-General in the Army Medical Service and Chief Psychiatrist of the Soviet Army.
2. E. Ya. Shternberg,[15] doctor of medical sciences, Professor of the Institute of Psychiatry of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences.
3. L. L. Rokhlin,[16] Honoured Scientific Worker, Professor of the Institute of Psychiatry of the Ministry of Health.

Tashkent, 2 February 1970.

[14] Nikolai Nikolayevich Timofeyev, b. 1898; 1942–47 Chief Psychiatrist of the Soviet Army; 1947–54 deputy head, and 1954–56 head, of the Department of Psychiatry, Leningrad Medical Military Academy; from 1956 deputy director of scientific work, Leningrad Bekhterev Psychoneurological Scientific Research Institute; author of about 10 works; a recent article 'Military psychiatry and traumas of the brain', *Korsakov Journal of Neuropathology and Psychiatry*, Vol. 67, No. 11 (1967), pp. 16–80–2). For his biography see *Portraits of Prominent USSR Personalities*, p. 628.

[15] Probably the author of the booklet *Mental Illness Clinics for Middle-aged and Elderly Persons* (Kiev, Institute of Gerontology, 1965), 13 pp.

[16] Leon Lazarevich Rokhlin, b. 1903; from 1932 professor, from 1946 doctor of medical sciences, from 1957 deputy director of scientific work at the Institute of Psychiatry of the Russian Ministry of Health; author of more than 150 works, co-editor with A. V. Snezhnevsky of the book *Schizophrenia* (Moscow, 1965), vol. 2 (Works of the Fourth All-Union Congress of Neurologists and Psychiatrists . . .). For his biography see *Portraits of Prominent USSR Personalities*, p. 521.

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The Prison Mental Hospitals[1]

> 'It is time to think clearly: the incarceration of free-thinking healthy people in madhouses is *spiritual murder*, it is a variation of the *gas chamber*, but even more cruel: the torture of the people being killed is more malicious and more prolonged. Like the gas chambers these crimes will *never* be forgotten, and all those involved in them will be condemned for all time, during their life and after their death'.
>
> Alexander Solzhenitsyn, June 1970

About the Special Psychiatric Hospitals

P. G. Grigorenko

THE idea of special psychiatric hospitals is not in itself uncommendable, but as for the specific way this idea is implemented in our country—there is nothing more criminal or inhuman.

The point is that the method of dealing with objectionable persons by judging them insane and confining them to psychiatric hospitals for lengthy periods or even for their whole life is as old as the very idea of the 'madman'. Even taking this into account, progressive people have long fought to institute controls concerning the treatment of psychiatric patients. These people have also fought so that people who have committed crimes while of unsound mind should not be subject to criminal punishment, but sent for psychiatric treatment. The distinguished Russian psychiatrists Bekhterev and Serbsky fought for this also. Soviet legislation went far towards meeting the demands of progressive people. But the trouble is that the whole thing has since been completely removed from public scrutiny and placed under the control of a specially chosen apparatus. Doctors for psychiatric hospitals are appointed by special selection processes in which their medical qualifications are of secondary importance and other qualities have precedence, the main one being the ability to knuckle under and suppress their medical 'ego'.

We must start our discussion by asking whether the people who find their way into the special hospitals are always real mental patients,

[1] Reproduced from the forthcoming book by Peter Reddaway, *Uncensored Russia, the Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union* (Jonathan Cape: February 1972).

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or whether the pre-requisites for repressive injustice are built into the system. A person is sent to the notorious Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry on the order of an investigator. This institute nominally comes under the Soviet Ministry of Health, but I myself, on more than once occasion, have seen Professor Lunts, the head of the department diagnosing me, arrive at work in the uniform of a KGB colonel. True, he always came into the department in his white coat. I have also seen other doctors of this institute in KGB uniform. But the exact relation between the KGB men and the Ministry of Health I have not managed to ascertain. People say that only one department is under KGB control—the one which diagnoses political cases. I am inclined to think that the influence of the KGB—and it is a decisive influence—extends over the whole of the institute's work. But if even what people say is true the question arises: can the psychiatric diagnosis of political cases be objective if both the KGB investigators and the medical experts are subordinate to one and the same person, and, what is more, are bound by military-style discipline?

I will recount what I have seen myself. I arrived in the second (political) department of the Serbsky Institute on 12 March 1964. I had not previously even heard of such a method of repression existing in our time as the declaration of a healthy man to be of unsound mind; I was unaware that this 'Chaadayevan'[2] system existed in our country. I realized it only when I myself was presented with a committal order for a psychiatric investigation.

Having read the order, I looked at the investigator and asked: 'Well, so you've found a way out of your dilemma, have you?' The investigator, greatly embarrassed, started assuring me that the investigation would continue after the medical examination, and a case would be drawn up. I felt there would be no more investigation, and that a mental hospital was my lot for the rest of my life.

In the department I was taken to there were 11 people. From what I imagined the examination to be like I tried to predict what diagnosis awaited each of them. Even without medical training it was clear that the only one of us who was mentally abnormal was Tolya Edamenko, but he, according to my prediction, would end up in an ordinary camp. The 'loony-bin', in my opinion, awaited three of us: myself, Pavel Borovik (an accountant from Kaliningrad) and Denis Grigorev (an electrician from Volgograd). The investigation against all three of us had yielded nothing and there was no foreseeable chance of finding anything.

All the others ought, in my opinion, to be found normal, although some of them were acting the idiot very skilfully, feigning pathological conditions. I had doubts about one, Yury Grimm, a Moscow crane-driver who had circulated leaflets bearing a caricature of Khrushchev.

[2] The noted Russian thinker Pyotr Chaadayev (1793–1856) was officially declared to be mad after the publication in 1836 of an essay in which he saw the only salvation for Russia's backwardness in the traditions of Western Europe and of the Roman Catholic Church. He was not, however, put in a mental hospital.

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To him I said: 'If you recant, it'll be a loony-bin for you, if you don't —a camp.' (An investigator was visiting him several times a week, trying to persuade him to recant and promising him all sorts of wonderful things.) Yury did 'recant' and got three years in a strict-regime camp.

Grimm's case testifies in the best possible way to the fact that the Serbsky Institute is simply a subordinate organ of the investigation authorities. Both the investigator and the doctor spoke to Yury about one thing only—recanting. Moreover the doctor was a worse bully than the investigator, painting a vivid picture of how Grimm would be shut away for ever among 'loonies' if he did not recant.

In Leningrad too I met people who had landed in a psychiatric hospital without being mentally ill. I was especially saddened by the tragic case of engineer Pyotr Alekseyevich Lysak. Because he had spoken at a student meeting against the expulsion for political reasons of a number of students, he had landed in a psychiatric hospital and, at the time of my arrival, had already been there for seven years. Bitter anger at this wild injustice, at his ruined life, had permeated his being, and he would write complaints daily, which, naturally, never reached their destination, but found their way into his hospital file and were used as an excuse for further 'treatment' (people who do not admit their illness are not usually discharged from special psychiatric hospitals). I tried to drum this truth into his head. During one such conversation, I said in irritation: 'Your reasoning is so unreal that I'm beginning to doubt your normality.' He stopped all of a sudden, looked at me with an expression I shall remember to the day of my death, and asked in a barely audible voice and a tone of bitter reproach: 'Do you really think that a man can spend seven years in here and still remain normal?'

Here is the very essence of the inhuman system of forcible treatment. The whole horror of the position of a healthy man who finds himself in conditions like these lies in the fact that he himself begins to realize that in time he will become like those who surround him.

My military training, and maybe the iron constitution which my parents passed on to me, enabled me to learn quickly to insulate myself from my surroundings, and my internment in hospital passed without doing any particular harm to my psyche. The one thing I cannot forget, the thing that sometimes wakes me up at night, is a wild nocturnal cry mixed with the hollow sound of shattered glass. From that I could not insulate myself. Evidently during sleep one's nerves have no defence mechanism against such stimuli. But I can imagine what a man must go through who is receptive to everything around him through his highly strung nervous system, and whose defence mechanisms are not as well developed as mine.

Even if cases of people finding their way into these establishments were few and far between, even then every such case ought to be subject to the most thorough investigation with maximum publicity.

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But these cases are not accidents; they occur systematically. Moreover, the system is widely practised. I have said that within as little as one month, while I was being diagnosed, the Serbsky Institute promoted three healthy people to the ranks of madness and sent one undoubtedly abnormal man to a camp. The latter man also belongs to a system. I only realized this after reading A. Marchenko's book *My Testimony*. Mentally sick people are necessary in the camps in order to make life even more unbearable for the healthy.

In the Leningrad Special Hospital I met a young man who was interesting to talk to. He had landed up there in the following way: he had been arrested for petty theft and would possibly have been released without being brought to trial if it had not suddenly occurred to the investigator that with this man's help he could round off a certain 'dead' case—a murder case which had never been cleared up. They did not require very much of the arrested man: he was to testify that at the moment when the murder was committed, one of his friends had been in the village where it took place. The man knew that this was untrue and refused to testify. The investigator then said: 'Aha, so you don't want to assist the investigation? . . . Well then, I'll lock you up in a place where you'll remember me for the rest of your life.' And he sent him for a psychiatric examination. The diagnosis team declared him to be of unsound mind. The young man was lucky. In the hospital his doctor happened to be an honest man, who was able to get the findings of the diagnosis team annulled. But it took him *six years* to do it. As a rule it is impossible to have a diagnosis annulled, because the diagnosis is given on many occasions by repeated medical examinations, and can only be revoked with the consent of the doctor who gave the initial diagnosis.

For a healthy man, the atmosphere which surrounds him in a mental hospital is terrible, and no less terrible are his complete lack of rights and his helplessness. The 'patient' in a special psychiatric hospital does not even enjoy the miserable rights of the camp prisoner. He has no human rights at all. You can do anything you like to him, and no one will object. No one will defend him, and none of his complaints will ever reach the outside world. His only remaining hope is an honest doctor.

But I assert that *a system in which the only hope is someone's honesty is absolutely worthless.*

The atmosphere of the madhouse, the complete lack of rights and the absence of any real possibility of regaining one's freedom—these are the terrifying facts which everyone who lands in a special psychiatric hospital has to face.

Radical changes must be fought for in the diagnosis system and the conditions in which patients are kept in special psychiatric hospitals; the public must be given the right to exercise some real control over the conditions of confinement and the treatment of patients in these establishments.

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Several Stalins

Robert C. Tucker

THE best-known Stalin biographies were produced while their subject was still alive and able to control the sources of information about, *inter alia,* himself. Souvarine's *Stalin* was completed in the late 1930s. Trotsky's was still unfinished when the assassin sent by Stalin struck him down in 1940. Deutscher's came out in 1949 and was only enlarged by a chapter, not revised, in the new edition published in 1966. The classic Stalin biographies, along with many others, were written without benefit of the mass of new evidence now at our disposal.

Some of the new material, such as Milovan Djilas' revealing *Conversations with Stalin,* has come from sources outside of Russia. But the great bulk is Soviet in origin and a product of the Khrushchev period's experiments in 'de-Stalinization'. As a Soviet politician desirous of reforming the Stalinist system and yet opposed by conservatives to whom such reform politics spelled danger, Khrushchev found it necessary to legitimate his position and clear a way for action by impugning certain events of the Stalinist past, most notably the Great Purge of the 1930s. To accomplish this object, he had to set some historical facts on the record, as he did in the report to a closed session of the 20th Party Congress in 1956—a report that did not remain secret for long. This opening of the floodgates for hitherto unknown or suppressed information on Stalin and the Stalin years may or may not have been Nikita Khrushchev's main service to Soviet Russia, but it unquestionably was a great service to Russian studies.

The flow continued in many forms. Other, public speeches by Khrushchev and some of his associates, contributed further information useful to the Stalin biographer, as did scholarly writings by historians like Burdzhalov and Nekrich, protocols of Party meetings in 1917, previously unpublished writings of Lenin, diaries of his secretaries, press articles on posthumously rehabilitated purge victims, and memoirs by Soviet writers, officials, military officers and others. This new material, taken in its entirety, still leaves a great many important questions about Stalin unanswered or only partially answered. Like any historical testimony, it must be used with critical caution. But all this being said, the fact is that the Stalin biographer is far less in the dark now than 20 years ago. He is much better informed about Stalin as a personality and about various key points in Stalin's political life, such as 1917, the Civil War, the last months of Lenin, the collectivization drive, the Great Purge, and the second world war. Even on the most carefully guarded subject of all—Stalin's role in Soviet foreign policy—we have at least somewhat more information than before.

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The regime of Khrushchev's successors has been less kind to Russian studies. Its gradual reinstatement of Stalin in a place of honour in Soviet history has necessitated and been accompanied by a new censorship of historical facts and testimony at variance with this effort. Meanwhile, however, a vital new source of historical information has opened up through *samizdat*—the circulation of uncensored writings in typescript—and this source has yielded much material of interest to the Stalin biographer. Some notable examples are: a verbatim report of a critical discussion by rehabilitated Old Bolsheviks of a draft volume of the official Party history dealing with the revolutionary period; the memoirs of Evgenia Ginzburg and Galina Serebriakova, two purge victims who survived and wrote about it; Zhores A. Medvedev's story of what happened to Soviet genetics in the Stalin period and after,[1] and Nadezhda Mandelstam's magnificent account of the road to Calvary on which she and her husband embarked in 1934 after word of his unpublished (and unflattering) 16-line poem about Stalin reached Stalin.[2] Svetlana Alliluyeva's *Twenty Letters to a Friend*, originally written in 1963 'for the drawer', may be viewed as a sort of contribution to the *samizdat* literature, and the glimpses it affords of Stalin as perceived by his daughter while growing up and in adulthood are of no less value to the biographer for the fact that he may not always accept her interpretations. Further, we know that the *samizdat* literature includes a major work by Roy Medvedev, the historian brother of Zhores, about Stalinism and Stalin. Since this book has not yet appeared abroad, we can only hope that it will, and soon. Finally, in *Khrushchev Remembers* —which I take to be Khrushchev's own material, however raw, arbitrarily edited and incomplete the text may be—we have a major addition to the unofficial memoir literature on the Stalin period and a source of many a significant new historical detail concerning Stalin, particularly in his later years.

Still another genre of *samizdat* literature useful to the Stalin biographer is the work of fiction in which Stalin appears as a character. In Solzhenitsyn's novel *The First Circle*, to take the best-known example, there is a sequence of scenes, dated late 1949, in which the ageing Stalin has a nocturnal soliloquy, starts writing his papers on linguistics, and talks with his secret police chief, Abakumov. Those who consider this fictionalizing of Stalin a weakness of the novel seem to me to miss a point. Solzhenitsyn, like many other intellectuals in Russia, finds the Stalin question endlessly interesting because of the deep connexion with the greater question of the Russian Revolution itself and its paths of development. In addition to being contemporary Russia's best novelist. Solzhenitsyn is something of a sovietologist. Witness the author-like character of Nerzhin in *The First Circle*, who

[1] Zhores A. Medvedev, *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969).

[2] Nadezhda Mandelstam, *Hope Against Hope: A Memoir* (New York, Atheneum, 1970).

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became interested in the Stalin question as a boy when he read his works and found them, by comparison with Lenin's, 'a sort of mush', and who, as a prisoner later on, writes secret notes on Soviet history because of a compulsion—as he puts it to himself—to 'grapple with the riddle of the inflated gloomy giant who had only to flutter his eyelashes for Nerzhin's head to fly off'. Whether or not the nocturnal Stalin scenes in *The First Circle* contain any new items of historical fact,[3] they are valuable as a partial record of Solzhenitsyn's 'grappling', his interpretation of Stalin as a personality.

One further source of new evidence concerning Stalin is material that previous biographers have tended to overlook. In all branches of scholarship, the appearance of 'new' evidence often turns on changes in what is regarded as significant. Such changes are occurring in biography now through the Freudian revolution and the resulting new appreciation of the importance of childhood and youth in people's lives. Erik Erikson's exploration of the 'identity crisis' in *Young Man Luther* opened, in this respect, a new epoch in the field of biography—an epoch, however, which has yet to be felt in Stalin biography. Here the standard form has been the ordinary political biography, with relatively little attention to the formative years that Stalin spent before, at the age of 19, he became a seminary dropout and professional revolutionary. What *brought* him to this crucial decision, psychologically speaking, is not a question satisfactorily answered in the literature of Stalin biography, although some of the material relevant to the answer has been available to the biographer for 30 years or so. Since the question has not been treated as central, the significance of pertinent recorded facts about Stalin's seminary years has not been fully perceived.

IF Stalin is fated to become the subject of a new biographical literature in the coming period, how is our picture of him likely to be affected? One way of approaching this question is to reconsider some past views in the light of present knowledge. I am not referring to particular works of biography so much as to general images of Stalin that have been influential both in the biographical literature and the public mind.

In Trotsky's view, which has undoubtedly been one of the most influential, Stalin was in essence a man of the bureaucratic apparatus, and his qualities—the very qualities in fact that explained his success—were those typical of the apparatus-man: practicality, strong will, persistence, primitive theoretical equipment, stubbornly empirical mind, lack of creative imagination, and mediocrity—above all, mediocrity. Trotsky's theory of Stalin was thus part and parcel of a larger theory of the takeover of the Bolshevik Revolution by a new ruling stratum, the 'Thermidorian bureaucracy'. It all came to him in a flash one day in 1925 when he was talking with his deputy Sklyansky, who asked for

[3] The possibility that they do is not excluded. On internal evidence, for example, Solzhenitsyn appears, in writing them, to have had access to the Alliluyeva manuscript, *Twenty Letters to a Friend*, or knowledge of material contained in it.

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his view of Stalin. 'Stalin,' Trotsky replied, 'is the outstanding mediocrity in the Party,' and in that short conversation, as he later recorded in his autobiography, he grasped for the first time, in all its psychological and social complexity, the problem of the Thermidor. 'For the thing that matters is not Stalin, but the forces that he expresses without even realizing it.'[4] Or, as he summed it up later in *The Revolution Betrayed*: 'Stalin is the personification of the bureaucracy. That is the substance of his political personality.'

It is hard to resist the thought that this theory of Stalin had elements of unconscious rationalization. At the moment of its formulation, Trotsky was losing out to Stalin in the post-Lenin political struggle. To succumb to a man he saw as a third-rater must have been intensely galling to this proud revolutionary, but less so if what he was succumbing to was a whole new social stratum of which Stalin was merely the representative figure and symptom. But whatever view one takes of the origin of Trotsky's theory, it seriously misread the situation. Lenin had the truer perception when he wrote in the document of late 1922 that later became known as his 'testament' that Trotsky and Stalin were the two most able men in the Party leadership. As many were later to point out, Stalin was no mediocrity as a man of politics. He was in fact *besting* Trotsky in the fight for the succession. And not simply because he had certain 'qualities' that endeared him to the bureaucracy, or because of his power over appointments, but because he was making effective use of themes to which wide circles of the Party were responsive, such as the theme of the possibility of constructing socialism in one country. To the extent that it existed, the peculiar affinity that Trotsky perceived between Stalin and the rising Soviet bureaucracy was largely a result of Stalin's staking out of a position that the new men of power found convincing. The appearance of such an affinity was therefore a tribute to Stalin's formidable political talents.

Not having risen as the bureaucracy's creature, Stalin never was that. But neither, for a long while, was he its absolute master. He achieved this position with the great terror of the 1930s, through which he destroyed not only the Bolshevik Old Guard but the bulk of that very bureaucracy which had given him its support in the 1920s and executed his policies of forced collectivization and industrialization in the sequel. The new bureaucratic generation that succeeded to the command posts during the Purge was, in the fullest possible sense, Stalin's own creature and servant. One of Solzhenitsyn's services to sovietology is his gifted portrayal of this fact in the imaginary scene between Stalin and Abakumov. He shows us this man—the first apparatus-man of Russia in 1949—cringing before Stalin, knowing that

> one mistake in his presence could be that one mistake in life which set off an explosion, irreversible in effect. Stalin was terrifying because he did not listen to excuses, made no accusations; his

[4] L. Trotsky, *My Life* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1960), pp. 481, 506, 512–513.

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> yellow tiger eyes simply brightened balefully, his lower lids closed up a bit—and there, inside him, sentence had been passed, and the condemned man didn't know: he left in peace, was arrested at night, and shot by morning.[5]

PROFESSOR E. H. CARR, whose many-volumed history of Soviet Russia through the 1920s is almost the only truly monumental work of scholarship produced in Soviet studies in our generation, does not regard Stalin as either a mediocrity or a mere embodiment of the bureaucracy. He sees him as an historical figure in his own right and a great one. Countering Trotsky's remark that it was not Stalin who created the machine but the machine that created him, Carr observes: 'But it required something more than a machine to "create" Stalin and put him in power.'

Yet, the influence of Trotsky is still to be seen in Carr's own interpretation of Stalin as 'the most impersonal of great historical figures', not a moulder of events and circumstances but one moulded by them. To illustrate this thesis, and what he calls 'the essentially impersonal character of Stalinist policy', Carr asserts that no element of personal conviction, and certainly no originality of conception, was involved when Stalin assumed leadership of the industrialization drive. The aims he pursued in his vigorous and ruthless way were those 'dictated by the dynamic force inherent in the revolution itself'. His qualities, like his convictions, were those of his milieu; they 'mirrored the current stage of the historical process'. His role in Soviet history was that of an outstanding organizer and administrator, an *executor* of revolutionary policy with no vision of where it would lead. His distinctively Russian orientation in socialist construction betrayed the absence from his makeup of the West European influences imbibed by the other Bolshevik leaders as part of their Russian intelligentsia tradition. Their Marxism had unconsciously assimilated the Western cultural foundations. His, reflecting the anti-Western educational tradition in which he was reared, had the character of a 'formalistic creed rather than that of an intellectual conviction', faith being a more important virtue to him than reason.[6]

Carr's view of Stalin corresponds in a number of ways to the characterization given by Isaac Deutscher, who had earlier spoken of Stalin's 'almost impersonal personality'. Deutscher does not see Stalin as a man of ideas or Marxist theorist. Rather, Stalin appears in his biography as essentially a pragmatist, concerned more with making things work than with theory. Here, too, Stalin is the one who accomplished by ruthless means a revolution that others had conceived and designed; he is the executor of other Bolsheviks' ideas. Thus, Deutscher maintains that the ideas behind Stalin's revolution from above in the early 1930s

[5] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *The First Circle*, trans. Thomas P. Whitney (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 101–102.

[6] E. H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), Vol. I, pp. 174–186.

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were 'not his', that Stalin embarked upon this second revolution in an 'unpremeditated, pragmatic manner', and that he was 'precipitated into collectivization' by the chronic danger of famine in 1928 and 1929.[7]

One need not rate Stalin among the foremost Marxist thinkers in order to disagree with the Trotsky-Deutscher-Carr view of him as basically a non-intellectual with no great concern for theory. The fact is that Stalin from early youth gravitated not simply to revolution but to Marxism as an overall philosophy and as a theory of society, history and revolution. It is true that he was self-taught as a Marxist, but so were those Bolsheviks with whom Carr contrasts him; Marxism was not among the subjects officially offered in Russian universities in those days. During and after his years in the Tiflis seminary, Stalin mastered the writings of classical Marxism then available, along with the Russian Marxist literature and the histories of European socialism. The exposition of Marxism that he published in 1906–07 (in his work *Anarchism or Socialism?*) set forth some of the ideas he would express in his essay of 1938 on dialectical and historical materialism. His treatise of 1913 on *Marxism and the National Question* was generally recognized as a significant contribution, at any rate to Bolshevik Marxism; and although he wrote it with the help and under the direction of Lenin, the work itself was no more Lenin's than any successful dissertation is the work of the man who supervises it. In 1924 he produced, in *The Foundations of Leninism*, an erudite compendium of Leninist thought that was to prove serviceable as a handbook of theory for several generations of Party members.

In a conversation of 1928 with Kamenev that became widely known in Soviet circles at the time, Bukharin, then in close contact with Stalin, remarked that he was 'eaten up' by the craving to be recognized as a theoretician. In the last years of his life, Stalin was still striving to fulfil this ambition. In 1950, when extremely grave economic and social problems urgently pressed for his attention, he lavished time and energy on the effort to produce a *magnum opus* in his papers on *Marxism and Linguistics*; and he delayed the post-war Party congress for years so that he could give it an epoch-making Marxist theoretical revelation with his booklet, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (1952). Stalin was an intellectual of some little learning, limited but not negligible talent, and grandiose pretensions. He never became the eminent Marxist thinker that he yearned to be, but he also never ceased trying. One could call it a classic intellectual's story were it not for the tragic consequences—for others—that failure had in this instance. Needless to add, none of what has been said obviates the fact that Stalin also wanted to go down in history as the doer, the man of practical deeds who translated the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary programme into reality. His pretensions to historical greatness were not only far-reaching, but many-sided.

[7] Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 273, 295, 318, 322, 326.

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The impersonal Stalin of Carr and Deutscher is a case of the mistaking of historical appearance for reality. It would have been (had it been so offered) a perfect characterization of Molotov, who was indeed the 'almost impersonal personality', a man of commonplace qualities, a doer who was not a thinker, and one who became an instrument of the historical process. But Stalin is a different matter. Not only did he have political ideas and a Marxist-Leninist mind of his own, whatever its crudities and limitations; some of his personal qualities—qualities that affected his political style or policies—were out of the ordinary. Such diverse observers as Milovan Djilas and George Kennan, both of whom saw Stalin at close quarters, concur, for example, in the view that he was (in Kennan's words) 'a consummate actor'.[8] Paradoxically, Stalin's extraordinary histrionic ability may help to explain the appearance of impersonality that he frequently conveyed, and also why it was only an appearance. It may account, too, for the fact that a man we now know to have been morbidly sensitive to the least possible slight, irascible, moody, hyper-suspicious, given to occasional fits of rage, and capable of the kind of panic and depression that came over him when Hitler attacked Russia in 1941 could delude some of his biographers into believing that the pseudonym Stalin ('man of steel') was not simply his wish for himself or pose but a true summation of his personality.[9]

Another personal quality of Stalin's pertinent to our argument was his intense Great Russian nationalism, which was accompanied by an anti-Semitism that grew quite obsessive in his final years. Great Russian nationalism was not peculiar to Stalin, although he felt it with a special intensity that was bound up with other aspects of his personality as well as with his non-Russian ethnic origin. It was an attitude that he shared with a certain section of the Party in the early post-revolutionary years, but not with the Party as a whole. There were forces working in both directions, as shown, among other things, by the conflict that developed between Stalin and Lenin over this very issue in 1922.[10] The forces of resistance to what one Bolshevik called 'Russian Red patriotism' were then still strong in the Party. Their defeat in the later years undoubtedly owed something to the fact that an extreme exponent of Russian nationalism became leader of the Party. In this instance, then, Stalin possessed an attribute that could not be ascribed simply to his time and place; and his possession of it proved influential for the subsequent course of events.

[8] G. F. Kennan, *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960), p. 248. For Djilas' observations see *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1962), *passim*. See also Kennan's later statement: 'Stalin's greatness as a dissimulator was an integral part of his greatness as a statesman', *Memoirs: 1925–1950* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), p. 279.

[9] Boris Souvarine, *Stalin: A Critical Survey of Bolshevism* (London: Secker and Warburg, n.d.), p. 134; and Francis B. Randall, *Stalin's Russia; An Historical Reconsideration* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 34.

[10] On this conflict, see Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (2nd ed., New York: Atheneum, 1968), pp. 270–289; and Moshe Lewin, *Lenin's Last Struggle* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), ch. 7.

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STALIN is not rightly seen as a pragmatic leader who simply led in the direction that events were tending. Even accepting Professor Carr's contention that he moulded himself to events rather than vice versa in the Party struggles of the 1920s (which seems at best partially true), we have to recognize the great change that occurred between that period and after, between Stalin rising and Stalin risen. Already at the end of 1929, the year of victory in his long fight for the supreme leadership, Stalin took advantage of his new-won ascendancy to place his strong personal imprint upon the first great policy act of the Stalinist era—the plan for total collectivization of agriculture. Archival information released in Soviet publications during Khrushchev's time shows that he intervened in the bureaucratic policy-making process to impose far swifter tempos than the drafters of the plan had thought feasible, and that he quashed certain provisions that had been written into the plan to safeguard against panic reactions on the part of peasants whose holdings were to be collectivized. This in turn contributed materially to the catastrophic course that events took, culminating in the great famine of 1931–33 which claimed millions of lives. Very probably, collectivization in some form and according to some timetable was a foregone conclusion after the grain crisis of 1927–28. But this does not mean that it had to take the form it did, that Stalin was 'precipitated' by brute events into the breakneck course he followed. History—as it usually does—offered alternatives, and there was no lack of Bolshevik minds to grasp them. Much light has been shed on this question by the revisionist Soviet history of collectivization that emerged during the Khrushchev period, and by the recent work of Western scholars like Lewin and Nove.[11]

The evidence is strong, although it has not yet been adequately presented in our scholarship, that Stalin did not embark upon the second revolution in 'an unpremeditated pragmatic manner'. He acted on certain rather distinctive ideas that had been maturing in his mind for several years before 1929. Even if they showed some influence of the thinking of Preobrazhensky and the Left opposition, these ideas cannot simply be ascribed, as Deutscher has done, to that source. The use of coercion to effect a swift total collectivization had never, for example, been a part of the Left opposition's programme, nor did it envisage the pace of industrialization that Stalin sought to enforce. The developments of that time do not support the thesis of the essentially impersonal character of Stalinist policy.

Stalin's career before and after 1929 provides an illustration of Sidney Hook's paradigm of the 'event-making man', who is dependent upon a social class in coming to power but subsequently emancipates himself from this dependence and makes himself into a force for the

[11] See especially M. Lewin, *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968); and Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR* (London: The Penguin Press, 1969). Also, Stephen F. Cohen's forthcoming study on *Bukharin and Russian Bolshevism.*

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shaping of the historical process.[12] In Stalin's case, as already indicated earlier, the Great Purge of the 1930s was the ultimate radical means by which he emancipated himself from dependence upon his bureaucratic social constituency. This gigantic act of terrorism was itself one of the supreme modern manifestations of the impingement of personality upon history, and paved the way for others. One of them was the conclusion of the pact of August 1939, which freed Hitler to unleash the second world war. Many more followed in the post-war years of Stalin's rule.

ONE further Stalin remains to be considered here, among the larger number that might have been discussed: Khrushchev's Stalin.

In this instance we are not dealing with a biography but with material for one, material of a rare documentary kind, full of significance for Stalin biography. The special report that Khrushchev gave before the closed session of the 20th Party Congress on the night of 24–25 February 1956—or rather the condensed version of it that reached the West and was published in *The New York Times* on 5 June of that year—is a close-up portrait of Stalin as observed behind the scenes by political associates over a period of years, together with the results of a posthumous inquiry into aspects of his rule that remained more or less obscure even to these associates, or many of them, while he was still alive. All future Stalin biographers will have to take this document into account and contend with its implications.

Scholars have taken issue with a number of specific points in the secret report. It has been noted, for example, that Khrushchev was not correct in saying that Stalin originated the concept 'enemy of the people'. Some (including Soviet military memoirists) have questioned Khrushchev's remark that Stalin planned military operations during the Soviet-German war on a globe. But on the whole, the informational content of the report is accepted, and rightly so, as historically true. Some have even contended that it revealed little that had not already been known or surmised in the West, and was chiefly significant as an official Soviet confirmation of these facts. It is true that such subjects of the report as Lenin's 'testament' and certain particulars of the Great Purge were already known to us. But the view in question does not really do justice to the fundamental novelty of Khrushchev's Stalin-portrait, as regards both many specific details and general significance.

Apart from the question of basic factuality, there is the matter of fairness. After all, selectivity can combine elements of truth into a false or deeply distorted overall picture. Is this true of Krushchev's picture? An essential part of the answer, it seems to me, is that no one should take the secret report as a full rounded account of Stalin's life and work. Nor, for that matter, did Khrushchev offer it as such. He began it by observing that Stalin's merits in the Revolution, Civil War, and following years had been sufficiently written about to be well

[12] Sidney Hook, *The Hero in History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1943), pp. 166–170.

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known to all his audience. Far from denying these merits, he praised Stalin, in a later passage, for having been 'one of the strongest Marxists' in the 1920s and for having played a constructive part in the Party struggles of the post-Lenin years and the drives for collectivization and industrialization. Furthermore, Krushchev did not portray Stalin as a man villainous in his motivation, but rather insisted that he was not that. While presenting an appalling record of cruelties and brutalities towards Party members and others—a record that makes Stalin at certain later periods of his life look like a homicidal maniac—Khrushchev declared:

> . . . Stalin was convinced that this was necessary for the defence of the interests of the working classes against the plotting of enemies and against the attack of the imperialist camp. He saw this from the position of the interest of the working class, of the interest of the labouring people, of the interest of the victory of socialism and communism. We cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot. He considered that this should be done in the interest of the Party, of the working masses, in the name of the defence of the revolution's gains. In this lies the whole tragedy!

The Stalin biographer would do well to ponder these words seriously. Stalin may have been one of the great villain-figures of history, but he was not aware of it; he considered himself a *good* Bolshevik.

How, then, should we characterize the secret report as an historical document? In essence, it is a study in the abuse of power—indeed, an indictment on this charge, supported by a massive array of pertinent facts. Abuse of power is the *leitmotif*; these very words occur over and over in the document. Having reached the pinnacle of power, Stalin turned against the Party that had placed him there, destroyed many thousands of its loyal members and terrorized the rest, including those who worked most closely with him in high Party and state positions. In doing this, he acted on the vivid belief that he was surrounded by stealthily conspiring enemies who must be destroyed lest they destroy both him and the state of which he was leader. By eliminating those whom he perceived as enemies, many of whom were in the Soviet armed forces, he gravely weakened the country's preparedness for war; and his leadership on the eve of and during the Soviet-German war showed many failings. Imbued by a grandiosity that knew no bounds, he made use of his tyrannical power for—among other purposes—his own self-glorification. And in the final, post-war years his sense of being surrounded by malevolent plotting forces grew still more obsessive: 'Stalin became even more capricious, irritable, and brutal; in particular his suspicion grew. His persecution mania reached unbelieveable proportions. Many workers were becoming enemies before his eyes.'

The indictment for abuse of power is Khrushchev's theme; the particulars with which he supports it are what is of chief interest to the Stalin biographer, especially those particulars that say or imply some-

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thing about Stalin as a personality. I have given only a very rough sketch of them here. But this summary may be sufficient to suggest what is essentially novel about the secret report as a contribution to Stalin biography: it is the description at first hand of a person whose behaviour falls somewhere on the continuum of psychiatric conditions usually designated as 'paranoid'. Khrushchev himself did not use this term or indicate that Stalin might have been considered a psychiatric case; he was *indicting* Stalin as a man and leader. However, the factual testimony presents the picture of a personality of paranoid tendency. Moreover, this testimony is supported and supplemented by reports from other knowledgeable Soviet sources, including such an indubitably non-hostile witness as Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva. Her observations corroborate Khrushchev's at a number of critical points, particularly with respect to the 'persecution mania' (her words) and its progression to a peak in the post-war years.[13] Here it may be remarked in passing that the 'progressive' nature of paranoia, that is, its tendency to develop in early adulthood and grow increasingly pronounced with advance into later life, is regularly emphasized in textbooks of clinical psychiatry.

Khrushchev's Stalin was a bombshell, and scholarship is still feeling the shock. For various reasons, the field of Russian studies was less primed to assimilate the message than to resist it. None of the better-known Stalin biographies, so far as I am aware, had propounded the hypothesis of a paranoid Stalin and examined the evidence that may be adduced in its support. Nor had those few Westerners who saw Stalin on rare occasions noted the sorts of behaviour in him that associates were observing behind the scenes, although there were occasions when, as George Kennan reports, someone would see 'the yellow eyes light up in a flash of menace and fury as he turned, momentarily, on some unfortunate subordinate . . .'[14]; and Charles Bohlen, Roosevelt's wartime interpreter, recalls 'a rather acrimonious accusation by Stalin, at one of the dinners, that Churchill had secret sympathies for the Germans'.[15] Furthermore, students of the Soviet and other modern dictatorships had evolved a kind of 'systems approach' to the explanation of some of the facts to which Khrushchev made reference in the secret report. The terroristic purges of the 1930s and after in Stalin's Russia appeared, on this approach, to express the dynamics of 'totalitarianism' as a system, not the personal politics and

[13] Svetlana Alliluyeva, *Twenty Letters to a Friend* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 197. In her later book, Alliluyeva takes issue with the idea that her father's behaviour might be attributed to 'madness' (*Tol'ko odin god* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 311). What is of concern here, however, are her direct observations. For an evaluation of her testimony on Stalin, see the present writer's 'Svetlana Alliluyeva as Witness of Stalin', *Slavic Review* (June 1968).

[14] *Memoirs: 1925–1950*, p. 279.

[15] Charles Bohlen, *The Transformation of American Foreign Policy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), p. 23. Bohlen interprets Stalin's outburst as a tactical device to express irritation and concern at Churchill's reluctance to fix a definite date for the overseas invasion.

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psychodynamics of its leader. Indeed, the behaviour in question was not generally viewed as the leader's behaviour or a product of it, but as behaviour of the system—which to some extent, of course, it was.

Accordingly, the impact of Khrushchev's Stalin upon scholarship has been somewhat muted. The specific historical details and episodes to which the secret report makes reference have been assimilated without difficulty, but the broader implications are still, in a sense, being weighed in the scholarly mind. Some believe that what should remain uppermost is the responsibility of Leninism or the Soviet system *for* Stalin and his actions, whatever psychological motives drove him to act so. There is also some scepticism that a person of psychotic tendency could have acted as methodically as Stalin did in destroying those whom he perceived as enemies. As Professor Leonard Schapiro has written, *à propos* Stalin's motives for the *Ezhovshchina* of 1936–38, 'the assault on the Party showed too much careful preparation, planning and system for madness to be the explanation'.[16] In this instance, the objection appears to be based on a misunderstanding. The major authorities, starting with the father of modern psychiatry, Emile Kraepelin, have found paranoia to be a condition characterized (in Kraepelin's words) 'by the gradual development of a stable progressive system of delusions, without marked mental deterioration, clouding of consciousness, or involvement of the coherence of thought'.[17] Not only are 'careful preparation, planning and system' not foreign to individuals of this category; they are among the characteristic attributes of them. With mental powers fully intact, the paranoid organizes his life around methodical planning and scheming to strike at those who, he unshakeably believes, are doing just this to him. Stalin's behaviour in preparation of the events of 1936–38 in Russia gives every sign of having been an historic case in point.

The testimony of the secret report on this point, and in general on Stalin as a personality, receives both corroboration and further elaboration in the memoir material published in the West in 1970 under the title *Khrushchev Remembers*.[18] Especially significant is the wealth of fresh fact and observation concerning Stalin in the post-war years, when his paranoidal reactions became so pronounced—and at times even grotesque—that close associates needed no psychiatric sophistication to

[16] Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 428.

[17] Emile Kraepelin, *Clinical Psychiatry* (New York: Macmillan, 1902), p. 316.

[18] The circumstances under which this book appeared were unusual and remain (at this time of writing—February 1971) unclarified. A publisher's note states that the material emanated 'from various sources at various times and in various circumstances', and leaves it an open question whether Khrushchev 'intended or expected his words ever to find their way into print, either in his own country or in the West . . .'. Questions as to authenticity have been raised, partly on the basis of errors of fact that seem to some reviewers implausible as coming from Khrushchev. But on internal evidence the authorship of the material, or at least the great bulk of it, appears indubitably Khrushchevian. Pending further clarification of the circumstances of origin, editing, etc., however, the scholar would do well to be guarded in his use of the book as an historical document.

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recognize them for what they were. His suspiciousness reached such boundless extremes that he was overheard on one occasion saying 'I trust no one, not even myself,' and Khrushchev, after quoting the remark, comments: 'All of us around Stalin were temporary people. As long as he trusted us to a certain degree, we were allowed to go on living and working. But the moment he stopped trusting you, Stalin would start to scrutinize you until the cup of his distrust overflowed. Then it would be your turn to follow those who were no longer among the living.' [19]

Stalin's vivid sense of being surrounded by conspiring enemies found lethal expression in the 'Crimean' and 'Leningrad' affairs. When a group of prominent Soviet Communists who had headed a Soviet Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee during the second world war proposed to him afterwards that the Crimea be made into a Soviet Jewish Republic, Stalin perceived in their proposal a Jewish conspiracy to establish an outpost of American imperialism on Soviet shores; and he consigned its authors—in whom he now saw agents of American Zionism—to fates ranging from death to long-term exile. Molotov's wife, one of the Committee's leaders, was sent into exile; and Molotov himself, although still a member of the Politburo, came under a cloud of suspicion in Stalin's mind. Stalin decided that Molotov must have sold out to the Americans during a war-time visit to confer with President Roosevelt; and he cabled the Soviet Union's UN Ambassador, Andrei Vyshinsky, for confirmation of his theory that Molotov must have owned a personal railway car in America, as he had travelled by train from Washington to New York at that time.[20] The 'Leningrad affair' of 1949 took the lives of several high officials whom Stalin suspected of involvement in an anti-Soviet conspiracy, and threatened the lives of many more. In this connexion and in significant departure from the secret report, Khrushchev speaks of 'the sickness which began to envelop Stalin's mind in the last years of his life.' [21]

But after recognizing classical symptoms of paranoia in Khrushchev's Stalin and searching in the appropriate sources for any light they can cast on this type of personality and the patterns of experience that normally go with it, the Stalin biographer still finds himself face to face with the classical biographical task. He must try to reconstruct the life history of Stalin and as much of the associated *inner* life history and motivation as possible; he must relate them both to the changing culture and milieu; and he must explore the interplay of personality and society in this particular instance. Psychology or psychiatry may aid him—in part to discover how much more complex and difficult the task is than he realized when he started—but it can no more resolve the problem

[19] *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 307. This description of Stalin's inner mechanism of distrust is remarkably akin to that of Svetlana Alliluyeva. See her *Twenty Letters to a Friend* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), esp. p. 78.
[20] *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 259–261, 309.
[21] Ibid., p. 246.

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for him than it can relieve the clinician of the biographical effort involved in developing the case history of an individual patient. By virtue of their very generality, psychiatric categories (like other categories) are limited in what they can reveal about any individual person and how he became the person that he is, or was. No matter how inwardly and outwardly disturbed the life is or may have been, it still requires to be seen as a life. So, if the clinician must be a kind of biographer, how can the biographer find a short cut to his objective in the lore of the clinician?

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Stalin in the Second World War

James Douglas

IN the last dozen years a flood of military memoirs and studies of the second world war has been released upon the Soviet public. Between 1960 and 1965 the Institute of Marxism-Leninism produced the official six-volume history of the Russo-German War, then in 1965 a shortened one-volume version, and finally in 1970 a revised edition of the latter.[1] In the same year the Ministry of Defence also published a short history.[2] The flood of memoirs has shown no signs of abating: the memoirs of Zhukov, Shtemenko, Meretskov, and Rokossovsky have all been published since 1967.[3] There cannot now be many leading generals left who have not 'told all', so presumably this particular inundation will soon subside, although there are still a few potential sources untapped such as Marshal Vasilevsky. (He has dealt with various periods of the war, but has not yet written a full account.)

The printings of these memoirs clearly reflect the high value officially given to them: Zhukov comes out top with 600,000 copies, Rokossovsky and Meretskov both do well with 300,000 each. (Such figures make even Simonov's popular war-novels appear to be of distinctly limited appeal, for when *Soldatami ne rozhdayutsya* was published in book form in 1965 a mere 100,000 copies were printed.) The size of these editions is obviously not determined by a desire to flatter the marshals' *amour propre*, or by a high opinion of their entertainment value, but by a belief in their worth as propaganda. An article in *Krasnaya zvezda* put it thus: 'Eye-witness accounts—provided they are of general interest—are an excellent way of instilling military and patriotic values into people, of spreading our glorious battle-traditions.'[4]

In the light of this it may appear surprising that the Soviet government delayed so long before realizing the propaganda potential. Why was so little written about the war before 1956? Why were the marshals not encouraged to issue their memoirs earlier, if their works are of such interest and value? The answer is that the war was long an issue too sensitive to be exposed to massive doses of memoirs. The version of the war that was built up under Stalin was a structure based more upon fantasy than fact—indeed, too many facts would have brought the edifice tumbling down. In the gospel according to Stalinist historians Stalin was the source and fount of every victory; any defeats were of

[1] *Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza* (6 vols., Moscow, 1960–65). *Velikaya Otechestvennaya voina Sovetskogo Soyuza. Kratkaya istoriya* (1st ed., Moscow, 1965; 2nd ed., Moscow, 1970).

[2] *Velikaya Otechestvennaya voina 1941–5* (Moscow, 1970).

[3] G. K. Zhukov, *Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya* (Moscow, 1969). K. A. Meretskov, *Na sluzhbe narody* (Moscow, 1970). S. M. Shtemenko, *General'ny shtab v gody voiny* (Moscow, 1968). K. K. Rokossovsky, *Soldatskii dolg* (Moscow, 1968).

[4] Zhilin and Makarov, 'Memuarist i istoriya' (*Krasnaya zvezda*, 30 May 1967).

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minor significance and attributable either to poor local generalship or to purely temporary factors, which were—rather unfairly, it is implied—working in the aggressor's favour; final victory was proof of the divine wisdom of all Stalin's policies and actions both before and during the war. Such a version of events gave Stalin maximum credit, so why should he encourage any other? [5]

AFTER Stalin's death there was a strong military lobby interested in changing this version. The generals had received little recognition for their part in victory, and they were also worried lest the military strategy employed in the war should become so hallowed that it be deemed ideal for the present as well as the past. This pressure coincided with the general reticence being shown towards all aspects of Stalin's genius, and led to the diminished Stalin of the histories published between 1953 and 1956.

Reticence became outright condemnation at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. Khrushchev stood the Stalinist view of the war on its head; he gave Stalin the blame for all the defeats and allowed him no credit for the victories. He claimed that Stalin ignored clear warnings of the imminence of war, and that he failed to exploit the time and resources at his disposal. Military equipment was not modernized and the country's defences not maintained. The army purges were unjustified and meant the loss of invaluable officers. Nevertheless the awkward fact remained that Stalin did lead the Soviet Union to victory and, as Commander-in-Chief, presumably merited some praise. Khrushchev found a simple solution to this problem: he claimed that Stalin may have been in command in theory, but that in practice the war was won by others. To demonstrate Stalin's incompetence Khrushchev produced the story that the Generalissimo planned his campaigns on a globe. Zhukov, Meretskov, and Shtemenko all explicitly deny this claim.

During Khrushchev's reign the attacks on Stalin varied in intensity. The official six-volume history of the war apportioned the major share of the blame for the Soviet Union's unreadiness in 1941 to Stalin, but the military leaders of the time, such as Kulik, Mekhlis, Shchadenko, Timoshenko, and Zhukov were also blamed. Several of the memoirists went considerably further in their attacks on Stalin than did this history, but such divergencies probably did not unduly disturb those responsible for orchestrating the flow of memoirs and histories, provided that the main point was clear: Stalin was to receive no bouquets for his performance in the war.

Since Khrushchev's fall there has been a gradual refurbishing of Stalin's image, but, as the celebrated Nekrich affair showed, the change in attitude towards the dead dictator did not make itself immediately felt. In 1965 Alexander Nekrich, a professional historian, published a study of the beginning of the Russo-German War, entitled *1941 22*

[5] For an excellent study of the treatment of the war in Soviet history and literature see M. P. Gallagher, *Soviet History of World War II* (New York, 1963).

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iyunya. In it he described the warnings of war that flooded into Moscow from the most varied sources—from Soviet and foreign diplomats, from spies, from German deserters, from Soviet border-troops; he showed how these warnings were ignored either by Stalin himself, or by those who were more frightened of Stalin than of a German invasion—a fear that was all too justified. Nekrich gave a brief account of the beginning of the fighting and demonstrated into what chaos Stalin's policy of 'not reacting to provocation' had thrown the troops and their commanders; they were not even sure whether to fire at the German planes when the air-attack started. The villain in Nekrich's book is Stalin; the author makes it quite clear that Stalin had little excuse for not believing the warnings and that, in any case, he should have realized how weak was the position of his own army.

At first Nekrich's book was treated favourably; there was a laudatory review in *Novy Mir*, and, at a conference held by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism on 16 February 1966 to discuss the work, many of the speakers argued that in some respects it did not go far enough in its criticism.[6] However, it gradually became clear that the author's views were not approved of in high places, and that he was officially regarded as little better than a running-dog for bourgeois historians, and as guilty of a gross slander on the Soviet soldier and the Soviet people. In July 1967 Nekrich was thrown out of the Communist Party and his book was withdrawn from all libraries and bookshops.

It is not clear which features of the work caused such extreme measures to be taken against its author. The charges he laid against Stalin were not new; he did not go so far as to question the wisdom of the Soviet-German Pact of 1939, nor did he break the taboo on mentioning the Secret Protocol which covered the division of spheres of interest and the partition of Poland. On the other hand, he did refer to the Soviet-German Friendship Treaty of 28 September 1939 which, in his words, 'fixed the frontier between the two countries'.[7] This statement implied a high degree of collaboration over the siting of the new border; such an implication was probably unwelcome to the Party historians, for the official short history of the war avoids this treaty. Other unwelcome features of his account were his favourable handling of the British and American politicians, and his lack of attention to social and class interests when analysing policies. To these black marks were added the circumstances of the book's publication and its subsequent career. For a work of scholarship it was published in a large printing (50,000 copies); it received a good reception abroad; these facts, combined with the excitement caused at the conference of 16 February, ensured that any official action taken against the author would be well publicized. Whatever the merits or faults of the book, the cardinal consideration in the minds of the new Party chieftains was

[6] For the proceedings of this conference and for details of the Nekrich affair see the French translation of his work, *L'Armée Rouge Assassinée* (Paris, 1968).

[7] A. Nekrich, *L'Armée Rouge Assassinée*, p. 122.

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the desire for a fresh appraisal of recent history. They needed a way of signalling this wish and Nekrich happened to be a particularly resonant drum on which the order for a change could be beaten out.

The motives behind this order are not hard to see. The evidence supplied by Nekrich and others on the poor leadership and incompetent pre-war military planning made a powerful case against Stalin and also—though Nekrich is careful not to say so—against the Party and military leaders of the time. It was difficult for the Party to present a convincing defence against these charges. On the one hand, it could plead ignorance; it could claim that its representatives did not know the real state of affairs and so did not act against Stalin and his policies. On the other hand, it could submit a plea of diminished responsibility; it could admit they knew what was happening, but claim that they were in no position to go against Stalin's will. Neither of these two defences would throw a very rosy light on the activities of the Party.

For Khrushchev, the disadvantages of advertizing the mistakes of Stalin were outweighed by the personal power to be won through posing as the popular liberator from the Stalinist terror, but his successors were either not in a position to create any such advantages, or believed them not worth the price of publicizing past errors. Their solution to the problem of defending the Party's record was to re-edit it.

LIEUT.-GENERAL ZHILIN is a historian who was either given a better weather forecast, or who had a better feel for the prevalent historical wind than Nekrich, for he was one of the first to change his course. His book, *Kak fashistskaya Germaniya gotovila napadeniye na Sovetskii Soyuz*, first came out in 1965—the same year as did that of Nekrich—but, unlike Nekrich, Zhilin hastily brought out a revised and enlarged version which was published in 1966. The enlarged version included chapters on Hitler's calculations and miscalculations, on Western falsification of history, and on West Germany's aggressive post-war policy. Also included were more details of 'Plan Barbarossa'.

The revisions are small, but very significant—especially as far as they concern Stalin. In the first edition we are told that Stalin did not believe in the immediacy of war and so failed to mobilize the defence industry; this was the main reason for the miscalculations over the re-equipment of the armed forces. This paragraph is omitted from the second edition. The following may serve as an example of the lieutenant-general's skill as an historical strategist:

First edition: 'It may be claimed with complete justification that, had it not been for Stalin's obstinacy, the surprise invasion by Hitler's *Wehrmacht* would not have succeeded.' [8]

Second edition: 'It may be claimed with complete justification that, if proper vigilance had been shown at the time, the surprise invasion

[8] P. Zhilin, *Kak fashistskaya Germaniya gotovila napadeniye na Sovetskii Soyuz* (Moscow, 1965), p. 152.

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by Hitler's *Wehrmacht* would not have succeeded.'[9] (It should be noted that 'vigilance' has been used to translate *bditel'nost'*—a word with a strong Stalinist tang since it was employed particularly often in the thirties to justify ever more arrests and trials, and to spur the police and informers on to ever greater zeal.)

In the first edition the chapter dealing with the Soviet Union's preparations for war ends with a paragraph wondering at Stalin's pig-headedness in refusing to see the German danger; in the second edition this paragraph is omitted and in its stead we are given three pages dealing with military measures and Stalin's speech to the graduates of the Frunze Academy, in which he warned them of impending war. By this stage the new message being transmitted by Zhilin is coming through loud and clear.

Zhilin does not take issue with Nekrich directly, but the differences between them are easily seen. Even in his first edition Zhilin's criticism of Stalin is much more moderate than was that of Nekrich, and in the second edition it is moderated to a whisper. An idea of the speed of Zhilin's footwork may be gained from the fact that it took Nekrich's two most vicious critics, Prof. Deborin and Major-General Telpukhovsky, until September 1967 to lumber into action with a severe attack in *Voprosy istorii KPSS*. They had apparently had second thoughts about Nekrich's book, for when they spoke about it at the February conference they made only mild criticism. Deborin argued that it was wrong to attach all the blame to Stalin, and incidentally provided the conference with some comic relief when he tried to show off his military knowledge —an attempt that only revealed his lack of it.

Deborin and Telpukhovsky's attack was well answered by P. Grigorenko, a former general, in a letter addressed to the editors of *Voprosy istorii KPSS*. It was never published in the Soviet Union, but was circulated in manuscript form and later published in the West.[10]

Grigorenko begins by examining the criticisms made against Nekrich's book, and demonstrates how the two critics have wilfully distorted its contents by making sweeping generalizations and by quoting out of context. Grigorenko then conducts his own analysis of the events and policies leading up to the Russian defeats of 1941. His conclusions are much more extreme than those of Nekrich, for he claims that Stalin's policy was wrong not only in the period between the Pact and the invasion, but that even the Pact was a mistake. In his view the Soviet position was weaker, relatively and absolutely, in 1941 than it had been in 1939; by June 1941 the old frontier defences had been dismantled before the new ones were ready; in 1939 the Russian equipment may have been somewhat obsolescent or obsolete, but at least the troops were supplied with it and had been trained in its use, whereas in 1941

[9] P. Zhilin, *Kak fashistskaya Germaniya gotovila napadeniye na Sovetskii Soyuz* (Moscow, 1966), p. 221.

[10] There are several editions and translations of this letter. The author of this review used the French edition: P. Grigorenko, *Staline et la deuxième guerre mondiale* (L'Herne, 1969).

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they were in the midst of changing over from the old models to the new and often the old equipment was being withdrawn or run down before the new had arrived; the Soviet Union's potential allies in Europe had mostly been occupied by June 1941, whereas two years earlier there might have been some sort of alliance against Hitler. The two years of the Pact had seen Germany strengthened militarily, economically, and politically.

In spite of all this, Grigorenko still believes that the Soviet Union could have beaten off the German attack with the forces at its disposal had they been properly used. The troops should have been brought up to the border and put in a state of readiness; the new T–34 and KV tanks should have been used in large mobile formations to break the spearheads of the German attack.

Grigorenko sees Stalin as the root of all evil: he was responsible for the purges which deprived the armed forces of their best leaders and most of their experienced officers; it was largely his fault that the modern military theories developed in the twenties and thirties were not put into practice; it was he who imagined he could prevent Hitler from attacking by not reacting to provocation—a policy which eliminated any hope of effective preparations. However, the blame is not reserved for Stalin alone; of the military leaders, Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Golikov, and Zhukov also get their share.

In his zeal to prove the incompetence of Stalin and the military planners Grigorenko perhaps exaggerates the potential effectiveness of the obsolete Soviet equipment, and he gets some of his facts wrong: the Finnish war did not last for six but for four months. Nevertheless, his criticisms have been given here in some detail, because much of what he says has not been answered satisfactorily by the Soviet historians and high-ranking memoirists. In their attempts to show that the Soviet Union was busy preparing for war they refer to the number of mechanized corps being formed, or to the amount of new weapons being produced, but they do not discuss whether it was wise to carry out a major re-equipment programme amongst the front-line troops, or whether it would not have been better to form two or three mechanized corps and give them a full complement of weapons and vehicles, instead of trying to create so many corps that, as Zhukov admits, they could not possibly have been fully equipped until the latter part of 1942 at the very earliest. (In fairness to Meretskov it should be pointed out that he advocated the creation of about half as many corps, but his plan was changed by Zhukov and Stalin.)

IN the controversy about Stalin's talents one of the most important weapons has been the military memoir. For the period up to 1967 an excellent anthology of them has been compiled by Seweryn Bialer.[11] The book is divided into sections covering various stages and aspects of

[11] *Stalin and his Generals*, Seweryn Bialer (ed.) (New York, 1969).

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the war, each section containing extracts which vary considerably in their assessment of Stalin. Professor Bialer supplies a very good introduction in which he discusses the characteristics of the genre, its political significance, and the conclusions that may be drawn about Stalin's performance as a war leader. There are maps, copious notes, and a useful set of short biographies of the main characters and narrators. In the light of all these scholarly appendages it is particularly surprising that there is, unfortunately, no index.

Anybody faced with these memoirs has to decide how much the accounts of Stalin are determined by the past, and how much by the present. Professor Bialer writes about this problem, but perhaps more attention might have been paid to the way in which some memoirists varied their stories. N. G. Kuznetsov was, for example, criticized for his description of the immediate pre-war period and was prevailed upon to modify it in a later work. However, this is only a minor criticism, and Professor Bialer's book is to be recommended as a source of both information and interest.

Since the publication of Bialer's anthology many important memoirs have appeared which show the current trends in Soviet war-historiography. It is true that most of the authors published had already dealt with particular battles or campaigns in articles or short accounts, but this was the first time that their full story had been told. (It would be interesting to examine the chronology of their earlier publications and compare them with the book versions, but such a study is beyond the scope of this article.)

Memoirs which are valuable for what they say both about the historical Stalin and his present image are those of Meretskov, Rokossovsky, Shtemenko, and Zhukov. Rokossovsky and Zhukov rose to high positions of power under Stalin, but also suffered at his hands—Rokossovsky spending three years in prison (1937–40), and Zhukov being relegated to obscurity after 1946—so they had no reason to be ecstatic admirers of his. Nevertheless, the picture they all give of him is favourable and consistent in many points. They firmly lay the ghost of Stalin the Ineffectual. This figure may have existed briefly at the very beginning of the war, but his longevity was a creation of Khrushchev. Stalin took guidance and advice from his military experts, but his authority was unquestioned. Not even Zhukov, who was the most outspoken in his dealings with Stalin, went against an order which he knew to be the result of a misunderstanding. During the battle for Moscow Stalin got it into his head that a town near Moscow, called Dedovsk, had been taken by the Germans, and he ordered Zhukov to supervise its immediate recapture personally. Somewhat surprised by the order and the news, the latter made enquiries and discovered that Dedovsk had not been taken and that Stalin must have confused it with Dedovo, a small insignificant village. However, Zhukov's attempts to explain this to the Supreme Commander met with no success, and he had to go and watch the village being recaptured.

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Stalin's method of command was, for most of the war, to send the military members of the *Stavka* as representatives to supervise operations in crucial areas; they usually coordinated the actions of several army-groups (*fronty*). Zhukov and Vasilevsky were kept especially busy in this way. Shtemenko recalls that one of Stalin's first questions whenever they returned was when they proposed to leave again. Their frequent absences no doubt made it easier for Stalin to retain absolute control. He ensured that he knew more than anybody else; not even Zhukov, Deputy Commander-in-Chief from 1942, was always allowed to know what reserves the *Stavka* held, whereas Stalin knew both this and the exact state of the front-line. He received three reports a day from the General Staff and often telephoned the local commanders directly. Another source of information, but one about which the memoirists are understandably more reticent, was his watchdogs who were employed to report to him directly on the behaviour and words of the generals. Even a row between Mekhlis and Voroshilov was made the subject of a report by the former, lest Stalin should first hear of it from one of his informants.

The memoirs convincingly show that Stalin was firmly in command of the Soviet war-machine, but their attempts to cover up the embarrassing situation which prevailed at the beginning of the war are less effective. However, they effectively illustrate the current trend towards a more edifying view of Stalin.

This trend is similarly reflected in the recent new edition of the standard short history of the war. The first edition, published in 1965, contained strong criticism of Stalin—especially for his part in the Soviet preparations for war—but in the second much of this has been omitted or toned down. Analysis of the harmful effects of the military purges has been greatly shortened, and the pre-war period given a face-lift. An idea of the extent of the operation may be gained from the number of topics on which criticism of Stalin has been curtailed or cut out altogether; it includes collectivization, the Finnish War, the purges, technical and military planning, the warnings of impending invasion, and the new frontier defences. Sometimes the patient requires plastic surgery: old features are excised and replaced by new; sometimes cosmetic changes are sufficient: the same features are shown in a different light. The following may serve as an example of the cosmetic method: both editions state that the tank corps were broken up into single brigades and regiments in 1939, but they differ when it comes to describing their re-formation. In the first edition we are told: 'True, the Soviet command began to make good this mistake, but it did so too late—only at the end of 1940 was the formation of mechanized corps recommenced.'[12] In the second edition we learn that 'the Soviet command soon decided to return to the corps system'.[13] Such methods bear eloquent witness to the editors' desire to produce a more uplifting

[12] *Velikaya Otechestvennaya voina Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Moscow, 1965), p. 52.
[13] *Velikaya Otechestvennaya voina Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Moscow, 1970), p. 52.

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version of events and of Stalin in particular. Criticism is still made, but it is of a mild variety.

The articles published to mark the 30th anniversary of the German invasion conspicuously avoided Stalin and concentrated on seeing the war as proof of the resilience and capacity of the Soviet state. This suggests that the name of Stalin is still a two-edged weapon which is not used when the theme of national unity is being stressed.

The progress of Stalin's image as a war leader demonstrates that Soviet historiography mirrors the present as well as the past. It can provide useful information, but this requires careful sifting. As far as Stalin's future course is concerned, it is hard to believe that there will be any sudden change. The present Stalin still has a long journey before he reaches the pages of the 10-volume history of the second world war due to be published from 1974–77, but most of the interested parties would seem to be satisfied with him as he is. The generals have reclaimed their laurels and no longer have to listen to Khrushchev's stories; the Party leadership has provided itself with a respectable Stalin who presents them with no awkward questions, so it looks as though he will survive at least as long as does the present ruling group.

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Inspired by Amalrik

George Moldau*

AFTER a mutiny on board ship or in the army, it used to be a 'tried custom' to decimate the mutineers, that is to shoot every tenth man as a warning and a means of restoring order. It never failed to bring those left alive to their senses and to inculcate obedience. The new leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party followed a similar pattern in its treatment of the intelligentsia in Czechoslovakia. The number affected in leading positions, particularly among employees of scientific and research institutes and universities, often exceeded 10 per cent. The rest 'consolidated' and hoped that 'decimation' would not continue. It probably will not. But what chance of further development is there in a culturally and politically atrophied state, in which not a single literary weekly or monthly is published and in which every item prepared for printing, including invitations to matriculation balls, has to be approved by the censor? This is the question many of us are asking ourselves with greater or lesser concern. Reality gives the worst answer. *It works.* The whole system works—on a fairly low level, it is true; nevertheless, it works, even if it seems to be scraping the barrel all the time. A socialist state cannot very well collapse because it always has the possibility of reducing living and cultural standards proportionally for everyone and thus of maintaining a functional elite and the requisite mechanism. Provided intervention by public opinion, effective criticism, and global comparisons are precluded and a strict embargo is imposed on information, it can go on functioning for a long time. Lenin once defined the conditions for revolution. Such conditions do not prevail here, for both governing class and subjugated people can exist side by side. This lack of prospects, this reduction to *mere existence* and nothing more than existence, is the most horrifying aspect of our situation.

Most of the scientific workers, journalists, artists, and intellectuals in all fields who have been thrown out of their jobs are doing manual work, for example on the construction of the metro, or they are working as stokers, nightwatchmen, filing clerks, tram conductors, or office receptionists; the other employees, especially workers, have accepted them into their midst with expressions of solidarity. Even if the general working morale is so low that they find some time to study in their own field during working hours, these people are beginning to experience fatigue and a mental 'hangover'. This is not caused by feelings of

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guilt for what happened in 1968, but, on the contrary, by the realization that there is no way out of their present predicament, that time is flying, and that they have become mere spectators of life, unable to affect its course. They are overwhelmed by their own powerlessness and the shameless lies and banal phrases that are churned out daily by the press, radio, and television. The function of the mass media is not to inform the population but rather to rub in their helplessness, to show that, despite the fact that the whole nation thinks one thing, it is possible to repeat daily the exact opposite and present it as the truth and public opinion. It is also assumed that under the influence of these catch-phrases, the old 'stereotypes' of thinking will begin to appear. This, unfortunately, is already happening and is accompanied by total indifference to everything.

These downgraded intellectuals see, too, that life goes on; the man in the street may not listen to the radio and may complain every day about public transport in the rush-hours, but he shows no signs of wishing to revolt and improve the situation, for any kind of political activity seems absurd to him. Moreover, the generation now approaching middle age has never known an active political life; for them political activity has meant, at the most, an election campaign. Today people do not trust the politicians but they see no other alternative than to endure the existing state of affairs and manoeuvre to the best of their advantage. Bribery and doing jobs on the side for private interest and gain have become an indispensable framework for all other, including economic, relations and form the only well-functioning sub-system.

The profits from this private enterprise—in diametric opposition to the socialist principles preached for the past 20 years—go into the purchase of cars and weekend chalets and cottages. In their way of thinking, absorbed from petty bourgeois society, and their total lack of interest in politics, our working people do not differ vastly from American workers whom I know from first-hand experience.

Escape into 'private life' does not satisfy people who have been accustomed to participate in public affairs, and they long to transcend the soul-destroying daily round, to rationalize their experience, and to extract some fruit from the existing situation, into which they have been plunged against their will. Mostly former Communists, they were, naturally, flattered by the analogy between the year 1968 and the Paris Commune drawn by Eduard Goldstücker in his *Spiegel* interview. These people are endeavouring to work over and to define precisely the hitherto vague concept of 1968, which arose spontaneously. Without putting this into some future context, however, this continual emphasis of their uniqueness assumes the character of masturbation.

Czechoslovakia's fate may be instructive not only as a variant of socialist development but also as a historical variant of '*surrendering one's position*' from the viewpoints both of the governing regime's methods and of the people's reactions and attitudes. Further attempts to effect changes in the socialist countries will certainly follow (viz.

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Poland 1971) and in the event of their being liquidated by the USSR (which is equally probable), one can expect the so-called Communist governments to adopt the same course as in Czechoslovakia. A certain justification for writing this analysis is the hope that it will cure others of naivety and credulity such as was shown by Czechoslovak intellectuals towards promises made by Soviet exponents Husak and Svoboda and their lesser versions occupying top Party functions, directorships of enterprises, and chairmanships of Party organizations.

Artur London's book has acquired a special significance today: those of us who come into contact with the gentlemen at Ruzyn interrogation prison are acquainted with the mechanism of investigation and are, therefore, shockproof. I have spoken to several people in Czechoslovakia who have spent some months in custody or imprisonment and they all asserted that knowledge of London's book, Mrs. Slanska's testimony, or Artur Koestler's literary, more general, if less authentic writing steeled them to endure their situation. A chronicle of the treatment accorded recently to the Czechoslovak intelligentsia may one day serve a similar prophylactic purpose.

HOW was it possible to divide a nation, once so amazingly united, and reduce it to a state in which one citizen fears another and in which a people educated in Marxism curse only their immediate superiors, without calling to mind Marx's axiom from his *Thesis on Feuerbach* that the social system induces people to act in a particular way?

We all expected more terror, less absurdity, and a speedier tempo of consolidation, and we derided the idea that 're-Catholicization' could be carried out by means of the same ideological arguments used after 1948, for we assumed that the government needed to win people over to its viewpoint. We presupposed a retreat in the face of power pressure and the threat of force; now we have the impression that one of the main reasons for the present passivity is weariness and, above all, awareness of the unreality of the changes. Most insidious is the realization that resistance has no sense in the present international situation and heroism is a ludicrous anachronism. A relatively positive feature of the regime (which for the sake of simplicity we shall call Husak's) and its tactical procedure lies in its gradually stupefying rather than terrorizing approach. If the new regime had taken a hard line, based on Soviet nationalism, right from the outset, solidarity (cultivated throughout the years of Germanization) and perhaps heroism would have been manifested, and people would not have betrayed each other. Pressure, however, was applied very slowly; Husak's supporters appealed primarily to the common sense of the Czech intelligentsia, to their faculty for appraising the reality of a situation, and played on their traditional loyalty. If Amalrik in his 'Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?' complains of the primitiveness of the Russian masses, we can complain rather of a lack of 'primitiveness', a want of 'naive sense of honour', courage, and pride. To show an unwillingness to adapt oneself to the

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present situation—that is, publicly to preserve one's convictions and integrity—is interpreted by a certain proportion of our intelligentsia as 'simple-mindedness', as 'moral exhibitionism', and inability to hang on to important positions until times improve. Honour, morale, conscience, even falsehood and conformity, acquire a different significance in a nation such as ours, whose people have so seldom been allowed really to decide their own destiny. They grew up with an awareness of weakness, and their parents had to teach them the 'art of survival' rather than of living. We have rarely had the chance to enjoy anything more. Acting consistently according to principles has nearly always been a luxury in this country, and has often constituted a danger to the person concerned and to others. For a person to act honourably and in the light of his principles he must be convinced that his honourable act is not a mere gesture, but will have real meaning. And this is just what is lacking here. There is a general feeling that the Western countries have written us off, that any kind of effort is superfluous unless it is in accordance with a scenario agreed upon by the Great Powers. At the most we can be a sensation, and we can move only in a predetermined space. Under such circumstances the risk is out of all proportion to the results achieved.

During the past 30 years it has been brought home to us three times that our degree of sovereignty is precisely determined by the great and the powerful, to whose decisions we have ultimately to bow. Therefore, sober rationality has always necessarily triumphed over enthusiasm and emotionalism. We know that, for a long time to come, history will not play a decisive role in this state and that what is happening today is only an internal affair of Czechoslovakia, at the most of the Eastern bloc. What, then, remains but to conform and survive as our parents managed to do? And so we act according to the 'legacy of our fathers'. Those who have recanted assure their friends and acquaintances that in two or three years' time membership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party will again be open to the masses and that in the meantime not only mediocrities or utterly ruthless tyrants should be left in the Party. Existential decision-making, whether or not to join the Party, will become a thing of the past, or so they have heard, and the whole process of simultaneous marasmus and regeneration will begin again. It sounds cynical but in the final analysis it is true. Those who always toe the line, those who have recanted and thereby acquired a certain standing, will be the main representatives of all our institutions and of necessity the only partners to whom representatives of Western countries will turn. I recall a remark made by one of the main organizers of the 'sound core' of the new Communist Party: 'If someone whom we are willing to push through the screening test refuses to comply and as a result is thrown out of his job, he does not deserve sympathy. If a person sees 2,000 crowns lying on the pavement and does not pick them up, we do not pity him.'

Such—definitely not isolated—comments should not cause surprise,

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for the price we have had to pay for integrity is too high and, primarily, it is not commensurate with the effect which honourable conduct can achieve. Those who have not swum with the tide, who have clung to their convictions, enjoy great respect and have become idols of a sort, but at the same time they risk having the doors to public life and scientific work virtually closed to them for ever, as happened to many people who withdrew from political activity after 1948. Those who refused to renounce their opinions were simply and ruthlessly removed from the arena. They were written off not only in the political sense but as experts, scientists, writers, or artists. When after 10 or 15 years they were allowed to resume work in their own field (and this applied only to some), most of them found it impossible to catch up with what they had missed. In the mid-sixties when the new 'Marxist' generation, with minds sharpened by education and cleansed of fanaticism by their practical experience of socialism, went over to the offensive, these people aroused their sympathy but were often regarded as incapable or as bunglers.

The 'heroes' of 1968 were those who had been responsible for the 1948 Communist *putsch* and had installed a new 'government of workers and peasants' and those who, after initial disagreement, had joined them, adapted their ideas, or at least brandished the appropriate catchphrases. Members of this 'written off' generation are still alive and their example is a convenient excuse today for the compliant who want to play an active political part in the present regime.

Radical changes in Czechoslovakia are not usually accompanied by bloodshed so no one is 'troubled by pangs of conscience'. A widespread attitude may be expressed thus: 'Some must preserve their honour so that the nation may not disintegrate morally but at the same time sensible people must join the "sound core" of the Communist Party and, even at the price of their own demoralization, must participate in and strive to influence developments, to guide them in a more favourable direction and prevent extreme acts.' Of course, it is difficult to say how far this attitude is inspired by tactics and how much it is a self-excuse for the chance and desire to acquire a position and an excuse for self-excuse. The fact remains that after all their experiences, some members of the intelligentsia believe honourable conduct, in the sense of preserving one's convictions, to be an unnecessary sacrifice which they try to discredit in the eyes of others. The choice between honour and collaboration facing the intelligentsia of Czechoslovakia is complicated by the fact that the former, real adversaries of socialism have derived satisfaction from the defeat of 1968 which, in their view, confirmed what they had always claimed: that socialism as a system is not capable of regeneration and cannot exist without force and suppression.

The attitude of many intellectuals has been reinforced by a gradual blurring of the line between principled and consistent stands and calculating tactics, the effects of which have been felt by nearly all the working citizens of this state. The psychological significance of the 'loyalty

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tests', which were conducted at all places of work among both Communists and non-Communists, and which were regarded by many as a farce, is far-reaching. Never before in any country have so many people been faced with the existential problem expressed in the joke that the Party greeting 'Honour to work!' has been altered to 'Honour *or* work!'

I cannot judge whether those who organized this large-scale campaign to destroy the nation's character were aware of the psychological consequences and even reckoned with them, or whether they were motivated by the sheer naivety of old Party members believing in the significance of self-criticism as a secular, self-purging confession. I incline to the latter alternative and regard the tests as more or less an intuitive act of self-defence. All adult working people in this country have been required to express agreement with the 'consolidation process' and to append their signature to this more or less formal declaration, usually in front of a commission. Although they ridiculed the proceedings, in the end the overwhelming majority justified them rationally and presented themselves for screening, thereby sapping a further moral barrier within themselves; they then began to differ only in degrees of conformity and not in entirely different qualities. The few score—at the most 1–2 per cent of the members of the sound core of the Czechoslovak Communist Party—who 'remained steadfast' in 1968, distributed the Soviet newssheet *Zpravy* and met at Cechie could never have brought the whole nation to its knees and reduced it to a state of apathy without the psychological effects of the 'loyalty tests'.

The presence of tanks and a large number of enemy troops is generally used as an excuse. But it is only an excuse. Gun turrets on tanks are only a backcloth to lend courage to the activists; they could never have enforced the self-humiliating process called consolidation. In a state where it is an annual problem to send out telephone bills in good time and where the administrators of apartment blocks fail to collect the rent at regular intervals, the authorities have succeeded in amassing an inconceivable amount of incriminating political material on every citizen. This was made possible through the naivety, fear and cooperation of every one of us. Failing to learn the lesson of the pre-war Communist slogans—'Not a man out of work, not a heller off the wage'—or the Munich pact, or the Moscow agreement of 1968, people again joined in the game in the hope of saving their skin. Scientific workers, politicians, publicists, and historians obediently wrote out a list of their journeys abroad and the articles they had published; Party discipline and the image of the omnipotence of the state, fixed in their minds by trite stories of vigilance and honourable Regional Party secretaries, typified by Bagar in Rezac's novel, *Forming the Ranks*, made them afraid to lie or falsify. They carefully copied out pages of journals in which they had published articles, and after two or three months were amazed at the amount of information members of the screening commission had on them.

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Actually, there were so few 'true believers' (1–2 per cent of employees) that it was often difficult to set up a commission. In this, 'sensible' people or 'sober realists' played a pitiful role as they strove to hang on to and secure their jobs and positions. People of this ilk are predominant in the 'new Party' and the state leadership. Such members of the commissions argued:

> The entry of the troops is a fact, a reality which cannot be ignored. Every victor makes certain demands, so if we wish to preserve the existence of our institute, workplace, team, branch etc., we shall ultimately have to change our Party functionaries and perhaps sack a few people, promising them maximum support and help in finding suitable jobs elsewhere. But only promising. We understand each other and we know the ropes. It's a question of having your cake and eating it.

The Party purge was often carried out against a background of argumentation of this kind. Even the worst members of the core wanted to 'save'.

Dismissal was sometimes facilitated by the screened person who regarded himself as an 'honourable' victim, a ransom paid for the other employees. Those who had to go had usually been very active and their departure from their jobs or functions affected the situation. The 'forward lines' in the Party committees and trade union organs were replaced by defence players who persuaded the others to adopt a reasonable attitude towards demands for a 'general analysis and evaluation'. 'We'll write a self-criticism for the whole enterprise without referring to individuals; if we do have to mention names, we'll blame everything on the *emigrés*.' The nation accustomed to occupations again resorted to compromise. A month later a demand was presented for a further and more profound analysis of 1968; people had already grown used to phrases about rightist opportunists and now cleverly juggled with concepts, not realizing that in a further three months' time they would have to add to their enumeration of actions, compiled irresponsibly and often with needless zeal, the names of the initiators or at least of those who had attended important meetings and had not protested. Tactics provoked counter-tactics; personal enmities were aroused; fear of competition played a role; people writing reports on themselves and their colleagues forgot who had manipulated them into the game and often began to hate each other quite sincerely. Ignoring the lessons of the past, they began to see enemies in the first place among themselves and not in the system; they took revenge for unfortunately expressed words or criticism at meetings and voluntarily submitted material on themselves and their fellow-workers, confessing in banal phrases to intentions which they had never, in fact, entertained. For instance, the analysis of the so-called 'counter-revolutionary' activity at Prague University covered nearly *nine hundred* pages. On orders from the Regional Committee of the Communist Party and experts appointed by the Prague City Committee, some parts were re-written and formulations

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made more precise as many as eight times, each time by different people with slightly different interests and different friends and enemies. I do not remember how many times Artur London, Rudolf Slansky, Sling, Vlado Clementis, and Eduard Goldstücker wrote and re-wrote their 'confessions'. I know only that the pressure was similar, except that this time it was exerted on a whole group.

Naturally, it was neither possible nor desirable to sack everybody. Those who have escaped so far are under constant threat of dismissal: they all know that their dossiers are filed somewhere at the District Committee and that action can be taken against them at any time; they know that the process of selection has not been completed. This is the secret of the success of the consolidation process and the pliability of the people; this is the mechanism. Employees of an important institute of the Academy of Sciences were told at the beginning of 1971: 'The wage fund is to be cut by 20 per cent, therefore 5 per cent of the employees will have to go. Each of you has the chance to be one of those who remains.'

The first of the expelled Party members had been dismissed a year before, and during that year of self-critical reports custom had blunted general reactions. Now, remembering the fate of their colleagues, the staff of this institute sat up late into the night writing undignified self-appraisals, in which they weighed every formulation so that it should sound like proof of a genuinely self-critical, 'Marxist and Communist' attitude and at the same time 'should not disclose anything about them that was not already known and which could harm them'. People capable of really original scientific work admitted to me that they had worked over, re-formulated and re-written these self-analyses several times. In a number of cases it did not help them. These people feel humiliated at having been forced into such an act; they are angry with themselves, yet at the same time they try to justify their weakness and blame it on someone else. Some day they will want to take their revenge, yet at the same time they will fear every change, because it would contain the danger that someone else might discover these shameful documents and in print demand to know the names of the authors (as in 1968). Even at the expense of their own elementary interests, such people will involuntarily retard progress, fearing the consequences of a greater degree of freedom. The price they have paid for 'survival' is, from the moral point of view, too high and the character of many has been broken to the point where they will not be capable of genuinely creative work in the future.

Comrades Husak and Co. complain indignantly that the West is 'slandering' us and drawing an analogy between 'consolidation' and the Stalinist regime. I agree with Husak. A comparison with the fifties is not tenable, not only because there have as yet been no executions, but because the political atmosphere is different. In the fifties the Czechoslovak Communist Party put forward a new ideology, the possibilities of which had not been exhausted, and the idea of socialism

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was deeply rooted in the working class; most of the writers, too, supported some kind of modified socialism. Socialism contained an element of promise which was strengthened by Czechoslovakia's 'liberation' by the Red Army, and by the cold war, while the closing of the borders hermetically sealed the country from contamination by other ideas. In every nation there are only a limited number of people capable of reacting politically, for whom participation represents something of real value. After 1948 these people emigrated, were imprisoned, or became truly convinced communists, acting from political awareness. Therefore, they were all the more dangerous, hard and 'genuine'; they were not afraid of assuming responsibility.

The present regime has not introduced a new ideology or even attempted to do so. It only repeats with dogged obtuseness what was initiated long ago (pioneer uniforms and scarves, wall newspapers, salvage collections, anti-imperialist slogans) as though by repetition, by stereotyped thinking and acting, by a return to old and once-tried ways and methods, they themselves are acquiring a sense of security. This is understandable because the generation that has come to power again knows no other variant of socialism than that of ostentatious display. People explain jokingly that there are so many slogans and notices in the streets because the present Party members are too old to be able to read newspaper headlines, and the flags and bunting are there to conceal from the Party presidium the fact that the people are shaking their fists at them. So flags are flown from schools and offices (hardly any from private dwellings); and this leads to further cynicism and escape into private activities. Prague has never seen so many cats and dogs as now. The new regime must be aware of the current apathy but it does not even attempt to arouse enthusiasm or to gain supporters by any other method than promises of positions and money. Is this a proof of weakness and cynicism or of strength, or even arrogance?

If the new leaders were to offer a new variant of ideology, they might win over at least some young people who crave for high positions but need certain illusions about themselves and moral justification for their careerism. But this, too, is denied young people. Even pioneers are confronted with rational arguments that 'the red scarf round their neck makes no difference to their games and outings'; for the 'honour' of presenting Party functionaries with flowers at conferences they are awarded 60-crown tickets to the 'Holiday on Ice' show.

The new leadership has gradually deprived of influence even those who were possibly the only ones who, by their fanaticism, could have instilled some enthusiasm into the old ideology, i.e. the 'comrades from Cechie'. It is not fortuitous that a number of the new functionaries of the SSM (Youth Union) are children of these old pre-war Party members and that they were the first to join the ultra-left, the Jodas group. Affiliation with the Jodas group enabled them to see themselves in a better light, to avoid sinking immediately into the cynicism of the middle generation. Today, even Professor Jaromir Lang, a friend of former

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[Education] Minister Hrbek, declares that 'we envisaged things differently' and tries to establish contact with rightists at least over beer in pubs.

The reaction of our young people is sometimes incomprehensible to the West. They do not demonstrate, they do not revolt, they look on silently even when their contemporaries are expelled from school, and again a number of youngsters join the SSM before their matriculation or state examinations as their older colleagues joined the CSM (Youth Union) in the past. They observe the rules to about the same extent that hippies respect traffic lights at crossroads. Otherwise, politics does not exist for them; and a large proportion of youth expresses in private entirely uncritical admiration of the West, going as far as to approve of the war in Vietnam and to pass cynical comments on the deaths of Soviet cosmonauts. If they do not think in terms of organized resistance, it is because they are aware that every indication of revolt will be swallowed up in silence—nobody will ever hear about it, for there is no yellow press here that, with an eye to profit, would report their protests. Today's young people have never had the opportunity, apart from 1968, to differentiate in their political opinions, and now their particular standpoint takes the form only of a universal rejection. Even young people who are not indifferent and want to be active although they reject the leading role of the Communist Party, are not accustomed to think for themselves and to act and react independently. The overwhelming majority, however, particularly young workers, regard politics as being absolutely no concern of theirs and therefore not worth even a protest. This is exactly the same state of affairs that existed under Novotny. It can, therefore, be assumed that if conditions change, young people will react differently from now.

Today, apart from *apparatchiki* and 'Jodasites', the Party consists mainly of people who have joined and remained in the Party for purely existential reasons and who have never over-exerted themselves. This ballast forms about two-thirds of the membership; these members tell and pass on political jokes, keep the former active and now expelled members informed about Party plenary meetings and reactions in Party circles, and carefully fill out part-time job contracts for non-employees in their own names, the work being done and fee received by the expelled members. Such Party members are referred to thus: 'He got himself screened, but you can safely say what you like about him.' A remark by a zealous colleague of Academician Richta's is typical of a certain attitude: 'The Kosiks should be grateful to us. Instead of meetings and politics, they can devote themselves to study, and when the time comes, they will have, in addition, the halo of martyrdom and clean hands.'

Who, then, out of the major part of the nation which is now in opposition takes an active interest in politics, at least as regards opinions? The same, once politically committed section of the intelligentsia which is trying in some way to preserve its integrity and a high level of

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specialized knowledge of politics. This numerous group is again seeking justification for itself in certain historical laws and parallels and, with a naivety worthy of the initiators of the nineteenth-century national revival, believes that 'things can't go on like this' and that 'no government can rule indefinitely without the support of the people'. Perhaps it cannot rule indefinitely, but it certainly can for a very long time; and to assume that progress is automatic is also naive.

This section of the population has recently been augmented by a number of former Party functionaries who were removed from their posts in 1968–70 and who would normally never have understood this group of intellectuals or found themselves in the same boat with them. Today, these former *apparatchiki* are being strongly influenced by downgraded journalists, writers, and scientists, as though in affiliating with the latter they are seeking the support which was once provided by their Party function. Some of them take unnecessary risks, wishing, as it were, to atone for their previous activity and justify themselves in their own eyes. But this again is a non-independent stand; they are justifying themselves through sacrifice for something with which they do not identify themselves. A strong feeling of ex-Party membership prevails among them; this is expressed in mutual respect but also hatred vis-à-vis the present *apparatchiki*, and is reminiscent of the relationship between officers of two warring armies.

Distinctions are still being drawn among the expelled members as to whether they are true Communists or are not and never were. It may seem laughable, but it is a characteristic feature of this time and is important for our future development. Mixed feelings and negative attitudes towards campaigns and developments in 1968 and in the preceding stages are forgotten, enshrouded in a retrospective apotheosis of the year 1968 which *ex post facto* is regarded as a miracle which could have solved everything. This is another illusion under which this nation is living and will continue to live for a long time to come. The past has been erased and it is in poor taste to remind people of it, just as it is to entertain retrospective doubts about the feasibility of the ideas proclaimed then, or the potentialities of socialism as the optimal social system. A discussion of this kind is taboo, for people feel that it would constitute an ideological confirmation of their expulsion from the Party; therefore, they still adhere to principles which they often questioned even in Novotny's era. The only uniting principle has been and still is people's attitude to 1968 and their expulsion from the Communist Party. Up to now.

It is necessary to make distinctions among Party functionaries. There is a minimum of fanatics among them; the predominant types are dull and amoral; their moderation and obedience are a guarantee of the durability of this flat and soul-destroying regime. These people will not go to extremes, therefore in the regime which they head there will be no executions, and no resort to death and terror, which would provoke active resistance. Executions would shock the population but a four

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to five years' jail sentence soon passes, especially if the prisoner is someone else and not me. I hate to say this, but our immediate future hinges on differentiation among our amoral *apparatchiki* who vary at least in degree of intelligence and cynicism. Therefore, I am always pleased when a fanatical *apparatchik* is replaced by a relatively clever one.

Among people 'revolving round politics', on one side or the other, the possibility of political participation is of vital importance for, unlike the West, politics is the only form of 'enterprise' in Czechoslovakia. It is virtually the only medium through which one can intervene in events, leave one's mark in one's age and take risks, the only medium which offers the chance of a rapid rise in the world, a career, and a headlong fall. This is its attraction for many.

All the politically engaged groups, however, are aware that life goes on without them and that ordinary people, concerned only with securing the Sunday joint, regard them as dreamers, that the people, not as a spiritual source, but people in the sociological sense, no longer live with these problems. Apart from shortages and other economic deficiencies, only three things infuriate our people: the blatant stupidity of state propaganda, which is an insult to their intelligence, kowtowing to the USSR, and the presence of Red Army troops. Whoever eliminates or mitigates the last two factors will be a hero, even if the regime as a whole remains intact. The public has already got used to propaganda about our 'economic miracle', and thinking people realize that extrication from the Eastern bloc will in time become impossible because we shall be unable to keep pace with the West in the economic sphere. Many are aware that this affects not only the state but themselves as individuals: they see that when the frontiers are opened again, even to those with questionable political profiles, they will have nothing to offer the West and will find themselves in the position of poor relations. This is the basis of the ambivalent attitude to politics and politicians here. On the one hand, it would afford the ex-politicians some satisfaction if the situation here were to deteriorate still further; on the other hand, they know that those who did not choose to emigrate must relinquish all hope of participating in world problems today and probably in the future and must realize that all problems, including world problems, will assume different dimensions and a different key in this country. Whether they like it or not, the only relevant factor for those who have remained is our own economic and political set-up, and therefore they must try to influence it at least to a degree that will make it bearable. This means that they will again have to face the problem of cooperating with a regime which they cannot support and will again be compelled to solve problems of a moral nature, or else to learn to live a strictly private life, knowing that they are enclosed in a 'chalk circle' from which they cannot break away.

THIS brings us logically to a conception of the future, and possible further developments in Czechoslovakia. Here, too, a number of variants

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and ideas exist about which it would be inappropriate to generalize. People ask whether their present subjugation will also last 300 years or whether it will be shorter, and console themselves with the typical fallacy of modern historicism that development always leads from one point to another, and nurture a biased interpretation of evolution as something which must prove favourable to us. As regards the future, the feeling prevails among those who are willing and able to consider it that our future does not depend upon us, that small, weak, and betrayed on all sides, we are sacrifices on the altar of the political interests of the world powers. Although I know that emphasis on psychological comparisons in history is unpalatable, I cannot help seeing an analogy with a person who, having grown accustomed to a certain position in his childhood, manoeuvres himself as an adult into situations where he can react in his customary manner. Old communists have always been in opposition or in power only under conditions of real or fictive struggle (projected by themselves into their milieu). The generation that was responsible for 1968 grew up in this kind of atmosphere. Actually, this is true of the rest of the population, too, for the majority have always been in opposition to the status quo. National traditions and history bear this out—hence the ' difficulty ' in compiling textbooks for schoolchildren. This nation has always been held together not by varying kinds of allegiance but by dissidence and negation, which are easier and less demanding. The characteristic of contentment and assent seems scarcely to have existed, for under historical circumstances it could be cultivated only to a negligible degree. Even in 1968, which is, as I have said, being retrospectively idealized, people were until 21 August united by a common hatred of the representatives of the Novotny regime rather than by a common programme. But (even in the form of negation) people indubitably felt that they were protagonists and participators; therefore, after the drastic liquidation of these opportunities, the potentialities of 1968 were inflated to huge dimensions; 1968 became a symbol which now makes the contrast between wishful thinking and the wretchedness of reality more sharp. In 1968 people felt that they were being taken seriously, that they were being addressed in a comprehensible language, cleansed of Orwellian logic, that they were needed, that they could do something for themselves, that responsibility lay on their shoulders.

Today people do not believe a single word of ' The Lesson ' or any other documents of that type; if the mass media should happen to speak the truth, they would not be believed. But negation is not a programme. People are unsated spiritually; they receive no stimuli other than those that intensify their blunting negation. They are losing the habit of reading and discussing politics, and it will be difficult for them to discern the moment when things take a slight turn for the better. The mechanism of unsated hunger for information is more disastrous than the deadening excess of information in the yellow press, for spiritual starvation and stimulus deficiency bring all down to the same level and render stratification of opinions impossible, thus widening the gap between the small

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circle of intellectuals that go to great lengths to secure information and the rest of the population. A situation void of positive impulses gives rise to a vacuum filled only with hatred, and that hatred will engulf everyone who some day puts forward any kind of programme that *is not a mere negation of the present regime.*

Unfortunately, I believe that a future variant of 1968—if it is ever brought about—will take one of two possible forms: either it will be engineered from above and will follow the course of a palace *putsch* or it will be exceedingly bloody and will have nothing in common with socialist ideals. In 1968 there was no tendency to annihilate opponents; I am afraid that in the future there will be, although this is 'not in the national tradition'. A number of former activists are aware of this, which is another reason why they have resigned themselves to playing no part in politics. Formerly committed scientists have also consciously relinquished all inclination to participate in politics, convinced that for the next 10 years or so it will have no role in this country and that a further radical change will be too slaughterous for them as humanists to become involved. Therefore they seek significant values in quite a different field and many of them have learned to live with the realization of political hopelessness and to fulfil themselves in other spheres. Of course, this standpoint again *diminishes the hope of change through internal forces,* for the overwhelming majority of the nation does not even have this stratified attitude towards politics and socialism, indeed, refuses to have anything to do with politics. Socialism is no longer understood as a programme or an ideal but rather as the designation of a kind of system. In the minds of small children socialism is a demarcation line equivalent to racial or geographical division, black and white, and the man-in-the-street's attitude does not diverge markedly from this. However, unlike common racial division, in this case evaluation of auto-stereotypes takes the worst possible form and the image of socialism is not linked with predicates corresponding to the original meaning of the word or to what this concept is associated with in the West. Our people are so benumbed by stock phrases about 'the Leninist road to Communism' as 'the shining future', that anyone *who envisages persuading them into any kind of action in the future* will be compelled at the beginning formally at least *completely to deny socialism* and, unfortunately, Marxism in order to gain their confidence. In this, too, I see the danger of our nation being excluded from the current trend of world developments.

Although it sounds absurd, hopes for a solution to our nation's situation are pinned on the USSR. *A priori* devaluation of the authenticity of everything that is printed in the papers has lowered the level of information and interest in information published in this country and also diminished interest in world affairs; the attention of those who still take some interest is concentrated mainly on the USSR and its internal development. Consciousness of integration in the Eastern bloc is so widespread that the Czechoslovak public expects nothing from the USA

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or the West but expects much from changes in the East and consequently in that country. The second, possibly more important, hope lies in *regeneration from the untenable*. People have become so accustomed to think in economic terms that they postulate the inevitability of certain changes on the grounds that the economy is 'going to the dogs' and that it will allegedly be necessary to recall experts who will round off the sharp edges of stupidity, thus making it bearable. Optimists are waiting hopefully for the end of the consolidation process (i.e. for the time when all the clever people will have been dismissed) when the activists will have no further programme and will have to start 'doing something'; they will then need specialists and capable people and it will be possible to start again in the same way as under Novotny in the early sixties.

In conclusion I should like to point out the most significant 'lesson' which can be drawn from the present regime in Czechoslovakia and which will probably determine the key for the development of the whole Eastern bloc. This is the fact that *today it is possible to govern without open, brutally oppressive, terror and without a generally acceptable ideology*. It is possible to govern while turning a deaf ear to public opinion and the attitudes and reactions of the people and even the *political consciousness of the regime's apparatus* and its power transmission belts. Other regimes, including Hitler's, needed and need enthusiasts and fanatics. The *remarkable feature ensuring the durability* of this regime is that it *does not require a consenting people* at all in order to govern, and with a Byzantine arrogance, quite inappropriate to the twentieth century and our nation, it is utterly impervious to what people think. As in Parkinson's law, the regime perpetuates itself through its apparatus—plus the compulsory adornment of schools and buildings with flags. The population even works, for people know that they have to earn a living, even if the state and the state machinery continually thwart and complicate the process. Its cynicism is so perfectly organized, so almost impressively amoral that, at the drop of a hat and without major shocks (as was demonstrated after the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956), this regime would be capable of turning its ideological coat and calmly invoking entirely different gods and serving other powers. This, I think, is a further fact and capacity with which the West does not reckon.

Prague, August 1971

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Shawcross's Dubcek—a Different Dubcek

'Moravus'

THIS biography *, which has now appeared in a German edition, has not as yet been reviewed by anyone in Czechoslovakia, that is, by anyone with an intimate knowledge of the man, who has lived through the events and can best judge how far the author has succeeded in presenting a true picture. The present writer admires Dubcek's human qualities, but as a scholar he is concerned '*sine ira et studio*' also to examine his political weaknesses and mistakes. And the Shawcross biography offers an opportunity to summarize some of the experiences of 1968 with the hindsight of three years, and in the light of subsequent events. Naturally, a foreign author unacquainted with the language of the country is faced with many obstacles; our purpose is not to dwell on the numerous errors throughout the book, but to consider how far Shawcross has succeeded in interpreting Dubcek's personality, the broad purport of his policy, its trends and limits, and how far he has managed within the wider context to detect the domestic and foreign pressures that brought to disaster the policies that will forever be linked with the name of Dubcek.

SHAWCROSS comes closest to the truth when writing of Dubcek the man—his sensitivity, profound humanity, anxiety not to cause anyone unnecessary harm, his consideration for his associates, his understanding of the lot of the ordinary man, qualities hard to find in such measure among other statesmen of our day. Indeed, for a politician Dubcek possesses almost too much decency and loyalty. All this constitutes the charisma that has won so much sympathy. And in the light of subsequent events, compared with Husak's cold ruthlessness, his disloyalty to friends and allies, his harshness, many people in Czechoslovakia have come to esteem Dubcek's qualities the more. In this Dubcek will always win and his political stature is enhanced thereby. Shawcross also shows an excellent appreciation of how, still in the thick of events, Dubcek symbolized what is now referred to as the post-January policy in Czechoslovakia. The role of social myths in modern political life was pointed out by Sorel, and here we have a man who, in his lifetime, appeared as an almost mythical symbol personifying the yearnings of the Czechs and Slovaks, and in a sense of people in other parts of the world, for social justice and decency in public life, so that it need no longer be said 'politics is a dirty game'. In this respect Dubcek remained true to himself until the end, and

* *Dubcek* by William Shawcross (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970).

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since popular symbols are born and live on independently of the will of the mighty, the Dubcek symbol will remain, unshaken by Husak's attempt 'to cast down this false idol'. In appreciating all this Shawcross has undoubtedly been successful but, unfortunately, in other matters he is much farther from the truth.

Dubcek's political career was not nearly as purposeful and straightforward as his biographer suggests; far too much weight is given to a fairly rapid advance up the ladder. True, he must have been influenced as a young man by the environment of Trencin in the Vah Valley, which was industrially and culturally the most developed part of Slovakia; not by chance did Husak refer to it in 1968 as 'the capital of progress in Slovakia'. Though smalltown, almost rural compared with western centres, the area boasted the most modern textile and footwear factories in the wartime Slovak state. This environment, and his father's acquaintance with the United States, may well have given Dubcek an insight into modern forms of industry and management. The significance of his address at the funeral of Karol Smidke in 1952 is, however, overstated. As was always the case at official Party funerals, he was delegated by the appropriate Central Committee department, his address was written for him and approved. Moreover, the choice fell on this unknown provincial functionary because none of the higher-ups wanted to compromise themselves, while by sending a man of lower rank there was also an element of derogation towards the deceased, who as a former chairman of the Slovak National Council was entitled to greater honours. Only later did Smidke's funeral acquire a different significance.

The portrayal of Dubcek's further career is also over-simplified. His two years in Prague (1960–62) were not as noteworthy as the author suggests. Oldrich Cernik had been compelled to quit the post of Central Committee Secretary for Industry following a violent attack on him by Bruno Köhler involving accusations of revisionism in his decentralization policy of 1958–59. Dubcek was brought in as the man to correct the revisionist errors, the man trusted by the Soviets and Novotny. And he did not owe the Soviet confidence to having studied in Moscow with Brezhnev—the difference in age is too great for that; it was later, as a high-ranking official, that a closer acquaintance grew out of a common passion for hunting. But Dubcek had long been regarded by Moscow as especially reliable because he spoke fluent Russian, knew the customs and methods of the Soviet Party and altogether appeared to be the most pro-Soviet of the Czechoslovak communist officials. There was also the fact that, having been posted to Intelligence during his period of military service, he had contacts in these circles, too.

His arrival in 1960 in Prague coincided with the dismantling of the Slovak national administration, and Novotny wanted to compensate by bringing more Slovaks to the capital city. Dubcek, by his willingness and obedience, so far won Novotny's confidence that he was promoted

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to the Politburo and sent back to Slovakia as Bacilek's right-hand man in the Slovak Central Committee. Only at this point did Novotny discover that the compliant young man also possessed a mind of his own, and then came the real conflict. But the issue was not Bacilek's dismissal—that followed from the Kolder Report [on the political trials—translator's note] which included the recommendation that Bacilek be removed from the post of Slovak Secretary, and the Central Committee duly approved that in April 1963; the disagreement was whether the successor should be Chudik, as Novotny wished, or Dubcek, the candidate of the Slovak *apparat*, anxious that an outsider should not be put at its head (this was the first public appearance of the grouping Bilak, Janik, Pecho, Salgovic in support of Dubcek). This rebellion by the Slovak *apparat* had no deeper significance at the time —that came later. Revolts by the 'youth' whom Novotny had raised to higher posts were everyday occurrences just then, and few showed him any proper 'gratitude'. The ranks of Novotny's opponents were progressively joined by Barak, Cernik, Kolder, Indra and others.

The above facts serve to correct the interpretation of Dubcek's career as leading unequivocally to the point where he, and he alone, was destined to be the leader of 'January'. His political development and the trend of his views did not point indubitably to this. It is impossible to agree with Shawcross that this was the man seen from the start as best qualified to represent the policies inaugurated in January 1968; it was not a case of there being only one possible 'heir to the throne'. Once Novotny had lost the argument about dividing the posts of President and First Secretary of the Party, thereby forfeiting the chance of naming his successor (he had chosen Martin Vaculik), a whole list of candidates emerged. Hendrych had his speech ready to deliver upon assuming the post of First Secretary, Cernik and Kolder had their eyes on the job, and Smrkovsky was a possible candidate. When, after two days of arguing, Novotny saw the game was up, he wanted at all costs to prevent the election of anyone from what he called the 'Ostrava faction' (Cernik, Kolder); being aware of the rivalry among all the above-named, and others waiting in the background (Indra and others), he nominated Lenart. By putting forward a Slovak he ruled out, in view of the tension prevailing at the time, any opposing nomination of a Czech. Consequently, the anti-Novotny wing, to block the election of Lenart, came out with Dubcek who was on the whole acceptable to all the other candidates because he put their rivals out of the running. So the race was won by an outsider, a man whom, even on the evening of 4 January, nobody had taken into account. For the Czech public, to whom Dubcek was quite unknown, the surprise was all the greater.

Few of those who voted for the new Secretary had considered how to formulate and publish the policy to be adopted. They all assured him of their support, but few knew how to advise him. His rivals regarded him as a stopgap until such time as the post would fall to

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them (Kolder and Indra openly, Strougal more in the background). Novotny banked on Dubcek proving unable to cope and so giving him the opening for a come-back. Dubcek could rely on only a few Presidium members (Kriegel, Spacek, Boruvka, Bilak), while the rest tried from the outset to topple him. That the majority of the Presidium put their personal aims above the interests of the movement and their country was bound to cause trouble. This post-January Presidium was not a homogeneous body of supporters of what came subsequently to be termed 'the post-January policy'; up to the end of March it included Novotny men (Lastovicka, Lenart, Simunek) who put serious obstacles in Dubcek's way. It was not just the new First Secretary's initial inexperience and indecision that caused the 'loss of tempo', which was only gradually overcome in the ensuing months. (One cannot deny that in leaving for Bratislava immediately after his election Dubcek showed a rather light-hearted attitude; instead of taking over the safes, his office, and making the first arrangements, he went off to a hockey match.)

January was a month of groping for what to do; time was running on and people were growing impatient. Something had to be done to reassure them. But Dubcek chose the most unsuitable occasion for announcing his programme—the anniversary of February 1948, at the ceremony in the presence of Brezhnev, Gomulka, Ulbricht, and the rest. Even after last-minute amendments during the night, his speech was bound to fill the other communist leaders with horror at the idea of anything similar spilling over into their countries. The inexperience of some of his foreign affairs advisers had driven him into conflict at an unpropitious and definitely premature moment. It would have been better to have delivered the usual formal address at such a gathering and to have kept the programme for the Central Committee or for a public meeting of a purely domestic character. While up to that moment Dubcek had been regarded as a man enjoying Brezhnev's especial favour, he now appeared as one suspected of revisionism, and that at a time when he could not rely on a firm majority in the Central Committee or Presidium.

In January there were two alternatives, to embark on partial reforms of the existing system, or to go for radical change of a revolutionary nature. One or the other course needed to be chosen and resolutely followed, and the choice was still open in January because the public were apathetic, seeing the whole affair as a palace revolution and Dubcek as a 'new Russian *satrap*'. If, at that time, he had opted for piecemeal reforms of Novotny's set-up, there would have been no enthusiasm, but people would gradually have become reconciled. This course called, however, for swift action, to decide procedure, make the essential personnel changes, and halt demands for more radical measures. Then he would have had to lean firmly on the *apparat*, choose the right men for such a policy (Indra, Kolder, Bilak), agree with them on division of power, and go ahead regardless of all else.

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It would have been sufficient to announce that the resolutions of the 13th Party Congress were being properly implemented, whereas that had not previously been done, and to nip in the bud any movement towards press freedom and so on—as Gierek has done since December 1970, or Novotny after the Soviet 20th Congress in 1956.

A decision in favour of far-reaching political and economic change could be operated only when the masses started to move, which would be impossible without the help of the press, radio, and television—in which case it was right to relax censorship, with the sole exception of foreign affairs. Then, of course, it would have been essential to achieve big changes in the Central Committee membership, which could not be done without convening congress. Therefore it would be necessary to rely on the most progressive men in the Central Committee (Smrkovsky, Sik, Kriegel, and others) and get congress called as soon as possible.

Dubcek was unable to decide between these alternatives. At times he behaved as if he was aiming at minor changes, and he selected people accordingly (Bilak, Indra, and Strougal); at others he wanted to launch out on a grand scale, whereupon he brought in Sik, Kriegel, and Smrkovsky. The policy of minor reform was matched by seeking minor adjustments in relations with the USSR; a big change would have needed the backing of a shift in these relations at least of Rumanian proportions. The wavering gave rise to much tension and confusion. Not until June and July 1968, when the special meetings and the Party conferences at district and regional levels had come out unreservedly for radical political change, did Dubcek seem to incline towards the second alternative—but not even then wholeheartedly.

The same went for relations with other communist parties, a field where Dubcek still had the minimum of experience. In aiming at radical reform he was bound to face disagreement on the part of the Soviet leadership and objections from Gomulka, Ulbricht, and Zivkov. One course would have been to refuse to enter into any discussion whatsoever about internal Czechoslovak affairs (but first he would have had to be sure of a clear majority of like-minded men in the Presidium who would back him without wavering). In that event he would have had to act as Georgiu Dej did in 1961, or at least like Novotny in 1964.

It must be noted here that Shawcross's account of Novotny's policies lacks knowledge and insight into the different phases. It is not true that Khrushchev was in favour of all-out rehabilitation—he never dared to tackle the main Soviet political trials, and only members of the armed forces were rehabilitated in the full sense of the term; Novotny's rehabilitation measures kept in step with the Soviet, and went a good deal further after 1962 not so much thanks to Novotny as to the pressure of awakening public opinion.

Novotny came into open conflict with Brezhnev in 1964, over the sacking of Khrushchev, when the Party Presidium in Prague presumed to

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express its regret. Fearing revenge from the 'Gottwaldites' (Siroky, Köhler, Bacilek), Novotny took action to prevent them getting together with the Soviet leaders. He demanded the recall of the Soviet Ambassador Zimyanin, conducted an 'anti-Soviet' campaign inside the Party with Svestka, Fojtik, Auersperg and others, accusing Brezhnev of carrying out a bureaucratic neo-Stalinist *putsch*; criticism of some aspects of Soviet affairs was permitted, the Party Secretariat approved Hendrych's proposal to allow publication of Michal Reiman's study of the October Revolution, and Novotny ordered Cernik to prepare defensive measures in the event that Brezhnev should resort to economic sanctions. With Novotny's approval, discussion of a Czechslovak military doctrine was revived in the armed forces. In foreign policy the anti-China campaign was halted, and the quarrels with Yugoslavia were settled (even in 1961 Novotny had planned to bring a so-called Yugoslav group to trial—now he found Tito a man after his own heart). With the Rumanians, too, there was reconciliation; in propaganda for home consumption they were no longer labelled as nationalists, indeed it was suggested that they had a number of justifiable complaints against Soviet behaviour. A phase of wooing the intellectuals found its most open expression at the 13th Party Congress in 1965; the resolution on ideological policy adopted there was labelled as revisionist in the Soviet Union.

Shawcross has failed to understand this 'late Novotnyism' and therefore he cannot appreciate why, when fearing that things had gone too far Novotny started to back-pedal in the summer of 1967, it became fairly easy to unseat him.

Dubcek failed, in the new conflict with Brezhnev, to draw on Novotny's experience of 1964. By not refusing to talk about internal Czechoslovak affairs at the meeting of First Secretaries in Prague in February 1968 and, still more importantly, at the Dresden meeting, and by accepting the rules of the game as laid down by Brezhnev, he let himself be manoeuvred into a position where he had lost every round from the start; it was as if the Czechoslovak football team had taken on five other teams at once and presented them with the referee's whistle into the bargain.

Dresden demonstrated that the Soviet leaders were determined to do everything to stop the course on which Czechoslovakia had entered. At this point the Dubcek leadership had the choice of accepting the criticism and renouncing any substantial changes, or of refusing to discuss internal affairs, departing forthwith, and preparing all necessary measures. In the second case, the first step would have been to convene the Central Committee immediately to consider a motion for calling congress in May, the earliest possible date (technically feasible because the regional conferences entitled to elect congress delegates had already been called for April). But Dubcek and the other progressive members of the Presidium wavered, causing a further loss of tempo, now not

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just at home but in the field of foreign policy which was gaining pre-eminent importance for the future of the country.

By accepting the Soviet rules of the game the Dubcek leadership—divided in its views on the next steps on the home and international fronts—involved itself in continual difficulties (renewed talks in May, the Warsaw meeting, Cierna, etc.). In a similar situation, when the benevolent Khrushchev wanted to have Georgiu Dej removed, the Rumanian Party leaders adopted a firm, united stand: decision about their leaders and policy was theirs alone, no one had a right to interfere, not even the Soviet Party Secretary Khrushchev. The Albanians did likewise when the same benevolent Khrushchev tried to oust the leaders of the Party of Labour, and especially its First Secretary, Enver Hoxha. The Soviet military base at Vlora was at once surrounded by Albanian troops, the garrison disarmed and deported from the country. True, Albania has a fortunate geographical position. And the Rumanians, while even worse situated than Czechoslovakia, are not pursuing any dangerously radical political and economic reforms. The Rumanian and Albanian conflicts took place, of course, in a different international atmosphere, with China not yet in voluntary isolation as in 1968. While in those days the Chinese took a tolerant view of Rumanian ideology, though it differed from their own, up to August 1968 they were denouncing the Czechoslovak experiment as revisionist. True, in any case, Dubcek showed little interest in seeking contact with the Chinese communists, nor did he move to get the Rumanians to help him make such contact. 'The Little Entente', as the close relations with Yugoslavia and Rumania were sometimes termed, only half in jest, could not alone provide an adequate counter-weight to growing Soviet pressure (moreover, allusions to a Little Entente upset the Hungarians, who saw such a grouping as hostile to themselves). The sterile policies of the Kiesinger government in West Germany and the pre-election agony of the Johnson administration also contributed to a far from auspicious framework for the Czecho-slovak experiment.

While he ignores this international scene, Shawcross definitely overrates the potential internal difficulties facing Dubcek's policies. There really was no viable alternative here. Once he had decided to call congress for the beginning of September, Dubcek's standing improved enormously; the Extraordinary Annual General Meetings of Party branches and the district and regional conferences put paid to any hopes that the conservative elements in the Party had enter-tained of making a peaceful come-back. When their leaders totted up the delegates elected, they found they were defeated even before congress had met! The meeting would merely state this fact openly. And from that moment the danger of intervention became immensely greater. It was from this situation that the impetus for calling the Warsaw meeting arose. At Cierna, too, Brezhnev's prime demand was—postpone congress and make personnel changes. Not many people realized all

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this and those who pointed to the growing threat of intervention were few; our warnings were made light of and even dismissed as alarmist. Most public men held that 'they' wouldn't dare in view of public opinion abroad, the opposition of many communist parties and so on. The prospect was seen more as a theoretical than a real danger.

Dubcek has stated more than once that he knew nothing about the preparations for intervention. It would be more accurate to say that he knew, but regarded the moves as a bluff, an element in psychological pressure. What he did expect was first an attack from within, possibly to be followed by some form of foreign action. Following the return from Cierna and Bratislava, the Presidium disintegrated, with Kolder, Svestka, Indra and Bilak taking no more part in congress preparations —obviously in order to have an alibi, so that, should things change, they could not be accused of participation. They went off ostentatiously for a holiday at Orlik, where they were to be seen every day with their associates, not behaving like holidaymakers but like politicians on the eve of a big campaign. Dubcek heard all about this from members of his secretariat who were also holidaying at Orlik and could observe what was going on in the opposition camp. And therefore a state of alert was ordered from early morning on 20 August, the day when the coup was to be triggered off by a report tabled for the Party Presidium meeting; the Prague City Committee of the Party was ready to call a big gathering in the Old Town Square as soon as a signal came from Dubcek; the mass media, security and army units were also alerted. And Dubcek was right in assuming that the bid would be made at the Presidium meeting, but in the event there was a delay of a few hours. The reason may have been that news of Dubcek's resolve to call a public meeting, and the other measures, had come to the ears of the conspirators, who were scared to death of a confrontation with the public. (Possibly there is some truth in the now almost legendary tale that there was a muddle over the deadline—the Russians went by Moscow time, while their Czechoslovak partners followed Central European time.)

The Prague City Committee had already suggested, at the time of the Warsaw meeting, that the congress date should be put forward, but Dubcek was anxious not to provoke the Russians. Now the crisis was on he gave the go-ahead, but it was too late to prevent the occupation of the country, though congress could save the lives of the post-January leaders. Probably the last opportunity for a bid to ward off intervention was at the July Central Committee meeting which, just as it approved the Presidium reply to the Warsaw letter, would have agreed to convening congress. Firm action alone could help, a course like that taken by Ceausescu after 21 August 1968, when he mobilized public opinion and made it quite clear that in the event of attack Rumania would defend herself. And the Soviet leaders, anxious to avoid an open clash, drew back. In the case of Czechoslovakia, however, they were confident they would not meet armed resistance; if their troops went in, they would

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earn, at most, moral damnation, and Brezhnev and company were not afraid of that. They had seen various reassuring signs: Prchlik, who was for taking the Rumanian line, had been hurriedly sacrificed [in July 1968—translator's note]; in a personal talk with Brezhnev, Dubcek had complied with the demand to remove Kriegel, Cisar and Pelikan from their posts, he had entrusted Salgovic with state security, although there was no prospect of his loyalty in a crisis, and he had also agreed to Brezhnev's demand that congress be postponed, although he was at a loss to know how, in the given domestic situation, to achieve this. Moreover, the Soviets could be almost certain that President Svoboda would not, as Commander-in-Chief, give the order for combat readiness, and still less call for resistance. And so it was a safe bet.

A price was also paid for Dubcek's often unfortunate choice of people. He selected on the basis of personal acquaintance, as he had been accustomed to do in Bratislava, and not with a view to finding the right men for the job. As President, Smrkovsky would have been more suitable than Svoboda, yet Dubcek backed Svoboda, as Brezhnev wished, and not Smrkovsky who had wide public support. Fortunately, on the other hand, he rejected the young people's call for Cisar. Of course, one cannot assume that the outcome would have been as successful as with Rumania, but at least there would have been the feeling that everything possible had been done to avert intervention. As it is, although the question whether a more resolute course might have won through will remain open, the accusation that it was not taken can always be levelled.

Acceptance of the Moscow Agreement came at the close of the talks at which half the Presidium membership had arrived in unprecedented manner as prisoners forcibly abducted from their country. First they had been flown to the Warsaw Pact headquarters at Legnice (Dubcek in the same plane as Cernik and Simon, kept apart like prisoners), and then to Mukachevo in the Transcarpathian Ukraine; Dubcek and Simon were transferred to a hunting-lodge in the Polonina range in the Transcarpathian Ukraine, the others to various places on the Galician side of the same range. Shawcross explains their willingness to sign the document by what they had been through and also by the fact that they were unaware of what was happening in Czechoslovakia. That is only partly true. On Friday 24 August they got *Pravda*, from which they learnt that no new government had been installed; when ultimately they reached Moscow, where they were housed in official *dachas* or in the Kremlin, they had radio sets and could talk to Svoboda and his delegation, and they received full, very objective reports from the Czechoslovak Embassy which was operating a monitoring service. Moreover, on the Saturday Zdenek Mlynar, then a Central Committee secretary, flew in from Prague with detailed reports, including the results of the Party Congress at Vysocany, and also the Czech newspapers. One cannot, therefore, accept the author's statement that 'they certainly did not know the full extent of the Soviet political débâcle in

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Prague' (p. 184). Even Brezhnev, in his own way, admitted it by turning his prisoners into partners at the talks and by bombarding them with questions, such as: '*Kto eto takoy Shilgan?*' ('Who is this Silhan?' —(the man acting as Dubcek's deputy in Prague)). It was more a matter of having to decide whether any other course than the compromise laid before them was now possible. With the exception of Kriegel, they decided there was not. And they signed.

There remains only the question whether by this act they had set their feet on the slippery slope that culminated in the sacking of Dubcek in April 1969. Smrkovsky was right when he compared the leadership to an arch in which the shifting of one brick causes the entire structure to collapse. Dubcek was the only other member of the 'foursome' who realized this from the start. Svoboda was already going his own way during the Moscow talks—and so was Husak; perhaps it will soon be possible to assemble the evidence to refute the legend that Svoboda caused to be spread abroad about himself after the return to Prague. Cernik, who behaved courageously during the fateful night, the arrest, and the Moscow talks, soon set out to seek salvation on his own. And once the foursome had started to break up, their fall commenced, accelerated by the entry of new figures into the game (Husak and Strougal). Husak's disloyalty was already evident at the talks on 3 October.

One may ask, of course, whether Dubcek did all in his power to prevent the defeat not only of himself but of the course he represented. He agreed, for instance, to Smrkovsky's demotion in the hope of halting his own downfall; that was the action of a desperate man surrounded by sharks who fails to see that he cannot sate them by throwing his fellow travellers into the sea, or even by cutting off pieces of his own flesh—inevitably, he discovered that this merely whetted the creatures' appetites. At the time of the pro-Smrkovsky campaign, and of the Palach protest, there was still a chance of avoiding defeat (note the trade union congress), but Dubcek failed to appreciate this; on the contrary, he shunned mass actions, broke off relations with most of his former advisers, and thereby paved the way to his own ruin. The hockey affair accelerated matters. In April Grechko openly threatened to reoccupy Prague, Brno and Bratislava, by which time Husak and Svoboda were quite undisguisedly attacking Dubcek. Svoboda told him in a personal talk that if he refused to resign the army and security would proceed against him. Many of Dubcek's supporters, on the other hand, sought him out in those days urging him not to give in without a fight. And up to Monday 14 April he was inclined to this view. Then, on the Tuesday, he learnt about the Slovak Party Presidium decision to demand his resignation and about the accompanying campaign throughout Slovakia labelling him as an aider and abettor of the 'Right'—at this he was very upset and resolved to resign. He was bitterly hurt that no one in the Slovak leadership had stood up for him.

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By Wednesday 16 April Dubcek's fate was sealed; his one wish was to prevent Husak being elected as First Secretary. Svoboda and others were strongly opposed to his proposal of Cernik for the post. Whereupon Dubcek had his disagreement with Husak's nomination recorded in the minutes and then, as a disciplined Presidium member, he acquiesced in Husak's name being put to the Central Committee as the *nomination of the Presidium as a body*. (Shawcross simplifies the issue by failing to make this distinction. Even among the progressives in the Central Committee, Dubcek's nominee would not have won a majority.)

Dubcek explained later to friends why he had decided to resign without a struggle. He compared his situation with that facing President Benes in September 1938 when there was the choice of engaging in a hopeless battle or of resigning in the hope that the future would offer better opportunities. Like Benes, Dubcek opted for resignation because he saw no realistic chance of winning. He is convinced that time will prove him right, as, he believes, it has done in the case of Benes. To the objection that the decision lay with the Central Committee where, had he headed the fight, it might have been possible to win at least a narrow majority, he points out that Prague Castle was surrounded by security forces, the assembly rooms were hermetically sealed from the start of the Central Committee proceedings to the finish, telephone links with the outer world were cut, and no one was allowed to leave the Spanish Hall of the Castle until Husak had been elected. Had there been opposition under his leadership, Dubcek believes that he and his associates would have been whisked away regardless of the outcome of the voting and the occasion would have turned into an open *putsch*. Countering the view that then, at least, Husak's accession would have lacked the semblance of legality, Dubcek maintains it would have meant delivering valuable cadres into the hands of the adversary. And so the matter remains open, as does the evaluation of Benes' course in 1938.

In describing Husak's personality and the relationship between him and Dubcek, Shawcross has evidently been strongly influenced by his Slovak sources (and it is quite useful for the Western reader, who is more familiar with Czech views, to be able to compare the latter with the Slovak in Shawcross's interpretation). But the account also accepts the illusions about Husak so typical of the Slovak public's uncritical attitude towards him before and during 1968—he is presented as an out-and-out anti-Stalinist pursuing a policy independent of Moscow, a man regarded as the most experienced politician and the most consistent progressive, unequalled in Slovakia and still more in the Czech regions. To read this account is, as the Czech journalist Peroutka once wrote of Benes, to walk through a graveyard of illusions.

It is not correct to suggest that Dubcek was especially concerned to have Husak fully rehabilitated in 1963. To the Commission which considered the matter (known as the Barnabite Commission) he delegated

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Salgovic, Pecho, Bilak and Cvik who, aided by the Commission Chairman Koucky, did all they could to persuade the members not to press for full rehabilitation and especially not to demand Husak's return to political life. Husak heard about this from Pavlenda, Graca and other Commission members, and consequently he already, in 1963, had a grudge against Dubcek. There was also the jealousy of an older, more experienced man towards a nobody who had outstripped him.

In January 1968 Husak overcame his aversion enough to write a personal letter of congratulation to Dubcek, offering his services. But the letter remained unanswered and Dubcek remarked in his intimate circle that Husak should not be allowed back into politics. At this point Husak joined forces with the Prague progressives and, mainly with Smrkovsky's help, appeared on the platform at the March public meeting in the Congress Hall and elsewhere. His return to the political scene was undoubtedly made against Dubcek's will, and this rankled. He did his best to unseat Bilak, whom Dubcek had put at the head of the Slovak Communist Party with the express purpose of keeping Husak out. Over the ensuing months, with sterling help from the Czech progressives who saw him as a long-established opponent of Novotny and were therefore more on his side than on Bilak's, Husak succeeded in preparing the ground for the demotion of the Slovak Secretary at the coming Slovak Party Congress; just before the invasion he had managed to get Dubcek's agreement. And Bilak, who at the time of the Warsaw meeting had still been organizing support for Dubcek in the Slovak Central Committee with a view to bringing the Novotnyites in the Czechoslovak Central Committee to heel, went over completely to the ranks of Dubcek's opponents as soon as he learnt that the latter—following a discussion with Pavlenda, Zrak and Koscelansky, to which Husak was invited—had promised to support Husak's candidature for the post of Slovak First Secretary. Thus, by delaying agreement with Husak, Dubcek had alienated him, and now he had alienated Bilak as well without winning Husak's loyalty for having done so.

Dubcek explained his aversion for Husak by saying that he knew better than the people who were calling for a come-back the defects in Husak's character, and subsequent events have, in a sense, proved what was probably a psychological intuition to have been correct. But politically the matter was more complicated. Husak was the accepted leader of the anti-Novotny opposition in Slovakia, and only by uniting the Czech and Slovak opposition was it possible to make the post-January policy country-wide. Anxious to avoid a break with their Slovak opposite numbers, the Czech progressives had to urge Dubcek to change his attitude to Husak as the representative of a trend making itself felt at the time through the weekly *Kulturny zivot*; moreover, they had reason to feel uneasy about Dubcek's protégés, Bilak, Salgovic and Pecho. What made the situation so complicated was that the pro-Dubcek camp in Slovakia represented a threat to the post-January

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policy, while the Slovak advocates of that policy were opponents of Dubcek's personal allies there.

Dubcek is a pragmatist in politics (Shawcross exaggerates when he describes him as a first-class student; he did not get a 'red' diploma of excellence, but the blue one given for average results). He was no great student of political literature; he came to Lenin in Moscow, he first discovered Italian political thinking during 1968 and subsequently, and lacked acquaintance with post-Leninist Marxist writings, not to mention other political or sociological works. Having parted from the Bilak group, he had no substantial body of supporters in political posts; on the contrary, the Slovak progressives accused their Czech friends of overestimating Dubcek and underestimating Husak who, they maintained, was a man of European stature while Dubcek was merely provincial.

In this situation the Czech progressives had to try and reach agreement with Husak if they were not to lose their Slovak allies. They were not unaware of his political weaknesses, including an inclination towards old-time communism and a remarkable 'flexibility' of views (in November 1964 he wrote an article for *Kulturny zivot* in which he welcomed Brezhnev's succession to Khrushchev's job—the only Czechoslovak political writer to do so), nor of his passion for power at any price. But as long as the progressive trend in Slovakia failed to emancipate itself from Husak and its uncritical attitude to him, no Czech could do it for them. In the end Husak contributed to the emancipation himself by sacrificing his supporters one and all on the altar of reconciliation with Bilak and the Czech conservatives. By parting company from his admirers on his own initiative, he helped them to throw off his influence. And so in the course of 1970 views on Husak and his policies ceased to be an obstacle to alliance between Czech and Slovak progressives; and their common fate has united them in their attitude to Dubcek, both in esteeming his human qualities and in examining the weaknesses of the policies linked with his name.

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Letter to the Editor

18 August 1971

Sir,

I have been asked to provide a brief addendum to my note on rewriting *The Great Terror*, to indicate the pages in the Penguin edition containing fresh material, so that any reader who wants to may locate them without going through the whole book again.

Additions of substance are to be found on pp. 9–10 (preface); p. 46n. (further figures on child mortality in the 1933 famine); p. 73 (on Kirov's death); p. 81n. (on the Mikhoels murder); p. 113 (on Stalin's written instructions to Yezhov and Mekhlis); p. 154n. (on political dictation of court sentences); pp. 200–201 (Loebl's evidence on interrogation); p. 206n. (Czechoslovak proportion of usable public confessions); p. 254 (on Radek); p. 311 (on Yakir); p. 321 (more names in the July 1938 massacre); p. 354 (figures on Yezhov's execution lists for Stalin); p. 358 (fate of aircraft industry chiefs); p. 372 (on I. V. Kossior); pp. 435–436 (the purge in biology rewritten); p. 487 (labour camp ration scales, comparison with River Kwai); p. 586 (Comintern); p. 623 (Yezhov's execution); p. 632 (figures on Central Committee executions); pp. 691–692 (present status of Stalin and Raskolnikov); p. 694 (present role of purge veterans); p. 695 (Stalin today); pp. 700, 704–705, 712–713 (further figures and information on casualty totals); p. 735 (the Menshevik case).

Apart from this there are minor additions (such as the fate of individual members of purgees' families) on pp. 66, 154, 170, 172n., 276, 310, 341, 355n., 356, 434n., 441, 448, 449, 475n., 481, 577, 578, 607, 610, 628, 637, 651, 652, 716, 756. There are minor corrections on pp. 20, 104, 316, 361, 469, 618n., 629.

Robert Conquest

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